Doctoral (PhD) dissertation

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'Imagining' Minority Nations:

The Comparative Case of the Scottish and Catalan Nationalist Discourses

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1. Introduction

"Nationalism is as old as the hills" – argued Sangter (2019: 5) when introducing the role nationalism has played in European civilization. Forged under the pressures of history, communities with distinctive language, customs and culture emerged; the 'Old Continent' became a puzzle of nations connected by the shared geographical space. Nationalism is by far one of the most important concepts of European political history: nations were built on old customs, yet it was the Industrial Revolution, a Europe-based economic and social process which allowed the emergence of nations. Therefore, nations as we know them today, would be unimaginable without modern processes; the same way modernism would be entirely different without nationalism. This modernity and framework of European nations were the driving forces behind the linguistic and cultural diversity the continent enjoys today.

Yet nationalism, or to be more precise, some politicians building their policies on the supremacy of certain nations while twisting the concept of nationalism, overshadowed the modernizing force of nationalism. They divided the continent among the lines of nationality and drove their communities into pointless conflicts, leading to needless suffering, invented differences and wasted chapters in the book of European nationalism. However, nationalism never stopped being a force of modernization, development and revival, and today, Europe would be unimaginable without nations. When learning about nationalism, the focus tends to be on studying nations with established states; this is probably why researchers tend to focus more on the study of state as a concept with nation being the 'junior partner' in researches. However, as Smith (2010) noted, the duty of nationalism studies is to re-orientate the focus of social sciences to analyze the phenomenon of nationalism and start treating the state as 'junior partner'.

The prevenance of the force of nationalism is especially true in modern Europe where there are more than a dozen nations without their own states, forming essential parts of the continents future. Groups such as the Corsicans, Basques, the Welsh, Bretons, Scots, the Flemish, Frisians, Kashubians, Szeklers, Rusyns and Catalans undeniably played and continue to play an indispensable role in European culture, economy and politics, making the European continent a real family of nations – be that with or without own states. Some of these communities have successfully built their own autonomous frameworks within the larger constitutional orders of their respective 'home states'. The broad political, economic and cultural autonomy enjoyed by nations, such as the Basques, the Welsh or the Flemish is among the most advanced. Their level of autonomy in making local decisions that directly affect the local population is what many

other nations without states dream of achieving. Reaching this broad autonomy would have been impossible without regional political parties. The emergence of Flemish nationalism in Belgian regional politics, the success of Corsican nationalists in the Corsican Assembly Elections or the almost 40-years old regional dominance of the Basque Nationalist Party all support the argument that European politics has experienced a period of minority nationalist renaissance, thus giving relevance to researching nations without states.

However, there are two nations, namely Catalonia and Scotland, that have stood out in recent years for a number of reasons. First, these territories are autonomously functioning political arenas with their own parliament and government where nationalist parties have been in power for extended periods of time ever since the creation of the autonomous Catalonia in Spain and the devolved Scotland in the United Kingdom (UK). Second, these parties have not only governed these regions, but also used their position to secure more competences for their respective autonomous administrations, meaning that Catalans and Scots today enjoy far broader economic, political and cultural autonomy than when the process of devolving powers to regional levels started in Spain and the UK. Third, Scottish and Catalan nationalist parties also pushed for independence, arguing that it is in the interest of their nations to have a choice over secession and build an independent state. And last, the divergent responses of the British and Spanish States, as well as the contrasting public receptions within each territory, offer a rich field for exploring how national self-conception evolved over time.

For the first eight years in the history of the re-opened Scottish Parliament, Scottish nationalists represented the minority. However, in 2007, the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP) rose to power and an SNP-led Scottish Government was formed for the first time. Since 2011, the party has been the most voted Scottish-based party in each Scottish Parliament, British General and European Parliament (EP) Election. Being a secessionist party, their most important pledge was to hold an independence referendum, which they successful negotiated with the UK Government after winning the 2011 Scottish Elections. The referendum took place in 2014, but a small majority of Scots declined the party's vision for an independent Scotland. Despite this failure, the SNP remained the most successful political organization of the county and the most voted up until the 2021 Scottish Parliament Election.

In Catalonia, *Convergència i Unió* (Convergence and Union or CiU) was the most voted party from the creation of the autonomous Catalonia in 1979 until 2012. The Catalonia-based party successfully won Catalan, Spanish General and EP Elections in Catalonia, running on a ticket

to expand the level of autonomy enjoyed by Catalans, whilst staying part of the Spanish constitutional system. The pro-independence turn in Catalan politics in 2012 led to a cooperation between two of the largest Catalan parties, and the *Junts pel Sí* (Together for yes) coalition was formed in 2015 which integrated the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Republican Left of Catalonia or ERC) and certain factions of CiU, eventually resulting in the split of the Convergence Party. For the 2017 elections, former members of CiU formed the Junts per Catalunya (*Together for Catalonia* or Junts) alliance, which in 2020 became an official party. Despite the change in party structure, CiU/Junts and ERC have been in power in Catalonia since 2012, held multiple unofficial public consultations on independence and an unconstitutional independence referendum in 2017. Despite the unsuccessful referendum, ERC and Junts continued to be the most voted parties of Catalonia.

But what were the underlying reasons for their electoral successes and how could they remain the most voted parties in their respective political arenas during such a long, consecutive time period? By systematically analyzing and comparing the ways the Scottish and the Catalan parties framed their 'nations' and evaluating how their nationalist discourses evolved over time, it is possible to understand how nationalism acts as force of mass mobilization. This comparative assessment of the case of Catalonia and Scotland is far from being a new approach: as we will see in the upcoming chapters, authors who have carried out research in the field of comparative nationalism referend to these two regions as some kind of benchmark due to the similarities in their development as nationalisms without states. However, the emphasis was on analyzing these two nationalisms among the dichotomies provided by nationalism studies. However, less emphasis was placed on highlighting underlying differences between the two cases and exploring the role the parties' nationalist discourse plays in their electoral success. The approach of this thesis is especially unique as it aims to assess the case of Scotland and Catalonia from an ethno-symbolist perspective.

Moreover, the benchmark effect of the comparative case of Catalonia and Scotland is further enforced by usual cross-references between Scottish and Catalan politics. It is certainly not unusual to see Catalan flags in Scottish pro-independence rallies and vice versa. Or seeing Catalan politicians talk about Catalan independence and referencing the case of Scotland as an example for a democratic and constitutional path to independence in the 21st century. However, the fact that the new building of the Scottish Parliament, which opened its doors in 2004, was designed by a Catalan architect, Enric Miralles, also signals that Catalonia and Scotland, despite

the geographical distance, share some kind of bond and mutual respect that only nations without states can comprehend.

This thesis, therefore, building on existing research, while channeling in new findings, aims to offer a new perspective on comparative Catalan-Scottish studies and poses the following research questions:

Q1: What words were used recurringly by Catalan and Scottish nationalist parties during campaigns when directly referencing their 'nations'?

Q2: How are shared national attributes, relations with the home state and international affairs presented in the Catalan and Scottish nationalist discourse and how did these evolve since the secessionist turn?

Q3: Why were Scottish and Catalan nationalist discourses successful in mobilizing the electorate and maintaining their position as the most-voted parties despite the unsuccessful referendums?

To direct the focus of the thesis, the following hypotheses were formulated:

H1: The Scottish and Catalan nationalist parties used similar recurring topics and conceptual metaphors to build their political discourses, but due to different social and historical contexts, different sets of recurring words were used. It is hypothesized that main themes in campaigns were constant over time with little to no change in relative frequency (i.e. relevance) and topics were aided with the use of conceptual metaphors.

H2: The Scottish and Catalan nationalist parties both conceptualized their communities as a diverse, inclusive, wealthy, independent, European and internationally active nations, with their *ethnie* being reframed to fit this vision. However, Catalans and Scots reached the same conclusion through different means, differing in their approach to national attributes, the home state and international affairs.

H3: The Scottish and Catalan nationalist discourses were successful in mobilizing the electorate and thus maintaining their position as the most-voted parties because their nationalist discourse, both before and after the referendums, had a high resonance with the general public's vision of their own community.

2. Methodology and Structure

Discourse Analysis is a multidisciplinary way of studying language as a form of social practice, particularly focusing on the ways discourse contributes to the production and reproduction of power dynamics in society. Given this multidisciplinary nature, various methodological frameworks have been developed within the field, but particularly Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional model stands out as one of the most influential (Fairclough, 1993). As highlighted by Wodak and Meyer (2016) and Van Dijk (2009), Fairclough's model became one of the core approaches within discourse analysis for systematically integrating language within broader socio-political contexts. This framework ensured that a balance was created between linguistic analysis focusing on texts, discourse practice dealing with the ways texts are interpreted and social analysis assessing the broader context of discourses.

This balance helps to connect the dots by focusing on the complex relationship between discourse and politics. The three-dimensional framework allows researchers to move beyond surface-level textual analysis and delve into how discourse is both shaped by social structures and how social structures shape discourses. As Wodak and Meyer (2016: 23) observed, Fairclough's approach is particularly suitable for studies seeking to link micro-level linguistic features with macro-level social phenomena. This is one of the key reasons why this methodological approach was selected as this thesis aims to thoroughly analyze texts in a given context (Scotland and Catalonia) to answer questions about the relationship between nationalist discourse and political success.

The cornerstone of the first, text-based dimension is the assessment of linguistic features of selected corpora such as vocabulary, grammar, syntax, cohesion and text structure (Fairclough, 1993: 75). At this level, the assessment often employs systemic frequency analysis, functional linguistics, transitivity analysis, modality, nominalization, and the analysis of thematic structures (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014: 83; Fairclough, 2003: 19-23). Given the aims of the present research, the vocabulary and thematic structures of selected texts were analyzed using software-facilitated frequency analysis (AntConc software). This ensures that the lexical patterns, semantic fields, and repetitive rhetorical strategies that might otherwise remain implicit in qualitative readings can be identified (Baker, 2006: 47; Stubbs, 1996: 82). By quantifying word occurrences, it is possible to see how repetition works as a rhetorical tool, mapping out discursive salience of specific themes. However, 'counts are not interpretations', meaning that this quantitative level might not be enough to shed light onto underlying meaning

of words, nonetheless it makes the qualitative levels of the analysis more accountable through triangulation of evidence (Stubbs, 1997: 110; Baker et al., 2008: 278).

Moreover, the three-dimensional model is also ideal for the comparative case study within the field of political discourse because it provides a flexible and adaptable framework for studies of multidisciplinary nature (Baker et al., 2008: 281). In other words, it allows the combination of different methods which for any research carried out in nationalism studies is of key importance. Furthermore, the model also supports longitudinal studies, making it ideal for examining changes in discourse over time, such as in election manifestos, political speeches, policy documents, institutional communication and media narratives (Wodak, 2011: 38). A key example for this was Fairclough's (2000: 121-145) own assessment of New Labour in the UK, demonstrating how political and discursive strategies and ideological frameworks can be studied through shifts in vocabulary and tone.

For the text analysis, to have a grounded and comparable set of data for the two cases, the timeline for the analysis was set from the pro-independence parties rising to power (2007 in Scotland and 2012 in Catalonia) until the most recent autonomous elections that took place in the same year in Scotland and in Catalonia (2021). To make sure the evolvement of the nationalist discourses can be compared, the analysis is divided into two periods: years before and after the respective independence referendums that undoubtedly were one of the most important events in the last decade. Therefore, in Scotland, the first period is between the 2007 Scottish Parliament Elections and the 2014 referendum and the second is following the consultation until the 2021 Scottish Parliament Elections. Whereas in Catalonia, these are from the 2012 Catalan Parliament Elections and until the 2017 referendum and the second covers the years following the referendum until the 2021 Autonomous Elections.

The selection of relative texts for the assessment of political discourse was particularly difficult since the dynamics of Catalan and Scottish politics, public administration and media were entirely different. Official speeches were selectively available on the Catalan Administration's webpage, whereas in Scotland, everything was uploaded since the first members of the Scottish Parliament were elected. The same was true for speeches delivered by leading politicians in Parliament: availability was more restricted in Catalonia making a balanced comparison difficult. The possibility of using interviews and news articles published in newspapers was assessed, but unfortunately, more and more newspapers started charging for their platforms and some introduced especially high fees for using their archives. This policy certainly does not

support the work of researchers, and given that at least a dozen subscriptions would have been necessary in Catalonia and Scotland, newspapers were out of the question. Furthermore, the option of assessing online communication platforms (such as Facebook and Twitter) was also considered; however, in Catalonia, the changes of the party structure meant that CiU's platforms were deleted; it was not possible to review the communication of the largest Catalan party between 2012 and 2015.

However, luckily, the Manifesto Project (2025) developed a platform for researchers to help assess discursively the political manifestos of organizations to study parties' policy preferences. The database provides content-analytical data, coding the content of each political manifesto sentence by sentence to make comparative content analysis of parties' manifestos possible. However, in the case of Scotland and Catalonia, some manifestos were missing at the time of data gathering: manifestos very only available until 2019. However, given that the Manifesto Project (2025) represents an established system within comparative political science, with numerous researches using political manifestos for content analysis (such as Budge and Klingemann 2001; Klingemann et. al, 2006; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012), the methodology was adopted. Political manifestos published by the most-voted government parties in Scotland and Catalonia were selected.

In order to make sure the two cases can be compared scientifically, manifestos were selected in the same way. On the fixed timelines, the respective independence referendums served as middle points. Manifestos prepared for regional (i.e. Scottish Parliament and Catalan Parliament) elections, manifestos prepared for General Elections (UK and Spain) and manifestos prepared for European Parliamentary Elections were gathered. In the case when General Elections were held consecutively (such as in Spain in 2015 and 2016 or in the UK in 2015 and 2017) those were selected that were closer in time to the referendums. The primary source selection was thus balanced. However, in the case of Catalonia, the manifestos of both CiU/Junts and ERC had to be channeled in as they both represented the key government parties of the region and were consecutively the most voted forces at regional, state-wide and EU levels. The following table shows the selected manifestos.

Table 1: Selected Electoral Manifestos for the comparative case of Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
SNP: Scottish Parliament 2007	SNP: UK General 2015	CiU & ERC: Catalan Parliament 2012	Junts & ERC: Catalan Parliament 2017
SNP: UK General 2010	SNP: Scottish Parliament 2016	ERC: EU 2014	Junts & ERC: General 2019
SNP: Scottish Parliament 2011	SNP: EU 2019	Junts pel Sí: Catalan Parliament 2015	Junts & ERC: EU Parliament 2019
SNP: EU 2014	SNP: Scottish Parliament 2021	CDC & ERC: General 2016	Junts & ERC: Catalan Parliament 2021

This means that in total four different corpora were created: Scotland A (before referendum); Scotland B (after referendum); Catalonia A (before referendum); Catalonia B (after referendum). These were then loaded into AntConc, and a word list was generated for each. This allowed the enlisting of the most frequently used words that directly referred to the Scottish and Catalan 'nations'. This was important because the central aim was to understand how the nations are conceptualized and assess how the word use changed over the years. After this, for the four corpora, every sentence was selected where at least one of the keywords appeared, while the rest of the sentences were removed to only have direct references. Thus, the final four corpora, which will serve as a basis, was created, allowing the analysis of the most frequently appearing words in their context. These words (after removing stop words) were then coded into different categories according to their content, analyzing vocabulary and the use of conceptual metaphors.

Fairclough's second dimension, discourse practice focuses on the processes of text production, distribution and consumption. The emphasis here is on interpretation; rather than viewing interpretation as a mechanical decoding of meaning, Fairclough (1993: 78-85) conceptualized it as a socially conditioned process in which readers draw upon various cognitive, ideological, and discursive resources to make sense of texts. In this dimension, texts are assessed especially from the perspective of intertextuality (the embedding of other texts) and interdiscursivity (the mixing of discourses) (Fairclough, 1993: 84; Lemke, 1995: 48). Intertextuality involves the process of selective appropriation; certain ideas are amplified, while others are excluded (Bakhtin, 1981: 294; Kristeva, 1980: 66). In political discourse, this often entails the strategic

inclusion of certain ideological positions related to various fields such as economics and social policy, while silencing counter-perspectives (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 113-118). This is, as we will see in Chapter 4, is what framing theory calls the strategic neglecting of certain aspects of reality.

Interdiscursivity, on the other hand, focuses on the process of meaning production, allowing political texts to draw on socially placed discourses while also innovating or reconfiguring them in new ways (Fairclough, 2003: 34-35). In other words, underlying ideological positions and frames (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 4) can be assessed if the connections between already existing discourses are analyzed. For this research, quantitative content analysis was used to aid this section of the thesis and provide an in-depth assessment of the way key themes (highlighted in the first dimension) can be interpreted.

Lastly, the social practice or third dimension concentrates on channeling in the broader social contexts of the data found in the first dimension and interpreted in the second. The assessment focuses on how the discourse shapes reality by placing it in the socio-political context in which it exists (Fairclough, 1993: 87; Fairclough, 2003: 29; Jessop, 2004: 173). This argument is built on the assumption that discourse is not only semiotic in its nature, but also constitutive of social life; it is a mode of action as well as a mode of representation (Fairclough, 2003: 25-27; Fairclough, 2010: 236). In other words, the meaning of texts is understood fully if the social effects of these corpora are also taken into account. This is possibly the most important step in the methodology, helping to answer the question why Scottish and Catalan nationalist discourses were successful in mobilizing the electorate and maintain power.

The structure of this thesis, therefore, is built on the three-dimensional model. Chapter 3 introduces the field of nationalism studies in detail, providing a literature review of the works of authors who established, developed and cherished this field. This will be followed by the in-depth introduction of discourse theories in Chapter 4, especially focusing on the role of political discourse and the process of political framing. Chapter 5 offers a historical and political outlook of the case of Catalonia and Scotland to help contextualize the comparative nature of this work, while providing historic perspective and scholarly literature on the two nations with states (also called minority nations). Chapter 6 deals with the core text analysis of the selected and coded corpora, highlighting recurring topics and conceptual metaphors used to build nationalist political discourses. Chapter 7 focuses on the interpretation of the corpora aided by qualitative content analysis in order to conceptualize and compare the ways the two political actors framed

their community. Chapter 8 deals with the social dimension of the research by analyzing the social, political and economic contexts in which these discourses existed and evolved over time. The aim in this chapter was to try and understand underlying reasons, grounded in discourse theory, for the consecutive electoral successes and broad public support during the observed period.

The main limitation of the research is the limited scope of genres: due to limited access to reliable and comparable sources of data, this thesis only focuses on electoral manifestos, and therefore, on electoral campaigns. In order to narrow down the scope, only direct references to the Scottish and Catalan nations were analyzed in depth, indirect references (such as the use of '*we/nosaltres*') were not taken into account at this occasion. Moreover, in the case of Catalonia, one manifesto was missing as CiU ran on a common platform with other minority parties (such as the Basque Nationalist Party) during the 2014 European Elections and therefore did not have a separate manifesto. Furthermore, given that the emphasis was on finding the politically charged words that served as main building blocks of the conceptualization of the Catalan and Scottish nations, words with neutral ideological positions (such as *structure/estructura* or *reality/realitat*) were not coded into larger categories. Future research will likely be able to bridge these challenges and hopefully aid the methodology used in this paper to develop it further.

3. Researching Nationalism in the Modern World

The study of the origin of nations and the phenomenon of nationalism (often referred to as 'nationalism studies') is a very well-researched field, with a wide range of theories seeking to explain how nations are formed, maintained and developed. What is common in all approaches is their interdisciplinary approach which makes nationalism theories an ideal theoretical framework for studies conducted in a wide range of research areas, including that of political discourse analysis. The fact that the scholarly literature which explains, assesses and categorizes the different approaches is at least as interdisciplinary and diverse as nationalism studies itself says a lot about this academic field (Özkirimli, 2005, 2010; Koller, 2006; Kántor, 2004; Egedy, 2007).

This chapter has two principal aims. On the one hand, it provides a detailed assessment of the work of nationalism scholars, highlighting theoretical frameworks, key concepts and different approaches in the field. Certainly, to have a good framework of analysis for any modern-day nationalist movement, it is essential to grasp the knowledge that these theories accumulated. The first part of the chapter follows the theoretical categorization of Özkirimli (2010), which is arguably the most cited in the contemporary literature. Broadly speaking, we can differentiate between primordialist, modernist, ethnosymbolist and, what Özkirimli (2010) called, "new approaches" which emerged from the 1990s. And on the other hand, the chapter also demonstrates that the study of nations and nationalism is still relevant in the 21st century despite numerous studies and theorists signalling the end of nationalism as a result of globalization.

3.1. Nation and Nationalism: Concept and Origin

3.1.1. Primordialism

Primordialism is one of main approaches within nationalism studies, yet it is also one of the most controversial in contemporary nationalism literature. This approach, as pointed out by Smith (2010), Leoussi (2001) and Kendourie (1993), dates back to German Romanticism. Particularly to Herder's concept of *Volksgeist*[1], as primordialism maintains that nations are as old as humans themselves, and as such, nationalism can be considered as an inherent, natural part of human history (Özkirimli, 2010: 43; Smith, 2010: 55; Pongrácz, 2013: 111; Olay, 2016:

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[1] National spirit: Herder believed that each nation possesses a unique, organic and natural cultural spirit or character (*Volksgeist*) that is expressed through its language and traditions. Due to the emphasis on culture, Herder's approach is often referred in the literature as 'cultural nationalist' (Hayes, 1926; Schmidt, 1956; Nisbet, 1999; Spencer, 2008; Hárs, 2012).

34-35). Scholars who follow this school of nationalism studies argue that nationalism is not the product of recent historical developments such as the Industrial Revolution or the formation of the modern state; nationalism is deeply embedded in social bonds that transcend temporal changes and provide a primordial sense of belonging. Although the primordialist assumptions are built on the antiquity of nations, scholars offer different explanations for the same central argument. Van den Berghe (1979; 1981; 2005) Shils (1957), Geertz (1973) and Hastings (1997) can be considered as the 'founding fathers' of primordialism.

Pierre van den Berghe was the one who put forward the so-called sociobiological approach to social studies which he also used to assess the phenomenon of nationalism (Van den Berghe, 1978; 2001a). Van den Berghe was a vocal critic of ideological bias that he encountered during his work and maintained that evolution and biological processes play a far larger role in social relations than what humans – and more concretely Van den Berghe's peers – accept (Van den Berghe, 1990). According to this approach, there is an objective, external basis to the existence of nations as they are defined by common descent and endogamy (Van den Berghe, 2001b: 274). As such, nations can be understood as a form of kinship and shared ancestry at large or, as defined by Van den Berghe, nations are "super-families of (distant) relatives bound together by vertical ties of descent and horizontal ties of marriage" (Van den Berghe, 2001b: 274).

This is where biological characteristics come into play as race and ethnicity define who does and who does not belong to a given group, allowing for the differentiation between in-groups and out-groups (between 'us' and 'them') and for the emergence of social conflicts. The important impact of primordialists is that they introduced and differentiated between race and ethnicity. Race is the inheritable physical phenotypes (such as skin, eye and hair colour) which may be the basis of group membership, while an ethnic group or *ethnie* is based on the validation and possession of shared cultural characteristics, such as language, religion, symbols, traditions and myths (Van den Berghe, 2001b: 273). The concept of nationalism is related to *ethnies*; when the sense of belonging to an *ethnie* is transformed into political demands for independence, nationalism is born. Therefore, according to the sociobiological approach, a nationalism is the result of an in-group or super-family becoming politically conscious (Van den Berghe, 2001b: 273).

Undoubtedly, the sociobiological approach places emphasis on race and ethnic ties, but its main weakness is that it overlooks other factors in society that play essential role in the process of

nationalism. Other primordialist scholars, such as Shils (1957), Grosby (2001, 2003) and Geertz (1973) developed a different approach to nationalism which still maintains that common descent, language and blood define nations. However, instead of arguing that these primordial attachments are given, the culturalist approach claims that these attachments are only *understood* to be natural and *considered* as given by the people. It is people and the sense of belonging that creates nations; in this sense, it is the way people perceive these ties that define the concept of nations. Shils (1957) called this process the "attribution of significance". Therefore, cultural primordialists put more emphasis on culture as a system rather than on defining physical characteristics. Culture, according to Geertz (1973: 89), is a system of symbols (i.e. inherited conceptions that form our "intellectual stock") which people inherit through communication and pass it on to the next generation. The shared system allows for the inheritance of primordial sentiments. This approach already highlighted that the nation is based on a shared system of conceptions; it is not enough to pass on ethnic ties, one must also be aware of this process and verbalize the attachments.

Finally, there are scholars (particularly, Hastings, 1997; Gillingham, 1992; 1995 and Beaune, 1991) within the primordialist literature, often referred to as 'perennialists', who do not explicitly argue that nations are or considered as facts of nature (Lajtai, 2015: 133). Rather they view ~~it~~ them as "a constant and fundamental feature of human life throughout recorded history" (Özkirimli, 2010: 58). What this means is that they not approach the study of nationalism from an exclusively anthropological-sociological point of view but as historic constant. Ethnicity is defined as 'a group of people with a shared culture and spoken language', while a nation is a self-conscious community formed from one or more ethnic groups normally identified by their own language which possesses or claims political autonomy as community, together with the control of specific territory (Hastings, 1997: 2). Therefore, it is not enough to communicate attachments; these must be linked to sense of belonging to a group which wants to act jointly and autonomously (i.e. without interference from others) to control a territory.

The relevance of perennialism is that ~~is~~ it demonstrated that nationalism is a concept with two meanings: it is a political theory from the 19th century built on the assumption that all nations should have their own state (Hastings, 1997: 3). However, in practice, nationalism can be powerful only if the community believes that their own ethnic identity is important and should be protected (Hastings, 1997: 3). Therefore, with the more nuanced approach to the concept of nationalism (maintaining that nations are from an ethnic core, while also arguing that this community must acquire a sense of 'us' to formulate a political claim for own territory),

perennialists effectively argued that it essential to introduce political science to the study of nations and nationalism. This means that perennialism already touches upon the important connection between nation and state, yet this not as relevant as it is for modernist scholars (as discussed in Chapter 2.2.1).

Over the years, the primordialist approach to the study of nationalism was heavily criticized in contemporary literature. On the one hand, primordialist accounts of nationalism were criticized for their static approach to ethnicity and national identity which pass from one generation to another. Both Smith (1998; 2010) and Brass (1985; 1991) argue that ethnicity and therefore national identity are continuously redefined and therefore, not static. However, while Smith (1995: 33) argues that ethnic ties are subject to economic, social and political forces and therefore fluctuate over time, Brass (1991: 71) points to the role of politics in identity formation, claiming that elites manipulate ethnic ties to mobilize masses in their favour. Moreover, primordialism also failed to provide explanations for cases where people change their language or choose another religion, thus effectively cutting off ties with the attachments that had been considered as 'given' (Smith, 1998: 154).

And on the other hand, the ethnic element as a whole of the primordialist approach was attacked heavily. Brubaker (1996:15) was one of the most vocal scholars who argued that "no serious scholar today holds the view that nations or ethnic groups are primordial, unchanging entities". This is, of course, an overstatement from Brubaker as primordialist scholars continue to impact the scholarly debate about nations and nationalism (Grosby, 1994; 2001; 2005; Roswald, 2006; Murat, 2009). However, it does point to the relationship between primordialism and the dichotomy of civil and ethnic nationalism (also called Western versus Eastern European nationalism, French-type versus German-type nationalism or *Staatsnation* versus *Kulturnation*) (Renan, 1882; Fichte, 1922; 1955; Meinecke, 1908; Kohn, 1944; 1965; Schöpflin, 1998).

There is a vast literature explaining the evolution of this dichotomy, it is possibly one of the most researched areas of nationalism studies. Ethnic nationalism is primordial in the sense that it defines nation as a group of people sharing genealogical ancestry and a ~~shared~~ common language and connected culture and traditions, while civic nationalism is defined not by ancestry, but by citizenship and shared territory as the nation is a group of people that choose to be part of the national society[2] (Coakley, 2018: 255-257). Therefore, the civic nationalism

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[2] Renan defined the nation as a 'daily plebiscite' (Renan, 1882).

lacks any reference to primordial ties: while ethnic nationalism is closed and exclusive, civic nationalism is open and inclusive in character.

As we will see in Chapter 2.1.2, civic nationalism shares its origins with the modernist paradigm of nationalism as they both argue that nations are the result of socioeconomic and political processes of the 19th century and therefore, primordial attachments cannot be considered evidence of the existence of nations. However, it is important to underline that these two categories are important in the theoretical world, used as methods to analyze nations. In practice, nationalisms tend to share elements from both and in reality, boundaries between the two are often blurred. Therefore, agreeing with Tamir (2019), Kántor (2007), Shulman (2002), Bugge (2021) and Heiskanen (2023), this dichotomy leads to misleading conclusions as it oversimplifies the complex concept of nationalism and is not recommended to be used as sole analytical framework.

3.1.2. Modernism

As a reaction to primordialism that saw nationalism as natural and universal, a new theory emerged: modernism. After the Second World War, in the era of the 1960s decolonization and the emergence of structuralism, modernism challenged the primordialist status quo. As in the case of primordialism, different interpretations of the modernist approach emerged; however, they had a number of common aspects. Among these was the central idea that both nations and nationalism emerged in the last two centuries thanks to modern social and economic processes that took place in societies around the world. These included the Industrial Revolution, the new economic system brought about by capitalism, the secularization process that redefined the role and power of the Church and the emergence of modern bureaucratic state that centralized power. In essence, modernist scholars hold the view that without these changes, the birth of nations would have been impossible. As a result, we cannot talk about nations before the Industrial Revolution, given that the feudal system, the closed economic systems and the power of the Church made the emergence of nations impossible (Gellner, 2006; Smith, 2003b: 358; Gorski, 2006: 143).

3.1.2.1. *Nationalism as the Force of Cultural Transformation*

In the modernist literature, Gellner (1995; 1996a; 1996b; 2006) is widely considered as one of the most quoted authors of modernism who assessed the phenomenon of nationalism through

the historic development of humanity, aiming to highlight the social and economic context in which nationalism emerged. The starting point of the analysis is the assumption that nationalism and nations are not natural, permanent features of the humanity, but instead, came into being with the transition from the so-called 'agrarian' to the 'industrial' society (Gellner, 2006: 23). Prior to the era of industrialization, the agrarian society did not allow for nationalism to strive, polity and culture were not congruent. The polity was divided into small principalities, city states lacked any central authority and culture was controlled and dominated by religious groups, castes and dynasties, meaning that the majority of the population, i.e. peasants were left out of both political and cultural network (Gellner, 2006: 23).

However, the societal relations changed with the Industrial Revolution and the closed structure of the society opened up. People once 'frozen' into old structures now had to migrate and move between different roles, requiring them to adjust to the demands and learn new skills. As such, education, once being privilege of the elite, was now accessible through a standardized language and education system. These economic and social changes had to be administered in a new way: after all, standardization was only possible through a central authority capable of enforcing common standards. This is how centralized bureaucracy was formed, creating the necessary conditions for the emergence of nationalism. In a way, as argued by Dale (2017: 33-38), Gellner viewed nationalism as the result of a new relationship between political, economic conditions and human culture; the transition from the agrarian to an industrial society allowed for the creation of cultural sameness or homogeneity.

This cultural homogeneity was the basis of legitimizing political power: nationalism was defined by Gellner (2006: 54) a "political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent". In order to make the political and national unit congruent, nationalist movements made use of the pre-existing cultural forms to transform entire societies. This process involved the selection and reinvention of existing cultural forms (customs, language and symbols) into a new high culture that can be easily imposed upon an entire population. In other words, a national culture was invented where it was previously non-existent, and then imposed by elites to create cultural sameness, the basis of the new elite's political legitimacy. This process was possible thanks to the new centralized bureaucratic state; this means that Geller treats nationalism ('national unit') as a by-product of the emergence of the modern state ('political unit'). Due to the role Gellner attributed to culture, his approach is

often coined as cultural modernism in the nationalism literature (Özkirimli, 2010; Koller, 2006; Pongrácz, 2018; Rojas, 2004).

Similarly to Gellner, Anderson (2003; 2006) also focused on the role of culture and the construction of cultural homogeneity in the development of nationalism. Anderson also maintained that the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution made the emergence of nations possible, but he claimed that in this process, 'imagination' played an essential part. He argued that Gellner went too far when he claimed that nations are invented, because invention is understood as fabrication, giving a negative connotation to nations and nationalism. By approaching nationalism as a process of imagination, a more nuanced interpretation was developed by Anderson that treated nations as a mental framework developed through communication. He defined the nation as an "imagined political community which is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 2006: 6).

It is 'imagined' because the members of the nation will never know most of their fellow members; in all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact, the nation is created in the members' minds and imagined as a deep, horizontal comradeship (Anderson, 2006: 7-10). In other words, although people do not necessarily know each other personally, they have a shared, socially constructed understanding that they belong to the same community. The reason the national community is always imagined as 'limited' is because even the largest one has boundaries; borders beyond which other nations are formed (Anderson, 2006: 7-10). It can be deduced from this argument that nations are always aware of the fact that other nations exist. And, lastly, the nation is 'imagined' as sovereign because nationalism emerged when the legitimacy of hierarchical dynastic realm was challenged by the forces of Enlightenment and Revolutions across Europe; the goal of reaching national freedom and independence was born and was embodied by the idea of the concept of state sovereignty (Anderson, 2006: 10).

This concept was different to the former conception of sovereignty defined as the "automatic legitimacy of sacral monarchy" where the legitimacy to control power derived from divinity and people ruled were subjects (Anderson, 2006: 21). The modern state sovereignty sourced its legitimacy from the population and the people were citizens and not subjects. Therefore, state sovereignty is a fully, flatly and evenly operative use of legitimate power over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory (Anderson, 2006: 21). This 'fully, flatly and evenly operative of power' was possible through the new bureaucratic state that centralized

management of social relations. The state, therefore, was the goal of nationalism, not simply an agency.

3.1.2.2.   *Nationalism as the Force of Economic and Political Transformation*

It is interesting that from a theoretical point of view, other approaches to modernism put less emphasis on cultural transformations and, instead, treat nationalism as a political or an economic force. This entails an more realist approach to the phenomenon, analyzing nationalism through power dynamics. Brass (1985; 1991), Breuilly (1993; 1996; 2001; 2005) and Hobsbawm (1983; 1990) belong to the former approach, while scholars, such as Hechter (1981; 1985; 2000) or Nairn (1975; 1997) advocated for the latter vision. The approach of Bass shares a number of similarities with Breuilly's, but with some fundamental differences. Brass defined nationalism as "a political movement that requires skilled political leadership, political organization and resources to gain support and make successful demands in the political system" (Brass, 1991: 48-52). This means that Brass' approach is elite-centric; instead of only focusing on general, broader political and economic contexts and its effects on nationalism and nationalist movements, he turned the equation around.

The basic unit of analysis is not contexts but elites and their competition for power, which in return precipitates broader political and economic environments (Brass, 1991: 13-14). The political organization allows the movement to identify itself with the community, while the final goal is to become the one and only approved representative of the community that encourages united action. Brass claims that this exclusive position is used by nationalist movements to shape the identity of the community, which can be carried out through the creation of a political identity for the community via the invention of traditions. The author also argues that there are a number of aspects that determine which nationalist movements succeed and which fail to deliver goals. These include the ability of a movement to identify itself with the community, the ability to shape the identity of the group the movements wish to lead, the ability to provide continuality in leadership and the ability to maximize community resources for political purposes (Brass, 1991: 49). In essence, the Brass viewed nationalism as an instrument in the hand of political elites which can be used to mobilize the population in support of their goals. Due to the elite-focused approach, his theory in the modernist theoretical literature is often referred to as 'instrumentalist' (Koller, 2006).

Compared to Brass, Breuilly took steps to re-focus the discussion, putting forward an approach that was neither cultural nor strictly instrumentalist (Breuilly, 1993; 1996). According to Breuilly, nationalism does not arise from class interest, economic structures, cultural considerations or political calculations (Breuilly, 1993: 1-3). He claimed that focusing on class when analyzing nationalism was a misleading idea. It is true that nationalism builds upon some sense of cultural identification, and it is clearly connected with new and extended systems of communication. However, nationalism above all else is about politics and power; its central task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power. The state, according to Breuilly (1993: 369), is the "the possessor of sovereignty over a given territory". Nationalism is one particular response to the distinction, peculiar to the modern world, between state and society; it seeks to abolish this distinction (Breuilly, 1993: 390). This definition, of course, is very similar to the one put forward by Gellner.

However, the work of Breuilly demonstrated that in order to understand the phenomenon of nationalism, it is essential to analyze the role it plays in the pursuit of political goals, as national ideas would be non-existent without political action and organization. Breuilly defined nationalism as a "political movement seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments" (Breuilly, 1993: 2). In his books, he developed a possible framework of analysis that can be used to assess and/or compare nationalist movements as he argued that these common characteristics or objectives are present in all nationalisms that are in political opposition. These principal objectives are: legitimization, mobilization and coordination. Nationalism is used to justify the goals of a political movement to the state it opposes (legitimize), generate wide public support for the movement (mobilize) and promote shared interests among oppositional sectors of the society (coordinate). Co-ordination is an essential requirement, because only by its means does a new type of political opposition, a nationalist opposition come into existence. Whereas, mobilization and legitimacy, according to Breuilly (1993; 1996), give this opposition the real political force.

In sharp contrast to both Brass and Breuilly is Hobsbawm, who is also considered to be one of the theorists focusing on political processes instead of cultural and economic aspects (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). However, he represents a sort of radical instrumentalism which only raises questions, but fails to provide answers. Hobsbawm claimed that nations are the end result of "social engineering" and that "traditions are being invented" by political actors (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1). In other words, the biggest framework of invented

traditions is called nations. He distinguished between two types of inventions; the adaptation of old traditions and institutions to new contexts and the deliberate invention of new traditions. He also argued that history is used and abused as "a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion" (Hobsbawm, 1983: 12).

Hobsbawm in his book cites Gellner's definition of nationalism as reference and underlines that nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way round (Hobsbawm, 1990: 10). The overall issue with this approach is that Hobsbawm clearly states that nationalism in the late twentieth century was no longer an engine of historical development and that "nationalism is historically less important" (Hobsbawm, 1990: 163-183), meaning that the phenomenon is past its glorious decades. If this were the case, nationalisms in the 21st century would not exist. Arguably, nationalism plays a somewhat different role in this current century, yet it would be difficult to argue that the history of nationalism ended.

Within the modernist scholars, another distinctive branch is formed by economic modernists. Tom Nairn explained the emergence of nationalism via his theory of uneven world development. He pointed out that nations emerged due to economic changes; it was the nature of capitalism that allowed the birth of nationalism because the new economic system led to a struggle between national differences and not a struggle between classes. The new elites needed the support of the masses and nationalism was "the best available tool for the job" (Nairn, 1981: 340). Despite the overall economic reasoning, Nairn (1981) pointed out an important aspect of nationalism as a political movement. One of the core features of nationalism is that it aims to set goals for the future – such as independence, prosperity and equality – by looking back to the glorious past; progress is always presented by a certain type of regression (Nairn, 1981: 348).

In other words, all nationalisms have elements that lead to progress and regress, this ambiguity has always been present in the history of nationalism. Interestingly, the approach of Michael Hechter was similar to that of Nairn, but the former focused on economic development within a given territory. He argued that the uneven modernization of state territories created advanced and less advanced groups, where the former aimed to stabilize its position by dominating institutions and resources. This led to economic and political power concentration which allowed the emergence of intergroup tensions, leading to discriminatory policies. Nationalism was thus born out of what Hechter called "internal colonialism" (Hechter, 1975; 1985).

3.1.3. Ethnosymbolism

Over the years, both modernism and primordialism received a number of criticisms. But perhaps the majority of criticisms were coming from another theoretical branch within nationalism studies: ethnosymbolism. This theory was developed by Anthony D. Smith, but it was also supported and advanced by others, such as John Armstrong (2001). Nations for both modernists and ethno-symbolists were understood as communities that are embedded in specific geo-cultural and historical contexts. Furthermore, both modernists and ethnosymbolists agree that elites play an important role in nationalism. However, the latter also claim that the complex interplay between elites and various sections of the population was downplayed and simplified to a large extent as nationalism loses its force if ideas of the elite do not resonate with the general public (Smith, 2009: 21). Moreover, Smith also proposed that the theory of "imagined community" presented by Anderson or the theory of "invented traditions" put forward by Hobsbawm failed to account for the fact that communities are always imagined using the cultural and symbolic elements that predate the emergence of the modern nation.

The central thesis of Smith was that modern nations cannot be understood without taking pre-existing ethnic components into account. Smith (2010: 13) maintained that the early ethnic core (*ethnie*) is "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites'". Whereas a nation is "a named and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths, memories, symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture, reside in and identify with a historic homeland, and create and disseminate common laws and shared customs" (Smith, 1991: 14; Smith, 2005: 98). Smith (1991: 14) enlists five main assumptions based on his definition, arguing that nations are:

1. an historic territory or homeland
2. common myths and historic memories
3. a common, mass public culture
4. common legal rights and duties for all members
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members

Based on this definition, the key difference between an *ethnie* and a nation (beyond the fact that the former is pre-modern, while the latter is a modern concept) is that the *ethnie* lacks political referent, a public culture and laws shared by all, the pre-requisite to physically occupy (not just

to be linked) to a defined historic territory (Smith, 2010: 12-14). This, however, does not necessarily mean that the nations always need a state to prosper.

Smith highlighted that the term 'nationalism' acquired a range of meaning over time, he argued that nationalism, above all else, is an "ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'" (Smith, 2010: 9). What this definition does is that it aims to include all ~~building~~ essential building components of the concept, namely, that nationalism is:

a) an organized set of ideas (ideology)
b) built on three generic goals (autonomy, unity and identity)
c) pursued by a social movement in the context of an established or independence-seeking nation
d) and led in the name of people who share the same understanding (be that actual or abstract) of a community

Points a), b) and c) echo the works of modernist scholars, highlighting that nationalism is both an ideology and a social movement with political goals. However, point d) highlights an important aspect of nationalism which modernists in general disagree with, while ethno-symbolists argue in favour. According to other modernist scholars, nationalism predates nations given that nationalism is the product of modernity and the end result of this product was the emergence of nations in the late 18th century (Smith, 2009: 43). However, Smith argued that nationalism presupposes the concept of nations, but it does not suggest that nations exist prior to 'their' nationalisms (Smith, 2010: 10). There are cases where a small group of nationalists have an abstract concept of nation they wish create ('potential nation') and there are others where there this concept of nations is already shared by the majority of the community ('actual nation'). Note here that Smith (2010) in fact points to the very abstract nature of the concept of nation. But by claiming that idea that certain elements of the nation pre-date the Industrial Revolution (such as customs, language, symbols used and referenced by an entire community), he managed to explain nations as 'existing' sociological communities. A nation, therefore, is a mental framework based on ethnosymbolism.

Moreover, ethnosymbolism also offers a clear explanation for the relationship between the concepts of state and nation. The former refers exclusively to public institutions that exercise a

monopoly of coercions and extraction within a given territory, while the latter, as we have seen before, means a political and cultural bond, uniting a single community who all share an historic culture and homeland (Smith, 1991: 14). This does not mean that the two concepts do not overlap given that they both refer to a historic territory and sovereignty of the people, and modern states legitimize themselves among their people as states of particular nation(s) (Smith, 1991: 15). Nonetheless, there is tendency among scholars "to treat the state as dominant with the nation as a kind of junior partner" in studies, downplaying the dynamics of the nation by analyzing it in terms of state sovereignty (Smith, 2010: 17).

This culminated in the scholarly work focusing on the so-called 'nation-states', yet in practice, the number of states where the nation's boundaries coincide with the state's borders is minimal; around 10 percent of states in the world are 'nation-states' (Smith, 1991: 15). Therefore, Smith (1991; 2010) points out at the primary analysis of the relationship between nation and state should be reevaluated, focusing on the former and defining state in terms of the nation. Thus, the term Smith (2010: 17) put forward was 'national state' referring to "a state legitimated by the principles of nationalism, whose members possess a measure of national unity and integration (but not of cultural homogeneity)".

3.1.4. 'New' Nationalism

From the second half of the 1980s, a number of new approaches emerged in the study of nations and nationalism. As the work of contemporary scholars highlighted, it is difficult to categorize these theories which is why these are referred to as 'new', 'contemporary' or 'post-classical' (Guszman: 2017:11; Brubaker, 1996: 10; Özkirimli, 2010: 46). Özkirimli (2010: 170) argued that their critical approach towards classical modernist and ethnosymbolist theories and the overall emphasis on practice instead of meta-theories is what unites these 'new' theories. It is certain that new scopes were introduced into the field of nationalism (such feminism, post-colonialism and discourse), but arguably, the key assumptions of classical modernist scholars remained the benchmark of approaches that emerged in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.

Basic arguments are often borrowed from previous modernist scholars, and, agreeing with Smith (2010), new theories lack depth as they do not explain underlying processes in detail. Therefore, 'newer' approaches are rather an extension and a practical field work of the modernist literature, not an entirely new framework existing next to the primordialist, modernist and ethnosymbolist literature. Given the level of interdisciplinarity of these newer theories and

the scope and limitation of this work, only the main discourse-related approaches to the concepts of nation and nationalism will be introduced, namely, the work of Billing (1995), Calhoun (1997; 2007) and Wodak (1999; 2015; 2016). As we will see, the works of these scholars are built on the idea that nations are conceptual frameworks, echoing the arguments of Anderson (2003; 2006) and Smith (1991; 2010; 2011).

Billig (1995) agrees with modernist and ethnosymbolist scholars when claiming that nations are in fact modern and not primordial phenomena, but points to the subtle, everyday presence of nationalist sentiments. Agreeing with Anderson (2006), he views the nation as an 'imagined community', but adds that this imagination has a strong social ~~phycological~~ psychological dimension as the community is constantly and unconsciously reproduced. This is because elements (or in his words, "habits") of nationalism are present and with us (and within us) wherever we go (Billing 1995: 6). National flags, symbols and practices (such as standing for the national anthems at sport events) are part of the daily routine to such an extent that they repeatedly 'flag' the nation to citizens without conscious recognition; they appear in ordinary settings, making the nation seem natural and unremarkable (Billing 1996: 93). Moreover, nation as a concept is deeply embedded in our everyday language (such as politicians using 'we' to refer to the nation or a broadcaster summing up the 'national' news) as political and media discourse constantly remind individuals of their national background (Billing 1996: 109).

Therefore, in contrast to the extreme expressions of nationalism often associated with violent political movements, Billing (1995: 6) highlights the so-called 'banal nationalism' which can be defined as ideological habits that enable the nations to be reproduced. What gives power and influence for this type of nationalism is not a strong or violent expression of belonging made by leading members of the community. The power originates from a flag hanging unnoticed on a public building, which reminds people of their nationhood, and allows nationalism to be normalized without the need to use explicit rhetoric (Billing, 1995: 8-9). Nationalism, therefore, is "the ideology by which the world of nations has come to seem the natural world" (Billing, 1995: 37).

Similarly to Billing (1995), Calhoun (1997: 2) also notes that people in the West tend to ignore nationalism because it is so embedded in our way of looking at the world; we only focus on nationalism when it causes conflict between states, and between states and other actors who fight to change systems of government or state borders. In line with the modern interpretation of nationalism, Calhoun (1997: 2) claims that the emergence of nations is the result old

community structures changing due to urbanization and industrialization in the 19th century. In this re-organization of social relations, nationalism provided a sense of belonging and security for individuals, allowing them to feel part of the history, present and future of a larger collective.

This was possible because nationalism, according to Calhoun (1997: 22), is a "discursive formation" or "conceptual framework"; it is a way of thinking about the basic units of culture, politics and sense of belonging that help individuals to place themselves in the broader world system. This means that a nation, first and foremost, exists discursively and there is not one "objective" criteria for the concept of nation (Calhoun, 2007: 27). As a discursive formation, nationalism continually reproduces the idea that there should be a link (be that rooted in integration, distinction or an open conflict) between nation and state (Calhoun, 2007: 207).

The emphasis on nationalism as a discursive formation is also present in the work of Wodak (2015: 32) who defined nations as "entities discursively constructed through historical narratives, myths, and the symbolic power of language". Out of the different elements, history is the most powerful tool which is used by nationalist movements to legitimize current political goals and mobilize collective emotions, often by portraying their present actions as the continuation of the 'glorious' collective past (Wodak, 1999: 112; 2016: 89). This argument is not new and it is certainly not Wodak's as Nairn (1981) had dealt with his in book. Nonetheless, Wodak (1999) pointed out that not only the media, politicians and social practices (such as ceremonies) are employed in the construction of nations, but also everyday conversations. Due to this nature of nationalism, she argued that nations are not fixed or static, but are constantly negotiated and reconstructed in response to changing historical and political contexts (Wodak, 1999: 4).

3.2. The Relevance of Nations and Nationalism in the 21st Century

As argued in the previous section, there are three main approaches to the study of nationalism and its origins; primordialist scholars claim that nations are as old as humanity itself, modernists, as their name suggests, argue that nations are a modern phenomenon, while ethnosymbolists claim that nations are the result of modern processes, but are built around an ethnic-cultural core that pre-dates the era of the Industrial Revolution. However, the academic literature is not only divided on the origin and concept of nation and nationalism, but also about the relevance of nations and nationalism in the increasingly globalized world. There seems to be opposing views regarding the role nationalism has played and ~~will~~ is likely to play in a world

where economic, political, social and cultural boundaries between communities are blurred or transformed, and international issues – such as terrorism, migration, climate change and economic crises – provide new challenges to national communities (with or without a state) around the world.

Broadly speaking, as highlighted by Holton (2011: 159) and Guibernau (2001: 245-248), three main branches can be distinguished. The first approach claims that globalization has made nationalism and its junior partner, the state irrelevant, leading to the decline of national attachments over time. The second claims that nationalism ~~will~~ is likely to remain a salient force in the face of globalization, as the global interconnectedness does not negatively affect the political, economic and cultural foundation upon which nationalism is built. The third one took the second approach even further by highlighting that the processes of globalization and nationalism are mutually supporting. In the following chapter these approaches will be introduced; however, the second and third branches will be jointly ~~introduced~~ examined given that ~~are~~ both are rooted in the fundamental idea that nations and states are still relevant forces in politics in the 21st century.

2.2.1. The End of the State and Nationalism: The Triumph of Globalization?

In 1992, Francis Fukuyama published one of his most cited books entitled '*The End of History and the Last Man*' in which he claimed that humanity has reached the end of history with the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (Fukuyama, 1992). In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of the USA as a global hegemon foreshadowed a new area for politics. During this period, Hobsbawm (1990: 169) in his book '*Nations and Nationalism since 1780*' presented the idea that nations and nationalism are coming to an end when he claimed that "nationalism is simply no longer the historical force it was in the era between the French Revolution and the end of the imperialist colonialism after World War II".

According to his view, nationalism is fading because the Westphalian idea of the world of states is becoming irrelevant in an economically globalized world. After all, as argued by Breuilly (1993, 1996), all nationalisms wish to obtain state power and abolish the distinction between state and nation. However, the central goal of nationalism is no longer as relevant as it has been before given that in an increasingly globalized world, the state has been losing its essential functions. As argued by Jellinek (1922), the definition of the state consists of three essential elements: a government, a territory and a population. The codification of Jellinek's doctrine of

the three elements can be found in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933 (Montevideo Convention). Art. 1 of the Montevideo Convention provides a description of the state as a subject of international law and defines it the following way:

> *„The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:*
>
> *(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) capacity*
>
> *to enter info relations with the other States."*

Another widely cited definition of the state was provided by Weber (2004: 38) who defined it as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory". However, due to the forces of globalization, all elements of the state, the population or human community (nation(s)), the territory (defined by borders) and the government (as ultimate and legitimate force over the people and territory) have been challenged.

Globalization is a process that involves an increased movement of goods, services, technology, borders, idea and people with a series of economic and social consequences (Manners, 2000). The process of globalization therefore involves a so-called 'de-territorialization' of time and space; borders between countries are blurred as old territorial boundaries diminish with the increased movement of people, services and goods, resulting in a sense of perception of the world as a smaller place where events happening in far away places have direct effects on everyday life (Kinnvall, 2004: 742-743). In other words, as argued by Robertson (1992: 8), the process of globalization refers to both "the compression of the world" and the "intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole".

What this means for the state is that the economies are becoming building blocks of a larger, global economy that was built on technological revolution in transport and communication (Hobsbawm, 1990: 181-182). Therefore, states are not sole actors in the economy anymore: transnational companies and networks of international transaction work beyond the control of the state. As argued by Suter (2003: 1), the world is now moving from a globe divided by borders to a world without borders; therefore, the transnational companies have not only taken over the economic roles of states, but the result of the increasingly interconnected global economy dismantled the territoriality of states.

Furthermore, the forces of globalization in economic terms were accompanied by the rise of neoliberal economics built on market liberalization, privatization and more monetarist macroeconomic policies (Kinnvall, 2004: 743). This led to the rapid hollowing out of state, meaning that the functions of the state have been "eroded or eaten away" (Rhodes, 1994: 138; 2017: 119-136). Not only transnational companies become key powerhouses, but the state, mainly through the introduction of New Public Management (NPM), also gave up key policy areas and tools that could have been used to regain control over the economy and limit the power of companies. All this means is that the state has been decreasing its involvement in the economic sector and eventually lost its dominant role as the key source of economic power (Kinnvall, 2004: 743).

In theory, this reorganization of the economy makes the case for the rise of smaller nationalisms – as the Catalan and Scottish – given that in the globalized world, smaller states are not economically less viable than larger ones (Hobsbawm, 1990: 184). However, Hobsbawm (1990: 185) also argues that West European separatist nationalism (he explicitly mentioned the Scottish, Welsh, Basque and Catalan) wish to bypass the state through the EU in order to create a Europe of the Regions, and thus they lose their classical, core nationalist aim to establish an independent and sovereign state to become a subunit of a larger political-economic framework, the European Union. In other words, although the internationalization of markets and the technological revolution challenged the international system of states and created an opportunity for separatist nationalist movements, these advantages are not felt as these political organizations give up their core nationalist goal. Therefore, globalization effectively neutralizes nationalism at regional level.

The process of hollowing out of the state was not restricted to economic functions: from the second half of the 20th century, the state has given up other public policy functions through increased international cooperation, regional integration and emergence of international institutions. The number of intergovernmental organizations tripped from the 1950s to the 1980s and the number of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also grew dynamically (Hobsbawm, 1990: 181). In Europe, this process was exemplified by the European integration process which resulted in the pooling of state functions; a delegation of authority from national to regional and supranational levels which in turn limits the member states' sovereign power to exert their own decisions as they wish. Although some scholars, such as Hooghe and Marks (2001), claim that a new, multi-level system of governance emerged with subnational, national and supranational levels in Europe, the overall tendency is clear: from

every major reform period at EU level from Maastricht to the Lisbon Treaty, the supranational and the regional levels have been increasing their power, while the state has lost its former dominance. As Rhodes (1994: 142) highlighted when analyzing the case of British-EU relations, "Britain lost sovereignty when it joined the EU to a far greater extent than anticipated in 1972".

However, the political aspects of globalization go way beyond the strict geographical boundaries of Europe: international bodies, such as the United Nations (UN), Greenpeace International or Amnesty International have become the forums and tools for stressing political desires to create a single global community governed by justice, democracy and peace (Holton, 2011: 3). As argued by Suter (2003), the emphasis here is on the "global" aspect instead of "international". The latter means that the world is being governed by states at international level, whereas the former suggests that the global affairs run ahead of the ability of states to manage them and new structures are necessary to lead the change (Suter, 2003: 1-2). Here globalization is not only understood in economic sense, but also in terms of an institutional framework and a global identity.

The former approach, the assessment of globalization from the aspect of international instruments and organizations, is built on the assumption (or desire) that globalization will lead to the emergence of a world state (Morgenthau, 1946; Speer II, 1968; Chase-Dunn, 1990; Wendt, 2003; Ostrovsky, 2007). According to Wendt (2003), the "emergence of the world state is inevitable"; however, scholars disagree about the way this will occur. Ostrovsky (2007) argued that the world state will be reached in one step: the world will be divided into two opposing blocks (one based in North America and the other in Eurasia) who will fight in World War III and, if humanity survives the global conflict, the winner will conquer the world and establish its world state. Therefore, the world state will be born out of war and out of the process of one side "colonizing" the globe. This is a similar argument to the one put forward by Morgenthau (1946), who claimed that permanent peace cannot be reached without a world state. However, a key difference is that Morgenthau (1946), as did Wendt (2003), argued that in order for the world state to take shape, a series of fundamental changes have to transpire at institutional and community levels.

The first is to reach a universal security community where the states no longer see each other as physical threats, and disputes are settled peacefully (Wendt, 2003: 505). The second is universal collective security; the idea that if one experiences a threat, then all other actors take

action as if the threat had been directed at them. The third is universal supranational authority which is "the procedure for making binding and legitimate decisions about the exercise of this common power" (both universal security community and universal collective community would be reached) (Wendt, 2003: 505). This would require territorial states to surrender their power to a global subjectivity, meaning that sovereign states would cease to exist (Wendt, 2003: 505).

However, Wendt (2003) realized that in order to reach a global state, there must be a transition between different stages. The system of states will first transform to a 'society of states' where there is a growing sense of solidarity between actors, but states are still independent and sovereign (Wendt, 2003: 519). Then comes 'world society' (also called 'cosmopolitan society') where a thicker form of society is developed; the independence of states is constrained (Wendt, 2003: 520). In stage four ('collective security'), the deepening of relations between formerly independent states and between individuals will take shape, followed by stage five ('world state') with the transfer of state sovereignty to the global level in a way that individual recognition will no longer be mediated by state boundaries, but states as recognized subjects would still retain some individuality ("particularism within universalism") (Wendt, 2003: 520).

Interestingly, Wendt (2003: 504-506) also stressed that the world government does not necessarily require, for example, a central decision-making body or global army as long as it possesses: monopoly on the use of force; legitimacy (the population perceives the world state's existence and operation as right); sovereignty ("the exclusive right to enforce the law of the land") and corporate action ("a shared belief among its members that they constitute a collective identity or 'We'"). In other words, the global state must possess the characteristics that define the state in the Weberian or Jellinek way, including one of the key aspects: a population that defines itself as a community.

Albrow (1990) defined globalization as "all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society in which humanity becomes for the first time a collective actor." Here the emphasis is placed on a population (people of the world or humanity) with defined territorial boundaries (the entire world). Albrow (1990: 8) saw it necessary to define a connected term, globalism:

> *"Those values that take the real world of five billion people as the object of concern, the whole earth as the physical environment, everyone living as world citizens,*

consumers, and producers, with a common interest in collective action to solve global problems"

The increased connectedness of economies means that states and nations are not the only bearers of identity; the homogenous identity is challenged as people become global consumers of goods and information (Ariely, 2020). As a result, a new world order is slowly emerging where old referents of identification – race, language, history, customs and symbols – sourced by the framework of nations and states are undermined by universal, global values. Köhler (1998), Habermas (1998), Beck (2002) and Castells (2011) all agree that a new set of common values will be the basis of the 'world' or 'global' community and this foreshadows a clash between nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

Habermas (1998) agrees with other scholars on the fact that globalization fundamentally challenges the relevance of the state as a political model because it undermines the state's classic functions, such as claiming democratic legitimacy, maintaining internal security, defending borders, exerting influence over the economy or enforcing individual rights. However, there is no guarantee that the forces of globalization will build a new basis and new structures for democratic legitimacy and in this vacuum, popular movements with global outlook will have to provide the necessary collective power to build popular legitimacy in the form of "obligatory collective solidarity" (Habermas, 1998: 55).

This collective solidarity will not be based or limited by nations and states; instead, a more abstract form of civil belonging in the sense of universalism will emerge (Habermas, 1998: 84). This idea that a universal set of values will challenge nationalism and the state is also supported by Köhler (1998: 231) who stressed that democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the ecological preservation of the globe's heritage are emerging as common values and interests of peoples, making nationalistic claims less relevant in a more interconnected globe. However, Köhler (1998) also suggested that nationalism and the state system will not fade away entirely, because the world still lacks key structures of authority which could challenge the states' authority. Given that the world has no world state that unites peoples across the globe into one single entity with its own institutions, the shift in social values towards more globally accepted values ~~will~~ is likely to be a fundamental clashing zone between nationalism and globalism.

Universalism is rooted in the philosophy of the Enlightenment: Emmanuel Kant in *Perpetual Peace* argued for the universality of the rights of humans beyond the limits of particular national existence. The eternal contradiction between nationalism and a universalist cosmopolitanism

can be attributed to the Kantian realization that if nations and not humans are given the opportunity to articulate the rights of men, then universalism can never be achieved (Kant, 1991). As such, it is difficult if not impossible to reach common grounds between the idea that humans are all members of a single community (cosmopolitanism[3]) and the concept of nationalism.

The work of Beck (2002a; 2002b; 2007) also emphasized the clash between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, but highlighted that his assessment was different to the one followed by Kant and Habermas as he approached the question from a methodological and not a theoretical basis. Beck (2007: 286) claimed that "cosmopolitanism, as an intellectual movement, is united by a shared critique of methodological nationalism; the shared diagnosis that the 21st century is an age of cosmopolitanism; and the shared assumption that for this reason we need some kind of methodological cosmopolitanism". For the present study, Beck's first claim is of special importance as he claimed that social scientists must end their biased emphasis of social analysis based on the assumption that the world is divided into nations (Beck, 2007: 286-287). By leaving this misassumption behind, it is possible to see that "the earthly religion of the nation could be replaced by that of cosmopolitanism" (Beck, 2004: 309).

Castells (2011) identified nationalism and localism as the enemies of multiculturalism. He maintained, on the one hand, that the continent's competitiveness in global competition is constantly decreasing, and the unstable economic situation and rising unemployment threaten the sustainability of the welfare system. And, on the other hand, Castells (2011) claimed that nationalism and localism hinder the development of a full pan-European identity. This clash between identities would come to an end once Europe moved beyond the "old" matrix of nations and national identities; by introducing a new system of governance that simultaneously applies federation and confederation aspirations, it would be possible to channel in and unite the local, national and supranational levels in a new network of governance. Castells (2011:54) defined the nation as "cultural communes constructed in people's minds and collective memory by the sharing of history and political projects".

The Kantian idea of universalism, the work of Habermas (1998), Beck (2002), Köhler (1998), Castells (2011), together with the work of Marxist scholars in the field of nationalism studies, such as Hobsbawm (1990), seemingly make the study of nationalism, and more concretely

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[3] Kant in the narrow sense defined cosmopolitanism as "the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop" (Kant, 1991).

minority nationalism in a global world irrelevant. After all, states are losing their relevance in the global arena, but minority nations, such as the Scottish and Catalans, are not willing to use this opportunity to build their own independent nations; instead, they focus on becoming a political unit of Europe constituted by regions. Globalization is therefore bringing forward an area where the void created by states losing grip on the classical state functions and processes of legitimacy has to be filled by a sense of universal belonging that will not be built on shared language, customs or historical narratives. According to this approach to the relationship between globalization and nationalism, the transition to a post-national world is under way, and it is only a matter of time that nations will be superseded by the forces of globalization.

2.2.2. The Transformation of the State and the Revival of Nationalism in the Global Age

The theoretical literature on the relationship between nationalism and globalization in the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s experienced an era that was referred to as the "pro-global enthusiasm" by Calhoun (2007: 12). However, neither history as whole nor the history of nationalism and the state ended as it was proclaimed. From the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, a new paradigm emerged in the literature, arguing that the forces of globalization did not eliminate, but transformed the state, the central objective of nationalist movements (Sorensen, 2004; Shaw, 2008). Yet, this transformation induced by globalization has given a new push for nationalist forces and sentiments, including minority nationalist movements in Europe (Keating, Keating and McGarryn, 2001; Keating 2001; Keating 2013; Guibernau, 1999; 2013).

All elements of the state (human community, territory and government) have been challenged by the forces of globalization; however, the state remains the essential moving force of politics around the globe. On the one hand, despite the blurring of boundaries between states as described in Chapter 2.2.1., borders remain a key and defining characteristic of state sovereignty. One clear example of this blurring of boundaries is exemplified by the Schengen Agreement in the European Union: EU citizens can travel between member states without unnecessary border controls in order to be able to practice the right of free movement in the Union. Seemingly, European integration transcended or at least tried to transcend the territoriality of states. However, the 2015 migration crisis and the 2020 coronavirus pandemic demonstrated that this blurring, deepened further by modern technology and air travel, does not equate to the total elimination of boundaries; member states will reintroduce border control at any time they deem it necessary. Not to mention that the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian War also

highlighted that the control of a certain territory is still very much at the centre of the struggle for enforcing and practicing political power.

From the side of human community, the world still lacks Habermas' idea of "obligatory collective solidarity". The cosmopolitan dream was not reached in the last three decades; global values did not make nationalist claims irrelevant nor did they become globally shared given that democracy, human rights and the rule of law are essential for the Western world, but cannot be called world values. It is a possibility that the world is moving towards the creation of a global community; however, national community – be that a nation with a state or a nation without a state – attachment still plays an important role. Arguably, the world still has not left the first or the second stage of Wendt's (2003) transition to world state; a thicker form of society has not yet developed, and citizenship is still attached to states. Not to mention the fact that this form of belonging or supranational citizenship already failed to take shape at a level lower than the global.

The European Union, the world's biggest supranational political and economic union, was unable to foster a shared sense of identity, remaining an 'illusion' (Arts and Halman, 2005; Petithome, 2008; White, 2012). However, undoubtedly, European identity exists, but, as argued by Cram (2009) and Fligstein et al. (2012), it exists alongside national identities as the EU is only a facilitator for diverse understanding of identity. The reason for this is because the European identity is what Guibernau (2011: 313) called 'non-emotional' identity; a weaker sense of belonging that stands in contrast to the more powerful and emotionally charged national identities. Even the concept of EU citizenship – which was established by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – is attached to state citizenship: according to Article 20 of the TFEU, "every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union" and "Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship." In a nutshell, if the EU is often called *sui generis* from a legal point of the view; the same could be said from a human community perspective. The state is still the bearer of personal sovereignty (which is based on citizenship), while the primary source of attachment for communities is the nation (be that a nation with or without a state), making the study of nationalism from a social science perspective relevant even in a globalized, interdependent world.

From a governance perspective, the forces of globalization challenged the international system of states, but this process did not weaken the ~~primer~~ primary objective of nationalism, the state.

As it was highlighted before, as a result of the economic forces of globalization, the state was weakened and hollowed out; however, this process was soon met by a new area of bringing the state back in (Evans et al., 1985; Hindmoor, 2009). The state, despite the forces of globalization, remained a key actor, which is supported by the paradigm of governance. According to Rhodes (1994: 151), the term governance refers to a new process of governing through networks, a changed condition of ordered rule and the new method by which society is governed. In this system, some states' functions are dispersed 'upwards' towards the supranational and global sphere, 'downwards' via decentralization and de-concentration and 'outwards' with the outsourcing of public functions to businesses. As a result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that had pulled some previously centralized functions of the state a system of continuous negotiation among nested government at several territorial tiers was created, called Multi-Level Governance (MLG) (Marks, 1993: 391-392, as cited by Stephenson, 2013).

The transformation of the state is therefore especially important for both supranational and regional actors: they have benefited from increased role in governance. On the one hand, states have modified their independence of action to ensure that they can better cope with the forces of globalization (Bellamy, 2003: 176). They joined international agreements (such as free trade and climate agreements) and even established closer relations with a group of states (for example, the EU) through the "sharing" or "pooling" of state sovereignty that serve as basis of new institutions (Wallace 1999; Peterson 1997). And on the other hand, in some cases, this dispersion of authority has favoured the creation of an entirely new system of regional governments. Both the case of Scotland and Catalonia are key examples of this process, as the two regions have acquired self-governance through the transfer of state power from London and Madrid to Edinburgh and Barcelona respectively. Therefore, it is hard to back the argument that the state is losing its relevance in the 21st century; rather, the central government as the key institution of the state has shared some of the functions with other supranational and regional actors, meaning that sovereignty is jointly exercised.

However, not only the state, but also nationalism is gaining momentum in the globalized era. Economic globalization – which was intended to bring about prosperity and stability – brought job insecurity, shrinking middle classes and aggravated social tension further by dividing the world into losers and winners of globalization (Kinnvall, 2004: 74). Gidden (1990, 1991), Berger (1998) and Calhoun (2007) point towards the negative effects of economic globalization which affected communities and led to the emergence of an anti-globalization sentiment and

the rise of nationalism. As a result of increasing economic interdependence, new communication technologies, faster information exchange and individualization, the world opened up and shrank, but the protective framework of smaller communities vanished and people lost their sense of security (Gidden, 1991: 33). As a result, more and more people want to "de-modernize" and reverse this global process that "has left the individual alienated and beset with the threats of meaninglessness" (Berger, 1998: 22). What nationalism offers for these disengaged people is the possibility to reconstruct the cultural reference points upon which the past was built in order to bring back the lost sense of security (Kinnvall, 2004: 744).

Kriesi et al. (2006) took this argument further when they highlighted a paradoxical, yet interesting connection between nationalism and globalization. As national boundaries and national identity are unbundled by the forces of globalization, they become politically more salient (Kriesi et al., 2006: 922; Suny, 2011: 113). In other words, the argument that globalization makes nationalism irrelevant in the modern word as boundaries are blurred between communities and the sense of national belonging will be overwritten by the sense of universalism is not grounded; the more nations are weakened, the more their political importance will increase. Therefore, if Habermas (1998) and Wendt (2003) are right and globalization entails the creation of the 'obligatory collective solidarity' and a new 'cosmopolitan global society' is being built on post-national, universal values, then this process inherently leads to the emergence of nationalism as an even more powerful force than before.

A similar relationship between nationalism and globalization was discussed in-depth by Smith (1995; 2011) and Hutchinson (2005; 2011). Smith (2011: 154) synthesized that nationalism as an ideological movement for the autonomy, unity and identity of a human population presumes a world of divided national communities, and therefore, "must set its face against all forms of cosmopolitanism and world citizenship". He highlighted that supporters of the cosmopolitan idea tend to misinterpret nationalism as an obsolete idea in the global world; they argue that national ideals and sentiments are no longer relevant in a world where humanity faces new challenges, such as terrorism, migration and economic recessions (Smith 2011: 154). However, as Smith (1995) argued, these threats faced by social groups act as a catalyst for nationalism; they encourage communities to search for a common cultural base around which to mobilize to evade the perceived threat. Therefore, global threats – such as climate change, illegal migration or a pandemic – provide a good ground for nationalist claims; global issues, but nationalist solutions. Hutchinson (2005; 2011) also reached a similar conclusion and argued that globalization will definitely not lead to the end of nation. Quite the opposite; globalization will

result in new struggles for nation formation, because it promises to provide answers for threats that are likely to rise in a multipolar, global world (Hutchinson, 2011: 84).

3.3.   Summary

This chapter provided a detailed assessment of the research area of nationalism studies, highlighting the differences, similarities and overlaps between various approaches scholars had taken to assess the origin and characteristics of nations and nationalism and the role these play in the increasingly interconnected and globalized world. Primordialism, modernism and ethnosymbolism have been introduced in depth to place this study in the existing theoretical frameworks of nationalism studies.

Primordialism dates back to German Romanticism, particularly to Herder's concept of *Volksgeist*, claiming that nations are as old as humans themselves, and as such, nationalism can be considered as an inherent, natural part of human beings and human history. Therefore, primordialist scholars disagree with modernist scholars because they argue that nationalism is not the product of industrialization and capitalism. Although the primordialist assumptions are built on the antiquity of nations, scholars offer different explanations for the same central argument.

Van den Berghe (1979, 1981, 2001a, 2001b, 2005) argued that biological processes play an extended role in social relations, and as such, nations can be understood as a form of kinship and shared ancestry; they are super-families of relatives bound together by vertical ties of descent and horizontal ties of marriage. What defines the membership in this „large family" is the core ethnic ties (language, religion, cuisine, and shared symbols, traditions or myths) between members. When an ethnic group or *ethnie* becomes a politically conscious group, nationalism is being born. Therefore, nationalism can be defined as an *ethnie* with shared political demands.

Other scholars – such as Shils (1957), Grosby (2001, 2003) and Geertz (1973) – argued that the primordial attachments are not given undoubtedly. Rather, attachments are *understood* to be natural and *considered* as given by the people. A group must attribute significance to existing ethnic ties to have ~~a shared~~ a shared culture (which is a system of shared symbols), and then pass on this common understanding of symbols to the next generation. These scholars are often called as 'cultural primordialists' as they emphasize the role culture plays in the emergence and survival of nations instead of the strictly biological attributes that Van den Berghe emphasized.

Finally, there are scholars – such as Hastings (1997), Gillingham (1992, 1995) and Beaune (1991) – who view nationalism as a constant feature of human life in recorded history. This means that they do not analyze nationalism from a strictly anthropological-sociological point of view but rather as a historical concept. Therefore, a nation is a community formed from one or more ethnic groups, but it also one which possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, together with the control of specific territory. This definition, therefore, highlights the connection between nation and state as it introduces territory, identity and autonomy into the conceptualization of nationalism, but this connection is not as explicit as it is in the case of modernist scholars.

Although the work of primordialist scholars is essential, primordialism was heavily criticized in contemporary literature for its static approach to ethnicity and national identity, for its inability to provide explanations for cases where people cut off ties with attachments that had been considered as 'given' (i.e. language or religion) and for emphasizing the role *ethnies* play in nationalism. The ethnic component of nationalism is also a critical point in the literature as primordial ties are often viewed with regards to the dichotomy of ethnic and civic nationalism (also referred to as Western versus Eastern European nationalism, French-type versus German-type nationalism or *Staatsnation* versus *Kulturnation*).

Modernist scholars, on the other hand, argue that the rise of nationalism dates back to the era of the Industrial Revolution as the resulting re-organization of power allowed for the rise of nationalist sentiments. The new economic system brought about by capitalism, the secularization process that redefined the role and power of the Church and the emergence of modern bureaucratic state not only took over the roles of the feudal system, but also centralized power. The theories of modernist nationalist scholars may be categorized according to the role they attributed to different factors in the emergence and maintenance of nationalism over centuries since the Industrial Revolution (Özkirimli, 2010; Koller, 2006; Pongrácz, 2018; Rojas, 2004). As such, it is possible to distinguish between cultural, political and economic modernism.

In the modernist literature the most quoted author is Gellner (1995, 1996a, 1996b, 2006) who analyzed nationalism as the byproduct of the transition from the agrarian to the industrial society. Centuries old societal structures (such as the feudal system, monarchies, the social and cultural power of the Church) were transformed as the result of the economic changes, allowing for a new dynamic to emerge between the cultural, economic and political spheres of life.

Cultural homogeneity was created with the invention, selection and reinvention of existing cultural forms into a new high national culture. Moreover, power was re-centralized away from old structure towards the bureaucratic state that imposed the national culture upon an entire population and controlled certain aspects of life that had been previously controlled by old elites (such as the education by the Church or administration by smaller territorial entities).

The work of Anderson (2003, 2006) also focused on the role of culture, but he did not claim that nations were inventions and used only as a tool by the new elite as did Gellner. Instead of the negative connotation, he approached this process of 'creation' as 'imagination' and argued that a nation is "an imagined political community which is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 2006: 6). Here we see the strong link between nation and state; Anderson argued that a nation's central goal is to reach national freedom and independence that are embodied by the concept of state sovereignty. This sovereignty was different to the one that had existed for centuries because it did not derive from the automatic legitimacy of a monarch, but from the population who legitimized the use of power over a given territory. Therefore, the state, in relation to the concept of nation, can be defined as the use of legitimate power over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory (Anderson, 2006: 21).

Other scholars, such as Brass (1985, 1991), Breuilly (1993, 1996, 2001, 2005) and Hobsbawm (1983, 1990) highlighted the political aspect of modernism when exploring the role political elites and political power play in nationalism. Instead of focusing on the wider context which allowed for the emergence of nations, the dynamics of the phenomenon of nationalism was analyzed. Brass (1985, 1991) focused on the relationship between elites and nationalism, arguing that nationalism is an instrument of elites who wish to gain and maintain control over a group of people. He defined nationalism as a political movement that aims to identify itself with and shape a community, encourage united action, provide continuality in leadership and maximize community resources for political purposes.

This framework is similar to the one developed by Breuilly (1993, 1996), who claimed that nationalism used to justify the goals of a political movement (legitimize), generate wide public support for the movement (mobilize) and promote shared interests among oppositional sectors of the society (coordinate). Therefore, by analyzing the interests and actions of elites, it is possible to understand the way nationalism shapes the world. However, taking one step further the former argument, interest and actions are best understood in terms of the objective the

movements wish to reach. What unites the nationalist movements, as argued by Breuilly (1993, 1996, 2001, 2005) is the desire to obtain, use or oppose state power.

Undoubtedly, economic process and aspects also come into the modernist equation. Capitalism not only created new elites, but also new inequalities between groups and between different parts of the world (Hechter, 1975, 1985; Nairn, 1981). Less advanced and developed countries emerged, and within states, the same the modernization process was also uneven, meaning that a development gap emerged between provinces or regions. At state-level, the economic power concentration brought about political power accumulation for certain sub-state regions (such as large cities or highly industrialized provinces) and the same process could be observed at global level as developed states became power-houses of the world, while undeveloped states lagged behind.

This process of uneven modernization of territories culminated in colonialism (global level) and internal colonialism (within states) where the advanced and less advanced groups were formed and the former aimed to stabilize its position by dominating institutions and resources. Nationalism and nationalist sentiments allowed the new elites to legitimize their position and power, and win over the masses. A core feature of this process, as highlighted by Nairn (1981: 348), was setting plans for the future by referencing the 'glorious' past, meaning that the future in nationalist terms is tends to be presented by a certain type of regression. Interestingly, the same conclusion was also drawn by Wodak (1991: 112; 2016; 89), adding that this process is always discursively constructed.

The discursive construction of the nation is also present in other scholars who belong to the 'post-classical' or 'new nationalist' branch of nationalism studies; the works of Billing (1995) and Calhoun (1997; 2007) are prime examples of this. Billing points to everyday habits and language use that ensure that members are constantly reminded of their nationhood. For Calhoun (1997: 22), nationalism is a "conceptual framework", a way of thinking about the basic units of culture, politics and sense of belonging that help individuals to place themselves in the broader world system. This process allows for the constant reproduction of the central idea of nationalism, that there should exist some kind of link (be that distinction or separation through distinction) between nation and the state.

However, undoubtably, the theoretical work of Armstrong (2001) and Smith (1991; 2010; 2011) is one that offers to bridge the differences between primordialism and modernism, and it is used as core theory in this thesis. On the hand, their approach, ethnosymbolism, maintains that

nations and nationalism are in fact modern phenomena (as modernists claim), but they are eager to add that there is an ethnic core that pre-date the rise of nations and nationalism that serves as the powerhouse of nations. As such, a nation can be defined as "a named and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths, memories, symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture, reside in and identify with a historic homeland, and create and disseminate common laws and shared customs" (Smith, 1991: 14; Smith, 2005: 98). The key strength of this definition is that it sees nations both as real (existing) community and as a conceptual framework with abstract elements (such as symbols, myths and shared values).

And on the other hand, ethnosymbolism sees nationalism as both an ideology and a social movement with political goals: it is "an organized set of ideas (ideology) built on three generic goals (autonomy, unity and identity), pursued by a movement in the context of an established or independence-seeking nation and led in the name of people who share the same understanding (be that actual or abstract) of a community" (Smith, 2010: 9). Moreover, ethnosymbolism was also the most vocal about treating nationalism studies as a separate field, which should not be analyzed as a supplement to the state as theoretical concept. There is an important relationship between state and nations, but nationalism must concentrate on conceptualization of nations and ideology and movement of nationalism, while the state should be treated as the "junior partner" giving context to the analysis.

Moreover, this chapter also highlighted and argued for the relevance of nations and nationalism in the increasingly globalized world, claiming that in the context of nationalism, the state is not losing, but gaining new momentum in the 21st century. A number of scholars – such as Hobsbawm (1990), Suter (2003), Kinnvall (2004), Wendt (2003), Köhler (1998), Habermas (1998), Beck (2002) and Castells (2011) – put forward arguments for a new era in politics where the forces of globalization challenged the key conceptual elements of the state, namely, the population or human community (nation(s)), the territory (defined by borders) and the government (as ultimate and legitimate force over the people and territory). This approach saw globalization and the state as conflicting ideas. For them, globalization is the increased movement of goods, services, technology, idea and people between different parts of the world which leads to the compression of the globe and the intensification of consciousness of the world as single society and brings about the emergence of the world state. As such, all elements of the state are challenged, making the fight for or against the state (through nationalism) irrelevant.

This line of argumentation claims that defined population or human community (nation(s)), the territory (defined by borders) and the government (as ultimate and legitimate force over the people and territory) have been challenged by the so-called 'de-territorialization' of time and space. Borders between countries are blurred as old territorial boundaries diminish with the increased movement of people, services and goods and thus results in a sense of perception of the world as a smaller place where events happening in far away places have direct effects on everyday life (Kinnvall, 2004: 742-743). The power of the government is not unlimited anymore, the state has been hollowed out, both economically and politically. Government are not the sole controllers of the economy because the technological advancements, transnational companies, international transactions and trade made national economies components of the far larger global economy (Hobsbawm, 1990; Suter, 2003).

Furthermore, due to the emergence of neoliberal policies, key functions of the state have been eroded as they were given over to market actors (Rhodes, 1994, 2017; Kinnvall, 2004). The same tendency can be observed in politics; the number of intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations grew exponentially, limiting the power of states and their governments. This process will eventually lead to the emergence of a world state which will happen as a result of a conflict between two opposing international blocks (and the eventual dominance of one), culminating in world peace (Morgenthau, 1946; Speer II, 1968; Chase-Dunn, 1990; Wendt, 2003; Ostrovsky, 2007).

A similar hollowing out state power is noted by a number of scholars in terms of population and territory. In terms of population and territory, old referents of identification – language, history, customs and symbols – sourced by the framework of nations and states will be undermined by universal, global values. A new set of common values will be the basis of the 'world' or 'global' community which foreshadows a clash between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, the idea that humans are members of a single world community (Köhler, 1998; Habermas, 1998; Beck, 2002; Castells, 2011).

On the hand, from the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, a new paradigm emerged in theoretical literature, arguing that state and nationalism and globalization were mutually supportive concepts, not opposite ends of the spectrum. This approach defined globalization as the increased movement of goods, services, technology, idea and people between different parts of the world which transformed the state and fuelled nationalism by brining about new social, economic and political issues.

The cosmopolitan dream was not reached; even the world world's biggest supranational political and economic union, the European Union, was unable to foster a shared sense of identity that can overwrite national attachments (Arts and Halman, 2005; Petithome, 2008; White, 2012). The state, despite the emergence of new intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, trade networks and transnational companies, remains a key actor in a new system of governance. The central government as the key institution of the state has shared some of the functions with other supranational and regional actors, meaning that sovereignty is jointly exercised.

According to Rhodes (1994: 151), the term governance refers to a new process of governing through networks, a changed condition of ordered rule and the new method by which society is governed. In this system, some states' functions are dispersed 'upwards' towards the supranational and global sphere (such as the EU or the UN), 'downwards' via decentralization (towards sub-state entities, such as regions with political autonomy) and 'outwards' with the outsourcing of public functions to businesses. The state and the control of state power, therefore, are still relevant in the 21st century, despite the emergence of new actors.

Moreover, the effects of globalization did not neutralize, but fuelled nationalism. The world became divided into losers and winners of globalization, as countries experienced shrinking middle classes and growing inequalities, resulting in the emergence of an anti-globalization sentiment (Kinnvall, 2004; Gidden, 1990, 1991; Berger, 1998; Calhoun, 2007). As a result of increasing economic interdependence, new communication technologies, faster information exchange and individualization, the world opened up and shrank, but the protective framework of smaller communities vanished and nationalism emerged as a path towards the lost sense of security (Gidden, 1991: 33). This demonstrates that despite the long list of actors and processes that were deemed challengers of state power and nations, nationalism and concept of nations remain key driving forces of societies.

4. Political Discourse Analysis

Not only nationalism is as old as the hills; so is the conceptual connection between language and politics. Political thinkers have long recognized that language is not a neutral medium but a vehicle through which power is exercised, contested, and legitimized. What is common in the different approaches is, just as in the case of nationalism theories, is the multiple way through which the connection between politics and language can be viewed. Over centuries, it has

certain become one of the most important fields within political and international studies, but not just the academia dealt with the intertwining between the two concepts. Imagine a parliamentary session where all Members of Parliament are sitting silently without a single word spoken. Picture a political rally where people attending are not cheering (or booing) and speeches are not delivered with the emotional depths and factual knowledge that immediately grab the attention of voters. Or just try and envision a politician who is banned from using the very basic tool upon with the entirety of pubic service, his or her field and profession, is built: words.

Politics, therefore, conceptually cannot exist without words, and as we will see it, words tend to charged with political meaning. This chapter has two principal goals. On the one hand, it provides a systematic assessment of political discourse literature to name and define the key concepts used in the field and in this paper. And on the other, this chapter also aims to underline that the combination of critical discourse theory and cognitive discourse theory offers a strong theoretical basis for the assessment of modern nationalist discourses.

4.1. From Early Rhetorics to Language in the 'Narrow Sense'

In Ancient philosophy, thinkers demonstrated art of language in fact belong together, albeit their reasoning was quite different. Plato, in *Gorgias* and also *The Republic*, was suspicious of this art, associating it with manipulation and sophistry rather than truth-seeking (Plato, 2009). The fear was that rhetorical skills when detached from philosophical inquiry, would lead to demagoguery; genuine political thinking was philosophical, oriented toward truth and justice, rather than mere persuasion (Plato, 2009: 25-29). Aristotle, on the other hand, offered a more pragmatic appreciation of art of persuasion in public life. Rhetoric was defined "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (Aristotle, 2007: 39). Aristotle named three modes of persuasion: ethos (the speaker's credibility and moral character), pathos (emotional appeal), and logos (logical reasoning).

Ethos makes the audience trust the speaker, pathos engages the emotions to shape attitudes, and logos appeals to reason through structured arguments. These modes have become foundational in analysing political speech. Cicero and Quintilian, Roman rhetoricians, extended these ideas by formalizing the five canons of rhetoric—invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery—which would guide rhetorical education for centuries (Cicero, 2001: II.115; Quintilian, 2006: II.13). Their contributions reinforced the centrality of eloquence, argumentation, and moral character in the study of rhetoric.

However, classical Greek and roman philosophy was more concerned with the study of rhetorics, not political discourse as we know it today. It was during the Renaissance when the academic works started foreshowing modern approaches to framing in political life. Machiavelli, in The Prince, famously declared that "it is not necessary for a prince to have all the good qualities... but it is very necessary to appear to have them" (Machiavelli, 2003: 61). In other words, the presentation, appearances are often more important than reality itself; success depends not on truth, but on effective persuasion and the control of public perception. Similarly to Machiavelli, thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau also emphasized the special place and role of language in public affairs, however, this role was not always presented in positive light.

Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, asserted that "covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.", highlighting the necessity of enforcement through physical power but also the centrality of agreements to authority (Hobbes, 1998: 117). However, he also warned of the dangers of linguistic ambiguity: "the multiplication of absurdities... ariseth from the abuse of words" (Hobbes, 1998: 21). Therefore, language was a double-edge sword which was necessary to maintain social order, but could be used to abuse power and a weapon against political stability. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that language plays a key role in politics – be that a positive or a negative role, but certainly one that cannot be avoided.

Similarly, Locke also recognised the foundational role of language in politics. In *Two Treatises of Government*, he argued that legitimate political authority is derived from the rational consent of free individuals: "the consent of free men... must be given by some manifest act or declaration" (Locke, 1988: 287). Language enables the articulation of natural rights, the limits of governmental power, and the principles of lawful governance, helping to preserve freedom and rights. The same can be said for the work of Rousseau (Rousseau, 2004). If we agree with the idea that there is general will and a common good that comes together under the framework of the social contract, language has to be the medium that enable people to articulate and reconcile their individual interests within a communal framework. There is only one way to ensure that 'the people, being subject to the laws, become their author' (Rousseau, 2004: 62). That is through deliberation, which without language, is not possible.

In this sense 19th and 20th century accounts within language-based studies or linguistics carried on the accumulated knowledge and further integrated the different fields of study. However,

many scholars were not very supportive of linking language-based science to other academic areas, yet their conceptual work make them essential to understand contemporary views on political discourse. In the 19th century and early 20th century, the study of language was a rather limited field, at least for political scientists, as language was defined in its 'narrow sense' as a textual unit. This meant that main focus was the analysis of words (regardless of context), guided by logic and in certain cases by models taken over from natural sciences. Ferdinand de Saussure was one of the pioneers who studied 'the laws and signs that guide languages' (an early definition for the field of semantics) and focused on underlying structures of language and their way of shaping meaning (Saussure, 1966: 33). This approach was also championed by Charles Morris, who defined semantics as the study of the relation of symbols to the things (in the world) and their meaning (Morris, 1938: 6-7).

According to this approach, language should be understood as a system of signs and each sign is determined by its place in the system, that is, its reciprocal relationship with the signals around it. The language sign is independent of context and pre-exists the individual user, while the sign is composed of the signifier (sound-image) and the signified (concept) which are inseparable. Saussure (1966) defined "language" (la langue) as an internalized system of symbolic units (signs) marked by their intrasystemic relations, while "speech" (la parole) was considered as the empirical speech activity (Gasparov, 2021). However, given this structuralist approach to linguistics – which was taken further by other scholars such as Claude Lévi-Strauss (1955, 1968) –, the study of language remained a closed system up until the pragmatic-cognitive turn in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the work of Edelman (1964) already signaled a change in paradigm in semiotics (and politics), bringing this field closer to contemporary political science.

4.2. Text and Context as Units of Analysis

From the second half of the 20th century, language-based research started to move away from the narrow sense of language to include new aspects in the field. In this process, the emergence of a theory put forward by J. L. Austin, called speech act theory played an important role, as did the work of American philosopher J.R. Searle who developed Austin's framework further. The basic idea was that words are not only sources of information but they are also used to carry out action; there are aims beyond words or phrases when a speaker says something (Austin, 1962; Hidayat, 2016). According to Searle (1969, 1979), there are five illocutionary points that speakers can achieve by propositions in an utterance, namely: the assertive, commissive, directive, declaratory and expressive illocutionary points.

The assertive point is reached when speakers present how things are in the world; the commissive point when they commit themselves to doing something; the directive point when they make an attempt to get hearers to do something; the declaratory point when they do things in the world at the moment of the utterance solely by virtue of saying that they do; and the expressive point when they express their attitudes about objects and facts of the world (Vanderkeven and Kubo, 2002: 1-21).

Beaugrande and Dressler (1972) also argued that the analysis of words and sentences is not enough as they do not provide a comprehensive picture. Instead, linguistic analysis should concentrate on how texts function in human conditions and therefore linguistics should not align itself with the rigidness and inflexibility of physics and mathematics (Beaugrande and Dressler, 1972). The science of text therefore should not look for rules and laws, but discover regularities, strategies, motivations, preferences and defaults; understanding human reasoning when conveying knowledge in text is therefore more adequate than looking for logical proofs. Beaugrande and Dressler (1972) defined a text as a "communicative occurrence" which meets a set of standards (cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, intertextuality).

At the same time that linguistics moved away from word as unit of analysis towards texts and contexts, so did the political theorists whose main concern was to understand political science through language. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe came up with a new approach to analyzing the world, combining post-Marxist social thinking and post-Saussurian linguistics (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990, 1996; Mouffe, 1993). By merging together the work of other Marxist thinkers, such as the theories of hegemony and consent of Gramsci (1973) and the concept of ideological struggle of Althusser (1971), Laclau and Mouffle (1985) argued that elites within a society engage in discourse process to create popular consent for the unequal distribution of wealth and power. In other words, different social groups and their hierarchy can all be traced back to discourse: elites exercise their social and discursive hegemony by defining and upholding social structures (Laclau, 1990: 33).

Therefore, a world outside of discourse does not exist: the discursive and non-discursive worlds cannot be separated from each other (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 66). As argued by Breeze (2011), this argument can be regarded as a poststructuralist stance in the field of discourse studies, given that it echoes Foucault's (1972) famous "regularity in dispersion", an idea that it

is discourse itself, "the structuring of a discursive field", where we find specific rules concerning the functioning of discursive elements.

What essentially Laclau and Mouffe argue for is the idea that all social phenomena are mediated through discourse. Various discourses exist at the same time and they all structure the world around us in different ways as they define what is "true". Therefore, the meanings of social phenomena are never fixed; the struggle between discourses is constant. As such the subject of analysis of the discourse theory, as proposed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), is not to aim to find the true meaning of a social phenomenon, but rather to assess the asymmetric realities between the constructed reality by discourses. This idea brings discourse theory quite close, once again, to the genealogical work of Foucault, who argues (Foucault, 1972) that the task of the genealogist is to immerse themselves in power struggles that shape historical forms of discourse.

In this sense, the work of Foucault on poststructuralism always comes back as a clear reference point in discourse theories given that the French philosopher had a significant impact on the way linguistics understands the meaning of discourse in society (not to mention the emphasis he placed on the popularization of the concept of 'discourse'). However, as suggested by Fairclough (1993: 37), what Michel Foucault really contributed to was the field of social theory, as he not only mapped out the relationship between discourse and power, but also the discursive construction of social subjects and knowledge and the functioning of discourse in social change. Foucault's theoretical work was concerned with discursive practices as constitutive of knowledge; he assessed the conditions of transformation of knowledge associated with a discursive formation (Fairclough, 1993: 37).

Furthermore, the aim of Foucault's research was also to analyze "regimes of truth" and their history. In other words, he was interested in studying the rules that determine which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a given historical era, as well as how knowledge is historically ordered (Potter, 2005: 86; Jorgensen and Phillips, 1999: 12; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 102-103). These included, amongst other topics, the development, the fall and re-occurrence of statements on questions such as mental health (Foucault, 1965), sexuality (1978) and discipline and punishment (1977). Foucault called this the "archaeology of knowledge" or simply, "archeology" (Foucault, 1989). In his early work, he defined discourse as:

"a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation [...Discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of

conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form [...] it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history [...] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality" (Foucault, 1972: 117).

Thus, Foucault adhered to the general social constructionist premise that knowledge is not just a reflection of reality. Truth is a discursive construction and different regimes of knowledge determine what is true and false (Jorgensen and Phillips, 1999: 123). However, Foucault became more post-structuralist as he shifted his focus from the object of social interaction to the subjects, exploring the question of agency (Foucault, 1977, 1978; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 118-119). Instead of treating agents and structures as primary categories, Foucault focused on power. Similarly to discourse, power does not belong to particular agents such as individuals, the state or groups with particular interests; rather, power is spread across different social practices. Throughout his work, Foucault showed how specific opinions came to be formed and preserved. This today is commonly referred to as hegemonic discourse which can be defined as the "dominant viewpoint(s) throughout society, kept stable by political power dynamics" (MacDonald, 2003: 32).

4.3. Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA), originally introduced in a seminal book by Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, Bob Hodge and Tony Trew (1979) and later developed by Norman Fairclough (1989) in the UK, Ruth Wodak (1989) in Austria and Teun A. van Dijk in the Netherlands, took the theoretical grounding of social constructivist discourse theory further, often referencing Foucault and Althusser as primary inspiration. CDA introduced the study of discourses to a number of disciplines – including political science, international relations and even nationalism studies just to mention the most relevant ones for the current research – providing a bridge between disciplines and exchange of information between political and linguistic theory.

What unites the different sub-disciplines within critical theory is that they all carry out a systematic, text-based exploration of language to reveal its role in power and ideologies (Fowler, et al., 1979; Fairclough, 1989, 1995; van Dijk, 1999; Wodak and Meyer, 2016). After all, the study of discourse – a "form of language" – is about "talk and text in context", meaning that discourse analysis is only meaningful within a particular social and political theory, alongside its core ontological assumptions and overall political purposes (van Dijk, 1997: 3). As such, discourse has three, integrated dimensions: language use (assessed by linguistics to

study language), communication of beliefs (approached by psychology to study beliefs and the way they are communicated) and interaction in social situations (for the assessment of interactions in social situations) (van Dijk, 1997: 2). This also means that the core difference between the theoretical approach proposed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and CDA is that the latter re-introduces text-analysis to social studies to counteract the lack of linguistic focus of the former.

There exists a number of different ways to categorize the heterogeneous, diverse and often overlapping approaches within the field of CDA. As Benke (2000) and Luke (2002) argued, the difference is to be found in the extent to which theorists analyze the linguistic (or micro) and the social (or macro) aspects of discourse. Therefore, as put forward by Luke (2002: 100), CDA involves a principled and transparent movement back and forth between microanalysis of texts (via the use of various tools of linguistic, semiotic and literary analysis), and the microanalysis of social formations (i.e. institutions and power relations) that these texts construct. Those who wished to focus on the constitutive force of discourse and analyze the power relations implicated in subject positions favoured Fairclough's (1995) method of textually-oriented discourse analysis (abbreviated as TODA).

Fairclough understood discourse as an "active relation to reality"; he claimed that language signifies reality in the sense of constructing meanings for it, rather than merely referring to objects which are taken to be given in reality (Fairclough, 1993: 42). As such Fairclough defined discourse as "a form of social practice" which implies that discourse is both a mode of action, a form in which people may act upon the world, as well as a mode of representation (Fairclough, 1993: 63). His concept of discourse is built on three dimensions, built on both social and linguistic arguments. Any instance of discourse – or in the words of Fairclough, 'discursive event' – is understood as a piece of text, discourse practice and social practice.

The first allows the theory to assess the discourse as a subject of language analysis, the second ensures that the nature of the processes of text production and interpretation can be highlighted, while the social practice dimension "attends to issues of concern in social analysis (such as the institutional and organizational circumstances of the discursive event and how that shapes the nature of the discursive practice, and the constitutive/constructive effects of discourse referred to above)" (Fairclough, 1993: 4). Texts, in the view of Fairclough (1993: 4), are understood as "any product written or spoken", while van Dijk (1997: 3) distinguished between talk (spoken language) and text (written language) when referring to language use.

4.4. The Cognitive Turn in Political Discourse

At the beginning of the 1970s, cognitive psychology went beyond the self-imposed limitations of the study of the mental processing of words and isolated sentences, and scholars began to study the production, comprehension and memory of discourse. The cognitive approach was developed on the basis of semantic and pragmatic approaches and presented a new, integrated way to understand political discourse.

This approach seeks to show how knowledge of politics, political discourse and political ideologies are stored in long-term memory (as personal or 'episodic' memory) and social (or 'semantic') memory (Chilton, 2004: 51). Short-term memory deals with ongoing processes of discourse production and understanding, generating mental models of content and context (Chilton, 2004: 51-52). Long-term knowledge is frequently referred to as stored 'schemata', 'scenarios', 'scenes', 'conceptual models' or 'frames' which theorists defined in various ways (van Dijk, 1990, 1993, 2002; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Werth, 1999: 107). Framing in political science has integrated the frame theories of various disciplines, e.g. psychology, linguistics, media studies (Lakoff, 2004, 2009; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Schaffner and Sellers, 2010).

Cognitive frames or conceptual frames are semantic domains which relate to particular events, each containing certain scripts, which, in addition, contain particular roles (Goffman, 1986; Schank and Abelson, 1977; Brown and Yule, 1991; Ensink and Sauer, 2003; Ziem and Schwerin, 2014). From a linguistic perspective, framing is closely related to context. Context involves situation and language, its perception depends on the participants in the communication, and it is subject to negotiation, consequently, it is dynamic. Out of the three decisive factors of the situation (the mental, the physical and the social world), the mental world of the participants in a communicative situation, that is, their cognitive and emotional condition is the easiest to impact (Verschueren, 1999: 87-95). This explains why framing is exploited in political communication: emphasis can be changed unnoticeably to aspects of events or information which influence the audience in the desirable way.

Many theoretical works have explicitly adopted the notion of 'framing' to explain how choices of metaphor may relate to people's views and opinions on specific issues in given contexts (Semino, Demjén and Demmen, 2018). The focus here tends to be on framing as a process involving the use of language to reflect and facilitate different ways of understanding and

reasoning about things (Schön, 1993: 137). It is thought that metaphor works by mapping well understood source domains of experience (that are typically concrete) onto more schematic ones (that are typically abstract) (Kövecses, 2017). This is what Lakoff and Johnson mean when they define conceptual metaphors as "a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 36). Metaphors (given their cultural groundings) vary from culture to culture, but there are some general observations. For example, political concepts involving political action are conceptualized by movement or journey metaphors (for example, coming to a crossroads or moving towards a better future etc.) (Chilton, 2004: 52).

Within the field of discourse and nations, a key example for this process is the personification of nations. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 33-34), this involves the specification of a physical object as a person, allowing us to comprehend a wide variety of experience in terms of human motivations, characteristics, goals and actions. The metaphor 'Nation is a person' or 'Nation is a human body' allows the conceptualization of the collective as someone with human emotions (e.g., pride and anger) and own qualities. There might be certain social values (e.g., democratic, multicultural) and even own institutions (conceptualized as body parts) that define the community and set it apart from other social groups.

As such, this process is rooted in the experience of containment and boundary-setting, which is why states and nations have 'insiders', 'outsiders', a 'centre' and people 'on the margin' (Chilton, 2004: 52). This is directly connected to Chilton's (2004, 2014) other principal argument which later came to be known as Discourse Space Theory. People always look at the world in terms of dichotomous representations of good and evil, right and wrong and this is linked with the linguistic ability to evoke or reinforce these dichotomous representations in discourse in accordance with people's social goals (Cap, 2019: 19). The central goal involves getting others to share a common view on what is good and evil, right and wrong, and thus the "good" and "right" are conceptualized as "close to Self" and the "wrong" and "evil" as "remote to Self", meaning that a distance is created between the two parties (Cap, 2019: 19).

A subcategory of this personification process is the conceptualization of nations as family ('Nation is a family'). As highlighted by Lakoff (2002), the homeland is home, the members of the community are the siblings, and the political leader or government is the parent; however, their relationship with each other can be different depending on the context. On the one the hand, there is the strict father model where the collective (i.e., the family) is led by a strict leader (i.e., father) who believes in a strong work ethic, discipline and authority and sustains that the

success of the community depends on the members' ability to act within the established moral system. This model tends to be used by political parties that have a conservative ideology, favouring moral authority, individual responsibility and competition. On the other hand, there is the nurturing parent model which puts emphasis on teaching children (i.e., citizens) how to have empathy and respect for others and treat them as sources of their own happiness, while ensuring the maximum protection of the children from external dangerous. This approach to viewing the community tends to be favoured by left-wing, socialist parties that emphasize social responsibility and equity through protection and redistribution.

However, not only the concept of nations, but also the process of nation-building can be understood through metaphors. Ideas or arguments may be conceptualized as buildings, and as such, the abstract domain of nations is imagined through the concrete domain of buildings (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 46). As argued by Kolstø (2000), this also means that there are consciously acting agents ('builders' who are politicians leading the process) who follow strategies (i.e., plans) in order to reach their goals (i.e., 'build' or 'frame' the nation). Therefore, building on the definitions of Goffman (1986) and Entman (1993), reality can be understood as a schema of interpretation and as such the process of framing refers to strategic stressing of certain aspects of reality and the neglect of others.

The significance of framing as a strategy of political communication is that it facilitates the learning process by the target audience, during which they acquire skills to complement scripts and frames even though they are not explicitly worded (Druckman, 2010). As a result, the perspective provided to the voters sticks in their memories. In campaign communication, framing may range from 'equivalence framing' (attributing minimal difference to two things) to 'emphasis framing' (placing something in two opposing contexts suggesting contradictory judgement) (Druckman, 2010: 187), the latter being more typical in competing political programmes. Obviously, framing in political communication is a tool of persuasion as it is intended to influence the voters' attitude and behaviour.

The relevance of framing as a strategy for social movements was assessed by Snow and Benford (1998, 2000) who, taking the work of Klandermans (1984) further, argued that the successful mobilization of social movements depends on the successful application of three core frame elements: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivation framing. The first involves the diagnosis of a certain problem or challenge that needs to be solved and the ascription of blame to point towards the source of the issue; the second calls for a proposal of a specific plan

or strategy as a solution to the identified problem; while motivation framing means the encouragement of individuals to take part in the collective action to carry out the proposed solution (Snow and Benford, 1988).

5. The Case of Catalonia and Scotland: A Historical and Political Outlook

5.1. The History of Catalan Self-Governance and Nationalism

Over its long history, the territories that together form modern Catalonia – located on the northeastern part of the Iberian Peninsula, with Barcelona being its capital – was conquered by a number of different groups, including the Romans, Visigoths, Muslims and Franks, and formed part of the County of Barcelona. The term *Catalunya* (Catalonia) to describe this land would only be used from the 1150s, after the County of Barcelona (*Comtat de Barcelona*) and the Kingdom of Aragon (*Regne d'Aragó*) merged in a personal union in 1137, creating the Crown of Aragon (*Corona d'Aragó*) (Dowling, 2022: 51; Freedman, 1988: 5). The County of Barcelona, and its successor, the Principality of Catalonia (*Principat de Catalunya*) enjoyed a rapid economic growth in the Crown as Aragon expanded in the Mediterranean region, conquering new territories and increasing the importance of the Principality as key trading power of the Mediterranean Sea (Keating, 1996: 115).

In 1469, Aragon entered a dynastic union with the Kingdom of Castile (*Reino de Castilla*), leading to the *de facto* creation of the Kingdom of Spain (*Reino de España*).[4] However, this did not mean the close fusion of two realms. The decentralized nature of the Crown of Aragon was extended and followed, allowing the Principality of Catalonia to retain key political-administrative structures, namely its own legislative body (*Corts*), executive branch (*Generalitat*) and language (Catalan) (Keating, 1996: 115; Serrano Daura, 2019: 40; Martínez Laínez, 2016: 141-143; Anderle, 2001: 85).

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Kingdom of Spain aimed to create a more centralized monarchy, reducing the autonomy that Catalan territories had enjoyed for centuries. The Thirty Years' War was still ongoing in Europe, when the Catalan peasantry rebelled against King Philip IV; they protested against the royal army stationed in Catalonia and the increasing levels of taxation that the monarch had imposed (Eaude, 2008: 59). This uprising, lasting between 1640 and 1659, became known as *Guerra dels Segadors* (Reaper's War). Catalonia briefly became independent, but this did not last long. The region surrendered, came out of the conflict with reduced autonomy and had to face territorial losses. In 1659, the Franco-Spanish war ended with the Treaty of the Pyrenees, which ceded control over the Catalan territories Roussillon and

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[4] The unification process also included the conquest of Granada, the last Moorish entity (1492) and of Navarra, the Basque territories (at the beginning of the 16th century), all during the life of Ferdinand of Aragon.

Cerdanya to France (Eaude, 2008: 60), this way cutting the Catalan lands into two. Most of them stayed under Spain whereas some came to be ruled by neighbouring France.

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) ended with the victory of the Bourbons. Philip V - the grandson of Louis XIV, considered as the embodiment of absolutism - wished to impose the centralized French state model on Spain. Given that the majority of the Catalan elite had fought against him, supporting his Habsburg opponent, the king issued the *Nova Planta* decrees to abolish the special rights and regional institutions in the Crown of Aragon (Nemes, 2015: 118). This meant that both the Catalan *Generalitat* and *Corts* were abolished, all regional rights and competences were re-centralized, and Castilian was made the official language in the former territories of Aragon (Anderle, 2009: 133; Szente-Varga, 2012: 53). However, as highlighted by Keating (1996: 116) and Vilar (1962: 144), this forced process of centralization was not successful due to dynastic conflicts. Not to mention that, from the 19th century, centralization was undermined further by economic growth the revival of Catalan culture. The re-birth of Catalan culture, or better known as *Renaixença*, started as a linguistic-cultural movement to foster Catalan language use and support local arts, but ended up as a political movement fighting for the restoration of historical regional institutions and autonomous powers (Sipos, 2009: 80).

The first modern Catalan party was the conservative-regionalist Regionalist League (*Lliga Regionalista*), which in 1907 joined forces with other regional organizations in order to restore Catalan institutions. As a result of the success of the League, the Commonwealth of Catalonia (*Mancomunitat de Catalunya*) was set up in 1914, which administratively united the four provinces of Catalonia (Girona, Lleida, Tarragona and Barcelona) (Sipos, 2009: 81; Barcells, 1996: 169). Although the unification of the historical provinces was carried out to coordinate the administrative matters between the four units, the creation of a new assembly with provincial delegates and regional competences resembled the historical institutions of the Principality of Catalonia (Domonkos, 2010: 76).

Following a brief break in the institutional development of Catalonia during the short-lived Primo de Rivera dictatorship[5], an official autonomous status was negotiated with the Central State: Catalan institutions were restored, and the creation of a semi-federal Spanish State was planned (Keating, 1996: 119). The idea was to create a State where the different units of the

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[5] The Primo de Rivera military dictatorship started in 1923 and lasted until the proclamation of the Spanish Republic in 1931.

country could set up autonomous regions and draft their own Statutes of Autonomy with competences devolved from the Spanish State. By 1931, Catalonia became the first autonomous territory within the constitutional system of Spain, its institutional framework was solidified in the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (*Estatut d'Autonomia de Catalunya* or popularly known as *Estatut de Núria*) in 1932. A nationalist party advocating for independence, the Republican Left of Catalonia (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* or ERC) became the largest regional Catalan party which rooted its political programme in socialism. However, the lifespan of the autonomous Catalonia was not long: the rise of Francisco Franco[6] during and following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) resulted in the abolishment of the Catalan Statute, rapid centralization of power and ban on all regionally spoken minority languages which lasted during the entirety of the Franco dictatorship (1939-1975) (Harsányi, 1998: 123; García de Cortázar and González Vesga, 1997: 343).

Catalan nationalism and self-governance gained new momentum following the death of Franco; Spain became a constitutional monarchy under the new 1978 Spanish Constitution. The new fundamental law was the product of consensus between the different parties and historical regions (namely Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia) (Guibernau, 1997: 93). This meant that the document both respected the will of the political parties that wished to protect the sovereignty of the Spanish State and those that aimed to secure autonomous competences for their respective regions (Szilágyi, 1996: 41). The new Constitution emphasized both the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation" and the "right of autonomy of the nationalities[7] and regions", not factoring in that this duality could potentially lead to conflict within Spain (Spanish Constitution, 1978: 26; García de Cortázar and González Vesga, 1997: 374; Szilágyi, 2007: 29). As a result, a semi-federal state structure emerged, which resembled the semi-federal structure partially introduced before the Spanish Civil War (Colomer, 1998). 17 autonomous communities and 2 autonomous cities were established in the country, Catalon is being among the first territories to officially become an Autonomous Community in 1979.

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[6] Spanish dictator who led Spain between 1939 and 1975.
[7] The term '*Nacionalidad*' in the Spanish Constitution refers to the historical sub-state regions with distinct political and cultural characters, such as the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia.

Figure 1: Current Administrative Map of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia

Source: González (2016)

The modern constitutional-administrative framework of the autonomous Catalonia was based on a series of legislations that defined the competences of the Parliament of Catalonia, the President of Catalonia and the Executive Council (all together called *Generalitat de Catalunya*). The Spanish Constitution (1978) and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (1979) (which was revised and replaced by a new Catalan Statute in 2006) serve as the fundamental basis for the modern Catalan autonomous order. The Constitution defines the pool of competences that can be transferred to autonomous communities, while the Statute specifies powers acquired by the *Generalitat*. However, some exclusive powers of the Spanish State only set basic legal frameworks and rules, while allowing and respecting the right of autonomous communities to develop these further at a regional level (for example, environmental protection). Not to mention that the Government of Catalonia also partially monitors competences shared with the Spanish State (such as the organization of the banking sector) and matters where the Catalan Government may approve its own provisions to execute State legislation (Catalan Statute of Autonomy, 2006: 75-76). This means that competences of the State and of the Autonomous Community are far more intertwined than it first seems.

During and immediately following the Spanish Transition, Catalans were one of the most vocal supporters of the new constitutional order which had promised autonomy for the historical nationalities and regions of Spain (Spanish Constitution, 1978). During the 1978 constitutional referendum, over 90 percent of the Catalan population approved the Spanish Constitution, whereas in Spain the total votes in favour were 88 percent (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2019). Furthermore, the majority of Catalans also supported the creation of the Catalan Autonomous Community within Spain, with 88 percent voting in favour in 1979 (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2019). Not to mention that the largest Catalan party at the time, Convergence and Union (*Convergència i Unió* or CiU) also supported the creation of the State of Autonomies as it envisioned an asymmetrical constitutional structure where the historic nationalities were given more autonomous powers, while the regions' own competences remained more restricted (CiU, 2012: 10; Angulo, 1982). The first Catalan regional elections took place in 1980.

Although the Catalan electorate, since the early 20th century, has been leaning towards communist and socialist parties, the emergence of the new regional arena re-defined political dynamics. The Catalan legislative body is unicameral with the province of Barcelona currently sending 85, Tarragona 18, Girona 17 and Lleida 15 members (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2024). Voters in these provinces can vote for a closed list of candidates rather than single candidates and the D'Hondt method is used to determine the number of seats won by parties in each constituency. This allows for a proportional representation of parties in Parliament, making coalition and minority government more likely. A total of 135 members of Parliament are elected for a four-year term; it is their duty to elect the President of Catalonia who forms regional government and leads Catalonia. The election of the President requires an absolute majority, but if this fails, a simple majority is sufficient in the second round.

The results of the first regional election in 1980 showed that the re-funded ERC only played a limited role in Catalan politics and for decades to come, it remained a single-issue party that advocated for the independence of Catalonia and for all Spanish territories where Catalan is spoken (Serra, 2024:1). CiU, an alliance between two regional organizations, namely the larger *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC) and the smaller *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* (UDC), emerged as the dominant force. Ideologically, the party positioned itself as a centre-right, Catalan political formation, continuously campaigning for the need to transfer more powers to the regional pool of competences, while rejecting the possibility of independence (until the early 2010s) (Rico and Liñeira, 2014: 257; Massetti, 2009: 507).

The first president of CiU, Jordi Pujol[8], not only became the longest standing leader of the party, but also left his mark on regional politics. Pujol first became the President of the *Generalitat* in 1980 and left office in 2003, meaning that he had won six consecutive regional elections. Under his leadership, CiU became one of the largest regional parties in Spain, playing a key role in the Spanish Transition to democracy and the development of Catalan self-governance (Barrio, 2014: 9). In 2003, Pujol stepped down as leader and Artur Mas[9] assumed the leadership of the party. However, the new candidate failed to secure a majority in 2003 and 2006, while the pro-independence ERC secured its best results since 1980.

5.2. Political Tendencies Since the 'Secessionist Turn' in 2010-2012

The Spanish Constitutional Court's decision in 2010 to declare 14 articles of the new 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy unconstitutional and alter a series of others became an important milestone is Catalan party politics. The Court declared that defining Catalonia as a nation "lacks legal grounds" given that Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution recognized the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation" (Tribunal Constitucional de España, 2010). With Catalan regional elections in 2010, Mas shifted the CiU's position to support Catalonia's right to decide about its future and successfully led the party to regional victory in 2010 (Field, 2015: 122).

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[8] Founding member of CiU and the first democratically elected President of Catalonia following the Transition. He led Catalonia between 1980 and 2003.
[9] Leader of CiU from 2003 until its dissolution and President of Catalonia between 2010 and 2016.

Figure 2: Comparison Between the 2006 and 2010 Regional Election Results

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (2010)

Figure 2 shows the official results published by the *Generalitat de Catalunya* (2010). CiU returned to power after 7 years in opposition with seats in Parliament increasing from 48 to 62 and winning 38.4 percent of the popular votes. The Socialist Party of Catalonia (*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* or PSC)[10] came second with 28 seats and 18.38 percent of the popular vote, the third was the Popular Party of Catalonia (*Partit Popular de Catalunya* or PPC)[11] with 18 seats and 12.37 percent. These three parties were followed by smaller organizations, such ERC, the Initiative for Catalonia Greens–United and Alternative Left (*Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds–Esquerra Unida i Alternativa* or ICV–EUiA)[12], Citizens–Party of the Citizenry (*Ciutadans–Partit de la Ciutadania* or C's)[13] and Catalan Solidarity for Independence

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[10] The Catalan branch of the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español* or PSOE) which is a centre-left, social-democratic party that historically supported the federal country model where Catalonia would be one of the federal states of Spain instead of an autonomous community (Roller and Van Houten, 2008:13-14.). This makes the positioning of the PSC in the Catalan regional landscape difficult as for them the status quo (autonomy) is not enough but independence is inacceptable. This highlights the diversity that exists among Catalan parties that support Spanish unity.

[11] The Catalan branch of the Spanish People's Party which is a centre-right, liberal-conservative party which supports and wishes to protect the current constitutional model of Spain and in it, Catalonia position as autonomous community.

[12] It was a left-wing, green electoral alliance between *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds* and *Esquerra Unida i Alternativa* who support Spanish unity, but wish to create a Spanish Republic where Catalonia is one among the recognized nations in a plurinational country.

[13] A liberal, centric party created in Barcelona in 2006 that advocates for the unity of Spain, the maintenance of the State of Autonomies. After the 2010-2022 turn, they quickly became the counter-pole of Catalan separatist nationalism.

(*Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència* or SI)[14]. The result meant that CiU, led by Mas, could form a government with a simple majority.

When analyzing Catalan politics in 2010, it becomes clear that CiU was in fact at the very centre of the political spectrum in Catalonia allowing it to position itself as a 'catch-all party'. From the left, it was challenged by both the unionist PSC, the ICV–EUiA and the separatist ERC and from the Right, by the unionist PP and C's. Moreover, the last time CiU reached an electoral result this significant was in 1995. However, for the first time, a single-issue electoral coalition also won seats in Parliament: SI campaigned to make Catalonia a new state of Europe. In the 2010 regional elections, the parties advocating for some form of Catalan self-determination (CiU advocating for the 'right to de decide', while ERC and SI aiming for independence) enjoyed the support of 1,524,924 Catalans (out of 5,363,688 registered voters) and had 76 deputies, accounting for 56.3 percent of all seats in Parliament. Turnout for the election was not particularly higher than previous elections: 58.8 percent of voting age Catalans cast their ballots.

Although CiU's position was stable, Artur Mas decided to hold a snap election in November 2012 after mass demonstrations on 11th September that explicitly called for the Catalan Government to start preparing for the breakaway from Spain. This move from Mas (which was likely to have been based on the political calculation that the biggest party of Catalonia could be a potential winner of the social movement advocating for independence) proved to be misguided as the highest turnout (67.8 percent) for any Catalan autonomous elections in the post-Transition history did not favour Mas' party.

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[14] A short-lived electoral coalition which supported Catalan separatist nationalism and criticized other nationalist parties (ERC and CiU) for not being radical enough about forcing secession from Spain.

Figure 3: Composition of Catalan Parliament (2012)

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (2012)

The results of the 2012 Catalan elections, on the one hand, resulted in CiU slowly losing its dominant position as the number one regional party and, on the other, meant that Catalan nationalism now had two main parties. CiU lost 7.7 percent of the popular vote and 12 seats since the 2010 elections. At the same time, the more left-leaning ERC emerged as the second most voted party, claiming 13.7 percent of the popular vote and 21 seats in Parliament. PSC became the third power, followed by the PP, the ICV–EUiA, C's and a new party, the socialist, pro-independence Popular Unity Candidacy (*Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* or CUP).[15]

Despite the unsuccessful political manoeuvring, Artur Mas, with the votes of CiU and ERC, was re-elected President of Catalonia as he made an agreement with leading ERC politicians to hold a self-determination referendum[16] in 2014. The alliance now had 70 seats in Parliament and when accounting for CUP as well, secessionist parties had 73 deputies (which represent 54 percent of seats and in total 1,740,818 voters out of 5,413,868 registered). The nationalist, pro-independence government parties still had a clear majority in Parliament.

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[15] Far-left party advocating for the independence of Catalonia and for all Spanish territories where Catalan (or Valencian) is spoken, commonly referred to as 'Catalan Countries' or *'Països Catalans'.*

[16] This was a non-binding public consultation given that a legally binding referendum on secession is not possible under the terms of the Spanish Constitution.

Figure 4: Composition of Catalan Parliament (2015)

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (2015)

In 2015, following the non-binding 2014 independence consultation, Artur Mas decided to call another snap election which set a new record in turnout with 75 percent of Catalans voting. However, for the nationalist government, this also proved to be a strategic mistake. Mas' move towards full support of Catalan independence soon led to the dissolution of CiU as UDC did not support the secessionist platform (Barrio, 2014: 10). The CDC was re-organized and succeeded by a new party, called Catalan European Democratic Party (*Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català* or PDeCAT), carrying on the legacy and success of the former organization. In 2015, PDeCAT joined a pro-independence electoral alliance with ERC, called Together for Yes (*Junts pel Sí* or JxSí).

The new electoral coalition however lost 9 seats and 4.8 percent of the popular vote since the last elections in 2012. At the same time, CUP increased its share by 4.7 percent of the popular vote, translating to 10 seats in Parliament. This meant that pro-independence parties (PDeCAT, ERC and CUP) secured 53.3 percent in Parliament with their 72 deputies. Although this is a slight decrease in seats, it must be taken into account that they successfully increased their pool of voters to 1,963,508 (out of 5,510,853 registered citizens).

The biggest winner of the snap election was the Spanish unionist, Citizens–Party of the Citizenry which now had 25 deputies and a share of 17.9 percent of the regional ballots.

However, during government formation, it became clear that real winner of the snap election was in fact CUP which with 10 members in Parliament became 'the Catalan kingmaker'. *Junts pel Sí* did not have majority in Parliament and therefore had to look for other partners. CUP did not support the investiture of Artur Mas; therefore, to form a separatist government, a new candidate had to be selected.

An agreement was reached with CUP to nominate the then Mayor of Girona, Carles Puigdemont[17] – instead of Mas – as new President of Catalonia (Cetrà and Harvey, 2018: 6). His first move in Parliament already signalled that relations between Madrid and Barcelona would be deteriorating rapidly after his rise to power; Puigdemont was the first Catalan President in post-Transition history who took office without swearing allegiance to the Spanish king and the Spanish Constitution (Roger, 2016). Puigdemont was a key figure in organizing the 2017 Independence Referendum[18] which not only led to the illegal, unilateral Declaration of Catalan Independence, but also to the temporal suspension of autonomous institutions by the Spanish Government and the conviction of a number of leading Catalan politicians for breaking the constitutional order and the Spanish law.[19]

The Spanish Government enforced direct rule in Spain and proclaimed new regional elections in December, 2017 which to this day claim the highest turnout for any regional elections in Catalonia (79.1 percent).

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[17] President of Catalonia between 2016 and 2017. He joined *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* in 1980, later became member of the PDeCAT. Following the 2017 events and his conflict with PDeCAT over the party's future, in 2020 he founded a new party, *Junts per Catalunya* (Together for Catalonia).

[18] The 2017 Referendum was held unconstitutionally, and the Spanish Government decided to intervene with police force to restore the rule of law.

[19] Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez pardoned nine jailed Catalan leaders in 2021 and called for new dialogue between Barcelona and Madrid.

Figure 5: Composition of Catalan Parliament (2017)

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (2017)

The unionist C's emerged as the largest party of Catalonia with 36 seats, accounting for 25.4 percent of the popular vote. PDeCAT ran on a common platform with independents supporting Puigdemont under the name 'Together for Catalonia' (*Junts per Catalunya* or simply JuntsxCat). JuntsxCat came second and ERC secured third place. CUP, having lost six seats since the last elections in 2015, now only had 4 Members of Parliament. This means that altogether the parties supporting Catalan independence had 70 deputies (51.6 percent); only a narrow majority for the cause of the Catalan Republic and the lowest number since 2010, but they increased their number of voters to a record 2,079,340 people. As a result, the pro-independence forces could elect a new leader, albeit with some difficulties. Eight Members of Parliament were either in exile or detained by the Spanish authorities and the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled that Puigdemont – being in self-exile in Belgium – could not be named President of Catalonia as he has to be present during the investiture (Tribunal Constitucional de España, 2018). Therefore, Quim Torra, an independent who ran on a *Junts per Catalunya* ticket was elected as 131st President of Catalonia.

However, Torra was soon removed from power by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2020 for not guaranteeing the *Generalitat's* neutrality during elections and for disobeying the Central Election board (*Junta Electoral Central*) explicit instructions to remove pro-independence

banners from government buildings (Tribunal Supremo de España, 2020). The Catalan Vice-President, Pere Aragonès (ERC) became the interim president until the 2021 Catalan elections. In 2021, elections were held during the COVID-19 crisis and ERC became the most-voted nationalist party of Catalonia, followed by Together for Catalonia (*Junts per Catalonia*[20] or Junts), and consequently, Aragonès was named President of Catalonia to lead the coalition government formed by the two parties.

Figure 6: Composition of Catalan Parliament (2021)

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (2021)

The pro-independence parties (ERC, Junts and CUP) now had 74 deputies (54.8 percent) in Parliament; however, with only 1,366,044 votes, they had lost close to 700,000 voters who either stayed at home due to the pandemic or voted for another party. The pro-union, PSC became the number one pro-union party of Catalonia with 23 percent of the popular vote (while the other key force in favour of Spanish unity, C's lost 30 seats since the last election). The

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[20] It is important not to confuse the two political forces that ran under the name *Junts per Catalunya*. The first *Junts per Catalunya* (abbreviated as JuntsxCat) was a political platform created in 2017 to unite PDeCAT and other independent organizations that supported Carles Puigdemont. However, relations between the different organizations and between Carles Puigdemont and PDeCAT became tense following the 2017 Catalan elections, resulting in the creation of a new party in 2018 by Puigdemont also called *Junts per Catalunya* (abbreviated as Junts). This party was the result of the merger of different smaller political parties (including green, liberal and big tent organizations), with a large number of former PDeCAT members also joining.

PSC's position was solidified in the 2024 region elections; after ERC lost the support of Junts and failed to pass the regional budget in Parliament, Aragonès had to call for a snap election.

5.3. The History of Scottish Self-Governance and Nationalism

As in the case of Catalonia, Scotland – located on the northern part of the island of Great Britain and directed from the capital city of Edinburgh – also enjoyed a long and rich history, with various groups dominating its territory. The Celts, Picts, Angels, Britons, Vikings and the Romans all contributed to Scottish history (Fraser, 2009; Pope, 2001). It was in the 9th century when the Gaelic *Dál Riata*[21] and Pictland merged to form the Kingdom of Alba; Donald II (889–900) was the first to be called *rí Alban* or 'King of Alba' (Woolf, 2007: 122-126). Given that the Gaelic language dominated this territory, the term Alba was used to refer to the territory, and this name is still officially used in Scottish Gaelic today to refer to Scotland. The following two centuries, on the one hand, brought a rapid economic development, turning the Kingdom into a feudal country, and on the other, led to the consolidation of the Scottish–English border under the Treaty of York (1237) (Somerset Fry and Somerset Fry, 2005: 55-56).

However, the English-Scottish relations were only settled for a short time-period. A succession crisis in Scotland led to King Edward I of England invading the country in 1296; but the Scottish nobility, led amongst others by William Wallace[22], revolted against the English (Somerset Fry and Somerset Fry, 2005: 72-73). The conflict ended with King Robert I (commonly known as Robert the Bruce) solidifying his position as Scottish King and his country as an independent kingdom. However, peace did not last long; the English, led by King Edward III, invaded again in 1333, aiming to help Edward Balliol to become King of Scotland instead of the son of Robert the Bruce (MacInnes, 2016: 11-59). The conflict ended in 1357 with the signing of the Treaty of Berwick, leading to Scotland maintaining its independence (Brown, 2002: 143).

Up until the early 18th century, the Kingdom of Scotland functioned as an independent sovereign state with its own Parliament, King and languages (Scottish Gaelic and Scots[23]). In 1603, however, James VI, King of Scotland, had also become the successor to the throne of the Kingdom of England, uniting the two entities under one crown (Levack, 1987; Clerk, 1993).

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[21] A Gaelic kingdom in the western part of Scotland and north-eastern areas of Ireland which existed between the 5th and 9th centuries.

[22] A Scottish knight, originally from a Welsh family, who became one of the key leaders during the First War of Scottish Independence (Mitchison, 2005: 2).

[23] Scottish Gaelic was the dominant language until the 12th century when Scots, a dialect of northern English, became the dominant language of most of the country. Gaelic only preserved its former status in the Scottish Highlands (Webster, 1997: 16).

The personal union evolved further in 1707 when the Kingdom of Great Britain was created: the Scottish self-governing political unit ceased to exist, as the powers of the Scottish Parliament were transferred to the Westminster Parliament in London (Keating, 1996: 163).

Although from 1707 Scotland functioned as a constituent unit of the Kingdom, it preserved a distinctive sub-state character from the rest of the British Isles, even following the 1800 Acts of Union when the Kingdom of Ireland was merged into Britain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (UK) was created (Pittock, 2008: 115). As highlighted by Mitchell (2003: 3), this Scottish distinctiveness could be preserved as the UK adopted a system of governance that was neither strictly federal nor extremely unitary: although national sovereignty was located in the UK Parliament, Scotland preserved its own judicial system (Scottish Law), its century-old educational system, separate Church and separate local government system. Moreover, the Westminster Parliament in London also ensured respect for some of the political-administrative distinctiveness of Scotland by drafting parallel versions of legislation and establishing a Secretary for Scotland to handle Scottish affairs in the UK Government (Soule et al., 2012: 2). This localism allowed the maintenance of an autonomous civil society that is claimed to have played an essential role in the continued renewal of Scottish identity, placed within the wider context of the British Isles, and later within the British Empire (Brown et al.,1996: 5).

However, this does not mean that Scottish culture did not pay a price for being included in a large political project. The two local languages, Gaelic and Scots, lost their privileged role as features of identity and means of communication given that, by the 18th century, standardized English became the sole language of instruction throughout the country (Keating, 1996: 165). Moreover, the rise of a new national identity that aimed to encompass all cultural and political markers of the UK challenged the sense of belonging in Scotland; the Scottish national identity was channeled into the UK-wide British identity, transforming the cultural and political roots of Scottish self-identification (Colley, 2003: 117).

Scottish nationalism and self-governance gained new momentum during the 20th century. Following the 1970 General Elections, the Scottish National Party (SNP)[24] entered British parliamentarism, which was historically divided between large catch-all, state-wide parties; the left-wing Labour Party, the right-wing Conservative and Unionist Party, and the smaller,

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[24] The Scottish Nationalist Party is a Scottish nationalist, regionalist party that was founded in 1934 with the principal aim to restore pre-Union national sovereignty in a fully independent Scotland.

centrist Liberal Democratic Party. The Scotland Act (1978) was passed by the UK Parliament, and in 1979, a referendum was called to create the Scottish Assembly (a regional legislative body with limited powers transferred from Westminster) and the Scottish Executive (a regional executive body with powers devolved from the UK Government) (Soule et al., 2012: 2). However, given that the largest party in Scotland at the time, the Labour Party was divided on the issue, only 32.9 percent of the electorate voted in favour of creating a devolved legislative body, failing to meet the minimum limit of 40 percent; the piece of legislation that could have restored regional self-governance was thus revoked (Democratic Progress Institute, 2014: 31).

The case for an autonomous Scotland was frozen until the mid-1980s, when the Labour Party and the Liberal Party[25] agreed to hold the Scottish Constitutional Convention (1989-1995) with two main aims: to reform the constitutional framework of the UK with the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, and to lead the Scottish self-governance movement to evade the further growth of the SNP (Paterson et. al, 2001: 10). This is supported by the fact that the SNP withdrew from the Convention because other parties refused to assess Scottish independence as an alternative path; it was up to the Labour and Liberal Party to determine the new framework for the devolved Scottish Administration (Paterson et. al, 2001: 12).

As a result, in 1997, the Labour Party included in its electoral manifesto the commitment to hold a referendum on the Scottish devolution process[26] (Labour Party, 1997). Following the victory of the Labour Party in the UK-wide General Elections, a dual-question referendum was held in 1997 to decide whether the electorate in Scotland wished to establish a new Scottish Administration, and to determine if Scots wished to transfer tax-varying powers from London to Edinburgh (Referendums Act, 1997). Given that both questions received an affirmative answer, the first Scottish Parliament elections were held in 1999, and the first Scottish Executive was set up and led by First Minister Donald Dewar[27] (Paterson et. al, 2001: 18).

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[25] The Labour Party and the Liberal Party have historically been the most widely supported parties in Scotland in UK General Elections (Keating, 1996:171).

[26] Devolution is a process by which powers of a central authority are transferred to a regional administration, in this case from the UK Government to the Scottish Administration.

[27] Donald Dewar was member of the Labour Party and served as Scottish First Minister from 1999 until his death in 2000.

Figure 7: Current Administrative Map of the Devolved Scotland in the United Kingdom

Source: Scotland Info (2024)

The modern constitutional-administrative framework of the devolved Scotland within the UK has been composed by a series of legislations that defined the competences of the First Minister of Scotland, the Scottish Executive[28] and the Scottish Parliament. The Scotland Act (1998) served as the fundamental basis for the new Scottish constitutional order as it had initiated the devolution of competences to regional (i.e., Scottish) level. The Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) are not only elected in the first-past-the-post system as in the case of the British Parliament, but through a so-called additional member system (AMS). This means that in the Scottish Parliament elections voters have two votes (Scottish Parliament, 2024). One for the given constituency in which the voter resides (constituency vote); the candidate with the highest number of votes wins the given constituency. The second vote is for the so-called regional vote, allowing Scottish voters to also choose a party or independent candidate (regional vote). There are 76 constituencies and 8 regions, the latter all elect 7 MSPs in proportion to the

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[28] Under the 2012 Scotland Act, the Scottish Executive was renamed to Scottish Government. The Government is led by the First Minister.

number of votes parties receive. With the 56 regional MSPs, a total of 129 members form the unicameral Scottish legislative body, frequently referred to as 'Holyrood'.

The nomination of the First Minister of Scotland requires the Parliament's support: if there is only one candidate, he or she requires a simple majority, whereas with multiple candidates, the nominee is chosen through an exhaustive ballot.[29] The nominee of the Parliament is formally appointed by the British Monarch and then he or she forms government. Under the leadership of the First Minister, the Scottish Government administers a wide range of competences independently within the territory of Scotland, while a number of powers – those with internal and UK-wide impact – are reserved by the UK Government (Scottish Parliament, 2018). The rule of thumb in this framework has been that if a competence was not clearly listed as being reserved by London, then it belongs to the regional pool of competences (Scottish Parliament, 2018).

However, a closer look at the framework outlines that in practice there are certain areas where the competences of the UK Government and the Scottish Administration overlap. For example, some areas of the British taxation policy, employment, social security and transport were devolved to the Scottish Government following the approval of Scotland Act (2012) and Scotland Act (2016), both of which modified the original 1998 legislation. Therefore, although the system was designed to be transparent with a clear list of reserved and devolved powers, in the last 20 years, the constitutional framework has become more and more complex as certain policy areas have been jointly overseen by the UK and the Scottish Governments.

5.4. Political Tendencies Since the 'Secessionist Turn' in 2007-2011

Although the 1997-1999 constitutional reform process for a devolved Scotland was largely driven by Labour and the Liberal Democrats, neither of them emerged as the largest regional political organization. The real winner of the new political arena was the SNP, which, not long after the creation of the devolved regional administration, became the dominant force in Scottish politics. With regard to its political ideology, as demonstrated by Garnett and Steven (2017: 172-173) and Mitchell and Cavanagh (2001: 249), there seems to be a wide consensus among scholars: the SNP has been categorized as a centre-left, Scottish nationalist, pro-independence party. In the past 20 years, the party has shown a long-term commitment for

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[29] Exhaustive ballot means that "MSPs vote in favour of their preferred candidate, or they abstain. The candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated each time until one candidate has received more votes in favour than the other candidates combined. That candidate becomes the Parliament's nominee" (Torrance, 2024).

creating an independent Scotland, fostering the regional welfare system and investing in technology and green energy (SNP, 1999; SNP, 2007; SNP, 2016).

Alex Salmond[30], the leader of the party between 1990-2000 and 2004-2014, played a major role in making the SNP a regional government party in Scotland. He ran on a platform that campaigned for the transfer of more powers to the Scottish Government in order to "empower the Scottish people" (SNP, 1999: 4; SNP, 2007: 2). Following two consecutive losses in the Scottish Parliament elections in 1999 and 2003, Salmond assumed the leadership and led the party to victory in 2007 (Camp, 2014).

Figure 8: Comparison Between the 2003 and 2007 Regional Election Results

Source: Scottish Parliament (2003; 2007)

The results of the 2007 elections already signalled that the SNP was rapidly increasing its share of votes and with that their MSPs. The official data published by the Scottish Parliament (2003;2007) is shown by Figure 9: the SNP increased their number of seats by 20, meaning that with 47 members they almost doubled their MSPs, but the Scottish Labour Party still remained dominant with 46 seats (648,374 constituency and 595,415 regional votes). They were followed by the Scottish Conservatives (18 seats for the 334,743 constituency and 284,035 regional votes); Liberal Democrats (17 seats for the 326,232 constituency and 326,232 regional votes)

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[30] Leader of the SNP and First Minister of Scotland between 2007 and 2014. Following the majority of the Scottish population voted against independence in 2014, Salmond resigned.

and the Scottish Greens[31] (2 seats for the 2,971 constituency and 82,577 regional votes). The turnout for this election was 54 percent which matched previous elections. As a result, the SNP formed a minority government, having to rely on the support of parties to pass legislation. As a result, the question of independence was also in minority as majority parties were pro-union.

This very much changed in the 2011 Scottish elections as the SNP won a landslide victory with their campaign promising to have an independence referendum in their next term. They increased their constituency and regional votes by 12.5 and 13% percent respectively, allowing them to increase their number of MSPs significantly. At the same time, as shown by Figure 10 below, the Scottish Labour suffered its biggest loss in their history, while Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Greens now only had 5 and 2 MSPs respectively.

Figure 9: Composition of the Scottish Parliament (2011)

Source: Scottish Parliament (2011)

As a result, the SNP could now form a majority government without having to rely on other parties' support, while the clear mandate allowed them to start negotiating a deal with the UK Government to allow Scotland to hold a referendum on independence. Although at the time of the 2011 elections, the Scottish Greens remained neutral about the question of independence, during the campaign leading up to the referendum they publicly endorsed Scottish

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[31] A left-wing Scottish party which, as its name suggests, builds its political activity on environmentalism, the fight against climate change and social justice.

independence. Meanwhile, the Scottish Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Labour campaigned for staying in the UK. In the end, 55 percent of the Scottish electorate voted against independence in 2014, leading to the end of Salmond's political career, who was replaced by his deputy, Nicola Sturgeon[32].

Figure 10: Composition of the Scottish Parliament (2016)

Source: Scottish Parliament (2016)

Sturgeon led the party in the 2016 Scottish elections, and although the SNP failed to secure a majority in Parliament, they successfully increased their voter base (constituency votes increased from 902,915 to 1,059,898) and remained the most-voted party in Scotland. The Scottish Labour lost is position as the second most voted party in Scotland (securing only 24 seats) as the Scottish Conservatives claimed this title now by doubling their MSPs and increasing both constituency and regional votes. As for the Liberal Democrats, they remained a small party, yet the biggest winners of the 2016 elections were the Scottish Greens. The endorsement of Scottish independence and failure of the SNP-initiated referendum helped the Greens to triple the number of MSPs.

The SNP formed a minority government and in June, 2016, during the Brexit referendum, they campaigned in favour of staying in the EU. Although the majority of Scots voted in favour of EU membership, the UK as a whole decided to leave the block. From this point on, the SNP

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[32] The leader of the SNP and First Minister of Scotland from 2014 until 2023. She was Deputy First Minister between 2007 and 2014, but, following the resignation of Alex Salmond, she became the next leader of Scotland.

became the most vocal supporter of returning Scotland to the EU and the party kept the creation of an independent Scottish State a key priority (SNP, 2016: 9; SNP, 2021: 21). Both goals were reiterated by the SNP in the 2021 regional campaign. Despite the regional elections taking place during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, turnout increased to an all-time high (63.5 percent) and the SNP increased its representation in Holyrood (but falling short of their best performance in 2011).

Figure 11: Composition of the Scottish Parliament (2021)

Source: Scottish Parliament (2011)

The Conservatives maintained their second and Labour their third place respectively, while the Liberal Democrats lost 1 seat. The Scottish Greens reached their best result in the history of Scottish Parliament elections winning 8 seats. As a result, the SNP formed a minority government, but this time, a cooperation agreement was signed between the Scottish Nationalists and the Greens, allowing the latter to take ministerial portfolios in the Scottish Government in return for their support in Holyrood (Scottish Government, 2021).

However, since 2021, the SNP underwent a major internal crisis. On the one hand, their plans to hold a second independence referendum in 2023 failed; first, the UK Government refused to let Scotland hold another referendum, then the Supreme Court of the UK ruled that the Scottish Parliament does not have the power to legislate a referendum on independence (Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, 2022). And on the other hand, Nicola Sturgeon resigned as leader of the SNP and First Minister in 2023; she was succeeded by her health secretary, Humza Yousaf

who after a year also resigned and was replaced by John Swinney. Since Sturgeon left office, the SNP's support in opinion polls has been falling sharply, the party saw its biggest defeat in the 2024 UK General Elections. If the SNP cannot turn around this negative tendency until the 2026 Scottish regional elections, they ~~will~~ are likely to lose their dominant position, ending the most successful period in the party's history (YouGov, 2024; Refield & Wilton, 2024; Baker, 2024).

5.5. Summary

Both Catalonia and Scotland have had a long history as constituent parts of larger states. In the case of Catalonia, the region formed an essential part of the Crown of Aragon (*Corona d'Aragó*) in the 12th century, but at the same time, it retained its own political, cultural and administrative institutions and its own language.

Although in 1469 Aragon entered a dynastic union with the Kingdom of Castile (*Reino de Castilla*), the decentralized nature of politics and cultural life was still a key characteristic of Aragón, only to be changed following the centralization of the Spanish State in the 17th and 18th centuries. The 20th century brought a new paradigm into Catalan politics as Catalonia became an autonomous territory of the Republic of Spain in 1931. This, however, was short-lived, as the ~~rise of Francisco~~ Franco dictatorship (1939-1975) following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) resulted in the abolishment of the Catalan Statute, rapid centralization of power and a ban on all regionally spoken minority languages in Spain, including the Catalan.

What signaled a return to the autonomous functioning of Catalan institutions was the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (1979), which was based on the new 1978 Spanish Constitution, made possible by the transition to democracy following the death of Franco. The new fundamental law declared the right of autonomy of the nationalities and regions in Spain, thus the Catalan Parliament, the President and the Executive Council (altogether called *Generalitat de Catalunya*) could return to historic continuity as an autonomously working, own institution of Catalonia. The leader of then centre-right CiU, Jordi Pujol became the President of the *Generalitat* in 1980 – altogether winning six consecutive regional elections – and left office in 2003. The constitutional development of Catalonia came to a sudden halt following the Spanish Constitutional Court's decision in 2010, declaring 14 articles of the new 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy unconstitutional and eventually leading to the start of a new era in Catalan politics. This was the fall of the nationalist vision that wished to acquire more and more competences from the Spanish State and wanted to maintain Catalonia as an autonomous entity

of Spain (a nation without its own state) and the rise of a new nationalism that imagined Catalonia as a nation in Europe with its own, sovereign state.

Since the secession turn in 2010-2012, the political landscape of the region changed entirely. CiU, led by Artur Mas, started pushing for an independence referendum and the question of secession from Spain became one of the most important political topics in Spain. CiU, however, started losing its dominant position (in 2010 it had 62 seats, in 2012 only 50), while ERC emerged as the second largest nationalist party supporting independence (up from 10 seat in 2010 to 21 seats in 2012). CiU's turn to support independence soon led to its break-up and the Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT), carried on the legacy and success of the former organization. In 2015, PDeCAT joined a pro-independence electoral alliance with ERC, called Together for Yes (*Junts pel Sí*). However, *Junts pel Sí* with 62 seats in Parliament lacked majority and had to look for other partners. They reached an agreement with Popular Unity Candidacy (*Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* or CUP), which had only 3 seats in Parliament in 2012, but 10 in 2015, to nominate the then Mayor of Girona, Carles Puigdemont – instead of Mas – as new President of Catalonia. Puigdemont was a key figure in organizing the 2017 Independence Referendum which not only led to the illegal, unilateral Declaration of Catalan Independence, but also to the temporal suspension of autonomous institutions by the Spanish Government and the conviction of a number of leading Catalan politicians for breaking the constitutional order.

Following the 2017 referendum, elections were called and a pro-union party, Ciutadans (C's) became the most voted party (36 seats), while on the pro-independence nationalist side, *Junts per Catalunya* (an electoral alliance between independents supporting Puigdemont and PDeCAT) had the largest representation (34 seats), followed by ERC (32 seats) and CUP (4 seats). However, the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled that Puigdemont – being in self-exile in Belgium – could not be named President of Catalonia as he has to be present during the investiture and ~~the~~ Quim Torra, an independent who ran on a Junts per Catalunya ticket, was elected, but soon removed from power by the Spanish Supreme Court for not guaranteeing the *Generalitat's* neutrality during elections. The Catalan Vice-President, Pere Aragonès (ERC) became the interim president and his position was strengthened in the 2021 regional elections (held during the COVID-19 crisis) as ERC became the most-voted nationalist party of Catalonia (33 seats), followed by *Junts* (32 seats) and CUP (9 seats).

The 2024 regional elections signalled a change in Catalan politics. The tendency in voter turnout changed and voter activity returned to the levels recorded prior to the secessionist turn in 2010-2012. ERC lost its dominance as the number one nationalist party to Junts: ERC now had 20 seats, while Junts had 20 and CUP 4 seats. However, the biggest change was that the pro-independence nationalist parties, who for the past decade led Catalonia together as a coalition government or through parliamentary cooperation, lost their majority in Parliament: their 74-seat majority in 2021 was reduced to just 61; compared to 2017, they lost more than 40 percent of their voters with only 1,222,881 Catalans choosing Junts, ERC or CUP.

Scotland's development from a governance perspective was somewhat different, yet the region faced similar political situation since the Scottish National Party came to power in 2007. The region was an independent country up until the 18th century when the personal union between Scotland and England evolved further in 1707 and the Kingdom of Great Britain was created. Although Scotland ceased to exist as a sovereign state, throughout the centuries it maintained some of its former national characteristics, such as its own judicial and legal system, its century-old educational system, separate Church and separate local government system.

This meant that the centralization process was not as thorough as in Spain from an administrative-legal perspective; however, from a cultural perspective, the picture is entirely different. Catalonia, despite the political centralization of the Spanish State after the creation of the Kingdom of Spain, preserved its own language (the Catalan) which undoubtedly played an important role in the '*Renaixenca*' of the 19th century and formed a basis for the autonomist claims in the Republic of Spain. In Scotland, the two local languages, Gaelic and Scots, lost their privileged role as features of identity and means of communication as English became the sole language of instruction throughout Great Britain. Therefore, a key difference between the case of Catalonia and Scotland is that the former preserved its own language and cultural framework, built upon social and historic values. The Catalans, therefore, based their political demands for autonomy on language and own historic institutions; the Scots, on the other hand, had their past as a sovereign state to refer back to and argue for the need to hand back powers from London to Edinburgh. Different paths, but very similar results.

In 1999, the first Scottish Parliamentary elections were held following a popular vote that backed the devolution process to create the Scottish Administration within the constitutional framework of the UK. At the time, it seemed that Labour and the Liberal Party would emerge as the new political force of the newly created Scottish political arena. However, in 2007, the

SNP won the elections and for the first time in the history of Scotland, it became the number one party of the country. However, with these elections, voters not only voted against Labour and the Liberal Party and in favour of the SNP, but also against and in favour of two very different constitutional visions for Scotland. The two former parties wished to continue to strengthen the competences of Scotland, while ensuring that it remained part of the UK. However, ever since the SNP was founded in 1934, it had a different vision: they wanted to see a strong, independent and sovereign Scotland outside of the British constitutional structure.

It is at this point that another key difference emerges. In Catalonia, the Spanish Constitutional Court's 2010 decision and the mass demonstrations that followed it resulted in a shift towards nationalism with clearly secessionist goals, whereas in Scotland, this shift cannot be attributed to one or a few concrete events. We see a less radical shift towards a nationalist vision built around the demand for an own state. The SNP came to power in 2007 with 47 seats in Holyrood, but by 2011, it could increase its representation to 69 MSPs which was an important reference point in the talks between London and Edinburgh to allow Scotland a referendum on independence. Although the majority of Scots decided to stay in the Union, the SNP could maintain its position as the dominant party of Scotland. After the referendum, in 2016, the SNP secured 63 seats in Parliament and in era marked by crises in British politics (the UK leaving the EU and health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic) the SNP could increase its support to 64 seats in Holyrood in 2021.

However, during this decade, the voice of pro-independence nationalism also changed. The Scottish Greens also embraced secessionism and increased their number of MSPs from 2 in 2011 to 8 in 2021. Nicola Sturgeon, in 2021, initiated a deal to be made between two parties to include the Greens in the government work and ensure that the SNP-led executive branch has the necessary backing of the Parliament for stability. However, in 2023, the Scottish Nationalists underwent a major internal crisis. On the one hand, their plans to hold a second independence referendum failed. And, on the other, the longest serving First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon resigned and left the SNP's leadership. She was succeeded by Humza Yousaf who after a year also resigned and was replaced by John Swinney. It seems that internal instability started effecting the party's performance: in 2024, the party saw its biggest defeat in the 2024 UK General Elections. It is hard to tell whether this negative spiral will end or not, but the results of the 2026 Scottish elections will be likely to probably provide a clearer answer to this question.

Therefore, despite taking different paths in constitutional development and political results, both regions enjoy wide autonomy within their home states and undoubtedly, pro-independence nationalist parties dominated regional politics for over a decade. Their electoral successes, even in times of crises, demonstrate that their political vision had a clear mandate from the electorate. Despite drawbacks, such as the results of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum or the aftermath of the 2017 Catalan referendum, the pro-independence nationalist parties in both regions could preserve their position as leading forces of their respective political arenas. They continue to advocate for their vision of independence by offering solutions from global issues from a nationalist perspective.

6. Comparative Text Analysis of the Scottish and Catalan Nationalist Discourse

6.1. General Remarks of Corpora

In Catalonia, ERC normally prepared 100-200-page electoral programmes for the Catalan Parliamentary Elections, while Junts prepared somewhat longer, 100–350-page manifestos. Compared to the regional Catalan political arena, the manifestos prepared for the Spanish General Elections were shorter, between 50-150 pages for ERC, while CiU/Junts' were between 13-150 pages. For the European Parliamentary Elections, manifestos are even shorter, ranging between 12-79 pages. The length of these documents already signals the order of importance between the different levels of politics: it is the regional (i.e. Catalan national) level where grand visions and concrete policies meet. Compared to Catalan politics, the Scottish manifestos were shorter across political levels: for the Scottish Parliamentary Elections, the length ranges between 44-77 pages, for the UK General Elections 32-56 pages and for the European Parliamentary Elections around 20 pages. Again, just as in Catalonia, the length of these documents demonstrates that we are dealing with minority parties, where the main arena is the regional (i.e. Catalonia and Scotland).

What makes all manifestos important is that all of them were directed towards the same 'national' audience: the people of Catalonia and Scotland. Yet in the case of regional elections, the emphasis was more on regional vision; on defining the nation they are and aspiring to be, the future relations between the minority nations, the home states (the UK and Spain) and the rest of the world, including European and international organizations. These manifestos prepared for the Scottish and Catalan elections offer the 'big picture' for Catalans and Scots. Programmes prepared for the general elections were treated as an opportunity to voice concerns about the respective home states the minority nations belong to. While European manifestos, if their content had to be summed up briefly, were a platform to present the nations' vision beyond their borders, especially the role Scotland and Catalonia wish to play in the framework of the European Union. In other words, the three manifesto types (regional, state and European) supplement each other to form the Scottish and the Catalan nationalist vision.

The word choice across the manifestos in both Scotland and Catalonia were quite similar. The 15 most frequently used words in electoral manifestos before and after the referendums are summed up below.

Table 2: The Most Frequently Used Words in Manifestos Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
Scotland (1263)	Scotland (1045)	Catalunya (1774)	Catalunya (1647)
Scottish (583)	Support (536)	Més (1234)	Més (1411)
More (451)	People (425)	Estat (1168)	Social (1026)
New (406)	Have (421)	Social (896)	Estat (938)
Support (394)	New (407)	País (668)	Sistema (844)
Communities (390)	More (397)	Polítiques (639)	Persones (809)
Government (386)	Scottish (394)	Sistema (607)	Model (794)
SNP (352)	Communities (326)	Catalana (581)	Drets (709)
Have (346)	Work (310)	Persones (552)	País (701)
Work (268)	Government (282)	Nou (535)	Politiques (668)
Local (235)	Ensure (274)	Política (508)	Catalana (633)
People (232)	UK (240)	Europea (502)	República (611)
Ensure (201)	SNP (233)	Català (497)	Serveis (589)
Make (181)	Million (231)	Model (495)	Fer (588)
Take (180)	Can (224)	Serveis (444)	Empreses (582)

These words reflect the key themes in manifestos, while their respective frequency, as a tool of lexical repetition, reinforces thematic consistency across the texts (Van Dijk, 1997: 35; Sutopo et al., 2021: 246; Adorján, 2013: 2) The main themes include words referring to entire political entities (such as Scotland, Scottish, *Catalunya* and *país*), certain political institutions and policies (such as government, UK, *Estat*, *sistema*, *politiques* and *model*), society (such as *social*,

people/*persones* and communities) and different verbs (such as work, ensure, *fer*). The reason Scotland and Catalunya were the most frequently used is because the manifestos were generally characterized by syntactic structures that favor direct, active sentences, featuring *Catalunya*/Scotland or the Catalan/Scottish people as the grammatical subject, thus aligning agency explicitly with the 'nation'. Modals of possibility and obligation are particularly significant as verbs like *can, want, poder and voler* dominate the manifestos, helping to project confidence and commitment regarding the political objectives placed in the broader vision. In both Scotland and Catalonia, cohesion within the manifestos was achieved by the recurrent use of inclusive pronouns (such as we/*nosaltres* and all/*tots*) and temporal markers (such as now/*ara* and today/*avui*) that help link the political goals to the common collective present and the planned future. Moreover, the future tense was also employed heavily in both the Scottish and the Catalan corpora, further strengthening a vision of projected future.

Moreover, the changes in word use over time also share some similarities despite underlying differences. Europe did make the list in Scotland, while in Catalonia, it was one of the recurring words before 2017. Also, following the independence referendum in Catalonia, the importance of *drets* (rights) became more prominent, signaling the importance of the intervention of Madrid in Catalan politics and the imprisonment of a number of leading Catalan politicians and social actors. A similar shift can be noticed in Scotland, where following the referendum, the UK emerged as one of the most frequently used words. It is important to add that during this period, Scotland was not only going through the post-independence referendum period, but also the post-Brexit-referendum era in British politics. Both of these processes affected the relations between London and Edinburgh.

The corpora also included the use of rewording, especially while referencing Scotland and Catalonia and their respective population and key public institutions (i.e. *Generalitat* and Scottish Government). The following table sums up the most frequently used words to refer to Scotland and the Scottish people and Catalonia and the Catalan people.

Table 3: The Most Frequently Used Words to Refer to the Scottish and Catalan 'nations'

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
Scottish/ Scots (734)	People/ population (438)	Persones/ Poble/ Població (742)	Persones/ Poble /Població (965)
Community/ communities (390)	Scottish/ Scots (414)	País (668)	País (701)

People (232)	Community/ communities (326)	Catalans/ Catalanes (388)	República (611)
Nation (123)	Country (104)	Societat (355)	Societat (481)
Scottish Government (66)	Scottish Government (68)	Territori (254)	Territori (350)
Country (61)	Society (65)	Generalitat (283)	Generalitat (285)
Society (36)	Land (77)	República (276)	Catalans/ Catalanes (266)
Citizen(s) (25)	Citizen(s) (47)	Estat[33] (144)	Nació (27)
Land (23)	Nation (45)	Nació (58)	Estat[34] (25)

Here again the choice of words to refer to the 'nation' is similar in Scotland and Catalonia, yet some differences and changes can be seen. In Scotland, the word *nation* to refer to Scotland is not used as often as before the 2014 referendum; instead, 'country' was favoured. In Catalonia, *nació* was never championed, instead *país* and *república* were used to refer to the region. This is a logical move since in the Franco era 'nation' was regularly used in reference to Spain, and the 1978 Spanish Constitution also used the term to highlight the 'indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation'.

In the conceptualization of the Scottish nation, there were six main elements according to the words most frequently used in the context of the selected keywords listed in Table 3. National values, key population groups, social policy, economy, Scottish-British relations and global matters (European and international). During the assessed period, the importance of these building blocks shifted in Scotland. By 2021, the main element of the vision changed from an economic to a social focus, followed by important groups of the population. Before the referendum, however, global affairs came fourth, followed by Scottish-British relations. By 2021, the latter order remained the same, but the gap between the UK and international questions was closed, as the importance of the former grew substantially.

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[33] Only where it refers to estat propi, estat català, estat independent
[34] Only where it refers to estat propi, estat català, estat independent

	Values	**Groups**	**Social**	**Economy**	**Scottish-British relations**	**Global Affairs**
Before referendum	335	511	1010	1201	279	424
After referendum	363	683	1098	957	414	461

In Catalonia, the main focus was always the society, followed by economic questions. However, the groups of people and the values involved in the conceptualization of the nations expanded more than in the case of Scotland, while global topics and Catalan-Spanish questions following the referendum lost their importance compared to other areas. Before the consultation, social questions were followed by the economy, global affairs, Catalan-Spanish relations, values and population groups. However, after 2017, social and economy-related terms were followed by national values, global affairs, population groups, while Catalan-Spanish relations came last.

Table 5: Number of Words Coded into Most Frequently Appearing Areas in Discourse (Catalonia)[36]

	Values	**Groups**	**Social**	**Economy**	**Catalan-Spanish relations**	**Global Affairs**
Before referendum	676	554	3335	2080	1052	2036
After referendum	1284	1096	4044	2821	664	1334

Table 6 below shows the most frequently used words for each category, nation (Scotland and Catalonia) and time period (before and after the referendum).

Table 6: The Most Frequently Used Words in Each Category (Scotland and Catalonia, before and after referendums)

	Values	**Groups**	**Social**	**Economy**	**Home State-Nation**	**Global Affairs**

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[35] Includes all types of words except for verbs and stop words. The former is analyzed separately, the latter was excluded from the analysis.

[36] Includes all types of words except for verbs and stop words. The former is analyzed separately, the latter was excluded from the analysis.

Before ref. Scotland	Wealth[37] (55)	Local[38] (132)	Healthcare [39] (131)	Economy[40] (136)	Independence[41] (90)	Europe[42] (180)
After ref. Scotland	Fair[43] (79)	Youth[44] (114)	Healthcare [45] (132)	Economy[46] (132)	UK (124)	Europe[47] (164)
Before ref. Catalonia	Democràtic[48] (147)	Treballadors (76)	Social[49] (617)	Economia [50] (460)	Espanya[51] (282)	Europa[52] (898)
After ref. Catalonia	Sostenible [53] (200)	Local[54] (122)	Social[55] (621)	Laboral(s) [56] (544)	Espanya[57] (150)	Món[58] (446)

In terms of verbs used in the Scottish and Catalan corpora, Table 7 summarized the verbs according to their frequency. In both cases, parties used very similar verbs, only minor differences can be found between campaign communication before and after the referendums. The three most frequently used verbs in Scotland were *to support*, *to work* and *to ensure*. While in Catalonia, *to gurantee/garantir*, *to (push) forward/impulsar* and *to (make) better/millorar*.

Table 7: The Most Frequently Appearing Verbs in the Scottish and Catalan Corpora Before and After the Referendums

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	***After Referendum***	***Before Referendum***	***After Referendum***

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[37] Wealth/ Wealthier
[38] Local / Locally
[39] Healthcare/ NHS/ Health
[40] Economy/ Economic
[41] Independent/ Independence
[42] EU/ European/ Europe
[43] Fair/ Fairer/ fairness
[44] Young / youth
[45] Healthcare/ NHS/ Health
[46] Economy/ Economic
[47] EU/ European/ Europe
[48] Democràtic(a)/ democràcia
[49] Social/ socials/ socialment
[50] Economia/ econòmic(a)(s)/ econòmiques
[51] Espanyol(a)/ Espanya/ espanyoles
[52] Europeu/ europeus/ europees/ europea/ UE
[53] Sostenible / sostenibilitat
[54] Local/ locals
[55] Social/ socials/ socialment
[56] Laboral(s)/ laboració/ treball/ ocupació
[57] Espanyol(a)/ Espanya/ espanyoles
[58] món/ mundial/ internacional/ internacionalització/ internacionals/ internacionals/ global

To support (256)	To support (232)	Garantir (325)	Garantir (484)
To work (209)	To work (216)	Impulsar (221)	Impulsar (338)
To ensure (145)	To ensure (161)	Millorar (215)	Millorar (277)
To deliver (126)	To help (119)	Seguir (172)	Seguir (243)
To build (94)	To continue (111)	Permetre (160)	Permetre (211)
To continue (89)	To deliver (95)	Crear (129)	Crear (149)
To (take) forward (88)	To provide (93)	Disposar (126)	Desenvolupar (148)
To help (82)	To build (77)	Desenvolupar (120)	Promoure (138)
To provide (71)	To create (76)	Fomentar (114)	Partir (131)
To create (64)	To change (70)	Donar (109)	Posar (116)
1153	**1250**	**1691**	**2235**

Despite English and Catalan belonging to different language families, the verbs used in the context of the nation showed key similarities with few differences in the two cases. The verbs found in the corpora (when excluding stop words) may be categorized into three main groups: verbs for movement (such as *to continue/seguir* or *to forward/impulsar*), verbs for building (such as *to build* or *to create/crear*) and verbs for aiding (*to support, to help*, *garantir*, *milliorar*). The corpora in both Scotland and Catalonia, regardless of the assessed time period, were built on the use of these verbs.

In the case of Scotland, prior to the referendum, communication was based on four key verbs for aiding (*to support, to ensure, to help* and *to provide*), three main verbs for movement (*to deliver, to continue* and *to forward*) and three verbs for building (*to work, to build* and *to create*). Following 2014, the most frequently used verbs for aiding and for building remained unchanged, the key verbs for movement were *to continue*, *to deliver* and *to change*, with the latter being a new addition and *to (take) forward* dropping out of the list. This means that in the Scottish discourse, the verbs for aiding were used the most, and the referendum did not change the campaign communication in this aspect. Compared to Scotland, in Catalonia, verbs for

aiding (*garantir, millorar, permetre, disposar, fomenter* and *donar*[59]) represented more than half of the most frequently used verbs, followed by verbs for movement (*impulsar* and *seguir*[60]) and verbs for building (*crear* and *desenvolupar*[61]). After the referendum, more verbs for movement (*impulsar, seguir, partir, posar*) made the top 10 list; four verbs for movement, four verbs for aiding and two verbs for structure were found. This meant that the discourse (used before and after the 2017 referendum) experienced a shift that was not present in the case of Scotland. For Catalan nationalists, verbs calling for action (i.e. movement) became more prominent than before, but this did not mean that verbs for aiding lost their overall importance.

6.2. Shared Values and Prioritized Population Groups: Nations in Progress

Common values and frequently referenced population groups play an important role in assessing what parties think of the identity upon which their national communities' shared feeling of belonging together is built (Smith, 2010: 9). This is carried out by explicitly naming the social groups nationalists deem important for their national vision and by recurringly communicating about certain values in the context of words relating to their named human community (i.e. nation) that determine and define the nation they wish to build. This process also helps to answer the questions: who belongs to the community and what values are treated as universal, national values. Moreover, by comparing the two visions, their values and important groups, it is also possible to see possible shifts and changes that happened over time in the discourses.

Both in Scotland and Catalonia, the nationalist discourse was based on a shared starting point: progress. One of the most frequently recurring set of verbs used in the discourse was verbs for movement. In Scotland, before 2014, *to deliver, to continue, to (take) forward* and *to move* were the most frequently used, followed by five other verbs representing change and movement. After the referendum, the emphasis was on continuing, followed by delivering, changing and making forward movements. Therefore, in both assessed periods, moving ahead was the key priority in Scotland, while in terms of concrete verb use, the difference was not significant. Interestingly, however, there was a decrease in the use of verbs for movement and change, and compared to the other two main categories of verbs, motion was the least significant in the Scottish discourse, both before and after the referendum.

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[59] to guarantee, to (make) better, to allow, to provide, to encourage and to give
[60] to push/drive forward and to keep on
[61] To create and to develop

Table 8: Top 10 Verbs of Movement Used Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
To deliver (126)	To continue (111)	Impulsar (221)	Impulsar (338)
To continue (89)	To deliver (95)	Seguir (172)	Seguir (243)
To (take) forward (88)	To change (70)	Continuar (88)	Partir (131)
To move (26)	To (take) forward (42)	Avançar (84)	Posar (116)
To remain (21)	To remain (27)	Partir (58)	Avançar (62)
To take steps (15)	To stand (18)	Arribar (43)	Continuar (58)
To act (14)	To leave (16)	Actuar (24)	Arribar (48)
To leave (12)	To (make) progress (11)	Quedar (24)	Retornar (27)
To return (12)	To stop (7)	Retornar (20)	Actuar (26)
To (make) progress (9)	To return (7)	Sortir (18)	Quedar (17)
To stand (7)	To act (4)	Acabar (16)	Acabar (13)
419	**410**	**768**	**1079**

This is in direct contrast with the tendency in Catalonia where verbs for motion increased significantly in their total frequency. Prior to the referendum, *impulsar* (*to push forward*), *seguir* (*to keep on*) and *continuar* (*to continue*) were the verbs most commonly used in the Catalan corpus. After 2017, the third most commonly used changed to partir (*to leave*). Therefore, a key difference between the Scottish and Catalan corpora was in their use of verbs for motion. These form an essential part of the discourses, yet in Scotland, campaigns relied less on their use following the unsuccessful referendum, while in Catalonia, the emphasis was increasingly on 'making a move' in politics. A key similarity is that both in Scotland and Catalonia, verbs for progression, i.e. moving ahead were used more than verbs of regression and stationary, i.e. moving back or staying. The former included verbs such as *to continue* (*continuar*), to forward (*impulsar*), *to progress* (*avançar*), *to leave* (*partir*), while the latter *to remain* (*quedar*), *to return* (*retornar*) and *to stand*.

The use of verbs for motion signals that both movements conceptualize the nation using the conceptual metaphor for progress (Lakoff, 1993; Kövecses, 2010). Expressions such as move forward, advance and continue are not merely stylistic choices but reflect deeper cognitive structures that frame progress as a spatial and goal-oriented process. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 14-15) argue that the metaphor PROGRESS IS FORWARD MOVEMENT arises from embodied experience, where physical advancement is associated with improvement and achievement. Moreover, verbs of movement also signal urgency and momentum: they play an important role in framing actions of political actors as dynamic and future-oriented (Black, 2011: 49-50). Not to mention that a narrative of movement enables political leaders to break down complex political themes into a more relatable narrative of direction and purpose (Musolff, 2016: 34). After all, it is easier to connect to a mental picture that we are familiar with: movement roots deeply in our existence as humans: spatial metaphors anchor political language in familiar, physical schemas that shape how individuals conceptualize change (Chilton and Schäffner, 1997: 211).

Therefore, progress is not only a movement expressed in speech, but also signals a normative frame. Both Scottish and Catalan nationalist discourses are 'progressive' in the sense that they use verbs for motion to talk about progress. However, the analysis of the most frequently used words suggests that progress is not only a verbal action, but also a value-based domain where the nation is conceptualized (or re-conceptualized) by referring to a set of shared values and addressing groups in the population who are part of this process of moving forward. This is how progress (motion) helps to frame progress (value).

In Scotland, prior to the referendum, the nation was imagined as wealthy, green, climate-friendly, strong, fair, safe, healthy, ambitious, proud and as a democratic community. This valued-based self-definition did change following the referendum as fairness emerged as number one national value, and equality also made the list, highlighting that the emphasis on a fairer distribution of wealth within society became a more important asset. Strength, sustainability and safety were also included after 2014. These were followed by green, successful, wealth, inclusive and democratic. Moreover, the mentioned list of values expanded following the referendum as Gaelic and diversity were also frequently used, but they did make the top 10 most frequently referenced values.

Table 9: Top 10 National Values Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
Wealthier/ wealth (55)	Fair/ fairer/ fairness (79)	Democràtic(a)/ democràcia (147)	Sostenible / sostenibilitat (200)
Green/ greener (48)	Stronger / strong / strength (48)	llibertat/ llibertats/ lliure (90)	llibertat /llibertats /lliure (161)
Sustainable / sustainability (44)	Sustainable / sustainability (48)	Igualtat (77)	Igualtat (146)
Stronger / strong / strength (44)	Equal / equality / inequality (46)	Sostenible / sostenibilitat (74)	Democràtic(a)/ democràcia (131)
Fair / fairer / fairness (43)	Safe/ safer (36)	Cohesió / cohesionada (69)	Diversitat (130)
Safe / Safer (41)	Green / greener (28)	Valors (64)	Cohesió / cohesionada (70)
Healthy / healthier (29)	Success / successful (21)	Inclusió / Inclusiva (43)	Valors (67)
Ambitious (10)	Wealthier / wealth (16)	Diversitat (40)	Justa (58)
Proud (10)	Inclusive (12)	Solidaritat (24)	Inclusió / Inclusiva (55)
Democratic (9)	Democratic (11)	Confiança (21)	Solidària (45)

In Catalonia, democracy, freedom, equality, sustainability and cohesion were the key values prior to 2017, followed by inclusiveness, solidarity, confidence and transparency. In the Catalan vision, sustainability became the most essential building block after the referendum, while references to freedom were more important than before. Democracy only made fourth and was followed by diversity (*diversitat*), cohesion (*cohesió/ cohesionada*), respect (*respecte*) justice (*just*), inclusiveness (*inclusió/ inclusiva*) and solidarity (*solidaritat*). Just as in the case of Scotland, after the consultation, more values were 'added' as transversal, responsibility (*responsibilitat*), talented (*talent*) and integrated (*integrada*) were also mentioned, but did not meet the top 10 terms.

What unites the Scottish and Catalan discourse is the emphasis on equality (fairness and *igualtat*), environmental protection (green, sustainable/*sostenible*) and open-minded approach towards social diversity (inclusive/*inclusiva* and *diversitat*). The similarity is not only that these principals were present in the discourse, but also the fact that references to these values increased over time. However, differences outnumber similarities. The Catalan nation values

diversity, but also emphasizes the importance of maintaining social cohesion (*Cohesió/ cohesionada*). Freedom and democracy were values prioritized by Catalans, but this does not mean that Scots do not want to be free and democratic, but rather that the Catalan nation lacks these and is fighting for them. Moreover, a clear difference is that the Scottish nation was seen as strong, safe and wealthy (although the latter one lost its prevalence after the referendum) which are values entirely missing from the Catalan conceptualization.

In terms of population groups that the discourse prioritized, local communities, young people and families are at the very heart of both nationalist discourses, but with different emphasis and opposing trends. In Scotland, prior to the referendum, the local communities, the youth, rural communities, families and children were the key groups. These were followed by cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow and other cities) and carers. After the referendum, the youth became number one, followed by local communities, children, island communities and families. Women and disabled people were new additions to the list after 2014. Yet in both cases, when comparing the rural and urban references, the former were overrepresented in the Scottish discourse. Therefore, rural Scotland, in both periods, played an important role in the conceptualization of the nation. But with the addition of island communities, the rural areas arguably played an even more prominent role than before 2014. Furthermore, after 2014, more groups were included in discourse (but were not in the top 10), such as vulnerable people, carers, workers, Edinburgh, Glasgow, cities and teachers.

Table 10: Top 10 Population Groups Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
Local / Locally (132)	Young / youth (114)	Treballador(e)s (76)	Local/ locals (122)
Young / youth (111)	Local / Locally (120)	Local/ locals (58)	Dones (96)
Rural (85)	Children / Child (70)	Barcelona (58)	Joves/ jovent (91)
Family / Families (58)	Rural (57)	Joves/ jovent (48)	Gènere (90)
Children / Child (44)	Family / Families (45)	Dones (48)	Treballador(e)s (72)
Edinburgh (17)	Island/ Islands (40)	Universitats (44)	LGTBI (64)
Glasgow	Women	Famílies	Balears / valencià

(17)	(31)	(41)	(51)
Carers	Students / pupils	Comunitat	Universitats
(15)	(30)	(33)	(49)
Cities	Disabled	Discapacitat	Famílies
(11)	(18)	(32)	(47)
Regional	Vulnerable	Ciutats	Discapacitat
(11)	(18)	(26)	(46)

In Catalonia, workers (*treballadores/ treballadors*) were 'dethroned' by local communities (*local/ locals*) after the referendum, while women (*dones*) and sexual minorities (*Gènere; LGTBI*) emerged as new groups. The significance of the youth (*joves/ jovent*) also grew, while the relevance of families (*famílies*) decreased over time. Moreover, other Spanish autonomous communities (Balearic Islands and the Velencian Community), which before 2017 did not make the top 10, became seventh. Cities (*Barcelona, ciutats*) were treated as a priority before 2017, but were treated less important compared to other groups after the referendum. This is also supported by increased references to local communities (*local/ locals*).

What both the Scottish and the Catalan tendency share is the increasing emphasis on local communities (local, rural, island), young people (young/young; child/children; students/ pupils; *joves/jovent*; *universitats*) and women (*dones*) and decreasing importance of families (*famílias)* and cities (Edinburgh; Glasgow; *Barcelona; ciutats*) compared to other groups. The key difference is that the Catalan discourse underwent a significant change during the observed period, resulting in a more noticeable shift. Workers as a group went from being the most important in campaigns to being only fifth and cities also lost their prevalence, while the Scottish discourse retained its most frequently appearing groups. Sexual minorities, although present in the Scottish discourse, were not referenced systematically as they were after the referendum in Catalonia. Moreover, the Catalan discourse also included groups of people living beyond the current territory of Catalonia, an attribute that had no counterpart in the Scottish discourse. In other words, the two nations share some important similarities, but with essential aspects that make the discourses unique.

6.3. Protecting the Society and the Economy: 'Mother Nation'

According to Smith (2009; 2010), nationalism is also an organized set of ideas, an ideology. In the case of Scotland and Catalonia, the parties' ideologies are both conceptualized via the so-called nurturing mother synonym. In this model, based on the notion that the nation can be conceptualized in terms of a family framed by morality: the government, the leadership of the

community, is seen as a parent and citizens as children who are approached by a set of moral principles to help them succeed in life (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 2002; Lakoff 2004). One of these models is the nurturing mother model. The parent nurtures, cares for and teaches empathy to children to ensure they become responsible and self-disciplined people who live happy and full lives. The nurturing mother model is associated with parties who have a liberal, left-wing worldview, and its counterpart is the strict father model which, according to Lakoff (2002), is the characteristic of conservative, right-wing parties that approach morality from another perspective. The former, therefore, puts emphasis on caring and looking after the needs of citizens (such as food, healthcare and housing), protecting them from threats (such as disease, violence and unfair treatment) and taking actions to ensure the 'children' are treated fairly. There is equal distribution of wealth and opportunities and the differences of citizens are embraced and celebrated.

Table 11: Top 10 Verbs of Aiding Used Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
To support (226)	To support (232)	Garantir (325)	Garantir (484)
To ensure (145)	To ensure (161)	Millorar (215)	Millorar (277)
To protect (85)	To help (119)	Permetre (160)	Permetre (211)
To encourage (54)	To provide (93)	Disposar (126)	Promoure (138)
To strengthen (21)	To protect (66)	Fomentar (114)	Defensar (137)
To help (82)	To improve (59)	Donar (109)	Fomentar (132)
To provide (71)	To secure (32)	Promoure (107)	Potenciar (106)
To improve (54)	To encourage (30)	Potenciar (95)	Donar (104)
To promote (30)	To strengthen (20)	Defensar (94)	Assegurar (64)
To enable (37)	To enable (21)	Assegurar (55)	Protegir (39)
805	**833**	**1411**	**1692**

Table 11 sums up the most frequently used verbs that are used in the Scottish and Catalan political discourse with their respective change over time. In Scotland, *to support* and *to ensure* were the most frequently used verbs, followed by *to protect* before and *to help* after the referendum. Despite the two corpora being similar in the number of tokens, the number of 'nurturing verbs' increased. A similar tendency can be observed in Catalonia as numbers increased from 1411 to 1692. The manifestos used *to guarantee/garantir* and *to better/milliorar* extensively, followed by *encourage/fomenter* before 2017 and *promote/promoure* after the referendum. The Scottish and Catalan discourse were, therefore, very similar in verb use, using various terms for supporting and helping Catalans and Scots to succeed in life. However, a closer analysis of the economic and social policy priorities highlights the similarities and differences in the way the Scottish and Catalan parties see their economy and society. Moreover, the shifts in frequent themes also shed light to the changes that occurred in campaign communication before and after the respective independence referendums.

In Scotland, the national economy and businesses were the top priority before and after 2014. However, prior to the consultation, communication focused on the question of energy, investment, renewable solutions[62], jobs, growth, industries, food sector and transport. Following 2014, a shift occurred as energy was less important than before while creating jobs emerged as the third key priority. Renewable energy and transport dropped out of the list, while income and markets were new additions. The importance of growth and investment remained unchanged. In the first period, there were a total of 21 more words used in connection to economy, while in the second period, 19 other words were found.

Table 12: Top 10 Economy Related Words Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
Economy / Economic (136)	Economy/ Economic (132)	Economia/ econòmic(a)(s)/ econòmiques (460)	Laboral(s)/ laboració/ treball/ ocupació (544)
Business(es)/ company/ companies (126)	Business(es)/ company/ companies (107)	Laboral(s)/ laboració/ treball/ ocupació (390)	Economia/ econòmic(a)(s)/ econòmiques (508)

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[62] Not just energy meaning that the renewable was used in the context of other words as well which is why it was treated as separate word to energy.

Energy/ energies (109)	Jobs / employment (92)	Empreses / empresarial / empresa (200)	Empreses / empresarial / empresa (312)
Investment(s) (99)	Investment(s) (77)	Fiscal / fiscals (99)	tecnologies / tecnològic(a)/ tecnologia (135)
Renewable(s) (77)	Food (60)	Infraestructures (85)	finançament (113)
Jobs / Employment (76)	Energy/ energies (55)	inversió / inversions (92)	innovació (108)
Growth (59)	Growth (45)	Mercat (75)	Energia / energètica (96)
Industry/ industries (54)	Income (42)	Energia / energètica (74)	turisme / turística (97)
Food (35)	Industry/ industries (32)	Industrial / indústria (65)	Infraestructures (86)
Transport (35)	Market(s) (30)	Innovació (48)	Industrial / indústria (78)

Compared to Catalonia, Scotland was business centric, while Catalonia was labour centric at least in their word use. The former communicated more about companies, the latter more about employment. Jobs (*Laboral/ laboració/ laborals/ treball/ ocupació*) were so important for Catalans that employment emerged as the most frequently appearing term following the referendum. Yet in Catalonia too there was a shift as prior to 2017, labour was followed by businesses (*empreses/ empresarial/ empresa*), fiscal questions (*Fiscal/ fiscals*), infrastructure (*infraestructures*), investment (*inversió/ inversions*), markets (*mercat*), energy (*energia*), industry (*industrial/ indústria*), and innovation (*innovació*). After the referendum, fiscal themes and markets were excluded from the discourse, while technology (tecnologies/ tecnològic/ tecnològica/ tecnologia), finance (*finançament*) and tourism (*turisme/ turística*) were included. The Catalan corpus included 15 and 20 other words before and after the referendum respectively, signaling an expansion in the variation of words used in the economy related subjects.

In the field of social policy, in Scotland, healthcare and education were at very heart of social thinking during the entire period under assessment. Before the referendum, health was followed by education, general social services, carbon-dioxide emissions and general social questions, crime, culture, environment, rights of social groups and persons and tax. Following the referendum, healthcare was followed by services, education and general social questions, rights,

carbon emissions, tax, benefits, environment and security. This means that the protection of rights of social groups emerged to the fourth most frequently referenced social theme, CO_2 emissions and the environment were less recurrent than before.

In Catalonia, both before and after 2017, general social issues were followed by rights and services. Before the referendum, culture, education, the Catalan language, healthcare, sports, security and language questions were frequently referenced. After the consultation, the same set of words appeared in the corpus with welfare/*benestar* being the only new addition. Education emerged as the third, replacing culture, healthcare also advanced a position and the questions of languages spoken in Catalonia also became more frequent. Environmental issues were present in the discourse, but did not make the top 10.

Table 13: Top 10 Social Policy Related Words Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
Healthcare/ NHS/ Health (131)	Healthcare/ NHS/ Health (132)	Social/ socials/ socialment (617)	Social/ socials/ socialment (621)
Education(al)/ Educative/ School(s) (121)	Services/ service (125)	Dret/ drets (306)	Dret/ drets (489)
Services/ service (108)	Education/ educational/ Educative/ school(s) (118)	Servei/ serveis (302)	Servei/ serveis (426)
Carbon / emission(s) (72)	Social (69)	Cultura/cultural(s) (272)	Formació/ educació/ educatiu(s)/ educativ(es) (307)
Social (54)	Right/ rights (67)[63]	Formació/ educació/ educatiu(s)/ educativ(es) (266)	Cultura/cultural(s) (303)
Crime (54)	Carbon/ net zero/ emission(s) (51)	Català (241)	Salut/ sanitària/ sanitari/ sanitate (229)
Culture/ cultural (52)	Tax (40)	Salut/ sanitària/ sanitari/ sanitate (203)	Català (239)

[63] Excluding occasions where human and rights appeared together.

Environment/ environmental (46)	Benefits (38)	Esport/ esportiva/ esportives/ esportiu (146)	Llengües/ llengues/ lingüística (201)
Right/ rights (42)[64]	Environment/ environmental (29)	Seguretat (141)	esport / esportives / esportiu / esportiva (197)
Tax (41)	Security (29)	Llengües/ llengues/ lingüística (134)	Benestar (113)

When comparing Scotland and Catalonia, the similarities included the emphasis on general social services and education, yet the two nations differ significantly. In the Catalan conceptualization, the importance of healthcare only rose following the 2017 referendum, while in Scotland, the NHS has always played the most important role. Language was not a recurring word and culture only made top 10 before 2014, but dropped out after the Scottish referendum. Another key difference is that while in Scotland, environmental issues and CO_2 emissions were frequently referred to, these were not a priority in Catalonia. The opposite was true for the protection of rights of persons and people; in Catalonia, during the observed period, the 'national imagination' focusing on the society included a strong emphasis on the protection of the rights of different social groups (such as sexual, ethnic and religious minorities), while in Scotland, this question was recurring in the discourse, but only became the top 5 themes following the referendum. And lastly, compared to Scotland, sports clearly represent an essential aspect in Catalan nationalist discourse, meanwhile in Scotland, sports were not mentioned as frequently.

6.4. Active Global Citizen: Building a Connected Nation

Nationalism, and especially secessionist nationalism, can also be viewed as a social movement that is seeking independence in the context of established states (Smith, 2009; 2010). Therefore, textual analysis must also uncover the connection between the Scottish and Catalan nation and the context in which they actually exist. This has two principal domains. First, the relationship between the 'home state' and the secessionist nation: it is essential to uncover how the nation connects to the state it actually belongs to define what role does their relationship plays in the conceptualization of the nation. And second, the connections between the nation and established states beyond the boundaries of the home state are also important. This is carried out by maintaining diplomatic relations, developing new ones, working together with other entities (be

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[64] Excluding occasions where human and rights appeared together.

that a state or an international organization) and by creating new forums to tackle common issues.

In this process of planning and developing relations, the conceptual metaphor of building may be used which departs from the assumption that a nation can be 'imagined' in terms of a building. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 44-46), our understanding of arguments and theories can be structured through the conceptual metaphor of building, where ideas are treated as constructed objects requiring foundations, frameworks, and stability. In this metaphor, arguments are buildings: they can have a strong foundation, a coherent structure, or can collapse if poorly constructed (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 99). However, as suggested by Kolstø (2000), the building metaphor is also applicable to the concept of nations: there are consciously working agents (i.e. engineers, builders) who build a structure the same way 'nation builders' (i.e. political leaders) 'build' their nation using different construction materials. This means that nations are also planned, created, developed and built the same way a building is in order to make the conceptualization a physical reality. As argued by Charteris-Black (2005: 24-30), politicians frequently conceptualize international affairs through the building metaphor: they talk about frameworks of cooperation, weakening and strengthening of diplomatic relationships and building relations.

On the one hand, the use of the building synonym is supported by the Scottish and the Catalan parties' choice of most frequently used verbs that actively help the conceptualization of the nation in terms of a building. In the assessed and compared period, the number of these verbs increased in both the Scottish and the Catalan discourse; Table 14 below shows the most frequently used verbs that help the 'structuring' of the nations.

Table 14: Top 10 Verbs of Building Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
To work (209)	To work (216)	Crear (129)	Crear (149)
To build (94)	To build (77)	Desenvolupar (120)	Desenvolupar (148)
To create (64)	To create (76)	Establir (92)	Reforçar (88)
To develop (55)	To develop (66)	Construir (64)	Construir (84)

To establish (28)	To establish (43)	Reforçar (61)	Establir (74)
To plan (19)	To implement (27)	Consolidar (48)	Consolidar (68)
To maintain (17)	To maintain (24)	Formar (47)	Mantenir (53)
To implement (16)	To connect (16)	Mantenir (32)	Formar (38)
To connect (6)	To plan (9)	Configurar (24)	Integrar (25)
To organise (6)	To link (8)	Integrar (24)	Planificar (21)
To link (4)	To integrate (4)	Planificar (21)	Configurar (17)
518	**566**	**638**	**765**

In both the case of Scotland and Catalonia, similar verbs were used before and after the referendums, with some minimal changes over time. In Scotland, to work, to build, to create, to develop and to establish were used frequently before and after 2014, while in Catalonia, *to create* (*crear*) and *to develop* (*desenvolupar*) were followed by *to establish* (*establir), to build (construir)* and *to reinforce* (*reforçar*). The tendency was also very similar in the Scottish and Catalan discourse with increasing use of verbs that strengthen the imagination of the building synonym, but it was not as strongly present as the other two conceptual metaphors used by the parties.

And on the other hand, not only verbs for building were used frequently, but the concrete foreign relations[65] 'building blocks' of nations were defined in both the Scottish and the Catalan discourse.

Table 15: Top 10 'Home State' Related Words Used in Campaigns Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
Independent/ Independence (90)	UK (124)	Espanyol(a)/ Espanya/ espanyoles (282)	Espanyol(a)/ Espanya/ espanyoles (150)
UK (68)	Powers (77)	Procés (174)	República/ Republican(as) (146)

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[65] To be understood in this case as relations with entities beyond boundaries of the nation.

Referendum (25)	Westminster (61)	Independència/ independent (147)	independència/ independent (81)
London (24)	Independent/ Independence (45)	República/ Republican(as)(121)	Sobirania (51)
Nuclear (19)	Devolution/ devolved (29)	Autonomia (109)	Autodeterminació (50)
Westminster (17)	Referendum (25)	Transició (92)	Autonomia (50)
Powers (14)	England (20)	Sobirania (44)	Memòria (43)
Devolution/ devolved (11)	Brexit (13)	Referèndum (33)	Repressió (35)
England (11)	Deal (11)	Estatut (27)	Referèndum (32)
	Nuclear (9)	Autogovern (23)	Estatut (26)

The Scottish discourse, before the referendum, focused directly on reaching full independence, followed by the UK, referendum and different terms related to the British political model (London, Westminster and England). Nuclear weaponry was also mentioned often, as were the transfer of more power from the UK to Scotland and the devolution process. Following the referendum, the discourse increasingly focused on the UK, the transfer of powers and the British Parliament (Westminster) as the symbol of the very core of the British political system. Compared to these, independence, referendum and the nuclear weapons were less likely to be mentioned, while two new terms made top 10; Brexit and deal. The former is a direct reference to the UK's exit from the EU, while the latter included the deal the UK and the EU were negotiating.

In Catalonia, references to Spain and Spanish people were made frequently both before and after the referendum. Before 2017, the word *procés* was used to refer to the process of holding a referendum. This was followed by independence (*independència/ independent*), republicanism (*república/ republicana/ republicans*), autonomy (*autonomia*), transition to a new state (transició), sovereignty (*sobirania*), referendum (*referèndum*), statute (*estatut*) and self-governance (*autogovern*). After the referendum, *procés* disappeared entirely from the political communication. Republicanism emerged as the second more frequently used term, followed by independence and sovereignty. Self-determination (*autodetermináció*) was a new addition, and memory (*memòria*) and repression (*repressió*) were also not used prior to the consultation.

When comparing the word choices, the SNP pushed really hard for independence, but the failure in 2014 led to changes in the discourse. The UK as a constitutional system based on power sharing between London and Edinburgh was more frequently mentioned, and it is quite possible that these mentions were criticisms about the home state. In Catalonia, the centrality of the home state was always present, but following 2017, the events that followed the referendum were also included in the discourse. Moreover, the insistence on a unilateral secession instead of negotiated *procés* grew. This is suggested by the addition of the term self-determination; the idea that the nation has the right to choose its own destiny without interference from other entities, in this case the Spanish State.

Table 16: Top 10 Global Affairs Words Used in Campaigns Before and After Referendums in Scotland and Catalonia

Scotland		Catalonia	
Before Referendum	*After Referendum*	*Before Referendum*	*After Referendum*
EU/ European/ Europe (180)	EU/ European/ Europe (164)	Europa/ europeu/ europeus/ europees/ europea/ UE (898)	món/ mundial/ internacional/ internacionalització/ internacionals/ internacionals/ global (446)
World/ international/ global (127)	World/ international/ global (156)	món/ mundial/ internacional/ internacionalització/ internacionals/ internacionals/ global (525)	Europa/ europeu/ europeus/ europees/ europea/ UE (410)
Climate (30)	Climate (41)	Països (210)	Països (99)
Nations (29)	Human (25)	Exterior (100)	Exterior (92)
Trade (14)	Trade (24)	Cooperació (75)	Cooperació (76)
Ireland (13)	Countries (16)	Estats (36)	Humans[66] (66)
Countries (10)	Migration (13)	Pau (33)	Climàtic (37)
Peace (11)	Nations (9)	Projecció (26)	Pau (39)
Overseas	Ireland	Climàtic	Estats

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[66] Only included occasions where the word *humans* (human) were preceded by *drets* (rights), i.e. human rights.

(9)	(7)	(22)	(44)
Norway	Wales	Nacions	Nacions
(6)	(6)	(20)	(24)

As per global affairs, the Scottish discourse's main focus was the European Union and European politics at large, followed by international affairs beyond the continent. Bilateral relations were also important, this is suggested by the words nations, countries, Ireland, overseas and trade. Moreover, global issues requiring multilateral relations were also mentioned, such as the importance of peace and the fight against climate change. Following the referendum, the importance of international affairs beyond Europe grew; the significant gap that had existed between the frequency of words relating to Europe and the world disappeared after 2014. The question of migration and the word human (which included two areas, human rights and human trafficking) were added. Therefore, more global topics were included in the discourse, while the references to other countries (countries; nations; Ireland) were less likely to appear in the discourse.

In Catalonia, an interesting shift can be observed in the discourse. Although both Europe and the EU and global questions were essential parts of the discourse, before the referendum, the former was in focus, but after, international questions were referenced more frequently. These were followed by references to other countries, especially the so-called *Països Catalans* (mentioned 85 times out of 210 before and 33 times out of 99 after the referendum) that are not a recognized legal entity, but nonetheless an important building block of the Catalan political communication. These were followed by different terms (*acció; exterior; cooperació*) used in Catalan to refer to external relations (both bilateral and multilateral) and international questions, especially global peace and climate change. The significance of the latter grew over time as climate was more frequently used during the campaigns following the referendum.

Key seminaries between the Scottish and Catalan discourse include the strong emphasis on European and international affairs. This is supported by the fact that the EU and international questions are mentioned more frequently than any of most frequently used words in other areas (values, population groups, economy, social policy and home state). Building relations both in and beyond Europe and tackling global issues are the most important elements of the conceptualization of the Scottish and Catalan nations. Climate change, global peace and the protection of human rights are issues that are problems directly mentioned and embraced by parties in Scotland and Catalonia, with a similar tendency of referencing these issues more frequently over time. Moreover, both nationalist movements started using more often the terms

'countries' and 'states' to refer to other external entities, while the word 'nation' was used less. This is very similar to the way they started favoring country/*país* instead of nation/*nació* to refer to their own communities.

However, in the case of Catalonia, relations with other Spanish autonomous communities where the local language is referred to as Catalan by nationalists (be that a language that is called differently by locals, but share key similarities with the language spoken in Catalonia) were also deemed essential for external action. The importance of *Països Catalans* remained close to unchanged in terms of frequency. In Scotland, other independent countries (such as Norway) were explicitly mentioned prior to the independence referendum, while after, other areas of the British Isles were brough up more often. Therefore, in the case of the Scottish discourse, a shift happened from explicitly mentioned states beyond UK to countries of British Isles.

6.5. Summary of Results

In this chapter, the Scottish and Catalan nationalist discourse was analyzed and compared from a text-based point of view. The basis of the analysis was the assessment of political manifestos published by nationalist parties who governed Scotland and Catalonia during the observed period. The general description of the texts highlighted that the word use across the manifestos in both Scotland and Catalonia was quite similar. Broadly speaking, words could be coded into four main categories: terms referring to the people, regional institutions, territory and public culture of Scotland and Catalonia (such as country and *país*); content related to concrete policies and political institutions (such as UK and Estat) and verbs (such as *to work* and *fer*). The general overview of the texts already suggested that both discourses underwent some changes as some words were not used as recurrentlyas before the respective independence referendums (such as *república* becoming prominent in Catalan and the UK in Scottish discourse) or were dropped entirely from the most frequent repertoire (such as Europe in Catalonia).

Nonetheless, at this point, the difference between campaigns before and after the referendums was close to insignificant. However, the corpora included a series of rewording especially while referencing Scotland and Catalonia and their respective population and key public institutions. For the different periods, a most frequently used word list was generated which demonstrated that both in Scotland and Catalonia parties were less inclined to use 'nation' to refer to their own community; country or *país* was favoured instead. These rewordings were used as keywords to select relevant sentences where the parties explicitly talked about their nation (be that any element of the nation) and four sets of corpora were created one for each time period

(Scotland: campaigns before 2014 and after 2014; Catalonia: campaigns before 2017 and after 2017).

The content of the corpora was textually analyzed by coding the most frequently used words into different categories according to the context in which they appeared. Words loaded with ideological meaning (values), words referring to specific groups of people within the nation, words referring to social policy, words used for the description of the economy, words describing relations between home states (Spain and the UK) and the 'nations' (Catalonia and Scotland) and words relating to international affairs (be that European or beyond the borders of Europe). What this demonstrated was that Scottish discourse prior to the referendum was economy-focused, followed by social themes, population groups, global affairs and values. After 2014, words related to social themes were the most likely to be used, economy came second, while the frequency of UK related words grew the most.

In Catalonia, no such major shift was recorded: words related to social questions were always the main focus. The key difference is that while in Scotland every category (except for the economy) expanded in number of words used, in Catalonia, following the referendum, references to values and groups nearly doubled in frequency, while less content could be linked to international questions and Catalan-Spanish relations. Therefore, following the referendum, Scots increasingly talked about the UK, in Catalonia, this period was marked by less direct references to Madrid-Barcelona relations.

The general coding of the verbs used in the corpora showed that the Catalan and Scottish discourses relied heavily on the use of verbs that refer to some kind of movement or motion (such as *to continue*/*seguir*), verbs that refer to the physical act of building something (such as *to create*/*crear* or *to build*) and verbs that express help or aid (such as *to support* or *garantir*). In the Scottish discourse verbs for aiding were always used the most; the referendum did not change campaign communication in this aspect. In Catalonia, before the referendum, verbs for movement were used the most, while following the consultation, both verbs for movement and for aiding were used at the same intensity. This means that the Scottish discourse remained relatively stable in terms of verb use, focusing on supporting people, while the Catalans' focus was on progress, on moving forward with national objectives, but after 2017, helping people became equally important. Again, if only the end result is taken into account, the Scottish and the Catalan discourses are quite similar. But by factoring in the tendency, it was possible to see differences.

The most frequently used verbs of movement demonstrated that both in Scotland and Catalonia verbs for progression (for example *to move ahead*) were used, while verbs for regression (for example, *to return*) were used less. Moreover, when the time periods were compared, it showed that the relative use of these verbs for movement increased only in Catalonia, while in Scotland, their frequency slightly decreased. Nonetheless, the use of these verbs demonstrated that both movements conceptualize the nation using the conceptual metaphor for progress, where moving ahead means reaching goals, allowing complex political issues to be broken down to a communicationally more 'digestible' narrative of direction and purpose. This in turn means that behind the 'movement', there were hidden political matters framed *in terms of* movement.

In the case of Scotland and Catalonia, the progress (movement) supports the values expressed in the discourse as progress can also be understood as a normative (value-based) term. The analysis of the recurring values in the corpora demonstrated that both the Scottish and the Catalan texts put emphasis on equality (fairness and *igualtat*), environmental protection (green, sustainable/*sostenible*) and open-minded approach towards social diversity (inclusive/*inclusiva* and *diversitat*). References to these values increased further after the respective referendums, supporting that these were cornerstones of the two discourses. However, the difference was that 'own' national values were also present in both cases: Catalans emphasized the importance of maintaining social cohesion and the centrality of freedom and democracy (all of which were more frequently presented in the discourse after 2017), while Scots see their nation as strong, safe and wealthy (although the latter one lost its prevalence following the referendum).

The different population groups that play an important role in this process of conceptualization were also very similar in the two cases. During the assessed time period, the importance of local communities, young people and women grew as they appeared more frequently in the discourse compared to other groups, while references to families and cities decreased. The main difference between the Scottish and Catalan discourses was that the latter underwent a more significant change: workers, the most recurring group in Catalan campaigns before the referendum, were only the fifth after 2017. Also, the sexual minorities and people living in territories beyond Catalonia (Balearic Island and the Valencian Community) made the most frequently referenced groups after the Catalan referendum. Therefore, compared to Scotland, more changes occurred in the Catalan discourse in terms of population groups. Moreover, workers and sexual minorities were not present in the Scottish discourse in the frequency and therefore importance found in Catalonia.

The most regularly used verbs for aiding increased in both 'nations' during the observed period, highlighting the importance of helping people, giving support to those who need it and protecting them from threats. This signalled that both movements used the so-called nurturing mother synonym present in many left-wing parties' discourses across the globe. However, not only verb use, but the key themes found along the lines of economy and social policy related content also supported the application of this frame. Again, the main building blocks of themes were quite similar across the discourses and time periods (particularly, jobs and businesses),, yet there were some major shifts registered. In Scotland, following the referendum, energy questions were less important than before and employment emerged in its place, while in Catalonia, technology was the largest addition to list. Nevertheless, some key differences were also found. The Scottish discourse was business centric, while Catalonia was labour centric at least in word use as in Scotland, both before and after the referendum, businesses were mentioned more, while in Catalonia, ensuring that people have jobs was a more recurring theme than companies.

In the field of social policy, the emphasis on general social services and education were both important building blocks of the discourses regardless of the observed time periods. However, in Scotland healthcare was particularly important, while in Catalonia, an increasing emphasis was recorded regarding the protection of the rights of different social groups (such as sexual, ethnic and religious minorities). Moreover, language and culture were more important in Catalonia than in Scotland, whereas the opposite was true for environmental issues and CO_2 emissions which were not treated as priority in Catalonia. Sports, although somewhat losing their relevance in the Catalan discourse over the years, were still important, but in Scotland, sports were not mentioned frequently.

As per the most frequently used verbs for building, similar verbs were used before and the referendums, with some minimal changes over time. The tendency was also very similar as the frequency of verbs for building increased following the 2014 and 2017 referendums. The assessment of the process of building relations with the home states (the UK and Spain) and entities beyond (be that other states or international bodies) strengthen the image of 'building' nations. Regarding relations with the home state, the Scottish discourse underwent a seemingly more significant changes as prior to the 2014 consultation, the focus was on independence, the UK and the referendum, but after, the discourse focused on the UK and on the distribution of powers. Especially the UK was mentioned more in the post-referendum campaigns.

On the other hand, in Catalonia, Spain was always mentioned the most, followed by the vision of independence (building a state and transitioning to full sovereignty). However, following 2017, the events surrounding the referendum were also included in the discourse, this is supported by *repressió* being used frequently. Moreover, while before 2017, the emphasis was on transitioning (*transició; procés*), thus suggesting a negotiated process of secession, after 2017, self-determination (*autodeterminació*) and sovereignty (*sobirania*) were mentioned more. Therefore, while the Scots following the failed referendum advocated for more power and downplayed independence, in Catalonia, the relations were re-framed from a negotiated process to a one-sided decision.

In terms of global affairs, building European and international relations were important in Scotland and Catalonia. However, while in Scotland, Europe was always at the very heart of building relations with the external world, followed by entities beyond the 'Old Continent', in Catalonia, the referendum resulted in a shift as international matters were referenced directly more than Europe. Climate change, human rights and peace were frequently present in both discourses. However, trade was especially important for Scotland, as were relations with other countries for Catalonia. The latter includes did not only included multilateral and bilateral relations with states around the globe, but also relations with other autonomous communities in Spain, especially where Catalan/Valencian is spoken (this is forming part of the so-called *Països Catalans*).

7. Comparative Discourse Practice Analysis of the Scottish and Catalan Nationalist Discourse

7.1. Framing Nations as Diverse Communities

The Scottish and Catalan nationalist discourses are often referred to as 'cosmopolitan' (Nicolson, 2022; Creasy, 2022; Finley, 2022; Jackson, 2022; Knight, 2017; Calhoun, 2008; Nielsen, 1999) or as 'civic' (Keating, 1996; Hearn, 2003; Jeannier, 2021; Paul, 2020; Duclos, 2023). This is supported by the analysis of Chapter 6, which demonstrated that both discourses were built on a number of 'progressive' values, while including more and more population groups in their campaigns. The fact that both movements communicated about young people, rural and local communities, families, children, urban communities and sexual minorities already demonstrates that their vision is one based on inclusiveness and diversity, be that called 'cosmopolitan' or 'civic'. As suggested in Chapter 3, researchers must look beyond the eagerness of creating new dichotomies in the field of nationalism studies. Instead of creating new concepts for the same phenomenon, one must delve deeper and understand the depth of nationalism, concentrating on what this 'civic' or 'cosmopolitan' understanding of the nation means to different minority nations by comparing their respective conceptualizations. What the textual analysis did not show was the underlying practice of two nationalist movements to frame their *ethnie* to fit their inclusive and diverse vision for their nation.

In 2007, when the SNP rose to power for the first time in the history of Scotland, Alex Salmond, the then just elected First Minister of Scotland famously declared in his acceptance speech:

> "*In 1961, Bashir Ahmad came to Glasgow to drive buses. In 1961, the very idea of a Scottish Parliament was unimaginable. In 1961, the very idea of a Scots Asian sitting in a Scots Parliament was doubly unimaginable. But Bashir is here and we are here, and that part of the community of Scotland is woven into the very tartan of our parliament. And we are stronger – so much stronger – as a result. We are diverse – not divided*" *(Salmond, 2007).*

Describing the Scottish nation's pro-immigration sentiment through conceptually framing it as being woven into the oldest Scottish fabric (tartan) was a strong metaphorical image. However, Salmond's first speech as First Minister of Scotland not only summarized, but also set the nationalists' vision on inclusion and diversity in Scotland. The SNP stood by this conceptualization of the nation in the past 17 years, with every political manifesto referencing the welcoming and inclusive nature of the Scottish nation.

Table 17: Diversity and Inclusiveness in Campaigns Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

> *"The SNP wants to see a **culturally cosmopolitan Scotland**, capable of **attracting and retaining gifted people**, where our creative community is supported and their contribution to the economy is maximised" (SNP, 2007: 55).*
>
> *"Grow the population by 3% over the next 10 years: gain 150,000 by creating opportunities so fewer Scots would feel the need to leave, more Scots would return**, and more 'new Scots' would come to Scotland**" (SNP, 2007: 27).*
>
> *"**An 'earned citizenship' system**, similar to those in Canada or Australia, would allow Scotland to attract high-skill immigrants who can add to the strength of our economy and help deliver growing prosperity for the whole nation" (SNP, 2010: 19).*

> *"Scotland is a **diverse, welcoming and outward-looking nation**, with compassion and a drive for fairness sitting at the very heart of our values" (SNP, 2016).*
>
> *"**Tolerance, respect, inclusion** – these are attitudes and principles we want to encourage and foster in modern, fairer Scotland" (SNP, 2016: 21).*
>
> *"Scotland is a welcoming and inclusive nation and **we value everyone, no matter their birthplace, who has chosen to make Scotland their home** and to live, work, study, raise their families and build their lives" (SNP, 2021: 69).*

The extracts show that in Scotland the emphasis was on retaining citizens and attracting new people, on introducing 'earned citizenship' (while retaining regular citizenship) and building an outward-looking, diverse and welcoming country where people born in Scotland and beyond can join together to build an inclusive nation. Therefore, the nation was formed by 'old' and 'new' Scots, the former being born in Scotland and the latter having emigrated to Scotland. Native Scottish English, Gaelic, Scots and Doric represent the attributes of 'old Scots', the *ethnie* or "tartan" of the nation, while other native languages are markers of 'new' Scots. A key difference between Scots and Catalans is that the SNP did not offer linguistic or cultural paths of integration to be part of the Scottish nation. Compared to Catalan nationalists, the SNP was in a simpler position for two reasons. On the one hand, English is a global language spoken by over a billion people worldwide, while Catalan is spoken by approximately 10 million people[67]. And on the other hand, the native languages of Scotland, (Gaelic and Scots) cannot be a must

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[67] Only if we accept the Catalan nationalist position that Valencian and Balear are in fact Catalan.

to learn for all Scots as the number of speakers is very limited and therefore it is unlikely that they would be considered a shared linguistic attribute of the entire nation.

However, this did not mean that the attributes of 'old' Scots were entirely forgotten; the opposite was true. Before the referendum, Gaelic was only mentioned 5 times and Scots language 3 times in the context of the nation, while Gaelic was used 9 times and Scots once. Therefore, the protection of the languages of 'old' Scots was treated more important that before. Before the referendum, the emphasis was on protecting and promoting 'Scotland's own languages', while after 2014, the goal did not change, but was explicitly placed in the context of Scotland being a multilingual society. The same happened to teaching Scottish history and culture which was seen as a priority before 2014, but after the referendum, teaching colonial history and LGBTI history were also included in the frame. Therefore, languages, history and culture were framed to fit the inclusive vision of the nation.

Table 18: Framing Languages in Campaigns Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

*"An SNP government will focus on **increasing the place of Gaelic in education**, improving the*

status of the language throughout Scotland and supporting Gaelic speaking communities" (SNP, 2007: 57).

*"We will place science, modern languages and technology at the heart of education. **Scottish history, culture and heritage** will be embedded in school life to provide a Scottish world view" (SNP, 2007: 52).*

*"At the same time, **we will develop the concept of "Scottish Studies" in our schools**, creating a distinct strand of learning focused on Scotland and incorporating Scottish History, Scottish Literature, the Scots and Gaelic Languages, wider Scottish culture and Scottish current affairs" (SNP, 2011: 24).*

*"We will also bring forward a new Scottish Languages Bill which takes further steps to support Gaelic, acts on the Scots language and recognises that **Scotland is a multilingual society**" (SNP, 2021: 66).*

*"**LGBT history, role models and equalities education should be taught in schools** to tackle the prejudice which often leads to the bullying and social exclusion of LGBT young people" (SNP, 2021: 63).*

> *"We will fund the development of an online programme on Scotland and **the UK's colonial history throughout the world that can be delivered to schools**, and we will encourage Local Authorities to adopt the programme in all schools"* (SNP, 2021: 64).

Before the referendum, Scottish history and culture were integrated into a subject that also teaches current Scottish affairs and modern languages; in Scotland, history was historically seen as a 'socializing subject', meaning that the emphasis was always put on educating children to become responsible Scottish citizens (Smith, 2018:40). In other words, history teaching in Scotland is closer to a citizenship class where pupils learn about responsibilities and duties in a society: students learn about the ways they can contribute to their social and political communities (Smith, 2016). Therefore, the role history and native languages play were framed in the context of cotemporary issues, creating a unique type of teaching method in the UK, where the distinctive character of Scotland – as a country with shared history and cultural attributes – was emphasized. The wish to integrate Scottish colonial history and LGBT history into the curriculum is another step towards the diversification of Scottish history, framing history through the lenses of contemporary issues (i.e. Black Lives Matter Movement and LGBT movement).

As we saw in Chapter 4, the countryside was an essential aspect of Scottish culture and history, especially the native, Gaelic and Scots speaking population of the country. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the importance of rural and islands communities also played an increasingly important role in the modern Scottish discourse. However, these communities were placed in a sustainability and modernizing frame. A good example is the centuries-old crofting[68] tradition of rural areas of Scotland which the SNP has vocally supported and re-framed as a sustainable and modern way of farming. As the table below shows, by 2021, the SNP declared that crofting must meet newly introduced 'green' restrictions to receive funding. Therefore, a conflict arose between and old tradition and a new value (sustainability) with the latter winning in the end.

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Table 19: Framing Crofting in Campaigns Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

*"The SNP supports **the development of crofting as a nature-friendly, small-scale agriculture system** well fitted to provide home bases for many who live in our most fragile remote and island communities"* (SNP, 2007: 71)

*"**We recognise the important place of crofting in our society** and the contribution it makes to health and strength of many rural communities. We will encourage the creation of new crofts especially on public land"* (SNP, 2011: 39).

*"**Crofting plays a unique role in Scotland's Highlands and Islands heritage**, bringing distinct social, economic and environmental benefits to communities. We will continue to provide public support for the continuation of crofting and to secure thriving crofting communities"* (SNP, 2016: 25).

"Transform support for farming and food production so that by 2025 half of all funding for farmers and crofters comes with "green strings*""* (*SNP, 2021: 46).*

*"By 2025, however, **we will shift half of all funding for farming and crofting from unconditional to conditional support** and there will be targeted outcomes for biodiversity gain and a drive towards low carbon approaches which improve resilience, efficiency and profitability"* (SNP, 2021: 55).

Yet the question remains: what unites 'old' and 'new' Scots if it is not culture or history? The answer is: the common values of fairness, equality and sustainability which according to the SNP are shared by every Scot and which, as suggested in Chapter 6, all became more important attributes in the last 15 years. These values were very constantly referred to as national values of the nation ("Scottish standards"); especially fairness was seen as the common attribute of Scots. What united these values is that they were all conceptualized in terms of movement and change; as goals set in the future that Scots can reach. The vision of a fair, equal and sustainable Scotland is set in the future, it is destination that can be reached if Scots – both 'old' and 'new' embark on it by voting for the SNP.

Table 20: Framing Values in Campaigns Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

*"Together, we can make **Scotland fairer**" (SNP, 2011: 2).*

*"We will continue our efforts to strengthen our society, with **more Scots sharing in our nation's wealth**" (SNP, 2011: 5).*

*"Scotland can never be considered truly successful until all of its citizens consider themselves to be **equally valued members of society**" (SNP, 2011: 16).*

*"We are building a future where **we protect our environment as a truly sustainable society**" (SNP, 2011: 5).*

*"We set ourselves a new commitment to deliver high levels of sustainable growth for Scotland, with three Scottish standards – **solidarity, cohesion and sustainability**" (SNP, 2007: 21).*

*"The journey to **a fairer more equal and prosperous Scotland** is far from over" (SNP, 2016: 7).*

*"We need to harness the efforts of all of society – including the public, private and third sectors – to work towards **the common goal of an equal and prosperous country**" (SNP, 2016: 19).*

*"Creating a **fairer society** is fundamental to the beliefs of the SNP and is essential to the **sustainable, long-term prosperity** of the Scottish economy" (SNP, 2019: 14).*

*"Scotland has the chance of becoming a global leader in creating an economy that benefits everyone, and offers decent jobs, **sustainability, social inclusiveness, and stability**" (SNP, 2019: 13).*

Therefore, in the case of Scotland, being part of the nation is a choice for 'new' Scots and reality for 'old' Scots. Or, in the words of Reicher et al (2009: 34), being part of the Scottish nation is a "chosen destiny" or "matter of commitment". The languages and culture of 'old' Scots continue to be protected, but framed in a way to ensure social inclusiveness, with the latter receiving more and more focus. The same tendency was observed in the case of rural Scotland, which continues to be the celebrated backbone of the country, but framed to meet modern standards of sustainability and climate change. These restrictions undoubtedly led to the loss of some aspects of 'old' Scots as sustainability and inclusiveness were prioritized.

In Catalonia, similarly to Scotland, the nation was increasingly 'imagined' as a welcoming, inclusive community. This was also supported by the nationalist vision including more and more social group after the referendum, such as sexual minorities, women and disabled people.

Table 21: Diversity and Inclusiveness in Campaigns Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

*"**Una societat inclusiva** és una societat que avança, que innova, que té futur"* (ERC, 2012: 58).

*"Volem fer un nou país net i just, una nova socialdemocràcia, una societat del benestar avançada, **diversa, inclusiva i cohesionada**"* (ERC, 2016: 3).

*"**Un país acollidor, obert i socialment avançat**. La societat catalana acull moltes formes de **diversitat social i cultural**"* (Junts, 2015: 120).

*"**Un país acollidor i socialment avançat** de tots els ciutadans fundadors de la República catalana"* (ERC, 2016: 40).

*"La República Catalana es constituirà com **una societat diversa**, garantint els mateixos drets i oportunitats per a tothom, promovent la **interculturalitat i el plurilingüisme** com a riquesa del país i configurant **una societat cohesionada**, **inclusiva i solidària** en base als valors republicans i els drets humans"* (ERC, 2017: 91).

*"A Catalunya es parlen prop de 300 llengües, per tant, **la societat catalana és plurilingüe**"* (ERC, 2017: 95).

*"Catalunya, de sempre societat receptora de persones estrangeres i **terra d'acollida**, s'ha conformat també **lingüísticament amb població d'arreu del món**"* (Junts, 2021: 110).

*"**La gran diversitat de llengües parlades** a Catalunya és un valor cultural clau perquè una llengua sempre suma i mai no és excloent"* (Junts, 2021: 110).

However, the conceptualization of the inclusive nation was entirely different in Catalonia due to the role the Catalan language played in the nationalist discourse. This because the Catalan language (historically most important pillar of Catalan nationalism) was framed by conceptualizing the national language as a path to integration into a discrimination free, diverse and intercultural society that welcomes migrants and recognizes other languages. This strategy, the so-called linguistic immersion of immigrants, has had a long history in Catalonia since it was the primary method used to "catalanize" immigrant waves from Andalusia (Ucelay-Da Cal, 2014: 26). This allows the recognition of the Catalan nation as welcoming and diverse, while nationalist parties also emphasized the importance of "social cohesion"; everyone, including newcomers and natives, has to learn the "own language" of the nation. In other words, immigration is encouraged with the condition of knowing the shared language and the culture.

Table 22: Framing Native Language in Campaigns Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

*"Promourem la cultura i la llengua catalanes com **espai comú, cohesionador i integrador** per a les persones nouvingudes" (CIU, 2012: 135).*

*"**El coneixement de la llengua catalana quedarà garantit** a través d'un sistema d'ensenyament lingüístic universal i inclusiu que **no faci diferències entre la població** per raó de llengua" (Junts, 2015: 73).*

*"La llengua catalana serà **la llengua transversal del país** i serà **la llengua que vertebrarà la societat catalana**, **sens perjudici de totes les altres llengües**, oficials o no, que s'hi parlen" (ERC, 2012: 73).*

*"Promoure la interculturalitat i el **plurilingüisme de la societat catalana** amb el català com a **llengua vertebradora**, de cohesió i interacció" (ERC, 2021: 69).*

*"**El català ha de ser la llengua de cohesió** del conjunt de la ciutadania: és el vehicle d'expressió d'una societat, és el tret característic d'una cultura i és patrimoni també dels habitants no catalanoparlants del país" (ERC, 2021: 146).*

*"**Aprendre català com a llengua d'adopció i parlar-lo genera cohesió**, com a riquesa que aporta valor afegit i facilita la participació social, amb igualtat de condicions en la vida cultural, laboral i social" (Junts, 2021: 110).*

Despite the Catalan language being framed as an integration mechanism into a diverse, inclusive and multilingual society, and other languages being explicitly recognized to further enforce this diversity (such as Castilian-Spanish and Occitan), Catalan still remained the 'epicentre' of nationalism. This is further supported, as seen in Chapter 6, by the increasing references to the Balearic Island and Valencian Community as important population groups of the nation.

The conceptualization of the Catalan nation is not limited to the geographically and legally defined territory of Catalonia; this is supported by the way Catalan parties communicated about Catalan as a defying characteristic of the nation that exists beyond Catalonia. The Catalan nation has two main conceptual domains: one based on the established boundaries of the autonomous territory of Catalonia and another based on all territories where Catalan (or its 'sister languages', such as Balear or Valencian) is spoken. The common national attribute of the Catalan language is not only shared by the people living in Catalonia, but by others who are also part of the nation, but live beyond. This linguistically defined domain is referred to as *'Països Catalans'* by the Catalan nationalists. This pan-Catalan term disregards that other

autonomous communities do not refer to their own languages as Catalan and is built on the idea that these territories of Spain belong together based on language and culture (Johannes, 2022; Nemes; 2015: 121; Nemes, 2014: 276).[69]

Table 23: Native language as Defining Element of the Boundaries of the Catalan 'Nation'

*"En el naixement del nou Estat, Catalunya es proposa l'aprofundiment dels seus vincles amb la resta dels **Països Catalans**, constatant les arrels històriques comunes, el patrimoni cultural i lingüístic; els lligams comercials, industrials i territorials" (ERC, 2016: 24).* *"Per això mateix caldrà impulsar l'articulació de l'espai comunicatiu català, format pels mitjans de comunicació de Catalunya i els mitjans de comunicació de la resta de territoris històrics dels **Països Catalans**" (ERC, 2016: 25).*
*"També s'ha de posar al servei de la potenciació de **l'espai català de comunicació** en la seva totalitat, impulsant plataformes de distribució de continguts e**n català per al conjunt de l'àmbit nacional i lingüístic (País Valencià i les Illes)**" (Junts, 2021: 130).* *"**Els Països Catalans, l'espai natural de la llengua catalana** on cal aspirar a la plena normalització de l'ús de la llengua en tots els àmbits" (ERC, 2021: 146).* *"Denunciar al Parlament Europeu totes les agressions lingüístiques que pateixen els **catalanoparlants arreu dels Països Catalans**" (ERC, 2019: 54).* *"**Fer dels Països Catalans una realitat comunicativa** com a expressió de la seva realitat cultural i lingüística i reforçar-ne els vincles i la consciència col·lectiva" (ERC, 2017: 95).*

Moreover, the framing of the Catalan language as a path to cohesion within diversity is further supported by the references to a number of values that, due to their frequency in the discourse, could be considered 'Catalan national values'. In other words, it is not only the common language that unites Catalans in diversity, but also a number of values that all citizen embrace, and thus define the community. The Catalans, just as Scots, referred to sustainability and equality as essential values, but freedom and democracy were also explicitly mentioned as Catalan values. The reason, as suggested in Chapter 6, for freedom emerging as number one value is due to the imprisonment of social and political actors after the referendum: fighting for amnesty and freedom was recurringly mentioned as a result, increasing the frequency (and therefore the importance) of freedom in the discourse.

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[69] In the Balearic Islands, the regional language is called Balear, whereas in the Velencian Community, it is referred to Valencian.

Table 24: Framing Values in Campaigns Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

*"Llibertat: ens identifiquem amb els anhels i **els objectius de llibertat** nacional de Catalunya expressats de manera contundent pel poble català, i ens posem al seu servei" (CIU, 2012: 20).*

*"Volem dissenyar i construir un territori que sigui **competitiu**, que sigui **sostenible** i que garanteixi la **cohesió social**" (CIU, 2012: 101).*

*"Queda palesa la necessitat d'un nou marc normatiu a Catalunya que [..] avança cap a polítiques de **sostenibilitat** cap a la societat del coneixement i més responsable" (ERC, 2012: 91).*

*No podrem treballar per **una societat pròspera, equitativa, solidària i democràtica** si, abans, no podem exercir, com a país, la llibertat de la plena sobirania (Junts, 2015: 14).*

*"La cultura pública comuna és un espai comú de catalanitat, configurat a partir dels **valors democràtics, el respecte dels drets humans, la igualtat i el pluralisme**, així com **l'aportació cultural i lingüística singular** que fa Catalunya a la diversitat global" (ERC, 2016: 21).*

*Una república intercultural per viure junts els que som diferents, desenvolupant una cultura cívica comuna basada en els **valors de la democràcia, la llibertat i els drets humans** (ERC, 2021: 65).*

*Un sindicalisme republicà compromès amb la societat, amarat dels **valors republicans de llibertat, igualtat i fraternitat,** als quals s'hi han de sumar els valors feministes i ecologistes per tal d'afrontar amb garanties els reptes socials i tecnològics que presenta el món d'avui i del futur (ERC, 2021: 104).*

*Un país, una ciutats i uns pobles intel·ligents per millorar els serveis i la qualitat de vida de les persones i orientar les nostres vides cap a **la sostenibilitat** (ERC, 2019: 85).*

*Volem **un país nou on la democràcia sigui el fonament de l'arquitectura comunitària**, on es doni veu als ciutadans, amb democràcia representativa, amb democràcia participativa i amb democràcia directa, sense pors ni límits, de forma pionera, i entre les més avançades del món (Junts, 2017: 14).*

The Catalan nation, therefore, is defined as both a linguistic and value-based community, where linguistic plurality of the people is recognized, but becoming a member of the nation is subject to the knowledge of the language that acts as the facilitator of social cohesion; Catalan. This can be 'achieved' by being born in Catalonia (or to Catalan parents) or in other territories of the Catalan Countries and learning the language through socialization or migrating to Catalan lands and learning the national language through the process of integration. What unites Catalans –

beyond the language – is the shared vision of progression to embrace sustainability, freedom, democracy and inclusiveness. Given the duality of the conceptualization, the Catalan nation is both a territorially (i.e. Catalonia) and a linguistically (i.e. *Països Catalans*) imagined community.

Whereas for the Scottish nation, advancing towards the shared goal of a fair, sustainable and inclusive society is what unites the diverse community of people; being part of the nation is entirely based on embracing these values. Citizens might have different backgrounds – being born inside the country or choosing to migrate to Scotland –, but they all share the land of Scotland, where the native population's culture and languages are embraced, but are increasingly framed in terms of diversity and inclusiveness. Therefore, compared to Catalonia, the Scottish nation is a territorially defined community.

7.2. **Framing Nations as Wealthy Communities**

Both Scottish and Catalan nationalism have been extensively researched as 'welfare nationalist movements' for using social claims (such as the need to expand welfare policies to meet local economic and social needs) to underline the distinctive character of their nations (Kymlicka, 2001; Béland, 2010; Béland and Lecour, 2008; Geer, 2007; Muñoz and Guinjoan, 2013; Jeffery, 2009; Elias, 2009; Keating and Harvey, 2014). Historically, the development of the welfare states across Europe was cultivated by a notion of solidary among individuals, thus fostering a sense of shared identity (Keating, 1996: 34). This was not only used by established states: the link between minority nationalism and welfare systems was also demonstrated by Balthazar (1986: 31), who claimed that minority nationalism favoured social and economic intervention in the lives of the population (i.e. polices favouring the development of the welfare system) to strengthen the attachment of individuals to the nation. This was especially true for the case of Scotland and Catalonia.

McEwen (2002: 144) argued that the development of the welfare state and its policies was crucial for the SNP, while portraying Scotland as a more equal and social democratic society compared to other countries of the UK. Keating (2009: 87) also highlighted that the devolution of powers to the Scottish administration allowed the creation of a Scottish social policy based on the Scottish needs and political demands, thus further differentiating Edinburgh from London. Similar conclusions were drawn by researchers for the case of Catalonia. Catalan nationalists after 1980 also argued for the expansion of the welfare state as an integral part of the Catalan identity, while claiming that due to fiscal restrictions from Madrid, the progression

of this social vison was restricted (Lecours, 2007: 139; Béland and Lecours, 2016: 432). In other words, Spain threatened the Catalan identity as its constitutional framework was not adequate to meet the 'unique' Catalan needs.

Therefore, both in Scotland and Catalonia, welfare has not only been understood as social matter, but also as a key theme of national identity. Therefore, the comparative assessment of the Scottish and Catalan discourse should not concentrate on the degree to which these 'nations' are conceptualized as welfare nations. Instead, the analysis should focus on understanding how the two movements approached and balanced economic growth, social progress and environmental protection by commonly framing them in terms of sustainability.

In Scotland, rural communities were increasingly referenced for a reason: the natural environment plays an essential role in the conceptualization of the nation. The Scottish nation views its environment and landscapes as national assets that must be protected through environmental and climate policies. These 'natural treasures', together with the protective frameworks Scotland had developed, were claimed to be globally recognized assets of the country.

Table 25: Natural Environment as Wealth Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

*"Scotland's **environment** – built and natural – is one of our **nation's greatest assets**" (SNP, 2011: 5).* *"We are building a future where we **protect our environment as a truly sustainable society**" (SNP, 2011: 5).* *"We will take forward our proposal for an effective public engagement strategy so as a nation we can work together to drive forward **Scotland's transition to a low-carbon society**" (SNP, 2011: 26).* *"Scotland is **world-renowned for our clean environment** and the quality of our produce" (SNP, 2007: 71).*
*"We are considered to be **an international exemplar** and have made **substantial progress in making Scotland cleaner and greener**" (SNP, 2016: 29).* *"**Scotland is a world leader on tackling climate change** emissions – both in terms of our ambition and our record" (SNP, 2016: 29).* *"It also provides Scotland with valuable exports and revenues, stimulates jobs and growth and helps maintain **our outstanding natural landscapes and environment**" (SNP, 2019: 11).*

> *"**Scotland's natural larder** helps to create produce that is **respected and renowned around the world**" (SNP, 2019: 11).*

Yet the true strength of the conceptualization of the community as a green nation lies in the ability to frame issues that are important building blocks of the SNP's social democratic ideology through this green vision. As suggested by Chapter 6, Scottish nationalism increasingly focused on sustainability, especially sustainable growth which was understood as a gateway to prosperity that benefits businesses and citizens across the country. Even the North Sea oil, a sector seemingly far from being sustainable, nonetheless an important sector of the Scottish economy, was framed in terms of sustainability.

Table 26: Shared Sustainable Growth Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

> *"A big part of creating more prosperous and sustainable communities across Scotland is ensuring a greater benefit for communities from **our nation's substantial natural assets**" (SNP,*
>
> *"Growth must include the whole society and **not come at the expense of our environment**" (SNP, 2011: 38).*
>
> *"**We want to see more community benefit from renewable energy** and so will take forward our proposal for a new £2.4 million fund to enable community investment in renewables projects" (SNP, 2011: 38).*
>
> *"Scotland has been described as the "**Saudi Arabia of tidal power**", and the potential offered by our marine renewables is of a scale that can match the wealth and opportunity created by oil and gas in the North Sea" (SNP, 2011: 34).*

> *"**Creating a fairer society** is fundamental to the beliefs of the SNP and is essential to the **sustainable, long-term prosperity** of the Scottish economy" (SNP, 2019: 14).*
>
> *"Our ambition is for a stronger Scottish economy, with **the fruits of economic success shared more widely**" (SNP, 2015: 26).*
>
> *"We can deliver **more and better paid jobs, share the fruits of success amongst our citizens more equally**, and create stronger, more sustainable growth" (SNP, 2016: 19).*
>
> *"**We need to harness the power of all our natural resources** and also enable rural and island communities to thrive" (SNP, 2021: 70).*

In the sustainability frame, all economic actors were integrated one way or another. The SNP realized that the transition to sustainable growth might have negative consequences, making businesses unable to adjust to new standards and people losing their jobs. Therefore, the

campaign communication, whilst emphasizing sustainability, also focused on providing support and aid for businesses, industries and entire sectors of the economy to counteract any negative effects and ensure workers have the necessary skills to protect their jobs and even create new employment opportunities. Before the referendum, the emphasis was more on creating jobs particularly in the energy sector, while after, all sectors were covered (industry, service and agriculture) in this frame.

Table 27: Supporting Transition to Sustainable Growth Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

*"We are working hard to make Scotland Europe's green energy powerhouse, so we can make the most of **our vast green energy** potential and **create new jobs**" (SNP, 2011: 10).*

*"We are determined to ensure that Scotland's people have the skills they need to prosper as a result of **our nation's green energy** revolution" (SNP, 2011: 34).*

*"We have **already supported business in the development of green skills** hubs in Scotland to ensure we have the capacity to deliver energy efficiency and renewable generation measures in our communities and our homes and we will work to expand these sorts of initiatives" (SNP, 2011: 34).*

*"It will mean a **continued commitment to low and competitive taxes for our business community**; investment in our social economy and new measures to encourage the growth of new sources of finance for growing companies and enterprising communities" (SNP, 2011: 10).*

"Green Skills and Jobs for the Future: We will invest an additional £500 million over the next

*parliament to **support new jobs and reskill people for the jobs of the future**" (SNP, 2021: 48).*

*"Building on Scotland's strength in energy we will develop a new programme of work within our enterprise agencies, **working with companies in high carbon industries** like oil and gas to develop new technologies or access new low-carbon markets for their products" (SNP, 2021: 70).*

*"As part of our focus on meeting our climate change targets and promoting sustainable economic growth, **we will support businesses, the third sector and public sector organisations** working to boost productivity by using energy, materials and water more efficiently, so we can build a more resource efficient Scotland" (SNP, 2015: 32).*

> *"Food and drink is one of the jewels in Scotland's economic crown, and we will **do more to support its sustainable growth in the future**" (SNP, 2021: 55).*

Moreover, this inclusive and sustainable approach to growth, following the referendum, included more references to creating 'green jobs' in the Scottish economy, which contributed to jobs/employment being used more frequently.

One of the reasons why inducing and maintaining economic growth was especially important was due to the role publicly funded welfare services played in the Scottish discourse. The NHS and the Scottish education system were treated as 'social wealth', as assets that were key to the Scottish way of life. The nation's pride within social services, according to nationalists, was always the NHS: both before and after the referendum, the protection of the "most cherished public service" was seen as a key priority.

Table 28: Healthcare as Wealth Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

> *"Those who work in the **NHS do Scotland proud**" (SNP, 2007: 36).*
> *"**We are pledged to protect the NHS budget** in Scotland" (SNP, 2011: 3).*
> *"We are **all proud of Scotland's NHS** and the SNP is working hard **to protect and improve it**" (SNP, 2011: 5).*

> *"And, we will never stop trying to make **Scotland's NHS healthier**" (SNP, 2016:11).*
> *"A healthier Scotland: the National Health Service is our **most cherished public service**" (SNP, 2016: 11).*
> *"Our health service is **our most cherished public service** and we will ensure it is sustainable for the future" (SNP, 2021: 19)*

The same can be said for the other key area of Scottish welfare services: education. Schools play a crucial role in the society as they are "the heart of communities". They were framed as an investment to end poverty and a way to address inequalities in society, which is why education in Scotland has been free until the very end of university studies. Therefore, the development of free, universal healthcare and education system supports the nation's quest to build a fair, equal, diverse and healthy Scotland.

Table 29: Education as Wealth Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

> *"Schools are at **the heart of communities**" (SNP, 2007: 53).*

> *"And we will ensure **a fair start for young Scots with new investment** in early years and a school building programme that will cut by half the number of pupils in crumbling schools" (SNP, 2011: 1).*
>
> *"If we want to **tackle inequality in Scotland and break the cycle of poverty**, poor health and poor attainment, we need to continue to transform Scotland's approach to the early years" (SNP, 2011: 22).*
>
> *"We are ruling out tuition fees or a graduate contribution for Higher Education – **Scottish education will remain free**" (SNP, 2011: 7)*

> *"Scotland has a **good education system** – with great schools and teachers" (SNP, 2016: 16).*
>
> *"**A good education is an investment** – not just in our children, but in our society and our economy too" (SNP, 2016: 15)*
>
> *"As long as the SNP are in government, **there will not be no tuition fees in Scotland**" (SNP, 2021: 64)*
>
> ***Making sure Scottish education is world class** – for all our young people – will be the central mission of the next SNP Government (SNP, 2016: 7).*

In this social system, culture seems to have lost is relevance in the campaigns following the referendum, while taxation, on the other hand, remained an important aspect due to its role in the redistribution of wealth, especially by reducing taxes paid by the poorest sections of the society. Other aspects of the social system, namely, the protection of rights of population groups, benefits and security (especially social and income security) became more important than ever, which also supports that the importance of the social services increased over time.

In Catalonia, the relationships between social and economic topics were very similar in the discourse, despite the fact that sustainability only became the most frequently referenced value following 2017. Catalonia, just as Scotland, was 'imagined' as a nation that regards its natural heritage as an essential part of its national identity. The Catalan nature was regarded as a "national symbol" and an "indissoluble part of identity", with Catalonia being "a pioneer in Europe" in environmental protection. Like in Scotland, Catalan nationalists also argued that Catalonia was so successful that other nations should follow them: in this case, the EU regulation should catch up with the Catalans.

Table 30: Natural Environment as Wealth Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

*"Catalunya és **un país amb un patrimoni natural excepcional** i una elevada biodiversitat"* *(Junts, 2015: 76).*

*"El patrimoni natural de Catalunya ha d'esdevenir, per tant, un **emblema nacional** i un actiu econòmic de primer ordre del nou país" (CIU, 2012: 101).*

*"El patrimoni natural d'un territori, i la manera com aquest és gestionat, són també **part indissociable de la identitat d'un país"** (CIU, 2012: 101).*

*"Compromesos amb **un país més saludable, respectuós amb la natura i el medi ambient"** (Junts 2019: 3).*

*"**Catalunya és un territori pioner en la preservació d'hàbitats** i espècies i en polítiques per aturar la pèrdua de biodiversitat, raó per la qual s'ha d'implicar en la promoció de canvis substancials en totes les polítiques europees" (ERC, 2019b: 19).*

*"El patrimoni natural d'un territori, i la manera com aquest és gestionat, **és part indissociable de la identitat d'un país**. Catalunya és un país amb un patrimoni natural excepcional i una elevada biodiversitat, un entorn natural, ric i divers en espècies i paisatges…" (Junts, 2017: 49).*

The protection of the environment was then linked to sustainable growth the same way as in Scotland. Sustainable economic growth should not only be green and protective of the environment, but also inclusive, ensuring that all Catalans benefit from it through the welfare system. Economic growth should be green, while "serving the people" by creating new opportunities and welfare for all. Because sustainability is not only economic, but also social and environmental.

Table 31: Shared Sustainable Growth Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

*"Catalunya té l'oportunitat de constituir el primer Estat del segle XXI: un Estat basat en la **sostenibilitat social, mediambiental i econòmica"** (ERC: 2012: 6).*

*"Un compromís que, en tot cas, ha de respondre a la responsabilitat amb les generacions futures de catalanes i catalans i a les oportunitats i els beneficis que **una economia baixa en carboni** genera en termes de **prosperitat i de benestar a les persones i famílies** que viuen actualment a Catalunya" (CIU, 2012: 110).*

*"Catalunya ha de contribuir a una nova economia que sigui més estable, **més respectuosa amb el medi ambient**, amb una producció i una distribució més local, basada principalment*

> *en fonts energètiques pròpies i amb capacitat **de crear llocs de treball i benestar per a totes les persones**" (Junts, 2015: 88).*

> *"La República Catalana implantarà **un model mediambiental sostenible**, innovador i integral que **permeti compaginar el desenvolupament econòmic** i el respecte i la protecció d'un entorn natural de qualitat" (ERC, 2017: 98).*
>
> *"Garantir una economia per a la vida, amb **un nou model econòmic que estigui al servei de les***
>
> ***persones**, del teixit productiu de les empreses i **del medi ambient**, i no a l'inrevés" (ERC, 2021: 20).*
>
> *"**Una economia dinàmica, sostenible i al servei de les persones**, amb més recursos i competències en el finançament de Catalunya" (Junts, 2019: 3).*

The Catalan nationalists integrated their vision of sustainability into their discourse similarly to Scottish nationalists: by providing help to workers, businesses and entire sectors of the economy to ensure that building a sustainable country does not affect negatively the economic actors. However, before 2017, these aids were less developed, meaning that only general ideas were formulated covering entire sectors of the economy. Following the referendum, campaigns focused more on specific help provided for groups working in the local economy, industry, tourism, agriculture and fishery, small and medium size businesses and workers. Moreover, after 2017, technology appeared more frequently as part of the "economic transformation" frame that had been based on sustainability.

Table 32: Supporting Transition to Sustainable Growth Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

> *"En els espais protegits es tindrà una cura específica per garantir la continuïtat dels usos de les activitats **agràries, ramaderes i forestals, de manufactura i de turisme**, que són la font principal de vida i de riquesa de la població rural, **tot compatibilitzant la protecció dels espais** amb l'activitat tradicional i el turisme sostenible" (CIU, 2012: 103).*
>
> *"Promourem la recerca i el desenvolupament en matèria de sostenibilitat i Canvi Climàtic, **potenciant els grups i centres ja existents al país**, per tal de donar-los continuïtat i facilitar l'excel·lència, i **recolzant les empreses de l'economia verda que apostin per l'R+D**" (CIU, 2012: 111).*
>
> *"Aquest pacte ha de reactivar l'economia i **reorientar el sector productiu cap a un model econòmic més intel·ligent, més sostenible** i més integrador, que identifica com a primer*

> *àmbit prioritari **ajudar a reactivar els sectors productius** i portar a les empreses de Catalunya a nivells de competitivitat europeus" (Junts, 2015: 79).*

> *"Però sobretot, el que ens pot ajudar a fer més viu el territori és que siguem capaços de generar plans estratègics comarcals o supracomarcals **per treballar en el futur econòmic i sostenible de cada racó del territori**, amb **la potenciació de la nova indústria, de la logística, del sector primari i de les energies renovables i sobretot del turisme** que realça el patrimoni total de cada poble" (Junts, 2021: 225).*
>
> *"El model agrari, ramader, forestal i pesquer català es basa en l'empresa familiar, peça fonamental per **continuar oferint una gestió sostenible del territori des dels punts de vista social, econòmic, laboral, ecològic i cultural**" (Junts, 2017: 36).*
>
> *"**La transformació econòmica i tecnològica** del país només la podrem liderar **donant un suport** decidit a **les petites i mitjanes empreses, als autònoms i també a la indústria tradicional catalana**" (Junts, 2017: 41).*

The key difference between Scotland and Catalonia is that in the latter case communication about welfare policies was not primarily oriented towards healthcare and education, but towards the establishment of a welfare state that guarantees the collective rights of persons and provides outstanding education. Both before and after the referendum, the right to self-determination (right to vote) of the Catalan people was the most frequently referenced, followed by a number of social rights, including language rights, rights of sexual minorities, labour rights, right to adequate housing, rights of women and rights of refugees were also present in the discourse. However, following the referendum, the significance of the rights of sexual minorities, women and migrants increased significantly as they were more frequently referenced than before.

Table 33: Protection of Rights Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

> *"El tercer element de la cruïlla és la majoria política i social concentrada al voltant del **dret a decidir** del poble de Catalunya" (Junts, 2015: 15).*
>
> *"Contribuirem al coneixement i **l'ús de la llengua catalana** per part de les persones que atenen els establiments comercials i donarem suport als programes lingüístics de les entitats del sector" (CiU, 2012: 46).*
>
> *"Catalunya, un referent en **drets per al col·lectiu LGBTI**" (Junts, 2015: 118).*
>
> *"Recuperació de **drets laborals** per tenir empreses de qualitat i treball digne" (ERC, 2016: 38).*

> *"Fem una República Catalana que garanteixi el **dret a un habitatge** digne i els subministraments energètics bàsics i que impedeixi els desnonaments sense alternativa de reallotjament"* (ERC, 2016: 4).
>
> *"Cal continuar avançant en la protecció dels **drets de les dones**, alhora que es desenvolupen les eines necessàries per assegurar l'equitat i la igualtat d'oportunitats"* (ERC, 2012: 135).
>
> *"Reconèixer els **drets de les persones refugiades**"* (ERC, 2016: 10).

> *"La història ens demostra que quan un poble arriba a la conclusió que vol exercir el seu **dret a l'autodeterminació**, l'acaba exercint"* (ERC, 2021: 183).
>
> *"Garantirem el coneixement i potenciarem **l'ús de la llengua catalana** i de l'aranès a la Val d'Aran en tot l'àmbit educatiu, dins i fora de l'escola"* (Junts, 2021: 74).
>
> *"La República Catalana ha de garantir el **dret a un treball digne**, vetllar pels drets laborals de totes les persones treballadores, sense discriminacions i amb igualtat efectiva (...)"* (ERC, 2019a: 89).
>
> *"Combatre la involució dels drets de les persones que formen part del **col·lectiu LGBTI** arreu d'Europa, així com la violència que pateix el col·lectiu"* (ERC, 2019b: 11).
>
> *"**El dret a accedir a l'habitatge** és una peça clau de l'estat del benestar"* (ERC, 2021: 124).
>
> *"Incorporarem la perspectiva de gènere de forma transversal a totes les polítiques públiques per aconseguir posar fi a aquesta discriminació que limita **els drets de les dones** (Junts, 2021: 27)."*
>
> *"Garantir el **dret d'asil** a les persones refugiades descentralitzant el sistema d'acollida i creant un fons d'acollida per finançar-ho"* (ERC, 2019a: 44).

The other pillar of the Catalan discourse was education which was approached similarly to Scotland. The Catalan discourse framed education as an important aspect of modern Catalonia, highlighting Catalan tradition and excellence in teaching and its importance as a cornerstones of Catalan identity. Also, education was described as an investment in the future to tackle poverty and inequalities, and provide opportunities for children and young people. The key difference between the two 'nations' was that in Catalonia, social cohesion and the native language played a more important role in education. As demonstrated, Catalan acted as a path to ensure social cohesion in a diverse nation and this principle was also present in the discourse about education. Teaching Catalan (amongst other languages, but Catalan being the first language of instruction) to youngsters support the maintenance of social cohesion, enforces national identity and ensures that they can actively participate in the social life of the community.

Table 34: Education as Wealth Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

"Catalunya té una llarguíssima tradició de renovació pedagògica, en la línia dels moviments europeus més avançats i progressistes, i ha de disposar d'un sistema educatiu a l'alçada de la seva ambició com a país" (Junts, 2015: 12).

"(...) el coneixement de les dues llengües oficials per part de l'alumnat en acabar l'ensenyament obligatori, tot afavorint la cohesió social i la igualtat d'oportunitats"(ERC, 2012: 64).

"(...) cal impulsar una educació competencial que possibiliti la igualtat d'oportunitats a les persones d'entorns més desafavorits, i que actuï des de la justícia per afavorir la cohesió social i poder trencar el cercle viciós de pobresa i fracàs escolar" (Junts, 2015: 62).

"L'educació és la millor inversió de futur per al país, amb una formació integral que sigui l'instrument per assolir el benestar per a tothom, amb igualtat d'oportunitats i una cohesió social òptimes, tenint sempre present el principi d'excel·lència educativa" (Junts, 2015: 62).

"El model d'escola catalana és un model d'èxit pedagògic com han avalat diverses organitzacions internacionals. L'escola catalana és també un dels grans actius de l'autogovern, perquè ha permès cohesionar un poble divers com el català i garantir un assoliment de competències imprescindible per mantenir activat l'ascensor social i garantir la igualtat d'oportunitats" (ERC, 2019a: 111).

"La llengua és fonamental tant en l'evolució i construcció del procés cognitiu com de la capacitat de convivència i participació social" (ERC, 2017: 43).

"Potenciarem el domini de la llengua catalana per part de tot l'alumnat, com a eina de cohesió, identitat i convivència en la nostra societat (...)" (Junts, 2021: 83).

"Garantirem un model d'escolarització equilibrada amb igualtat d'oportunitats per tot l'alumnat, especialment en els sectors més vulnerables que ha d'implicar un ascensor social" (Junts, 2021: 83).

What this demonstrates is that both in Scotland and in Catalonia 'wealth' was framed by approaching the concept as both a social and economic term, but with this frame using elements that also showed some differences. In this framing process, sustainability was crucial, allowing economic growth to be framed as a socially inclusive, equal and environmentally friendly (i.e. green) phenomenon from which all economic and social actors can benefit. Both nationalist movements framed their environment as an essential part of their identity; sustainable growth allows for the environment to be protected, while ensuring that Scots and Catalans have jobs, businesses opportunities and economic progress. This progress is used to fund the other 'wealth'

of the nations: people. Social service and welfare were also essential elements in the two discourses. However, while in Scotland, economic growth benefits the continued support of the universal and free NHS, the national pride of Scotland, in Catalonia, the protection of the social frameworks that ensures the protection of the rights of people was cherished. As time progressed, the latter especially included the protection of sexual minorities, women and migrants. Education was seen as key in both Scotland and Catalonia, framing the education system as an investment in the future and as a system to tackle poverty and support equality. However, Catalans also saw education as a tool to foment social cohesion, especially through teaching Catalan, the central language of the education.

7.3. **Framing Nations as Global and Independent Communities**

Europe and international cooperation significantly expanded the fora of politics in the 21st century, with more channels to develop political and economic relations. Nations without states (Gottlieb, 1994; Guibernau, 1999; Keating, 2001) or stateless nations (Friend, 2012; Nagel, 2009; Moreno, 2006) have always played a key role in the history of international affairs, especially that of Europe. The European principle of subsidiarity, the desire to ensure that policy decisions are taken at the lowest possible level, is rooted in natural law tradition and Roman Catholic social teaching (Murray, 1995; Gosepath, 2006; Király, 2006; Hajdú, 2010; Evan, 2013). Decisions affecting entire societies are not only made at state level; towns, cities and even regions are active actors of the public policy process. The European integration processes helped to institutionalize and strengthen the principle of subsidiarity by making it a general principle of European Union law and by establishing a polity in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government (subnational, national and supranational) (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 2). In this complex system of multi-level governance (MLG) states continue to play a key role, but their authority dispersed upwards (towards EU institutions) and downwards (towards sub-state, regional actors).

MLG as a framework for European integration has received much criticism for putting too much emphasis on performance and efficiency; for the accountability and democratic deficit present at the EU level; for lacking predicative power and universal applicability and for failing to specify why certain levels are empowered, while others are weakened (Peters and Pierre, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2010; Blom-Hansen 2005; Stephenson, 2013; Börze, 2020). However, the scholarly debate about MLG underlined the fact that in the past 70 years, since the integration process started in Europe, the reallocation of certain areas of authority and responsibility away

from states was carried out in the spirit of subsidiarity. Therefore, the study of regional governance systems and regional identities is not only a limited, regional question, but a European one; sub-state regions with their own culture, history and language have played and will continue to play an essential role in forming European thinking, politics and governance (Schöpflin, 1991; Keating and McGarry, 2001; Elias, 2009; Anderson and Keil, 2016; Nagy, 2019).

In the Scottish discourse, Europe and the globe were both seen as reference points: they were presented as ways to magnify the strengths and values of the nation. Europe and especially the EU was important for Scots because it supported the nation's vision for sustainable growth. This is supported by the explicit references to the benefits of European energy market, important for Scotland to developed its green energy potential and export its oil reserves. Furthermore, EU funds, especially for farmers and fisheries (i.e. rural Scotland) was also essential, which is why the advantages of the Common Fisheries Policy and Common Agricultural Policy appeared in the discourse. Moreover, Europe also offered a platform to measure the nation's economic and social success by comparing Scotland to other European countries (especially North Sea countries, such as Norway and Denmark treated as role models) and Europe as region. Therefore, Europe was not only a facilitator of wealth for Scotland, but also a benchmark for the nation.

Table 35: Europe in the Discourse Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

*"We are working hard to make Scotland Europe's green energy powerhouse, so we can make the most of **our vast green energy potential** and create new jobs" (SNP, 2011: 11).*

*"With the backing of the European Union and **nations across the North Sea** now signed up, the supergrid is on its way: and that will allow us to get the vast energy from offshore Scotland to markets across Europe" (SNP, 2011: 34).*

*"We will set out the steps we need to take to increase childcare support here in Scotland **to match the best elsewhere in Europe**" (SNP, 2011: 22).*

*"We will pay particular attention to reducing health inequalities within Scotland - as well as **between Scotland and the rest of Western Europe**" (SNP, 2007: 34).*

*"We will provide Scotland with a strong and independent voice in Europe that will speak up for **Scotland's Agricultural interests**" (SNP, 2007: 70).*

*"The current system whereby landlocked Austria and Luxembourg have a greater say over **Scotland's fisheries** than Scotland does is unsustainable" (SNP, 2007: 72).*

> *"We can **match the success of independent Norway** – according to the UN the best place in the world to live"* (SNP, 2007: 7)

> *"Scotland remains **the largest oil producer in the EU** (…)"* (SNP, 2016: 16).
>
> *"Scotland's place in Europe matters to us as a nation and **being part of a wider European family of nations has brought us benefits**"* (SNP, 2016: 41).
>
> *"The SNP always has and always will fight strongly for a fair deal for Scotland in Europe – not least on matters like the **Common Fisheries Policy and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy**"* (SNP, 2016: 41).
>
> *"Being part of the **EU also gives Scotland direct access to the world's biggest single market** for goods and services: trade with the other 27 member states accounts for 42 per cent of our international exports, supporting over 300,000 Scottish jobs"* (SNP, 2016: 41).
>
> *"In contrast, **independent western European countries of Scotland's size** are among the wealthiest, fairest and happiest in the world. If they can do it, why not Scotland?"* (SNP, 2021: 12).
>
> *"Nicola Sturgeon is urging voters to deliver a "stop Brexit" message and **to keep Scotland at the very heart of Europe**"* (SNP, 2019: 1).
>
> *"The SNP wants Scotland to be part of an **EU that safeguards workers' rights, helps protect our environment** and allows us to travel, work and live freely"* (SNP, 2019: 1).

As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the relative importance of Europe grew over the years, which also had an effect on discourse practice. The Scottish discourse prior to the referendum used to view Europe primarily from an economic point view and even openly criticized the Common European Policies. Whereas after, economy (especially trade through the single market and EU funds through Common Policies) was the most important aspect, but Europe, referred to as "heart of Scotland", was also framed as a protector of Scottish values (sustainable growth, environmental protection and protection of the rights of people). Note this era included campaigns that were held following the 2016 Brexit vote and due to the result (i.e. the UK as deciding to leave the EU), the framing changed: it was explicitly declared that Scotland is a *European* nation.

However, Scotland is not only European, but also a global nation in that sense that Scottish nationalism sees Scotland as a proactive party in global affairs. The 'national value' of sustainability, together with economic growth through trade and climate action were the most important aspects of Scotland's international role. Scotland was seen as a hub for international

investment, attracting companies to invest in the country, especially in the low carbon and technology sector, while promoting own produce and services internationally to increase the level of exports. However, the SNP also saw Scotland as a good global citizen that not only enjoys the fruits of intranational trade and investment, but who was also willing to take on full responsibilities. Thus, Scotland's international relations were said to be based on values that had been framed as national values, among the most important one, fairness.

Providing international aid for underdeveloped countries and working together with other countries to tackle the effects of climate change were two of the most important responsibilities before and after the referendum. However, following the referendum, the importance of protecting human rights globally was more vocally present in the discourse.

Table 36: Global Affairs in the Discourse Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

*"Scotland will play **a full part in global efforts** to meet and **adapt to the challenges of climate change**" (SNP, 2011: 29).*
*"We will work over these next five years, with the sector, to open markets, **help companies to innovate, make production efficiency savings and safeguard jobs** in order **to boost Scotland's share of global markets**" (SNP, 2011: 37).*
*"The SNP's approach to **international relations would be based on principles that define Scotland as a nation**: compassion, fairness and humanity" (SNP, 2010: 19).*
*"(...) **we will help Scottish companies to expand and enhance our nation's reputation** as an attractive place for international investment" (SNP, 2011: 10).*
*"We will explore the creation of one or more Low Carbon Enterprise Zones as a way of **attracting new green energy and low carbon companies to set up in Scotland**" (SNP, 201: 11).*
*"**Scotland has responsibilities in the wider world** and so we will continue and protect our current level of investment in **international development**" (SNP, 2011: 29).*
*"Today, **Scottish international aid investment is making a big difference** to thousands of lives in some of the world's most disadvantaged communities"(SNP, 2015: 19).*
*"We are committed to promoting Scotland on the international stage to **boost our trade and investment, influence and networks**"(SNP, 2016: 13).*
*"There is great international interest in **Scotland's unique approach to climate action which embeds fairness**"(SNP, 2021: 68).*

> *"**Scotland is acknowledged as leading the way on 'inclusive growth'** and we will work with key partners to host an international conference (...) (SNP, 2016: 14)."*
>
> *"The SNP believes that Scotland must play its part – through action and leadership – in helping **tackle global issues** such as **extreme poverty**, the impact of **climate change**, the plight of **refugees fleeing war** and repression and the **humanitarian impact** of disasters and emergencies" (SNP, 2016: 41).*

Despite Scotland being a European nation and an active global actor, there was one nexus beyond the nation that was more difficult to define: the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK. The SNP being a pro-independence party saw the relationship between Edinburgh and London as one that was holding Scotland back by undermining the country's vision of equality, diversity, sustainability, 'Europeanness' and international proactivity. Both before and after the referendum, the UK was criticized for systematically neglecting Scottish interests. The UK Government undermined Scottish wealth (both economic and social) by introducing austerity measures in public spending and using public money to fund projects that were rejected by Scots (such as the Trident Nuclear Programme), leading to worsening public services and more inequalities in Scotland. In other words, the Westminster system was not working for Scotland.

Table 37: The UK in the Discourse Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

> *"The UK is well past its sell by date and **is holding Scotland back**" (SNP, 2007: 7).*
>
> *"Oppose the **London parties' agenda of cuts that will be so damaging to Scotland's** recovery and **vital local services**" (SNP, 2010: 6).*
>
> *"The London parties are part of the same metropolitan political machine – **a machine that leaves the ordinary men and women of our country on the outside**" (SNP, 2010: 7).*
>
> *"And **if we take on responsibility for tax and for welfare,** we can also better protect Scotland from Tory cuts" (SNP, 2011: 26).*
>
> *"Our opposition to the Trident nuclear missile system and its planned replacement remains firm– there is **no place for these weapons in Scotland**" (SNP, 2011: 29).*

> *"One of the greatest indictments of the current **Westminster system is that it works best for one part of society and one part of the country"** (SNP, 2015: 12).*
>
> *"That's why I am taking a stand to **protect Scotland's NHS from the privatisation** agenda of the Westminster parties" (SNP, 2015: 13).*

> *"That is why we must do all we can to prevent increasingly insular **attitudes at Westminster** from **shutting Scotland off from the world"** (SNP, 2015: 18).*
>
> *"Current **Westminster plans put at risk the creation of a strong domestic renewables industry**, including a sustainable supply chain, and threaten Scotland's security of supply" (SNP, 2015: 10).*

However, a clear solution was offered for the 'problem': independence. The Scottish discourse made sure to always highlight the benefits of Scottish secession from the UK. Among these were the ability to use the full spectrum of social policy to expand the welfare state and reduce inequalities, invest more in green economy to create employment and sustainable growth, have more funds directed towards international aid and climate action and the ability to develop Scotland's own migration policy that is based on the fair and diverse vision of the nation. Re-joining the EU was added to the list following the Brexit vote. In other words, the emphasis was on directing money towards key values that were essential elements of the conceptualization of the Scottish nation.

Table 38: Independence in the Discourse Before and After Referendum (Scotland)

> *"With independence, we will have the economic levers to **create new jobs** and take full advantage of our second, green energy windfall" (SNP, 2011: 28)*
>
> *"**Independence for Scotland will allow us to deliver higher levels of economic growth**. And that means we can protect more of the things that matter" (SNP, 2011: 28)*
>
> *"(With independence) **we will be able to address the priorities of people in Scotland**, from better state pensions to universal free childcare. Scotland could do even more to lead the world in areas like **renewable energy** and **tackling climate change**, and play our part in **creating a more peaceful and stable world"** (SNP, 2011: 28).*
>
> *"We will argue for Scotland to **take responsibility for immigration** so that we can develop a system here at home that more closely meets our needs" (SNP, 2010: 19).*

> *"With the full powers of independence, we would explore a legal duty on businesses to consider a wider range of economic and environmental outcomes - **ensuring Scotland's businesses focus on long term sustainable growth"** (SNP, 2021: 48).*
>
> *"With independence, we would advocate **rejoining the EU** and therefore return to CAP" (SNP, 2021: 55).*
>
> *"We believe we have **a strong role to play**, through both action and leadership - **on the world stage** now, and as a full independent country soon" (SNP, 2021: 71).*

> *"With independence, and **full power over migration policy**, we can build asylum and immigration systems geared to meet Scotland's needs and founded on **fairness and human rights** an independent Scotland will be a strong and **principled advocate for nuclear disarmament** on the global stage"* (SNP, 2021: 73).

However, following the unsuccessful referendum, campaigns were focusing more on openly criticizing the Westminster system. Direct references to independence were less common in the discourse, while the unsuccessful referendum was framed as an opportunity to secure more powers for the Scottish Parliament. The emphasis was on speeding up the transition of powers from London to Edinburgh (especially in the fields of welfare policy and taxation) to try to reform some aspects of the Westminster system and bring it closer to the values deemed essential for Scotland (fairness, equality, diversity and sustainable growth).

Table 39: Transition of Powers Following Unsuccessful Referendum (Scotland)

> *"While we did not secure independence for our nation, **we did secure more powers for the Scottish Parliament**, enabling more decisions to be made closer to home"* (SNP, 2016: 23).
> *"During the referendum, the parties campaigning for a No vote promised the people of Scotland substantial new powers for our parliament, amounting to real Home Rule, **maximum devolution and as close to federalism as was possible**"* (SNP, 2015: 35).
> **"Full devolution of the welfare state** would give us the ability to halt the cruelest and most damaging welfare changes and instead develop a system that supports people and families"* (SNP, 2015: 36).
> **"We will prioritise devolution of powers** over employment policy, including the minimum wage, welfare, business taxes, national insurance and equality policy - the powers we need to create jobs, grow revenues and lift people out of poverty"* (SNP, 2015: 12).

In Catalonia, just as in Scotland, Europe and especially the EU played a crucial role in the discourse. The Catalan nation was always – before and after the referendum – imagined as a European nation. A nation that wishes to lead Europe in environmental protection, protection of the rights of sexual minorities, speakers of minority languages and nations without states. Moreover, the Catalan language was also included as an important aspect of the nation that should be recognized at EU level, further highlighted the overall importance of the native language in the conceptualization of the nation. Therefore, the Catalan communication was built on the idea that the nation's key values should be 'exported' to showcase the 'wealth' of the community. What this meant was that Europe and the EU were seen as the legitimator of

values where elements of the Catalan national domain would be celebrated. Moreover, Europe and especially the EU funds were seen as an economic opportunity for the nation to increase its prosperity which could help Catalonia to take on an even more active role in European economic growth.

Table 40: Europe in the Discourse Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

*"Com a futur Estat membre de la Unió Europa, a la República catalana li convindria defensar **un model d'Europa federal"** (ERC, 2016: 44).*

*"En el camí de la transició nacional de Catalunya, promourem aquelles accions per al reconeixement del **català com a llengua oficial d'Europa"** (CIU, 2012: 135).*

*"Catalunya ha contribuït des de la més ferma creença i acció en la construcció d'una Europa plurilingüe, en **la defensa i el respecte de totes les llengües i els parlars"** (CIU, 2012: 135).*

*"La societat catalana **vol esdevenir referent europeu en matèria d'igualtat entre persones i de respecte a la diversitat** en orientació i identitat sexual"* (Junts, 2015: 117)

*"Catalunya haurà de **negociar amb la UE la recepció de les inversions europees** i assumir el cofinançament necessari"* (ERC, 2016: 117).*

*"Catalunya i Barcelona es troben en condicions òptimes per plantejar i **liderar una ambiciosa intervenció a l'àrea mediterrània"** (ERC, 2016: 44).*

*"La República Catalana serà un estat membre de la UE que treballarà per al **desenvolupament***

***federal de la Unió"** (ERC, 2021: 174).*

*"Reemprendre les iniciatives polítiques per **assolir l'oficialitat del català**, l'occità i la llengua*

catalana de signes a l'Estat espanyol i a la Unió Europea"(ERC, 2021: 146).

***"Avançar cap a un únic sistema electoral per al Parlament Europeu** en tot el territori comunitari, que respecti la diversitat de tradicions electorals existents a Europa, de conformitat amb el principi de proporcionalitat i territorialitat, i que **tingui en compte la representativitat de les nacions sense estat i la paritat"** (ERC, 2019b: 57).*

*"Tenim el potencial per **esdevenir aquest país referent dins d'Europa**: en polítiques socials, en el sistema de Salut, en igualtat, en polítiques de joventut, on tothom pugui tenir un habitatge digne i garantits tots els subministraments bàsics"* (Junts, 2021: 25).*

***"Els fons europeus del Next Generation EU** ens ofereixen, ara, una oportunitat única que hem de saber aprofitar per captar el màxim de recursos cap a Catalunya"* (Junts, 2021: 169).*

> *"**Esdevenir un referent i catalitzador de les relacions euromediterrànies**; una república mediadora i ambaixadora de la pau i la democràcia entre les diverses cultures que convivim a la Mediterrània"* (ERC, 2021: 175).

Cooperation in the Mediterranea, just as the North Sea nations in Scotland, was also recurrently mentioned, underlining the importance of regional cooperation within the larger European frame. However, in the Catalan discourse, the emphasis was always on reforming the EU: a federal Europe was supported that would allow Catalonia to show its economic and social strengths and benefits to the wider community of European nations. Scots, on the other hand, had always seen Europe as a family of nations, federalism was simply not part of the discourse.

In terms of global relations, the Catalan conceptualization placed an emphasis on Catalonia's increased role in international relations; a very similar approach to the Scottish. Catalans based their international affairs entirely on values deemed essential to the nation. Fighting for human rights and against human trafficking, supporting sustainable development with climate change in mind and helping underdeveloped countries through international aid and development all echoed the value of equality so essential for the Catalan conceptualization of nation at home. Catalonia was imagined as a leader in creating global equality, made possible due to the region's global position as a receiver of international investments and as a successful global exporter. The fact that Catalonia wished to have the blessing of the international community in their fight for independence also show that global affairs were at the very heart of national 'imagination'. Moreover, Catalonia was also conceptualized as nation globally known for it successes in sports.

Table 41: Global Affairs in the Discourse Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

> *"**El nostre internacionalisme és humanista**: comporta també apostar per **la solidaritat efectiva** amb les persones i els pobles més desafavorits i que pateixen situacions de flagrant injustícia, **just i treballar per un desenvolupament** equitatiu de tots els pobles, i apostar també per la lluita decidida **contra les desigualtats** a escala planetària (...)"* (ERC, 2016: 47).
>
> *"La defensa dels interessos de Catalunya mitjançant les eines de les relacions internacionals sempre es farà tenint en compte **l'objectiu de promoure la democràcia, el bon govern, els drets humans i el desenvolupament sostenible a escala global"** (Junts, 2015: 110).*

> *"Combatre les màfies internacionals dedicades **a l'explotació i tràfic de persones**, especialment dones, tot i que tinguin el seu origen fora de la UE"* (ERC, 2014: 25).
>
> *"L'objectiu de l'agenda exterior se centra en **la preparació del reconeixement internacional**, a partir de la legitimació del mandat a favor de la independència dels catalans en l'àmbit internacional"* (ERC, 2016: 16).
>
> *"Millorar la posició de Barcelona i Catalunya **en el rànquing dels territoris més atractius per a la inversió estrangera"** (CIU, 2012: 27).*
>
> *"**L'activitat industrial i l'exportació són essencials per aconseguir un país pròsper i socialment just**, en la mesura que estabilitzen l'ocupació i reforcen la seva sobirania econòmica respecte a tercers països"* (ERC, 2012: 17).
>
> *"**L'esport és una targeta de presentació immillorable** per portar Catalunya al món (...)"* (ERC, 2012: 74).

> *"La República Catalana serà reconeguda pel seu compromís i solidaritat i esdevindrà un actor global respectat i valorat pel valor afegit de les nostres aportacions per fer **un món més just, més solidari, més inclusiu i més sostenible"** (ERC, 2019a: 23).*
>
> *"Establir mecanismes específics per **posar fi al tràfic de persones** amb fins d'explotació sexual,*
>
> *fent especial èmfasi en les necessitats de la víctima"* (ERC, 2019a: 10).
>
> *"El compromís i el mandat de desplegar, en coordinació amb el Consell per la República, **una acció internacional orientada a aconseguir** suports i futurs **reconeixements a la independència de Catalunya"** (Junts, 2021: 14).*
>
> *"Continuar oberts al món en l'àmbit econòmic afavorint **les exportacions, la inversió estrangera** a Catalunya i la projecció del sectors econòmics punters de Catalunya (Junts, 2017: 6).*
>
> *La construcció d'una societat saludable i la consolidació de **Catalunya com una potència esportiva a nivell internacional"** (Junts, 2021: 28).*

Following 2017, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the overall importance of the global affairs in the discourse increased. This was due to the fact that beyond the elements of the international frame there were also concrete calls for international arbitration to solve the crisis generated by the 2017 referendum and the will to involve international courts to assess the legality of the Spanish State's intervention in Catalan legislative procedures was regularly addressed. Furthermore, the Catalans also wished to gain international support to convey another self-determination referendum. Therefore, global relations were more crucial than ever.

Table 42: Call for International Involvement Following Referendum (Catalonia)

*"Negociar la convocatòria d'un referèndum d'autodeterminació a Catalunya **amb mediació internacional"** (ERC, 2019a: 21).*

*"(...) i una aturada de la repressió, un reconeixement de l'existència del conflicte polític i **l'acceptació d'una mediació internacional** com a facilitador i garant de la negociació"(Junts, 2021: 9).*

*Valorarem demandar davant **els tribunals internacionals** aquelles violacions de drets fonamentals que es duguin a terme contra el Parlament de Catalunya per part de l'aparell judicial espanyol tal com ja s'ha començat a fer aquesta legislatura (Junts, 2021: 337).*

The relationship between Catalonia and the rest of Spain, another axis of Catalan foreign action, was framed differently. It was argued, both before and after the referendum, that the Spanish State did not understand Catalonia and the State was holding back the region (just as the UK did Scotland) economically and socially. The Spanish State hinders Catalan welfare policies by taking away financial resources and taxes collected in Catalonia and spending it elsewhere in Spain, thus undermining the *Generalitat*. Moreover, the State also ignored the democratic will of Catalan people. Before the referendum, this meant that the State did not allow the region to hold a legally binding referendum on independence, while after 2017, this reference was used for the intervention in the consultation process that effectively shut down the referendum through judicial procedure and police force.

Table 43: Spain in the Discourse Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

*"Per aquest motiu, **el sentiment que l'Estat espanyol no respecta Catalunya**, que no l'entén, que l'ataca, que li és deslleial, que no compleix amb els seus compromisos, **que l'ofega econòmicament -en conseqüència també socialment"** (CIU, 2012: 12).*

*"Catalunya aporta cada any **més de 16.000 milions d'euros** a la hisenda espanyola **que no retornen en forma de prestacions o serveis públics** als seus ciutadans" (ERC, 2012: 12).*

*"**El procés d'emancipació nacional s'ha accelerat arran del rebuig de l'Estat espanyol al nou model d'encaix proposat pel poble català** amb l'Estatut d'Autonomia de 2006, amb el moviment de consultes populars i, molt especialment, amb la manifestació del passat Onze de Setembre, que ens situa en un nou escenari" (ERC, 2012: 6).*

*"L'encaix de Catalunya i ha bandejat les seves necessitats i demandes legítimes i democràtiques; en un procés en què l'**Estat espanyol ha optat clarament per la construcció d'un únic pol polític i econòmic autocentrat a Madrid"** (ERC, 2012: 9).*

> *"Més de la meitat de recursos que l'executiu de l'Estat ha dirigit contra el Parlament **han afectat polítiques socials i la recaptació d'impostos** de la Generalitat" (ERC, 2019a: 50).*
>
> ***"Els Països Catalans han estat, de llarg, els més perjudicats pel model de finançament espanyol**, la qual cosa ha comportat que, malgrat ser els territoris que més aporten a la hisenda de l'Estat, siguin alhora els que menys reben per capita" (ERC, 2019a: 68).*
>
> *"La repressió de l'Estat no únicament ha tingut **una vessant policial o judicial sinó també econòmica" (ERC, 2017: 16).***
>
> *"A Catalunya, des de la tardor de 2017 som plens coneixedors de la persecució política i judicial que **l'autoritarisme de l'Estat espanyol és capaç d'exercir per tal de defensar la unitat d'Espanya** i d'impedir als catalans una cosa tan bàsica en democràcia com és l'exercici del dret a l'autodeterminació" (Junts, 2021: 270).*

As result, a key difference between Scotland and Catalonia and the pre- and post-referendum Catalan discourse was the recurring references to the Spanish State's intervention in 2017, leading to police brutality and political repression. The campaigns after the consultation were focused more on the events that followed the referendum and the Spanish State was criticized for not only politically repressing Catalans, but also economically. Thus, the older framing of economic (and therefore social in terms of welfare) repression that Catalonia had faced was amplified to include open political repression.

Although the framing of the 'State problem' was not entirely the same in the case of Scotland and Catalonia, the solution was: independence. Both before and after the referendum, the Catalan discourse explained the benefits of seceding from Spain. Full powers over finance and tax would allow the Catalan economy to grow sustainably and the Catalan welfare state to expand its social policies. In other words, the economic and social 'wealth' – without Madrid – would be used to cover the needs of Catalans, meaning that Catalonia would be able to develop at a quicker pace.

Table 44: Independence in the Discourse Before and After Referendum (Catalonia)

> ***"Disposar de la sobirania sobre els nostres impostos** per poder fer **fort i cohesionar** al màxim el nostre país" (CIU, 2012: 11).*
>
> ***"L'hostilitat econòmica de l'Estat espanyol fa impossible avançar cap el model socioeconòmic escandinau** sense la independència" (ERC, 2012: 111).*

> *"Catalunya té l'oportunitat de constituir el primer Estat del segle XXI: **un Estat basat en la sostenibilitat social, mediambiental i econòmica"** (ERC: 2012: 6).*
>
> *"Esquerra Republicana entén que el procés que s'ha encetat i que ha de permetre la independència de Catalunya **és l'inici del camí cap a la independència i la reunificació nacional i federal dels territoris que configuren els Països Catalans"** (ERC, 2012: 6).*

> *"A plena capacitat normativa, de gestió i de recaptació per part del govern català de tots el tributs que es generen a Catalunya esdevé necessària per reduir la dependència financera de "l'Estat, **per adaptar la política tributària a la realitat econòmica i social de Catalunya**, per garantir el finançament de l'estat del benestar (...)"* (ERC, 2021: 10).*
>
> *"Aquesta és la injustícia i **la discriminació econòmica que patim formant part d'Espanya i només amb un Estat independent ho podrem superar**, en favor del benestar i la prosperitat econòmica i social dels catalans i catalanes"* (Junts, 2021: 294).*
>
> *"Prioritzem les persones, treballem per la reactivació econòmics i la cohesió social i ens reafirmem que **la independència és l'única solució per garantir un país econòmicament pròsper i sostenible i socialment just i lliure"** (Junts, 2021: 9).*
>
> *"I evidentment, per la constitució de repúbliques a Catalunya, al País Valencià i a les Illes Balears, amb **la construcció d'uns Països Catalans lliures i independents amb drets per a tothom"** (ERC, 2019a: 16).*

Moreover, independence would also offer new possibilities to work together with other territories where Catalan (or Valencian or Balear) is spoken: external relations with these territories would continue to be close, eventually leading to the entire *Països Catalans* uniting politically as an independent entity. Therefore, the independence of Catalonia represents the first step towards the independence of the *Països Catalans*.

7.4. Summary of Results

8. Comparative Social Analysis of the Scottish and Catalan Nationalist Discourse

A somewhat different picture emerges when analyzing the results of text analysis in the sociopolitical context of Catalonia and Scotland. For frame resonance to occur, the political and social conceptualization of the nation should match, allowing the parties frame to sound familiar, therefore appealing and being convincing for voters. In this section, the Catalan parties' framing of their nation as a territorially (i.e. Catalonia) and a linguistically (i.e. Països Catalans) defined, welcoming and plurilingual nation will be assessed in terms of their social contexts.

The Catalan people's attachment to the territory is strong. This is supported by the so-called 'Moreno question' which historically measures the existence and overlaps of multiple minority identities in given territories, especially Spain and the United Kingdom (Moreno, 2005; Moreno, 2006; García et al., 2017; Guinjoan and Rodon, 2006).[70] According to the data of the Statistical Institute of Catalonia (2021), the majority of citizens have steadily felt more attached to Catalonia (63 percent in 2015, 62.4 percent in 2017 and 63,1 percent in 2020) than to Spain (24,8 percent in 2015; 25,9 percent in 2017 and 22,7 in 2020). Nevertheless, if we take into account claims to Spanish and Catalan identities to have a better understanding of overlapping identities, the picture is entirely different. During the assessed period, the percentage of the population with dual identities shows a positive tendency. In 2022, 67 percent claimed to have some levels of dual attachment to Catalan and Spanish identities, while Catalan only identity was at 29.6 percent. By 2024, the former group increased their share to 74.1, while the latter was reduced to just 16.9 percent. This means that the Catalan parties' territorially based conceptualization of the community represents the overwhelming majority of Catalans' feeling of calling their home *Catalonia,* but identities within are increasingly dual in nature. Therefore, from a political point of view, the emphasis on diversity in electoral campaigns is key as the Catalan 'nation' is itself is become more and more diverse.

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[70] "What later became known as the "Moreno question" was worded as follows: "In general, would you say that you feel...1. Only Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc.; 2. More Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc., than Spanish; 3. As much Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc. as Spanish; 4. More Spanish than Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc.; 5. Only Spanish. The purpose for conducting such survey questioning was to assess the degrees of self-government aspirations: the more the primordial regional (ethnoterritorial) identity prevailed upon modern state identity, the higher the demands for political autonomy would be. Complete absence of one of the two elements of dual identity would lead to a deep socio-political division. If this was the case, demands for self-government would probably take the form of a claim for outright sovereignty and independence" (Moreno, 2015: 5).

The other important element, language and more precisely the plurilingual idea of the nation with Catalan being the guarantor of social cohesion is a far more complex question. ERC and Junts both recognize linguistic diversity of the nation, yet neither of the Catalan pro-independence parties published their manifestos in Spanish or Occitan, every parliament opening speech in the Catalan parliament between 2012 and 2024 was delivered in Catalan and the website of the Government of Catalonia is only available in two languages, Catalan and English. It is also telling that in the entire corpus, Castilian (*Castellà/llengua castellana*) was explicitly mentioned 73 times, Occitan (*Occità/llengua occitana*) 60 times, while Catalan (*Català//llengua catalana*) 321 times. Diversity is recognized in the discourse, but the message is clear: the Catalan ethnie is still bult around the Catalan language.

According to the Statistical Institute of Catalonia (2025a), between 2013 and 2021, Catalan has been rapidly losing importance in the everyday life of the nation. In 2013, 36.4 percent of the population used Catalan as first language, while 55.1 percent used Spanish. In 2023, only 29 percent and 49.2 percent used Catalan and Spanish respectively, while the number of people using both official languages doubled. At the same time, the number of people who can write and speak Catalan reached all time high in the history of democratic Catalonia (Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2025b). The population's knowledge of the Catalan language is high, but Catalan is still a minority language in Catalonia in terms of language use. Therefore, the Catalan nation, from a social perspective, has two languages: Spanish and Catalan, with an increasing group of people who claim that they have two first languages.

The challenge for the Catalan nationalist parties is that over 2.700.000 people in Catalonia identify with Spanish and only 2 million with Catalan (Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2025a). The pool of people who they can potentially win over to vote for the nationalist cause decreased between 2012 and 2024. But if we compare the popular vote they received in each election and the number of people who think Catalan language is their identity marker, the nationalist parties' success with their vision of multilingual society built around Catalan in undeniable. Nonetheless, frame resonance is limited: the vision of the nation with one own, national language and multiple others being recognized around it is far from reality. The Catalan people have two languages, Catalan and Castilian-Spanish and only a minority, 2 million people recognize Catalan as marker of their identity. Given that this vision excludes the majority of Catalans, the parties' electorate pool in their nationalist vision is quite limited: this must have played a role in the fact that they have been unable to reach over 2 million votes in elections.

Table 45: Catalan Language as Marker of Identity Relative to Votes Casted for Nationalist Parties (citizens)

	2012	2015	2017	2021
Popular vote	1.614.383	1.628.714	1.884.094	1.125.934
Catalan as marker of identity	2.295.000	2.275.000	2.275.000	2.032.000

In terms of embracing the vision of a welcoming nation: the Catalan population has been overly supportive of immigration to Catalonia between 2012-2021. Surveys during this period suggested that the majority of the Catalans are pro-immigration and over 51 percent of people think migration should not be limited in any way (Institute for Political and Social Sciences, 2023). This is also supported by data collected by the Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (2025a), which highlighted that only 0.3 percent of the population thinks immigration is a problem. However, despite the majority being supportive of immigration, the overall tendency changed in 2019, in the year when Catalonia registered 105.866 newcomers, the highlights figure since 2007 (Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2025c).

The population of Catalonia is and has been diverse in terms of background and with thousands arriving from outside of Spain every year. Around 70 percent of citizens were born in Catalonia, approximately 20 percent in other Autonomous Community and 10 percent outside of Spain, with the last group doubling its size in the last 10 years (Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2025d).

Table 46: Percentage of Immigrants Relative to Catalan-born population (%)

|	2012	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022	2024
Outside of Spain	2.2	5.2	7.5	6.9	7.4	7.8	9.4
Other Community	19.9	21.1	24.1	24.5	23.5	22.9	20.8
	22.1	26.3	31.6	31.4	30.9	30.7	30.2

The Catalan nationalist support for a welcoming nation, therefore, resonates well with the general population. Even with the growing number of people reporting immigration as top problem in the region, the overwhelming population remains tolerant and welcoming. However, if the tendency continues, parties will have to address the question and adjust their vision accordingly. Nevertheless, the parties' language-based integrative approach to migration is working well. Despite the large number of people emigrating to Catalonia, the population's knowledge of Catalan continued to increase (Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2025b). Moreover, the percentage of population born in another autonomous community of Spain being stable, while the number of people born outside of Spain increasing, the Catalan population is changing in line with the nationalist parties' vision of a diverse nation.

Yet one of the most important questions in the political life of Catalonia is the question of independence: the idea that the Catalan nation can prosper if it can claim full control over its political future as an independent republic. The social analysis of the question of independence shows the picture of a divided society: neither camp of the population had a clear advantage over the other and neither of them reached the 50 percent mark. The pro-independence voters failed to claim clear majority immediately following the events of the 2017 referendum, but their share increased from 41.1 to 48.7 percent and were leading in polls (Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2025d). However, as the figure below shows, during the summer of 2019 the tendency changed.

Figure 12: Population's support for Catalan Independence (2015-2024)[71]

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[71] Official statistics are only available from the 2015 as before that, the Statistical Office did not ask this question.

Source: Statistical Institute of Catalonia (2025d)

With the COVID-19 crisis starting in early 2020, the polls show that less and less people named the Catalonia-Spain relations as principal problem of the region. In October, 2017 48.9 percent of respondents said that this question was the nation's main concern, but with crisis starting, health care and concerns with the economy and the labour market skyrocketed (Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2025e). But since 2022, these concerns went back to the level registered in other years and the level of distress about Madrid-Barcelona relations continued to decrease. The share of the population wanting to secede from Spain is at all time low since the 2012 independentist turn in Catalonia. The relationship between economic concerns and support for independence demonstrates that economic issues alone are not necessarily enough to serve as opportunity structures for secessionist movements as suggested by Jaráiz et al. (2019), yet the economic argument that Catalonia would be better of without Spain is still present in the Catalan politics and discourse (Muñoz and Tormos, 2014; Martín-Díaz and Cuberos-Gallard, 2021; Carvalho et al., 2021; Núñez, 2023). The Catalan support for independence was actually reduced despite the negative economic effects of the COVID-19 crisis. Therefore, the majority of the Catalan population majority now wishes to remain part of Spain, their lead is not definitive, but the negative tendency does not favour the political success of secessionist parties.

Despite this, nationalists successfully won the majority of the Catalan provinces in the 2019 General Election and formed government following the 2021 Regional Election. Their conceptualization of the nation is strongly built on independence and building a Catalan

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republic is on top of their political agenda. However, the pro-union climate will likely to affect the way their frame resonates with the general public. In other words, if the negative tendency continues and the national frame remains the same, the parties could potentially loose the leadership of Catalonia as it happened in 2003.

In terms of values that are claimed to be "national values of Catalonia": social justice and equality resonated well with the general public as between 2012 and 2021, the tendency among citizens can be summarized as a turn away from the centre towards the centre left (Centre d'Estudis). At the same time, the raw research data of the Manifesto Project (2025) suggest that ERC was shifting the ERC moved left away from the political centre to left closer to CUP, while Junts was centre-left, right to the ERC. This meant that the values represented, the centre-left positing of the parties was an important element in successfully addressing the majority of Catalans. Politically speaking, this shift to the left (regardless if the shift was first induced by the parties or the population) was an essential in maximizing votes. However, the tendency following the 2021 changed, the Catalan public is now towards the centre, meaning that if the nationalist parties wish to keep their positions, they have to take into account this new trend.

Attachment to Scotland as a country (both territory and institution) has been strong among Scots. In the 2011 census, 62.4 percent of the population claimed they have Scottish identity, while Scottish and British dual identity was recorded at 18.3 percent and British only identity stood at 8.4 percent. By 2022, dual identification reduced, British only identification increased and Scottish only identity reached 65.5 percent (National Records of Scotland, 2024). However, the national identification based on the 'Moreno questions' shows a different story: dual British-Scottish identities are still present in Scotland, but the entirely opposite tendency can be observed (What Scotland Thinks, 2023). The share of people with some level of dual identities[72] was the highest in 2016 with 65 percent of the population to this group. Only 6 percent claimed they are British and not Scottish, while 23 percent felt they are Scottish not British. By 2023, 32 percent reported feeling Scottish not British, and dual identities are now at 56 percent. This means that compared to Catalonia, less people identity with the home state, dual identities are not as significant as in Catalonia, while 'national only' (i.e. Scottish) identification is stronger.

It is true that the Scottish nation is becoming increasingly diverse as more and more people migrate to Scotland from the UK and other countries, while the number of Scotland-born population is decreasing. In 10 years, the percentage of people born in other countries of the

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[72] More Scottish than British; Equally Scottish and British; More British than Scottish

UK increased 6,9 to 10 percent, outside of the UK from 9,7 to 10,5 percent, while the share of the Scotland-born people is down from 83,4 to 79,5 percent (National Records of Scotland, 2011; 2022). Despite the fact that overwhelming majority of the population was born in Scotland and compared to Catalonia, the background of the population is therefore less diverse, Scots think of themselves as an increasingly diverse nation.

Table 47: Percentage of Immigrants Relative to Scottish-born population (%)

	2011	**2022**
Outside of the UK	6.9	10
Other UK	9.7	10.5
Total	16.6	20.5

Source: National Records of Scotland (2011; 2022)

Furthermore, in the assessed period, the Scottish population became even more support of immigration. In 2011, 56 percent of the population wished to see a reduction in migration rate increased to 58 percent by 2014, yet both figures were the lowest compared to other countries of the United Kingdom and the majority continued to see immigration as a positive process for Scotland (Migration Observatory, 2013; Migration Observatory, 2014; BBC, 2014). From the 2016, the climate towards migration changed across the UK and majority of Scots wish to maintain current levels of migration (26 percent) or even increasing it further (31 percent) (Migration Policy Scotland, 2024). Furthermore, the majority of the population thinks that immigration enriches Scottish cultural life (55 percent), diversity is good for Scotland (65 percent) and it helps filling jobs for which it is hard to find works (69 percent) (Migration Policy Scotland, 2024).

The growing levels of dissatisfaction with immigration reported in Catalonia is non-existent in Scotland: between 2011 and 2023, immigration was the 3rd and 4th most important issue reported in the UK, while in Scotland, the date collected by both Ipsos and YouGov show that immigration was not even in the top 10 Scottish problems despite the fact that in the first half of the 2010s, the majority of Scots supported immigration reduction (Scottish Government, 2023). Therefore, taking into consideration the tendencies in both Scotland and Catalonia, both populations conceptualize their respective nations as welcoming, but in Catalonia, immigration is increasingly seen as a more relevant issue, while in Scotland, the opposite tendency was

recorded and immigration is simple not seen as an emerging social issue. Therefore, the Scottish nationalists' framing of Scotland as a diverse and welcoming nation resonates well with the way people preserve their nation.

9. Conclusion

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