IN BLACK FAUX LEATHER COVER!!!

Doctoral (PhD) dissertation

FORMELLA COLLINS NKAPNWO

2024.04.27

UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE
Doctoral School of Public Administration Sciences

ON THE INSIDE PAGE!!!

Formella Collins Nkapnwo

The Intricacies of Peace, Democracy and Development in the Central African Sub-Region: Understanding the Trends and Challenges.

Doctoral (PhD) dissertation

Supervisor:

Prof. Dr. Szabolcs Pásztor PhD

……..

Budapest,

Declaration

I hereby declare that this PhD thesis entitled " The Intricacies of Peace, Democracy and Development in the Central African Sub-Region: Understanding the Trends and Challenges." is the product of my own work. It contains no material that has been previously presented in whole or in part to any institution of learning for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Any already published materials that have been used in this thesis to the best of my knowledge have been duly acknowledged. Unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged

Candidate's Signature:……

Date:

Name: Formella Collins Nkapnwo

Supervisor’s Declaration

Abstract

This study delves into the intricate connections between peace, democracy, and development in the Central African sub-region, a region often characterized by political unrest and economic hardships. Through a comprehensive analysis of the link between these three aspects, the research aims to reveal prevailing patterns and identify the persisting obstacles hindering advancements in these domains. This dissertation makes use of a combination of both descriptive and correlational research design to elucidate the trends and challenges plaguing this geopolitically volatile area. It focuses its attention on countries such as Cameroon and Central African Republic comparing them with countries like Ghana and Kenya, with the aim of dissecting the multifaceted relationships that link politicl statbility or peace with democratic governance, and economic development. Through a detailed descriptive analysis, this study outlines the current state of political affairs, the democratic processes, and their current levels of economic development, including an exploration of historical conflicts, governance frameworks and economic performance metrics. It then makes use of the correlation technique to identify and quantify the relationship between these three variables, in a way that permits the reader to understand the how each of these variables influences and predicts the others. With an extensive use of data involving secondary data from reports from non-governmental organizations and international databases, the analysis derived helps to provide a nuanced understanding of how how the precence of or lack of each of these variables affects the other. The findings reveal that the Central African sub-region is characterized by a cyclical pattern of political instability, which profoundly affects democratic governance and economic growth. It is quite clear that periods of instability correlate with sharp declines in democratic practices and economic stagnation. Conversely, to the situation in Cameroon and Central Africa, this study also highlights in a careful

comparative case study, instances which prove that efforts towards democratixation and improved governance bring about more sustainable peace, and economic development as exemplified in Ghana and Kenya. On the otherhand, this dissertation equally identifies key challenges, such as deepened political corruption, clientelism, and external political forces, which contribute to supress these variables in all societies. This research posits that achieving sustainable peace and development in the Central African sub-region hinges significantly on the creation of robust democratic structures and inclusive governance mechanisims. This dissertation a section towards proposing policy recommendations that aim to reinforce democratic institutions, improve economic sustainability, thus promoting unity and peace. It also emphasizes on the need for support that prioritizes local needs and conditions.

Absztrakt/Összefoglalás

Dedication

Acknowledgement

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration iii
Abstract iv
Absztrakt/Összefoglalás vii
Dedication viii
Acknowledgement ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS x
Table of Figures xiii
List of Tables xiv
List of Abbreviations xv
CHAPTER ONE 1
INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 1
1.2. JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY 4
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 5
1.4. HYPOTHESES 7
1.5. SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF STUDY 8
1.6. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 9
1.7. THESIS STRUCTURE 9
CHAPTER TWO 11
METHODOLOGY 11
INTRODUCTION 11
2.1 LOGIC OF INQUIRY 11
2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 13
2.3 RESEARCH METHODS 24
CHAPTER THREE 26
THE NATURE OF POLITICS IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA: CASES OF GHANA, KENYA VS CAMEROON, AND CENTRAL AFRICA REPBLIC. 26
INTRODUCTION 26
3.1. STABILITY AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN SSA 28
3.2. A DIFFERENT PATH FOR SUB-SAHARA AFRICA? 31
3.2.1. HOW SSAS COLONIAL PAST SET THE STAGE FOR TODAY'S PROBLEMS 32
3.3. OVERVIEW OF POLITICS IN GHANA 34
3.3.1. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN GHANA SINCE INDEPENDENCE. 35
3.3.2. THE NATURE OF POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY IN GHANA 37
3.4. THE NATURE OF POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY IN KENYA 43
3.4.1. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN KENYA SINCE 1991 46
3.5. OVERVIEW OF POLITICS IN CAMEROON 51

3.5.1. THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICS IN CAMEROON SINCE THE REUNIFICATION 54
3.5.2. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN CAMEROON SINCE INDEPENDENCE. 57
3.6. THE NATURE OF POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC..... 67
3.6.1. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SINCE INDEPENDENCE .. 70
3.7. GENERAL REMARKS 74
CHAPTER FOUR 76
RIGID CONSTITUTIONALISM, LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE POLITICS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STATES..... 76
INTRODUCTION..... 76
4.1. THEORIZING POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY 77
4.2. TRACING THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL POWER IN CENTRAL AFRICA 81
4.3. THE NEED FOR THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA..... 92
4.4. CONCLUSION 95
CHAPTER FIVE..... 96
A DEEPER LOOK AT DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA . 96
INTRODUCTION..... 96
5.1. DEMOCRACY 98
5.2. PEACE 100
5.3. DEVELOPMENT 101
5.4. INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA..... 103
5.4.1. HOW DEMOCRACY LEADS TO PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT..... 103
5.4.2. HOW PEACE LEADS TO DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT..... 103
5.4.3. HOW DEVELOPMENT LEADS TO DEMOCRACY AND PEACE 104
5.5. CASE STUDIES OF SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES WHERE THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY 104
5.6. THE CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT 105
5.6.1. INTERNAL FACTORS THAT HINDER DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT 106
5.6.2. EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT HINDER DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT 107
5.7. WAYS TO OVERCOME THESE CHALLENGES 107
CHAPTER SIX 109
THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY AND ITS IMPACT ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON AND CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 109
INTRODUCTION..... 109
6.1. THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY IN CAMEROON 110
6.1.1. GOVERNANCE..... 111
6.1.2. RULE OF LAW..... 112
6.1.3. CIVIC SPACE 113
6.1.4. FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 114
6.1.5. HUMAN RIGHTS..... 115
6.1.6. MINORITY RIGHTS 116
6.1.7. CAMEROON'S PERFORMANCES IN COMPOSITE INDICES MEASURING DEMOCRACY 117
6.2. IMPACT OF THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN CAMEROON 120

6.3. IMPACT OF DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY ON DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON 123
6.4. THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 125
6.4.1. GOVERNANCE 125
6.4.2. RULE OF LAW 126
6.4.3. CIVIC SPACE 127
6.4.4. FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 128
6.4.5. HUMAN RIGHTS 128
6.4.6. MINORITY RIGHTS 129
6.4.7. CAR'S PERFORMANCE IN COMPOSITE INDICES MEASURING DEMOCRACY 129
6.5. IMPACT OF THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN CAR 132
6.6. IMPACT OF DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY ON DEVELOPMENT IN CAR 133
CHAPTER SEVEN 135
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE EFFECT OF THE LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SSA (CAMEROON AND CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC VS GHANA AND KENYA) 135
INTRODUCTION 135
7.1. THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN GHANA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 135
7.2. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA 137
7.2.1. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN GHANA 137
7.2.2. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA 138
7.3. THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN KENYA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 138
7.4. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA . 140
7.4.1. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN KENYA 140
7.4.2. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 141
7.5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN SAMPLE FORMER FRENCH COLONIES (CAMEROON AND CAR), AND SAMPLE FORMER BRITISH COLONIES (GHANA AND KENYA) 141
7.5.1. STATISTICAL COMPARISON ON THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN CAMEROON AND CAR VS GHANA AND KENYA 142
7.5.2. EMPIRICAL COMPARISON ON THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT: CAMEROON AND CAR VS GHANA AND KENYA 146
CHAPTER EIGHT 150
GENERAL CONCLUSION 150
NEW SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS 153
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES 156
NOTES 172

Table of Figures

Figure 1. Freedom House freedom rating for Africa 2005 – 2017 18
Figure 2. Map showing autocracy and instability in Africa 20
Figure 3. GDP Per Capita in the Central African Sub-Region from 1990 - 2021 22
Figure 4. UNDP Human Development Index for the Central African Sub-Region from 1990 - 2018 23
Figure 5. General overview of the level of democracy in Ghana, 2020 41
Figure 6. General overview of the level of democracy in Kenya, 2020 47
Figure 7. general overview of the level of democracy in Cameroon, 2020 63
Figure 8. Support for presidential term limits | 29 countries with presidential or semi-presidential regimes | 2011/2013 66
Figure 9. General overview of the level of democracy in Central African Republic, 2020 72
Figure 10. Public Perception of the Rule of Law in Central Africa, 2021 86
Figure 11. Public Perception of Anti-Corruption in Central Africa, 2021 88
Figure 12. Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law in Central Africa, 2021 90
Figure 13. Democratic Elections score in Central Africa, 2021 93
Figure 14. Cameroon's performance in the 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' component of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) from 2012-2021 120
Figure 15. Cameroon's performance in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 'Political Stability Absence of Violence/Terrorism' indicator 2013 – 2022 122
Figure 16. Cameroon's performance in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 'Political Stability Absence of Violence/Terrorism' indicator 1996 – 2022 123
Figure 17. CAR's performance in the 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' component of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) from 2012-2021 131
Figure 18. CAR's performance in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 'Political Stability Absence of Violence/Terrorism' indicator 2013 – 2022 133
Figure 19. Comparison on Cameroon, and CAR vs Ghana and Kenya's performances in the 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' component of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) from 2012-2021 146

List of Tables

Table 1. Cameroon's scores and category in EIU Democracy Index 2013-2022 118
Table 2. Cameroon's scores and category in Freedom House 'Freedom in the World Report 2013-2022 ... 119
Table 3. CAR's scores and category in EIU Democracy Index 2013-2022 130
Table 4. CAR's scores and category in Freedom House 'Freedom in the World Report 2013-2022..... 130
Table 5. Comparative table on the performance of Cameroon, CAR, Ghana, and Kenya on EIU's Democracy Index..... 142
Table 6. Comparative table on the performance of Cameroon, CAR, Ghana, and Kenya on Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index..... 144
Table 7. The impact of the state of democracy on political stability: Cameroon and CAR vs Ghana and CAR 147
Table 8. The impact of the state of democracy on political development: Cameroon and CAR vs Ghana and CAR..... 148

List of Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRC	Armed Forces for Revolutionary Council
APRD	Popular Army of the Restoration of Democracy
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BTI	BertelsmannStiftung Transformation Index
CAR	Central African Republic
CHR	Centre for Human Rights
CIGs	Common Initiative Groups
CNU	Cameroon National Union
CPDM	Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CPJP	Patriots for Justice and Peace
CPP	Convention People's Party
CRM	Cameroon Renaissance Movement
CRTV	Cameroon Radio and Television
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DW	Deutsche Welle
DWB	Doctors Without Borders
EC	European Commission
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ELECAM	Cameroon National Electoral Commission
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICC	International Criminal Court

IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
IIDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KNDP	Kamerun National Democratic Party
KPU	Kenya People Union
LON	League of Nations
MESAN	Social Evolution Movement of Black Africa
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MRC	Mouvement pour la Renaissance du Cameroun
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NLC	National Liberation Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDA	Preventive Detention Act
PNDC	Provisional National Defense Council
PNP	People's National Party
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
RTI	Right to Information
SCNC	Southern Cameroons National Council
SDF	Social Democratic Fron
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SSA	Sub-Sahara Africa

UC	Union Camerounaise
UFDR	Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPC	Union of the Peoples of Cameroon
USDS	United States Department of State
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Since independence, many countries in the African continent have experienced a checkered and questionable economic history, characterized by persistent incidences of public demonstrations, due to the retrogressive economic policies and the continents' historical roots which seemingly contribute to a great deal to its present status-quo, thus enclaving the political setting of these countries and consequently the consolidation of democracy. Neo-colonial lineages, embezzlement of state resources and corruption have stood at the top of these country's economic agenda since they were promised independence in the 1960's.

This experience or what I preferably call 'anomality' based on the fact that it remains an issue conducted and of no consequential concern as to putting an end to it by these country's leaders, has misguided the structure and functioning of the body polity of these countries, further impeding and frustrating the already startled peaceful coexistence and effective service delivery of public goods and services provoked by the colonialists. I will highlight that the outcomes of economic policies and citizens' participation in elections and electoral outcomes in these countries have been very discouraging as the politics of self-interest, accompanied by corrupt governments, who retain power through electoral malpractices remains the day-to-day state of affairs in these countries.

There remains an influx of political, bureaucratic and socio-cultural constraints to economic development, consequently the lack of democratic consolidation and peace. Despite recorded improvements in local participation in developmental schemes through-out these countries, genuine participation and responsibility within the leaders and the peoples has

not been marked to be growing. Evidence of this is that these countries continually are being stormed by intricate webs of crises, clientelism, electoral malpractices, decaying economic policies and moral and political decay with ceaseless regime and leadership failures, who continually try to wriggle themselves out of these situations that are more or less of their own proper creation.

Such unproductive policies remain nothing but stumbling blocks to meeting the development needs of our developing economies, thus requesting an urgent need for different strategies to wipe out poverty, by bringing in place sustainable development at all levels of the economy. Emphasis as this study shall further reveal must lay this task to the strengthening of proper checks and balances possible in civil society organizations and lastly the encouragement of genuineness and selflessness among leaders.

Democracy has been experimented in Africa for several years now and people continually wait impatiently to see some desired results, but their aspirations have always been cut short. Majority of these countries' populace who are poor continue to hope for change that seemingly may never come, especially with the present state of affairs characterizing the political activities of these countries. This status-quo prompted me to reason out some positive remedies to such undemocratic and retrogressive development entrapment. As it is always said, that necessity is the mother of invention, I believe that civil participation by organized civil society organizations; which represents the actual plight of the people in need of positive change should spearhead to participate in chronicling their desired change and a responsive government which eventually gives up to pressure from these civil society organizations. This study piece shall seek to establish an alternative approach to the existing democracy rhetoric, approaching the democratic development by laying emphasis on development economics and the role of economic growth in the transformation of these countries.

The Central African sub-region and almost the whole of sub-Sahara Africa has been characterized by an intricate chemistry of dynamics regarding peace, democracy and development. This dissertation aims to take the painstaking task to examine the sophisticated relationships, the prevailing trends, and significant challenges that shape the connection between peace, democracy and development in the Central African region. In so doing, this research seeks to brighten the multidimensional nature of these interactions by investigating the underlying factors that either enable or obstruct the achievement of sustainable peace, vigorous democratic institutions, and meaningful and sustainable development in this especially unique part of the world.

Despite the great attention that debates surrounding peace, democracy and development in the Central African sub-region and Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) in general have received, their importance remains paramount due to several ongoing factors whose evolving dynamics makes them even more of pressing need. This dissertation aims to fill the gap of the lack of modern solutions to the ever-changing environment by offering an empirical investigation of the intricate factors that characterize the region. The geographical and political landscape of the Central African sub-region is constantly evolving, with new actors, new interests, and influences which shape the region. This dissertation thus tries to capture these changes and provide a nuanced understanding of how both internal and external factors influence the pursuit of robust peace, democratic consolidation and sustainable development. It also funds a deeper understanding of these intricate issues by providing valuable guidance for policies and actions that can result to positive and long-lasting changes in the Central African sub-region.

The purpose of this study is to model a unique analysis which provides a sustainable path towards tracing first the problems facing the implementation of strong civil societies to ensure that development is not only economic, but human and also reflected in other aspects,

then evaluating how effective the implementation has been so far at attaining its objectives. It will present a practical explanation of why the Central African Region is lacking behind other regions of Africa as far as good governance, development and peace are concerned. This study shall seek to establish an alternative approach to the existing democracy rhetoric, approaching the democratic development by laying emphasis on development economics and the role of economic growth in the transformation of these countries. This thus makes the research unique and interesting.

1.2. JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY

Several compelling reasons drove the desire towards the choice of this topic for this doctoral research. The following is a summary of the motives behind this topic:

- The persistent need of addressing the several issues that plague the Central African sub-region. The interval of occurrence of issues in the nature of conflicts, political instability, and underdevelopment do not only make the search for a solution a moral imperative but also critical for the well-being of the people in the region and the stability of Sub-Sahara Africa as a whole.

- Also, this topic tackles the interconnections between peace, democracy, and development, distinguishing that any progress made in either domain can positively influence the others. This presents a holistic viewpoint which is very important in formulating the much desired inclusive and solutions.

- The history, cultural diversity, and challenges surrounding the Central African sub-region make it a unique geopolitical point of interest. This regional specificity is important because it highlights the important of localized research, in order enables the ability to draw upon historical experiences, learn from past initiatives and their

successes and failures. This allows for the possibility of the development of more effective based on regional and historic specificity.

- Another very important reason for choosing this topic is driven by ethical and moral imperative and the need to implant a potential impact. Engaging in research that backs principles such as human well-being, human rights, which are associated with peace, democracy and development, is a responsibility. This research has the potential to inform policy decisions, interventions, and strategies that can lead to sustainable peace, democratic consolidation and robust development, thus positively impacting the lives of the people in the region and beyond.

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

In order to fill the existing policy gap and correctly analyse the assumptions, practices and also compare the different concepts, methods and theories that have been so far used in the analysis of issues surrounding the lack of peace, democracy and development in the Central African sub-region, this dissertation is guided by the following research questions:

- To what extent has the lack of economic sovereignty and democratization affected peace and development in the Central African region? This question seeks to address the lapses faced in the democratic consolidation process in the countries of Central Africa Region, who with a common historical background, also face common problems regarding their democratic and development structures, which have transcended into their economic and social development. We also have to bear in mind that the concept of democracy since its adoption by many African countries has been understood and defined by many to be the holding of regular elections. Looking at this closely, this research also seeks to address this issue of democratic lapses by investigating and providing answers to the question that;

- Does the holding of regular elections guarantee the process of democratic consolidation as enshrined during the 'third wave'? This dissertation shall focus on analysing 'what is it that has to be ruled and run in a democratic manner, particularly if we want a political system subtle and so sensitive that it can catch small signals from the people and convert them into concrete ideas that can be put on the agenda and ultimately also into practice.

- Also, another important question this work seeks to answer is that; why have other indicators of development other than GDP growth been relatively absent in literature of economic development in these countries. This section seeks to investigate development from a broader dimension to include human development as indicated by United Nation's Human Development Index, infant mortality rate, literacy rates, life expectancy, etc. Most importantly, this study will try to breakdown and expose the neo-colonial strings that have held these countries down since their independence, which characterizes their lack of development. Democracy, development and Peace are all measured in terms of mass value and as such, testing the hypothesis here below will better allow us ascertain how investing in which mass value variable is more important that the other, and our human nature implies without strong obstruction that investing in the human self, the society, the citizens, educating the masses, and empowering them should be the most important.

The focus of this study shall in effect divert and pay greater attention to the role and importance of strong civil societies. Studies on democracy in Africa have more often only laid emphasis to electoral irregularities, regime longevity and constitutional reforms, with very little emphasis given to civil society, which is the people, who should be the focal point

of every talk of democracy. A strong and educated people equal a strong and consolidated democracy. This has hardly been the case, as things that are supposed to be outspoken are mouth-tapped. The need for social transformation has often been largely neglected in Africa. Accountability remains oblique so far as social life in most African countries is concerned and as such, the truth is never known because of the lack of a strong civil society, which has consequently denied majority of these countries' populations' access to the good life they all deserve. Investments in strengthening the knowledge-base of civil societies empower the people to be aware of their duties and prerogatives, which permit them, live a better and peaceful life. The overall purpose of this thesis is to review and obtain empirical evidence related to the above-mentioned research questions and also to reveal their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and finally try to deduce policy options that may help advance the situation.

1.4. HYPOTHESES

Within the context of the comparative case-study that this thesis undertakes on the relationship between advances in peace, democracy and the level of political stability and development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), my analysis shall be guided by the following hypothesis:

- The democratic deficit in the Central African Region can be associated to the decline in political stability and the dwindling levels of development in the region as evidence in the case-study countries, Cameroon and Central African Republic (CAR).
- Inversely, advances in democracy in Ghana and Kenya can be associated to the increase in their levels of political stability and development.

1.5. SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF STUDY

This study draws its significance from the fact that it tackles a very pertinent, pressing, and challenging issue confronting the stability and development of Sub-Saharan African countries--decline in democracy. The political landscape in most Sub-Saharan African states is marked by a decline in democratic governance evident in human rights violation, shrinking of the civic space, election malpractices, unbridled corruption amongst others. Using two countries in the Central African subregion (Cameroon and Central African Republic) as case-studies, this thesis tries to provide a detailed analysis of the interplay between democratic decline, political stability and development. While several scholars have written individually on the three aforementioned political phenomena, very few academic inquiries have been undertaken to address the interplay between the three. This thesis is one of the few to focus entirely on this issue. This therefore seeks to make a significant contribution to the corpus of knowledge in the field of African governance in general and on the impact of democratic decline in African countries.

Another area where this thesis makes a unique contribution to knowledge on democratic governance in Africa is its comparative approach that seeks to identify similarities and differences in the experience of democracy and its impact on political stability and development both at the subregional level (with the case of Cameroon and Central African Republic both of whom are in the Central African sub-region), and the regional level (with the cases of Ghana in West Africa and Kenya in East Africa).

Finally, the significance of this thesis is also embedded in the fact that it does not just seek to add another academic work on the shelves but intends to serve as reference and source of information for policy-makers in Africa and beyond who are confronted with addressing the challenges of governance in African and other third world countries.

1.6. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

In terms of scope, this thesis has both a subregional and regional outlook. It focuses principally on two countries in the Central African sub-region as its case-studies: Cameroon and the Central African Republic. However, to provide a broader context and perspective, it compares the experience of the two case study countries, which are both former French colonies, to that of two other African countries with a different history, approach and outcome in democratic governance: Ghana in West Africa and Kenya in East Africa.

Methodologically, this thesis relies extensively on secondary sources given the financial and logistic constrains involved in undertaking field trips to gather data from primary sources. To circumvent this limitation, this researcher has made use of online data repositories containing primary data like composite indices published by the World Bank and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG).

1.7. THESIS STRUCTURE

This thesis consists of eight chapters. The introductory chapter sets out the addressed problem and the main questions of the thesis, the objectives, the importance and contribution of the research, the scope of the research describing the relevant literature and hypotheses related to peace, democracy and development in Sub-Sahara Africa. It also describes the limits of the research.

The second chapter looks at the nature of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with a comparative case-study between two former British colonies (Ghana and Kenya) and two former French colonies (Cameroon and Central African Republic). It shall explore the nature of democratic governance in these countries and highlight similarities and differences.

Chapter 3 of this thesis explains the details about the research methodology, research design and strategy, the justification for the use of a mixed-method approach. It equally discusses

the reliability and validity of the study.

The fourth chapter shall provide a critical analysis of rigid constitutionalism, legitimacy, and democracy in politics of SSA countries.

Chapter 5 is going to examine the decline of democracy and its impact on political stability in the two main case-study countries of this thesis—Cameroon and Central African Republic.

The sixth chapter shall focus on the decline of democracy and its impact on political stability in Cameroon and Central African Republic.

Chapter 7 shall present a comparative analysis between the effect of the level of democracy on political stability and development in SSA. It shall compare the case of Cameroon and Central Africa (former French colonies) to that of Ghana and Kenya (former British colonies).

The eight and last chapter will focus on a general conclusion of the entire thesis. It shall present a summary of the main points, and findings in the various chapters and determine whether or not the hypothesis that was set forth at the beginning of the thesis can be validated or not based on the facts brought forth in this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the quandary of democratic deficiency in Central Africa and its impact on peace and development in the region, requires a robust research methodology. This chapter focuses on the methodological framework of this thesis. It identifies and explains the various choices in terms of approach, procedures and techniques that would be used to collect and analyse data on the interplay between peace, democracy, and development in the Central African region. This study will adopt a mixed method which constitutes qualitative and quantitative methods alongside positivist and interpretivist research techniques which attempts to understand the reality of a phenomenon through the use of objective legal principles. The dissertation will embrace a cross sectional case study method which will complement each other, to enable it better execute the research agenda. It will focus on Cameroon, Central African Republic; countries which having a common heritage of colonization, face serious governmental problems with weak political systems, whose governments though elected, have been almost transformed to autocratic regimes, and rigged by corruption, poverty and underdevelopment.

2.1 LOGIC OF INQUIRY

Generally, there are two logic of inquiry researchers can use in their quest to acquire knowledge on different phenomena: inductive, and deductive approach. An inductive approach or reasoning is a method of inquiry which begins with observations on specific cases and seeks to establish generalizations at the end (Hyde, 2000). According to Bernard (2011: p.7) inductive research approach "involves the search for pattern from observation

and the development of explanations – theories – for those patterns through series of hypotheses". An inductive research approach is very useful for the development of theories or concepts given that it identifies patterns from data collected through observation and try to derive general propositions from them (Sheppard, 2020). Qualitative research usually follows an inductive approach but theories based on this method of inquiry is often untested (Hyde, 2000). Inductive approach can be considered a bottom-top approach in carrying out research.

Deductive approach, on the other hand is the reverse of inductive approach in that it begins with generalizations which are applied to specific cases. Bingham and Witkowsky (2022) point out that deductive analysis entails "applying theory to the data to test the theory". Deductive research is particular useful for qualitative or quantitative research works that involve hypothesis testing. Wilson (2010: p. 7) summarizes the essence of deductive approach as one that involves "developing a hypothesis (or hypotheses) based on existing theory, and then designing a research strategy to test the hypothesis." The line of reasoning guiding this approach is the idea that if a causal link is implied in a particular case study or theory, one can use deductive research design to test the potential of such link existing in a generalized situation (Gulati, 2009).

Concerning the logic of inquiry for this study, the deductive approach has been chosen. The motive for this choice resides in the fact that this thesis employs a theoretical framework and contains hypotheses to be tested concerning the subject of enquiry. Deductive research approach is highly adapted for scientific enquiries which involves theory and hypothesis testing given their rigor in terms of logical analysis. This claim has been affirmed by Snieder and Larner (2009: p. 16) who point out that: "the deductive approach follows the path of logic most closely. The reasoning starts with a theory and leads to a new hypothesis. This

hypothesis is put to the test by confronting it with observations that either lead to a confirmation or a rejection of the hypothesis".

In the context of the current research, the adoption of a deductive approach would enable this research to effectively investigate the relationship between democracy, peace and development in the Central African Sub-region. It starts from a hypothetical model that there exist positive and mutually enhancing relationship between democracy on the one hand and peace and development on the other. In other words, democratic society, are characterized by good governance which enhances development and peace. In the case of the Central African sub-region, this study shall attempt an analysis the impact of democracy on its pursuit of development and political stability. It shall examine if the relatively poor performance of the sub-region (compared to other sub-regional counterparts) can be explained by its record in the pursuit of democracy.

2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

In terms research design, this study is both descriptive and correlational. It is descriptive in the sense that this thesis explores the interplay of political phenomena like democracy and peace in an in-depth manner as well as a classification and summarization of differences and similarities in the manifestation of the phenomena investigated in various countries in Central Africa. Exploration, summarization, and classification are all characteristics of descriptive research design (Kramer, 1985). The combination of these three features of descriptive research would enable me to come out with an in-depth examination of the subject matter (the impact of democracy and peace on development in Central Africa).

Another peculiar feature of descriptive research is its systematic and accurate portrayal of situations (Dulock, 1993). This study also seeks to present facts in a systematic and accurate manner which is befitting of any true scientific inquiry. It shall pursue an in-depth analysis

of the background and context of democracy in the Central African sub-region in particular and Africa in general before focusing on a closer and comparative look on the case study countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Congo, and Democratic Republic of Congo). It shall provide statistical and factual analysis of the evolution of democracy in the aforementioned case-study countries from independence to the current state of affairs.

Correlational research helps to establish the relationship between variables (Seeram, 2019; Comiskey & Curtis, 2015). This thesis looks at the relationship between democracy, peace and development in Central Africa. It examines how these variables interact with each other and if there is a positive or negative relationship between them in the context of specific Central African countries. A correlational approach is essential to elucidate the cause of the developmental stagnation and political instability that has characterize many countries in the Central African sub-region.

A correlational analysis shall be carried in this study using composite data on the performance of the case-study countries in democracy and good governance and how that affects their outcome in development and peace. Here, international composite indices on democracy like the 'Freedom House Index' (published by Freedom House) that measures countries performance on political rights and civil liberties across the globe (Freedom House, 2022), the 'Democracy Index' (published by the Economist Intelligence Unit) that examines the state of democracy (electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture) in the world (EIU, 2022), and the Human Freedom Index (jointly published by the Cato Institute, the Liberales Institute of the Friedich Naumann Foundation, and the Fraser Institute) that focuses on personal and human freedoms around the world (World Population Review, 2022), would all be useful for data analysis.

For governance, one can rely on global composite measurements of governance performances like: Transparency International (TI)'s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which measures the perception of corruption in the public sector in using a global corruption ranking (Transparency International, 2021); the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) which measures governance performances of countries in the globe from six dimensions (Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; Voice and Accountability; Control of Corruption; Regulatory Quality; Government Effectiveness; and the Rule of Law) (World Bank, 2022), and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) which measures and monitors the performance of African countries in four key areas of governance (Participation, Rights, and Inclusion; Security and the Rule of Law; Foundation for Economic Opportunity; and Human Development (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2022).

This study also employs a case-study design in trying to unravel the deficit of democracy in Central Africa and its impact on peace and development. Crowe et al (2011: p. 1) define case study as "a research approach that is used to generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a complex issue in its real-life context". It involves gathering data from a wide range of sources and through different methods of data collection like observation and interviews (McLeod, 2019).

Case study can be focused on a single case where it is possible to intensively investigate the phenomenon or case under consideration or multiple cases otherwise known as cross-case where the researcher focuses on multiples cases (Zainal, 2007; Gerring, 2006). Generally, case-study research focuses on individual group representative, a phenomenon, or an organization (Hancook et al, 2021). According to Swanborn (2010), case studies are suitable to answer broad research questions concerning social process and can provide solutions to explanatory issues at micro-levels which can be applied in social science theories. Case-

study as a research approach enjoys huge attraction and usage across several discipline especially social science, health, law, political science and has formed the basis of the production of a vast number of publications including classics in several disciples (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Gerring 2004).

Case-study research has a huge appeal in the discipline of political science especially among researchers on political economy and political scientist with an inclination to quantitative research for instance: Acemoglu et al (2003); Rodrik (2003); and Bates et al (1998).

This thesis employs a cross-case type of case-study that focuses on the seven countries that constitute the Central African sub-region: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Congo, and Democratic Republic of Congo. It shall undertake a comparative case-study of the aforementioned countries given their distinctiveness.

Comparative case-study emerged as an approach in political science in the mid-20th century within the framework of interstate comparison between various states in the US or between the government of different countries in the world (Barnhurst, 2005). According to Dion (1998), comparative case studies is usually based on the selection of a dependent variable which is comprised of a phenomenon that generates political interests. Goodrick (2014: p.1) notes that comparative case-studies are particularly effective in analysing and synthesizing "the similarities, differences and patterns across two or more cases that share a common focus or goal".

Such an approach would be very helpful investigating and identifying patterns and distinctiveness in the evolution of democracy in the various countries of the Central African sub-region and how such has affected their path towards development and peace. It is worth noting that the Central Arica is the most endowed sub-region in Africa in terms of natural resources (Mwanasali, 1999) but seems to be suffering from resource curse as the region

remains generally poor. A comparative case-study analysis can shed more light on this paradox.

Another reason why a cross-case analysis is better suited for this research is the fact that countries of the Central Africa sub-region have a little bit of diversity in their performance on democracy, governance, development, and peace. In terms of democracy, all countries in the Central African Region have performed poorly in various indices of democratic governance. All Central African countries selected as case-study are ranked in the 'Authoritarian' category in EIU's most recent Democracy Index rankings (2021) with the following scores and global rankings: Gabon (Score: 3.40/10; Rank: 121/167); Congo (Score: 2.79/10; Rank: 137/167); Cameroon (Score: 2.56/10; Rank: 143/167); Equatorial Guinea (Score: 1.92/10; Rank: 158/167); Chad (Score: 1.67/10; Rank: 160/167); Central African Republic (Score: 1.43/10; Rank: 162/167); and Democratic Republic of Congo (Score: 1.40/10; Rank: 164/167) (EIU, 2022). All of them are also classified in the not free category in the 2022 Freedom House's annual Freedom in the world report with the following scores: Gabon (21/100); Democratic Republic of Congo (19/100); Republic of Congo (17/100); Cameroon (15/100); Chad (15/100); (7/100); and Equatorial Guinea (5/100) (Freedom, House).

A map published by Freedom House illustrating trends in democratic governance in Africa for a twelve-year period (2005 - 2017), reveals there has been no change in democratic governance among all the Central African countries in this study (Central African sub-region: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Congo, and Democratic Republic of Congo) for the past 12 years (See Figure 1).




Figure 1. Freedom House freedom rating for Africa 2005 – 2017

Source: Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/article/democratic-governance-africa-three-key-trends

The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) offers the following bleak assessment of governance in the Central African Region:

> Central Africa is a region struggling under the legacy of conflict and authoritarian rule. Many of its governments' leaders or their families have been in power for decades, and elections have rarely met the standard of free, fair, and credible. There is persistent violence in eastern Congo, Anglophone Cameroon, and the Central African Republic.
> (CSIS, 2022)

According a recent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) briefing on the situation in the Central African Region provided by senior UN officials, the region is going through a paradox of strides in democracy and adverse security conditions (UNSC, 2022). The brief highlighted the following situations in the region:

> ...while several countries of the region are on track to hold elections in 2022 and 2023, notable challenges threaten to derail those efforts. In Cameroon, the crisis emanating from Boko Haram splinter groups and displaced persons fleeing neighbouring countries has only grown, with the situations in the country's north-west and south-west regions of particular concern as violence flares. In Chad — which is undergoing a transition following political turmoil in 2021 — "the most important challenges lie ahead" as constitutional talks begin. Meanwhile, heinous attacks continue against civilians and Government troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and bilateral relations between Kinshasa and its neighbours are deteriorating.
> (Ibid.)

Poor governance seems to have made the sub-region vulnerable to violence and political instability. A good example of this is the Central African Republic, which has been identified by many scholars and international organizations as a typical example of a failed state (Hearth, 2021; Aidi, 2019; Cleenewerck et al, 2017; Lizak, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2007). Violence and political instability seem also to be pushing the sub-region towards a humanitarian crisis as noted in a report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) on the sub-region (UNOCHA, 2021). Concerning the selected case-study countries in the Central African sub-region, the UNOCHA Report notes the following about the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Cameroon:

> In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), long-running conflict and protracted crises continue to affect millions of people, with severe protection risks, forced displacement, and high levels of food insecurity. In western Cameroon, violent conflict in the South-West and North-West regions has displaced more than 700,000 people.
> As the crisis deepens, an entire generation is affected. The education of millions of children is compromised. Across the Sahel, some 6,000 schools are closed or non-operational due to violence, jeopardizing children's future, especially girls who are the least likely to return to school after prolonged interruptions. In the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon, two out of three schools are closed, affecting up to 700,000 students. Across the Central Sahel, over 137 health centres remain closed due to insecurity, while most of the ones still open are not fully functional.
> Women and girls are at heightened risk of sexual and gender-based violence. In Mali, the number of reported gender-based violence cases increased by 40 per cent compared to last year. In the Central African Republic, gender-based violence is the first identified protection risk, and the percentage of women and

girls who experienced a protection incident doubled compared to the same period in 2020.
(Ibid.).

The African Center for Strategic Studies traces several armed conflicts in Africa to the absence of accountability and lack of legitimacy in African states. It classifies all the case study countries in this thesis as either autocratic (Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Democratic Republic of Congo) or semi-authoritarian (Gabon, and Central African Republic), and identifies four of them (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, and Democratic Republic of Congo) as having an active conflict (See Figure 2).




Figure 2. Map showing autocracy and instability in Africa

Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/autocracy-and-instability-in-africa/

Unlike the case of democratic governance where all the case-study countries have similar performances in global composite indices, there are significant disparity when it comes to economic growth and human development statistics. Equatorial Guinea and Gabon have maintained a higher GDP per capita than their neighbours in the region for the past three decades (See Figure 3), meanwhile Gabon is an outlier when it comes to human development in the past three decades (see Figure 4).




Figure 3. GDP Per Capita in the Central African Sub-Region from 1990 - 2021

Source: Compiled from World Bank GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) - Sub-Saharan Africa: https://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?downloadformat=excel




Figure 4. UNDP Human Development Index for the Central African Sub-Region from 1990 - 2018

Source: Compiled from UNdata Human development trends: http://data.un.org/DocumentData.aspx?q=human+development+index&id=418

A comparative case-study would provide an opportunity to better understand the aforementioned disparities in the Central African Sub-region.

2.3 RESEARCH METHODS

In terms of research methodology, this thesis shall employ mixed methods as it combines both quantitative and qualitative research approaches in its collection and analysis of data. Mixed method refers to a research approach in which the researcher combines both quantitative and qualitative research methods in the conduct of his study (Shorten & Smith, 2017; Creswell, 2002; Maxwell & Loomis, 2003). Though researchers have been engaged in the combination of quantitative and qualitative data for several years, mixed methods of research only emerged in the 1980s (Molina-Azorin, 2016), and gain recognition as part of the third methodological movement in the fields of psycology, health science, sociology, and education (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2021; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie) in recent times. According to Creswell (2014) summarizes the conduct of mixed research in the following steps:

> It involves the collection of both qualitative (open-ended) and quantitative (closed-ended) data in response to research questions or hypotheses.
> It includes the analysis of both forms of data.
> The procedures for both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis need to be conducted rigorously (e.g., adequate sampling, sources of information, data analysis steps).
> The two forms of data are integrated in the design analysis through merging the data, connecting the data, or embedding the data.
> These procedures are incorporated into a distinct mixed methods design that also includes the timing of the data collection (concurrent or sequential) as well as the emphasis (equal or unequal) for each database. These procedures can also be informed by a philosophical worldview or a theory.

This study shall collect both quantitative data through survey and quantitative data in the form of published works (books, peer-review journal articles, online news sources, etc) to carry out analysis on the phenomenon under study.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE OF POLITICS IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA: CASES OF GHANA, KENYA VS CAMEROON, AND CENTRAL AFRICA REPBLIC.

INTRODUCTION

There are a total of 46 countries identified by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), grouping them to be Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA). This grouping has a few exceptions from the total 54 countries that make up the African continent, all at different stages of economic, political and social development. SSA is particularly one of the most heterogeneous part of the world, comprising of people of diverse cultural heritages and religion, which has translated into the political lives of these states. However, despite the heterogeneity of these states, they all exhibit certain general characteristics or developments relating t the nature of statehood and governance, which is almost unique in the world. The following section tries to identify these general characteristics and then proceeds to throw more light into the nature of politics in the selected case studies upon which this dissertation bases its findings.

- As of the beginning of the 1990s, many of these countries in Sub-Sahara Africa went through or at least began a process of political transformation and since then, there has been frequent regime changes in some of these countries. The continent thus became more open to western values such as democracy and people's participation in political activities such as in elections increased compared to the pre 1990 period.
- SSA is amongst the world's most ethnically and culturally diverse areas, thus harbors great potential for ethnically driven conflicts.[1]

- Despite the fact that there have been several instances of political transformation and regime change in the countries of SSA region, there is little effect felt on how accountable these regimes are. There is regime change but patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism continue to dominate the continent's political activities.
- Also, common to all SSA countries is the inability to provide basic social and economic services and weak governance all due to inadequate policy conception and delivery.
- Despite haven adopted some form of political transformation since the 1990s, several major governance deficits continue to plague these countries, necessitating serious and unrivaled efforts by these governments to get things working well. The effects of these governance deficits have spread towards other sectors of these countries, and inflicted serious economic and social damages that continually pose a threat to their long-term stability.
- All countries of SSA rely heavily on remittance inflows, which according to the World Bank, steadily increased, only slowing down during the COVID-19 crisis due to the restrictions. Remittance inflows into SSA surpases foreign direct investments (FDI) and external support or aid. Funds from remittances provide a stable source of much-needed external funding to facilitate economic development in general and finance development in particular, thereby helping these countries to attain their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). According the the most recent data published by the World Bank, this interest-free source of finance for major developmental projects and driver for economic growth in SSA grew by 6.1% in 2022 to a whoping $53 billion and $54 billion in 2023, with an additional 1.9% growth rate (World Bank-KNOMAD, December 2023 and 2023). Apart from reliance on remittances and FDI, SSA has external support, which comes in the form

of aid, donations, and loans from both major international organizations and bilateral partners. These external aid and loans play a very influential role in the policy-making and the composition of the political structures of these countries. The general scenario is the weakening of governance structures due to their over reliance on external aid and the conditionalities that come with these.

3.1. STABILITY AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN SSA

We should note that while it is common practice for Authoritarian structures to give way to more plural regimes around the world, 21st century politics reveals the same pattern in SSA. Though following the tides, a number of countries in SSA are in a situation that could be described as being in a regression pattern, with conservativism gaining grounds, thus strengthening authoritarianism. SSA compared to other regions of the world has the poorest average ratings regarding democratic progress in the 21st century in the developing world. The number of regimes which exhibit tenets of democracy such as regular elections has significantly increased since the 1990s with the exception of Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan, who are yet to hold any direct elections based on general consensus of its entire population.

SSA is one of the regions in the world which has seen the highest fluctuations in terms of simultaneous progress and regression in democratic standards (Zamfir, 2021:5). Freedom House concluded that in 2019, SSA region amongst other regions of the world stood at the fore front in both positive and negative progress towards democratic growth. It concluded that out of 12 largest global democratic backsliders, 7 of the countries were from SSA and out of the 7 largest global democratic progress recorded, 6 were from SSA. This further explains the heterogeneity of the continent and the unique way in which its politics is different compared to other regions.

Political stability and transformation have a pattern of distribution in the continent. The wind of change carrying democratization has affected visible impacts in certain Sub-regions such as South Africa and West Africa, while neo-patrimonialism and patrimonialism, authoritarianism has continued to flourish in Central Africa, while East Africa remains in a myriad of both scenarios.

This era is even more complicated than when the continent just attained independence and democracy was yet to be the guiding governing principle as it is now. The expansion of liberal democracy seems to be slowing in the continent same as it is slowing everywhere around the globe with the rise of right-wing populist political parties and strengthening of political positions by reigning leaders. This "*va et viens*" trend of democracy in Africa, which exhibits it to be in a constant state of advancement and retreat, has led to a mosaic of political arrangements. While some of these regimes like Sudan have been toppled by popular uprisings following the Arab spring that started in North Africa, these moves have been frustrated by some of the leaders who remain in power through political manipulations. Such regimes and also some who gained power through military coups and other forceful means in SSA have succeeded to thrive with very little opposition, and even benefit from international recognition despite the external pressure exerted on them. Somewhere somehow, there has continued to be the pervasiveness of Larry Diamond (1996) calls "pseudo democracies" and "feckless democracies" as designated Thomas Carothers (2002). The socio-political and economic lapses faced by the various countries in the region, remnants of the very doings or ill policies of the leaders have been severally exploited as baits to strengthen their positions in power. The outbreak of civil conflicts and infiltration of terrorist groups into some countries such as the Boko-Haram encroachment in Cameroon, Mali, and Chad have been exploited by the leaders to influence law makers to implement decisions that strengthen their hold no power.

Another variant of authoritarianism that the SSA region is witnessing that continuous to impede democratization is what many scholars have come to term "authoritarian development/modernization". The norm has been these leaders resort to giving preference to socio-economic outcomes at the expense of democracy, while strengthening their positions in doing so. Glaring examples exist in SSA such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, with the later being the most distinct of these regimes. From this point, it can be generalized that the current issues facing the SSA region especially socio-economic backwardness and increasing terrorist activities has led to several constitutional amendments through-out the region, a tide which seems to be cutting across every corner of the globe, which changes in policies aimed at limiting the activities of these jihadists. The situation in SSA however tends to aggravate the already very complicated political terrain, and favors the continent's strong men in consolidating their regimes against building sustainable democratic institutions. Development authoritarianism as mentioned above though it creates some degree of socio-economic development, it on the other hand still contributes to the demise of these states as it creates class divisions due to corruption, leading to uneven growth and a widening gab between the rich and the poor. The problem with the regimes in SSA is that unlike the East Asian examples from which they try to copy from, they do not expand the spheres of economic, civil, and political rights for all citizens.

Sub-Sahara Africa's colonial past also has a major role to play till date on the acquisition, the rise/use and also the erosion of state power. Jeffrey Herbst offers a great overview of this relationship and poses some intriguing questions about the future of Africa, which are really worth pondering on. He questions whether constitutional democracies in Africa could/can be developmental? And also, whether competitive democratic political systems in Africa can deliver or give rise to an effective government which securely holds the sole right to power and authority, (Herbst, 2014).

3.2. A DIFFERENT PATH FOR SUB-SAHARA AFRICA?

Looking at the nature of politics in the region and the various paths which the drive for democratization seems to be taking since it swept through the region in the 1990s, it is undoubtedly reasonable that the SSA region is unique. The culture of democracy is relatively very new and seemingly foreign to the terrain. This study believes that more dialogue and debate on traditional perceptions of the history and contemporary work-a-day meanings of democratization and democracy among the divergent cultures, peoples and countries of Africa should be established. This issue has been previously highlighted by scholars such as Peter P. Ekeh who garnered towards Africa's "unique historical configuration" which to him has stood as a barrier between the new "public" institutions and the communal structures that have persisted and continue to exist even though imposed political settings come and go (Ekeh, 1975).

Another prolific African scholar who shares these views is Achile Mbembe, who in one of his essays proposes that if ever answers are to be sought regarding African solutions to its democratic institutions, much emphasis must be alluded to the political activities that transpired out of the formal political structures and emerge from below (Mbembe, 2001).

The heterogeneity of African cultural dispositions and the success of East Asia and China opened a new chapter in Africa especially SSA causing leaders to question transitions to pluralist democracy. Though their arguments have always been debunked as self-serving, these views have continued to flourish around the region with increasing momentum. Authoritarian development has been adopted by a handful of nations in the region as a more suitable path by poor countries as opposed to pluralist democracy, which many describe as "competitive clientelism" (Stiglitz et al., ed. 2013). Countries within the SSA region which have sought to adopt pluralist democracy unlike their tougher counterparts who have adopted

authoritarian modes of governance, placed the primacy of political order and showed their ability to maintain force domestically and externally.

Despite the different paths different SSA countries seem to be adopting, authoritarianism continue to hold its grounds in the region, constitutional and pluralist democracies continue to be resilient in the region at least for at least some countries. However, history has proven that for the 1990s democratic enthusiasm to be re-established and realized, several factors must be incorporated into the state-building capacity. Also, a blend of domestic and external actors must be ready to work genuinely to create a state that is not only authoritative, but also effective in the provision of the needs of the citizens, and also accountable.

A neglect of one aspect, siding with one against another such as choosing the authoritarian development model against the pluralist democratic model will only lead to several limitations which will affect state-building in the future.

3.2.1. HOW SSAS COLONIAL PAST SET THE STAGE FOR TODAY'S PROBLEMS

Africa's present problems can be partly blamed on its colonial past even though some argue that times have passed and the continent's leaders are in apposition of making decisions that should favor them. Tracing the origins of Africa's problems cannot be concluded without making reference to the 19th century, an era when European powers drew political frontiers to secure their respective spheres of influences, irrespective of the diverse indigenous cultural and territorial jurisdictions that already made up the African continent. This was the genesis of the current socio-ethnic tensions that characterize the continent today. This very period saw the forced occupation of African lands by Europeans who equally forced hundreds of thousands of indigenous Africans into becoming laborers and migrant workers in their companies and plantations around the globe.

The result of this cruelty was that at the end of this era in the 1960s, the continent had been almost completely depleted of its resources and working population. Also, exploitative policies had been enshrined in the minds of the few indigenous personnel whom they trained, and who continued the process of administration. This era also streamlined African economies towards the raw material supply chain as it was mainly extractive, a legacy a legacy which the continent is still yet to recover from as it is poised by embezzlement. At independence in the 1960s, al most all national economies in the SSA were only producers of cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, palm oil, etc. all geared towards exportation to European markets which they do not have control over the prices of these cash crops.

The extractive nature of these economies led to the concentration of the youthful population along the urban centers established by the Europeans and this led to progressive population boom at the expense of basic necessities like proper housing, sanitation and other infrastructures. This situation was further worsened by growing unemployment, which has remained uncontrollable.

The successive governments in a bait to alleviate the sufferings and improve on the quality of infrastructure and services resolved to borrowing from multilateral external agencies and bilateral partners. However, the financial assistance from these external bodies often come with conditionalities which not every SSA country can live up to, thus leading to inadequate policy realization and thus more crisis compounded by the increasing growth in their borrowing figures. These programs had serious politcy implications for countries down the ladder of poverty. Many countries in the SSA region currently face serious financial crises resulting from the huge external debts they have gradually build-up over the years. Most of these country’s export earnings are used to service their debts, thus leaving them with very little to invest in sustainable long term development projects, the consequence of which is

more borrowing. These countries are thus stuck in a constant roulette with almost no way out.

The sections that follow will provide the chequered political and constitutional histories of the case study countries this study seeks to examine, to lay the ground foundation for the understanding of subsequent unfolding throughout this dissertation.

3.3. OVERVIEW OF POLITICS IN GHANA

March 6th 1957 was the dawn of a new era in Sub-Saharan Africa, when Ghana opened the way to become Africa's first country to be set free from the colonial system, when its independence was restored. Ghana's independence was preceded by periods of unrests due to their zeal for self-rule and independence, which saw all the leaders involved arrested for trying to defy the colonial authorities, acts which prompted the British government to set up the 'Coussey Committee' which in turn suggested the drafting of a colonial constitution in 1951, (Abdul-Gafaru, 2009) to facilitate the handover of control over to the nationalists. Ahlman recounts that Democratic practice in Ghana dates as far back as 1951, several years before the country gained independence, when prospective leaders and nationalists luring for political independence from Great Britain, held their first democratic elections. This was the first of its kind in any British African colony and characterized to have been a universal suffrage (Ahlman, 2011). It is worth noting that unlike the case in some African countries where the colonial masters chosed the leaders they left behind, the democratic process in Ghana had already shown signs of maturity that resulted in the people voting for their own leader in a free and competitive election made up of three native political parties such as the Convention People's Party (CPP), the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), and the National Democratic Party. These elections saw the CPP emerging victorious and at its herm was Dr Nkwame Nkrumah, who became the country's first Prime Minister in 1952 (Abdul-Garafu, 2009). His party later again won another election in 1954 which catapulted Ghana

to independence in 1957 with Dr. Nkrumah being the first president of any Sub-Saharan country.

3.3.1. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN GHANA SINCE INDEPENDENCE.

Ghana's independence was granted and ratified by the 1957 constitution, and is highlighted to have maintained some colonial traits, which provoked 1960 constitution to be instituted to enable Ghana attain its status as a republic (Osafo-Danso, 2015: 49). The joy of democracy and independence in Ghana were however short-live as shortly after the country became independent, its first democratically elected government overthrown in a military coup. Haynes maintains that Dr. Nkrumah's government had become governmentally authoritarian and had transformed Ghana into a one-party system (1993: 451). Another variant justifying the coup adds that Dr. Nkrumah's institution of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) had given him the powers to arrest and imprison his political adversaries without fair trails (Sarfo, 2014).[2] Ghana's 1966 *coup d'etat* was but one of many that happened during the country's early years of independence, which almost destroyed its democracy, with very short-lived periods characterized by elected governments. This period also saw the re-writing of Ghana'a constitution and transitioned the country from one republic to another. Following the short-comings and the authoritarian nature of the 1960 constitution, Ghana's second republican constitution was drafted which ended the 3 years military rule led by General J.A. Ankrah. He seized power in Ghana, freed all political prisoners imprisoned during Nkrumah's regime and re-introduced multipartyism in Ghana in 1969 after an election.

This constitution ushered Ghana into a Parliamentary Government, a new system of governance to enable power sharing, and divided the posts of head of government and head of state and from the election results, Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia who came victorious was sworn

in as head of government/prime minister (Asare & Prempeh, 2010). While the electoral college picked Edward Akuffo to be the president and head of state. Despite the introduction of separation of powers, this newly formed government was overthrown in another coup led by General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong on January 13th 1972. Ghana's second republic initiated in 1969 met its end with this coup Keatley, (2011). Acheampong's reign was however more extensive than that of his predecessor, General J.A. Ankrah, as he controlled Ghana from 1972 to 1978, but due to his highly unsuccessful policies, he was deposed in an internal coup led by General Frederick Akuffo on July 5, 1978 (Bonye et al., 2013). General Akuffo's reign was brief and faced an unsuccessful rebellion may 15, 1979 by some junior officers of the Ghanaian armed forces, which led to the arrest of Lieutenant Rawlings and some others for trial on counts of treason (Osam, 2008: 114). On June 4, 1979, another coup took place, which overthrew Akuffo, then freed Rawlings from custody and members of the coup made him leader of the newly formed Armed Forces for Revolutionary Council (Ibid). Owusu narrates that Rawling's AFRC embarked on an exercise "house-cleaning" which tackled the general public and the armed forces, aimed at reinstating a sense of moral responsibility and accountability and integrity in Ghana, which led to the execution of all of Ghana's military heads of state as well as some members of the armed force on charges of subverting constitutional rule (Owusu, 2006: 190). Owusu further narrates that Rawling that Lt. Jerry Rawling's AFRC passed on power peacefully to the People's National Party (PNP) led by Dr. Hilla Limann, victors of the democratic election which was already in plan before the coup on September 24, 1979 (Ibid).

Dr. Hilla's victory to the presidency in 1979 marked the beginning of Ghana's third republican constitution which was cut short lived, toppled again in a coup in 1981, barely seven months into his term of office by Lt. Jerry Rawlings under the banner of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) (Osafo-Danso, 2015: 53). Ghana, the torch

bearer of democracy in Africa had sunk gradually into oblivion of successive coups with an uncertain political and economic future. The return of Lt. Rawlings to military rule in Ghana in 1982 is described by many as a turning point in Ghana's history (Osam, 2008, Handley and Mills, 2001: 39, Adedeji, 2001), and a subject of many controversies also (Ninsin, 1993, Haynes, 2003). Ghana's transition from military to civil rule took more than 10 years as Lt. John Rawlings ruled Ghana uninterruptedly till 1992 when the fourth republic was inaugurated, and has remained the supreme law of Ghana under which its current democracy operates (Abdul-Garafu, 2009). Haynes describes the decade of military rule under Rawlings as "characterized by a strongly nationalistic orientation, socially-oriented development programs, and a foreign policy marked by an unusual blend of anti-imperialism and pro-Western initiatives" (1993: 451).

3.3.2. THE NATURE OF POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY IN GHANA

Ghana has remained relatively very stable since the inception of the fourth constitution in 1992 under John Rawlings' democratically elected government which is hailed for laying the foundation for democracy in this previously highly militarized state. The seeds of democracy in Ghana were sawn during this period and Ghana has become an example to follow once again in the African continent. However, it worth investigating the nature of democracy in Ghana today under its current democratic setting. The following sections will shed light on some important tenets of democracy around the world which goes beyond just the right to vote to include beliefs such as freedom of the press, freedom of association, electoral transparency and presidential term limits. This is to expose at what level Ghana currently stands in the world to give any ready a clear picture of democratic progress in Ghana as of the writing of this dissertation, to evaluate how institutionalization through sustained political practice has affected democracy in Ghana positively and negatively.

3.2.2.1 Press Freedom In Ghana

Ghana's 1992 constitution which ushered in the fourth republic, introducing once more multiparty democracy in Ghana is said to have guaranteed for its citizens some social, political, and economic rights and also advanced the level of consciousness amongst the citizens (Adbul-Gafaru, 2009). Press is a gadget of political suppression and is also a defense system for citizen liberation and advocacy, and government actions and private expression and opinions are made known to the general public through press freedom. While the political institution in place plays a great role in determining press freedom, it should also be noted that it is also relatively functional based on the differences in socio-cultural, economic and political settings.

Just as one would imagine the early years of press in Africa after independence, the media system in Ghana was no different, characterized by institutionalized controls due to the high centralization of power. Ahmad, Pride and Corsy citing Biney, (2011) and Anokwa, (1997) maintain that Nkrumah's grip on power between 1957 and 1966 and his ideology highly affected the development of media in Ghana, and had petrifying consequences on journalists (2016: 62). Media censorship is something acquainted to Ghanaian politics especially with its long history of military coups as each coup leader put in place laws to control the media, even though a few media organizations dared to defy these laws, (Ibid). Ghana has over the years since the beginning of civil rule in 1992 known a lot of progress in terms of press freedom and increase in the presence of private media due to media liberalization as instituted in the 1992 Constitution Chapter 12. 162(1).[3]

Despite this guarantee of media freedom, independence and pluralism, Ghana has recently been on the headlines as a hard place for journalists after a very intensively investigated report aired by a group of investigative journalists exposing high levels of state-level orchestrated corruption, which forced these group of journalists into hiding after their colleague was shot dead while driving in Ghana's Capital, Accra (Reporters Without

Borders, 2019.[4] Hussein-Suale belonged to the *Tiger Eye*, a group of independent investigative journalists in Ghana led by popularly known Anas Aremeyaw Anas, who operates by the motor: "Name, Shame, and Jail" (Engmann, 2020). Reporters Without Borders place Ghana on number thirty (30) according to the 2021 World Press Freedom Index, out of 180 countries they surveyed.[5] While little has been made by the government to curb threats against investigative journalist especially in Ghana, the government of Ghana however concluded and officialized a law on access to state-held information, which was initiated 20 years after its introduction into parliament. The Right to Information act represents a major step taken by the Ghanaian government to ensure transparency and ensure awareness by the public of all official matters, meeting up demands of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and thus promoting democracy. The RTI act passed consented to by the president on May 21, 2019[6] to complement the stipulations of Ghana's 1992 fourth republican constitution. It should however be reiterated that the passing of the RTI alone does not guarantee press freedom in Ghana, but it entails a lot of institutional collaboration and implementation to make the country standout as a press free state in SSA.

3.2.2.2 Freedom Of Association In Ghana

Ghana's 1992 fourth republican constitution was instituted after a nation-wide referendum during a military led regime by the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) under Lt. Jerry Rawlings, after pressure from both internal and international human right groups, which finally yielded to a fair guarantee of rights for all. Amongst the provisions of this constitution was the Bill of Rights and its provisions were correlated to freedom of association and assembly as enshrined in Article 21 (Rutinwa, 2001:23). Article 21 of Ghana's 1992 Constitution guarantees the right of Ghanaians to;

> freedom of assembly, including the freedom to participate in processions and demonstrations, … freedom of association, which shall include freedom to form or

> join trade unions, or other associations, national and international, for the protection of their interests; … the right and freedom to form or join political parties and to participate in political activities subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a free and democratic society and are consistent with the Constitution.[7]

Ghana in Africa is one of the most politically and socially free countries in the Sub-Sahara African region. Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index 2021 classifies Ghana on a Global Freedom score of 82 out of 100, considering Ghana free.[8] Ghana has enjoyed decades of freedom since the inception of the 1992 Constitution. This however, recent years have proven that institutional bottle-necks may hampered smaller political parties from participating in the political process due to the increase in the party/candidature registration fees for both presidential and parliamentary candidates. Though Rutinwa sees some of the conditions for party registration in Ghana as being pitched against registering unnationalistic parties, he however agrees that highlight that these conditions are too many and cumbersome often beyond the abilities of some of the parties to bear, (2001: 26). The overall performance of Ghana in terms of civil liberties is generally very high as observed International IDEA (2021) on the figure below and justifies the observations made by Freedom House.




Figure 5. General overview of the level of democracy in Ghana, 2020

3.2.2.3. Electoral Transparency And Credibility And Presidential Term Limits In Ghana

The voice of the citizens in choosing their leader is principal tenet of democracy, and has been used as a standard for the measurement of democracy by many authors. How free and fair this process is also significant in determining the level of democracy enshrined in every democratic constitution. Przeworski maintains that through elections, citizens get to hold their leaders responsible for their actions and governance (Przeworski, 2011). Ghana's democracy after independence was constantly interrupted by incessant *coup d'états* until Ghana's return to multi party politics during the inception of the fourth republic in 1992 has considered elections as an important test of its democracy. The 1992 constitution of Ghana unlike many constitutions around the world which have been amended to increase the number of years spent in office, it mandates presidential elections every four (4) years to allow the people choose their president and also parliamentarians. Since 1992, Ghana has been able to stand out amongst its African counter-parts as an ideal democracy with its good democratic practices during elections. Elections in Ghana are carried out under the supervision of the Electoral commission (EC) which is established under Chapter Seven the 1992 Constitution (Nkansah and Gawu, 2020). Though the president of Ghana as per Article 70(2) reserves the right to appoint the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Electoral Commissions, Article 46 of the same constitution stipulates that

> "… in the performance of its functions, the Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority" (Ghana 1992 (rev. 1996).[9]

The independence of the Electoral Commission is guaranteed by the constitution, thus setting a fair ground for democracy to prevail. Ghana remains one of the few African countries that has seen successive change of power from an incumbent to the opposition, a situation which remains very rare in Africa, and this can be praised to the high level of credibility and independence the Electoral commission enjoys. There has so far been little or nor instances

of violence in any of the seven elections held in since the inception of the fourth republic, and despite the few cases of electoral disputes registered, due constitutional process has always been followed to address the irregularities successively with no violence (Ghana 1992 (rev. 1996).

Despite the fact that power in Ghana since 1992 has revolved between two political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the successive leaders have abided by the stipulations of the 1992 Constitution which limits presidential term limits to a maximum of two terms of four years. Ghana's strong constitution can thus be applauded for setting the right grounds on which vigorous elections trod, propelling Ghana over time as a beacon of democracy in the Sub-Sahara African region.

3.4. THE NATURE OF POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY IN KENYA

Kenya gained fame in Africa for its anti-colonial war dupped the "mau-mau revolution", which was one of the most violent anti-imperialist wars on the African continent. Kenya's mau-mau rebellion pitted the British colonial government against white settlers on the one hand and the Kenyan Secret society called "mau-mau" on the hand, which led to the formation of the Legislative Council in 1957. Following these violent struggles for independence and long negotiations which began in 1957, the British authorities finally agreed for elections to be organized in 1963 on the principle of "one person, one vote", marking it the 1st democratic elections in Kenya. Following this pivotal year in contemporary Kenyan history, General elections were held between May 18-26 to elect representatives into the senate (41 seats), house of representatives (129 seats), seven assemblies regions and a prime Minister (Sanger and Nottingham, 1964). Following these elections, Jomo Kenyatta's party, the Kenya African National Union won the elections and he became the first Prime Minister of Kenya on June 1, 1963, and prepared Kenya for the signing of its independence. Finally on December 12, 1963, Kenya's independence was proclaimed making it Kenya the

34th African country to gain independence (Sanger and Nottingham, 1964). On December 12, 1964, on the first anniversary of independence, Kenya's first Republic was proclaimed, with Jomo Kenyatta becoming the first president of Kenya (Carol, 2012: 16).

Following the one-party system train that was cutting through the continent, Kenyatta's KANU party and the main opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) colluded to pave the way for a de facto one-party system (Branch and Cheeseman, 2009: 6). This system was not accepted by all as in 1966, a new opposition party was formed, the Kenya People Union (KPU) by Oginga Odinga, but was short-live as it was later banned barely three years after its formation and its leaders were imprisoned following KANU's monopoly of force and resources (Mueller, 1984). Jomo Kenyatta monopolized Kenya and went through three successive re-elections as president of Kenya without opposition until his death in 1978 and power was peacefully transferred to Daniel arap Moi, his fellow party member and former co-prisoner during the "Mau Mau" (Tamarkin, 1979). Moi won the 1979 presidential elections in Kenya without any opposition and in 1982, instituted a constitutional amendment on Section 2A, that made Kenya a de jure one-party state (Throup, 1993), thus preventing any opposition party from registering. Kenya forged through another two rounds of presidential elections in 1983 and 1988 on this principle of a single party, but with the dawn of the 1990's evidence of dissatisfaction and undemocratic rule following KANU's monopoly of power and resources had flooded Kenya, causing a pandemonium throughout the country, which resulted in a failed coup. Kenya had become significantly divided ethnically between the tribes of former president Kenyatta and Moi, as the shares of prebends were not flowing as they used to under the Kenyatta reign. Moi's government quickly succumbed to the observations of Bates as he lost control, with economic decline, rise in political uncertainty which sparked a heavy crack-down on political dissidents and public demonstrations (Bates, 2015).

1991 saw the dawn of a new era for Kenyan politics after the demands for constitutional reforms finally yielded in the repealing of Act No 7 OF 1982 that had instituted a one-party system. The system was finally restored in 1991and multipartyism restored.

With the repealing of the one-party system, multipartyism was instituted and with it followed the first ever multi-party presidential elections since independence in 1992 (Throup, 1993), which saw the incumbent, Daniel arap Moi, being re-elected for a fourth term. Intense constitutional review activity followed during the 1990s driven by the forces of opposition parties and civil society. Despite the constitutional, public freedom and press freedom witnessed, the 1997 December elections shockingly revealed Moi's re-election for a fifth term in office after a disputed presidential election (Southall, 1998: 109). In December 2002, Kenya held another democratic and election and, in this election, the KANU, Kenya's long reigning party since independence was defeated and power was transferred to the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), marking a turning point in the political history of Kenya. It is worth noting that the constitution prevented Daniel arap Moi from competing in these elections, leading the rise of Mwai Kibaki to power on December 27, 2002. The transition to Mwai Kibaki welcomed a new era in Kenya with democracy flourishing until the controversial elections of 2007, when Kenya quickly shocked the world, switching from a vibrant democracy to a battle field. Human rights watch described the situation in Kenya in 2007 as "ballots to bullets".[10] Post-election violence following the controversial elections led to more than 1100 deaths and the internal displacement of more than 600 000 peoples, and with several reasons to blame for this violence (Barkan, 2013, Burchanrd and Djak, 2013) which quickly obscured the feeling of political progress. The violence was followed by the signing of several agreements between President Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, the two main competing candidates for the elections on February 1, 2008, calling for an end to the violence, and a second agreement was signed on February 8, 2008, to institute power

sharing between both parties (Horowitz, 2008, Cheeseman and Murray, 2017). The power sharing agreement led to the amendment of the constitution, creating the office of Prime Minister[11], leading to the formation of a coalition government bringing Raila Odinga to power as Prime Minister of Kenya in April 2008, and Mwai serving his second term as president. Though the power sharing agreement was plagued with its own pitfalls, it necessitated the coalition government to deliver to Kenyan citizens a new constitution and this was one of the most significant periods in Kenyan history. Previous constitutions were all aimed towards strengthening the position of the executive against other arms of government and gave the president control over the parliament, the judiciary, and the electoral commission (Nyadera et al, 2020). Kenya's 2010 constitution laid the foundation for a stronger democracy in Kenya by limiting the power of the president and thus was an enduring solution to Kenya's longstanding dictatorship problems.

3.4.1. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN KENYA SINCE 1991.

The 2010 constitutional amendment laid a strong foundation for democratic government in Kenya, and has since kept the country on a stable path, healing the wounds of the country's rough past under its various dictatorial regimes. It is however important to consider the general progress the country has made through its institutions towards the advancement of certain important tenets of democracy, in order to fully ascertain at what level the country is democratically, by looking at data and investigations by independent international organizations. The figure below however shows a general overview of the level of democracy in Kenya as per International IDEAs observations, which considers several factors to arrive at its conclusions.




Figure 6. General overview of the level of democracy in Kenya, 2020

3.4.1.1. Press Freedom In Kenya

Press freedom is an important tenet of democracy according to which the libertarian theory (Siebert et al. 1972) argues that media in a liberal system has a set of critical roles and

functionalities that are clearly spelled out in the constitutions. This is to guarantee that the media remains free from state control to keep the citizens informed and play a watch-dog role to thwart the government from overstepping its bounds. Nyadera, Agwanda and Maulani citing Dahl, remind us that Kenya's information sector throughout the 1960s to 1990s, remained largely characterized by the state-run television network and radio services, used to spread state propaganda and also silenced any whistle-blowers who tried to expose state crimes (Nyadera et al. 2020). This can be alluded to the nature of the government in power, the one-party system of governance that largely characterized the nation since independence (Ochilo, 1993). Kenya has always been proliferated by the presence of several media organizations, including privately owned, independent and state-owned media houses. The free practice of the press however is largely dependent on the political situation witnessing the country at one stage or another. Kenya's 2010 Constitution guaranteed press freedom, but the respect of this clause of the constitution has largely been unwarranted and depended on the political and economic situation of the country. Since 2010, Kenya has gone through a series of political mayhems, which have led to several instances of government crack-downs on freedom of the press. Reporters Without Boarders reports that the Covid-19 pandemic similar to Kenya's past unstable political scene also played a great role on the press freedom and the influence of politicians over the media continues to be felt, through media censorship. While they rank Kenya on 102 out of 180 countries in the 2021 World Press Freedom Index, they score Kenya on 33.72%, maintaining that the media in Kenya is still largely not free.[12] It is equally worth noting that the 2010 Constitution of Kenya under Article 35 guarantees every Kenyan the right to seek access and acquire, public information from both public and private institutions (if they are acting in a public nature). This clause was concretized in 2016 by the passing of the Access to Information Act.[13]

3.4.1.2. Freedom Of Association In Kenya

Article 36(1) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya guarantees every Kenya the "right to freedom of association, which includes the right to form, join or participate in the activities of an association of any kind" (Constitution of Kenya 2010). This article equally encourages the establishment of trade unions and for them to design their agenda in a way that does not infringe the law. The Kenyan government as can be anticipated, however, has continually used its monopoly of force to crackdown on any gathering or trade union activities that it considers as undermining its authority. A rare instance reported by DW news in 2017 saw the arrest and incarceration of several medical doctors, leaders of the doctor's union, around the country for staging a protest that allegedly crumbled the health sector.[14] The squelching of peaceful protesters is a common practice throughout Kenya especially when the interest of the leaders are at stake. Freedom Houses' 2021 Freedom in the World Index ranks Kenya 48 out of 100 in terms of political and civil liberties, and classifies the country as partly free.[15] This can be suggested to the fact that despite the fact that the country's constitution guarantees these laws for every citizen, the institutions in place have exercised prejudice in implementing these laws. The observations by Freedom House are complemented by those made by International IDEA as can be seen on the previous figure exhibiting the country's profile.

3.4.1.3. Electoral Transparency And Credibility And Presidential Term Limits In Kenya

Kenya has had a long history of elections prior to the country's independence. However, the credibility of the elections held in Kenya has always been subject to several controversies. The years following independence up to the return of multi-party politics in 1992 in Kenya, saw the country holding presidential elections in a de facto and de jure one-party system without any opposition (Throup, 1993). The credibility of the electoral process in Kenya during the one-party system and during multipartyism has always been characterized by

debates, leading to legitimacy crisis. Elections in Kenya are under the supervision of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) instituted in 2011 by the 2010 constitution in the IEBC Act to oversee electoral processes in Kenya, whose commissioners are appointed by the president of Kenya and confirmed by the parliament for a six-year term. The effectiveness of the IEBC has been characterized as largely ineffective (Barkan, 2013), despite the introduction of computerized voter registration and the biometric data system. The history of elections in Kenya under the IEBC shows post-electoral violence (2013, 2017). Freedom House reports that violence and intimidation stained the 2017 elections and questions of transparency were raised after one of the commissioners of the IEBC in charge of vote counting, Chris Msando was murdered and found dead, from torture few days before the elections, while another member fled Kenya for the United States. These elections saw president Kenyatta being victorious for a second term with 98.3 percent of the total vote after a rerun was conducted, boycotted by the main opposition candidate, Raila Odinga (Freedom House, 2020). The monopoly of force by the interim has repeatedly been reported to be a disfavoring factor for the opposition parties whose rallies are constantly dispersed by police brutality. The drama that has so far characterized elections in Kenya has seen criticism from both the International Criminal Court and Transparency International, and while Kenya being a member of the Rome Statute has severally threatened to withdraw from the ICC when the ICC indicts the Kenya leaders for going against the rule of law and gross human rights violation (Harbeson, 2014: 205).

With regards to presidential term limits, Kenya's 1992 Constitution initiated changes, which according to Article 142(2) limited the number of terms for which a president can serve to two terms of five years. This important clause of the constitution has been largely respected since its inception in Kenya and a 2020 Afro barometer survey shows that about 78 percent of Kenyans are still in favour of this ruling, while another 85 percent are in favor of adding

age restrictions to the clause to promote democracy.[16] The Republic of Kenya despites its history of political polarization and instabilities resulting from electoral violence, fueled by ethno-regional differences has so far respected the presidential term limit and the fate of which shall be determined in the 2022 elections to come as president Kenyatta is expected to round-up his two terms.

3.5. OVERVIEW OF POLITICS IN CAMEROON

This section digs deep into the bumpy constitutional and political history of Cameroon to give a full understanding of the French and English systems prior to the country's independence, which has shaped the nature of politics in modern day Cameroon. It will then conclude with an analysis of the events that led to the dominance of the French system of administration which has become the most talked about aspect of governance in Cameroon. The political history of Cameroon kicked off in 1884 with the German annexation of the country, then known as "Kamerun" and the country gained its first presence in the international scene through its participation in the First World War in 1914, serving as German soldiers. Two years later, the country was partitioned between Britain and France as conquered territories in an Anglo-French condominium that concluded the war which saw Germany defeated, and ousted from Cameroon (Chiabi, 1997:9-10, Ngoh, 2001:1-2). The conquered territories were further placed under international administration as "mandated" territories by Britain and France in 1919 after they both signed the "Versailles Treaty". In 1922, Cameroon then officially became a mandated territory of the League of Nations (LON) assigned to both Britain and France and lasted for 23 years until 1945 when this status was replaced by a Trusteeship agreement when the LON was dissolved and replaced by the United Nations (UN). The territorial division of Cameroon into two unequal parts since 1916 between Britain and France marked the genesis of Cameroon's political turmoil, which will mature into a civil war after 100 years in 2016. The British and French administration of

Cameroon with their respective policies officially ended in 1960 (for France) and 1961 (for Britain) when both sections gained independence and unified in 1961, marking the beginning of the country's highly disputed constitutional foundations. This unification plunged Cameroon into a myriad of governmental issues ranging from bad governance to legitimacy crisis, which has resulted to the lack of peaceful coexistence by both parties. This throws more light to the fact that the country's politics cannot be completely understood or discussed without referring to its colonial past.

The involvement of local indigenes into the political scene in Francophone Cameroon has been traced as far back as to 1925, when the French administration formed what was then known as the "Conseil de Notables". This was in a bit to absorb and integrate local chiefs who were the leaders of the indigenous groups into the process of administration (Le Vine, 1964: 92-94). It should be noted that the appointment of these local chiefs was base on colonial (French) administration's interests and as such, they made anyone who favored their interests, chief, sparking a conflict of leadership in Cameroon with the creation of artificial chiefs. It should be noted that the French colonial administration administered through the policy of "*indegenat*", a policy which prevented indigenes from participating in political activities Rubin sees this as the "most resented facet" of French prejudice in Cameroon (Rubin, 1972: 51).

While the French administration in Cameroon can be characterized as being more direct, the British administered their own part of Cameroon through the "Indirect System" of government through the use of chiefs and fons who were the leaders of the indigenes. These local authorities were tasked with administering their indigenes, thus extending their original functions of maintaining law and order to the collection of taxes for the colonial government (British) and also the provision of basic amenities such as health services and educational facilities.

It is worth noting that Southern Cameroons during the British mandate was divided into two and administered as part of Nigeria. This attachment to Nigeria and the lack of autonomy gave the Cameroons a bargaining disadvantage in terms of projects and finance due to the lack of proper representation in what was then known as the Central Legislative Council (Ngoh, 2001: 61). This disadvantaged position prompted Southern Cameroon indigenes to begin pressuring for autonomy from Nigeria. The fight for autonomy began to give way for Southern Cameroons indigenes in 1954, when the provisions of the Lyttleton Constitution granted Southern Cameroons with a quasi-federal status including a Legislative Assembly and also an Executive Council (Lyttleton Constitution) while still being part of the Nigerian Federation. This status was later dropped and improved and a "House of Chiefs" was created in 1957 to become the 1st upper legislative organ in Southern Cameroons alongside a ministerial government which was consolidated in 1959 after the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) leader, John Ngu Foncha came out victorious from the 1959 elections, and power of administration was finally transferred from the Governor General in Nigeria to the Southern Cameroon's Commissioner by 1960 (Ngoh, 2001).

Regarding independence, while French Cameroon gained independence after the UN Resolution 1349(XIII) was passed declaring independence for the region on January 01 1960 to a government that had allegedly been carefully selected and favored by France (Enonchong, 2021: 13). The unconventional nature of the independence immediately sparked an old rebellion in the newly independent Republic of Cameroon, spear-headed by the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC) political party, which had earlier warned the UN General Assembly of the unrepresentative nature of the government that the French were preparing for Cameroon. These allegations were debunked by the UN visiting mission to Cameroon. However, evidence of French interest was immediately felt once more as it quickly favored the government to crush the rebellion (Atangana, 2010: 98).

Unlike the independence of the Republic of Cameroon which was planned and finalized by the UN General Assembly, the Southern British Cameroons suffered a different fate. Often described as a neglect and lack of support from the UN, the independence and autonomy of the region could not live to see the day's light (Atanga, 2011: 47). Faced with a lot of dismay and disappointment from the actions of the UN who had promised the peoples of Southern British Cameroons a plebiscite to help them decide their fate, the peoples of Southern British Cameroons had no choice but to settle on accepting to "achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon". The second and only option on the plebiscite cards was that; "Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria?". Note should be taken that the leaders of the governing administration under Foncha and opposition in Southern British Cameroons had in contemplating for the options for independence due to the lack of a consensus, petitioned the UN General Assembly in a joint statement for the plebiscite to be postponed. Their petition was however counteracted by UN Resolution 1352(XIV) which slated that the plebiscite was to hold not later than March 1960.[17] The course of Cameroon's present predicament was set by the reluctance of both the UN General Assembly and Great Britain to oversee their role of trusteeship in Cameroon to the latter. This has had significant implications in the history and future of the country, as their right to self-determination was denied, forcing them to join an unequal alliance/marriage with the Republic of Cameroon in 1961, 11th of February, sealed by UN Resolution 1608(XV) taking effect as from 1st October 1961.

3.5.1. THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICS IN CAMEROON SINCE THE REUNIFICATION

Several scenes have been witnessed on the political stage in Cameroon since its reunification on the basis of a federal structure on October 1st 1961. The country briefly enjoyed multipartyism shortly after reunification, but later was transformed into a single party

system, put in place by president Amadou Ahidjo while trying to put in place his ideas of a grand and unified Cameroon and inclusive development. This was during a period when multipartyism was being considered in many parts of Africa as a means of depleting resources which could be unified under a single party to foster development. Cameroon finally surfaced again as a multiparty state in 1990 thanks to new wave of democracy that was cutting across Africa which was instituted as a result of a constitutional amendment triggered by several violent clashes and political unrests. This period of evolution in Cameroon's political development shall constitute the main part of the analysis of this dissertation. This era ushered in a multitude of dynamic political parties with a complicated network of relationships. This study's analysis of the political scene in Cameroon based on primary and secondary data reveals that since the country's reunification, the political scene has been dominated and led by a one political party, the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) whose history can be traced even as far back as the Country's early years of independence when the country was administered under a de facto one-party state under the Cameroon National Union led by Amadou Ahidjo. It is worth noting that the current head of state who is also leader of the current ruling party CPDM was the vice president of Cameroon during the one-party regime under the Cameroon National Union, which he later renamed CPDM when he became president in 1985. Politics in Cameroon despite the introduction of multipartyism has also been characterized as being subjugated more towards ethnic affiliations than ideological. Decades of political activities have proven that Cameroon is indeed a facade multiparty system which often finds itself faced with an illusion of pluralism, fueled by the objective observation of the many political opposition parties scattered everywhere and the harshness of the struggles between them. Sindjoun (1994) describes the country as moving from opposition in a one-party system to opposition in a multiparty system. The activities and actions of political parties in Cameroon since

reunification have helped to validate the country's status as a pluralist democracy. This is because the existence of political parties defines what political pluralism means as a means of promoting freedom of expression amongst the people. This has however had a very minimal effect on the proper functioning of the legal and political institutions of Cameroon. The main characteristics of politics in Cameroon is that of people ascending into public offices in order to derive certain benefits. A form of politics Lire Bayard described as "*politique du ventre*" or politics of the belly (1989: 439).

The disguise democracy practiced in Cameroon since the introduction of multipartyism has operated with oppression and intolerant of opposing voices and all forms of criticisms. This however, domestic demands for political liberalization have increasingly continued to be seen in the country as highlighted by Victor J. Ngoh in Mbaku and Takougang (2004: 434-437). Amongst the most outstanding demands for political liberalization has been the long-lasting cry by the Anglophone minority, who have been through decades of constant marginalization as regards to politico-socio-economic development within a united supposedly united Cameroon (Konings, 1999: 305-307). The government has since independence been unable to manage the diverse nature of the Cameroons, which has led to decades of antipathies especially emanating from the Anglophone minority due to the socio-economic neglect and unfair political representation. The nature of affairs in Cameroon today are unquestionably haunted by the diversified and chequered nature of its history which has made the country relatively unstable since independence and reunification. A handful of reasons exist that account for the numerous legal, political and administrative matters fuddling development efforts in Cameroon, but the country's colonial past and inaccurate preparation of the colonies especially the Anglophone minorities towards self-determination is largely to be blamed.

3.5.2. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN CAMEROON SINCE INDEPENDENCE.

Cries for political liberalization in Cameroon since independence and reunification have never been attempted to be tendered to until the 1996 Constitution which ushered in some measure of political liberalization in Cameroon, which arguably have remained insufficient as can be explained by the current events in the country. Cameroon continuous to be marred by undeniable governance and development challenges which have rendered national consolidation measures vulnerable and led to a stalled democratic process. The outburst of the 'Anglophone Crisis' (Agwanda et al. 2020) in 2016 is just the tip of the iceberg on all the inert grievances that the peoples of Cameroons have been enduring since independence and reunification. The 1996 Constitutional amendments by the Cameroon government came in as a means to decentralize the state structure aimed at unifying Cameroon into a unique Cameroonian identity. Prior to these amendments, the Anglophone minority have historically always divided in their own views, some calling for a return to the original terms of reunification in 1961 which guaranteed a federal structure thus preserving their ideal form of statehood and unique identity. Another faction built up with time more aggressively and stood for total secession as the only means to genuinely preserve their identity. Enonchong emphasizes that despite the decades of cries by the Anglophone minority for fair treatment, the government continuously denied of the existence of such allegations and instead encouraged a divide and rile policy to further hollow the two anglophone regions against each other (2021: 178).

While the 'Anglophone Crisis' has brought Cameroon into the limelight, it has raised several questions on the democratic progress the country has made since attaining independence. The following paragraphs will briefly cut across the application of some important indicators of democratization such as liberty of the press and expression; liberty of association; the nature of holding transparent and credible elections; religious freedom and its influence on

politics in Cameroon; and finally, the limitation of presidential mandates. These factors will give any reader a clear position as to which position Cameroon finds itself on the democratic scale.

Respect for democracy, democratization, good governance and good government are terms that have gained prominence in modern political discourse. Often, in order to pass judgment on a country's governance system, its leaders and elites, it is strictly necessary to use an analytical grid and data set comprising the various principles of a democratic state. Several carefully carried out surveys have determined the standards of democracy across the globe which can be relied upon to establish some acceptable degree of conclusions on democracy based on indicators observed in each of these states. Despite the fact that there is no consensus on the exact meaning of democracy and the ways of measuring it, events in Cameroon show a glaring example of whether or not the state is being governed well enough or not. International data set have seen Cameroon occupy a disturbing position internationally as far as democratic progress is concerned. Considering the fact that Cameroon is a young democracy, the aim of this section is to provide answers to some pertinent questions such as; are certain factors which could allow Cameroon to be considered a democracy or an authoritarian state? What can we learn from the analysis of democratic indicators in relation to the situation in Cameroon? Does this sectoral analysis reveal the state of politics and democracy in Cameroon more advanced than they have seem?

3.5.2.1. Press Freedom In Cameroon

Press freedom is a fundamental point and of overriding value in all democracies and the preamble of Cameroon's 1996 guaranteed both freedom of expression and of the press. Press freedom allows the citizens to be informed of the state of their country and keeps them current with all happenings and actions of leaders and daily news on the country. There is a plethora of newspapers and media houses in Cameroon with news articles and programs that

openly challenge the president and his government, which a first glance will give a very positive image for press freedom. However, there has been a long and steady decline in press freedom in Cameroon as defamation and slander remain a criminal and civil offense liable to a prison sentence and a hefty fine and even a dead penalty when found guilty as per section 305 of the Penal code. The situation appears to be even more complex and without meddling into the politics of press independence, this section focuses more on press freedom as a desirable value for a democracy. Reporters Without Borders in their 2021 World Press Freedom Index ranks Cameroon 135th out of 180[18] countries in their index. This ranking shows a steady decline in the country's position as compared to previous years as they qualify Cameroon as "one of Africa's most dangerous countries for journalists". It is the observation of the author that media works in Cameroon are carried out either in fear of infuriating the governing authorities, or the journalist take the side of the authorities and openly praise them to the detriment of the general public. This fear of the practice of journalism was aggravated with the outbreak of the Anglophone crisis in 2016, when the government of Cameroon enacted a controversial law on the basis of human rights violations, apparently aimed at further muzzling journalists. The 2014 controversial anti-terrorism legislation permitted the government to outrightly label journalists, government critics and other outspoken personalities including activists as "terrorists", making them liable to trial in military tribunals (Ngangum 2021: 236). These incommunicado arrests and detentions of journalists has worsened lately with the political turmoil the country is currently facing. Panic struck the journalism community in 2020 when a popular Anglophone journalist Samuel Ajiekah Abuwe, popularly known as Wazizi was reported dead in after several months in detention.[19] Also, the operation of media houses in Cameroon is highly censored. The country is known to place politically motivated temporal and

permanent bans on media houses which engage in politically sensitive topics to publicize alternative discourse.

The lack of a free and independence press in Cameroon which has over the years become a more authoritarian state makes democracy a far-fetched dream for the country. It should be noted that the president has been in power since 1982 and is the case with all authoritarian governments, will do everything to control the narrative and twist the truth to favor them. In the same vein, press freedom is further trampled upon because there is no law in the country which compels public officials to disclose public information to the public, thus forcing journalists to often rely on secondary sources of information, which in most cases are debated. Though the past years have not been very good for the country with the increasing encroachment of terrorist activities from Boko Haram in the North to the Secessionist factions in the two Anglophone regions, the government can be concluded to have made investigative journalism which continually threatens the government's position and terrorism into a cocktail which continues to stifle press freedom in Cameroon. The anti-terrorism law in Cameroon needs careful reformation, after which it will be able to observe the articles of the constitution which protect human rights and the right to free press. This law is also contradictory to several international treaties which Cameroon is signatory to, thus a big setback to democracy in the country.

3.5.2.2. Freedom Of Association In Cameroon

Freedom of association represents another very important tenet of democracy in a country. The alludes to the right to unite around a common cause, to associate in different organizations in order to share and be stronger and have the support of a group. While it is common place to be able to create all kinds f associations or groups without fear of repression or reprisals, provided they do not infringe on the constitution as written in the Preamble and Article 10 (1).[20] With these promises in the constitution, the situation in the country is

however very different. Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index classifies Cameroon on 16th on a scale of 100 on the Global Freedom Score, categorically stating that the country is not free.[21] It should be noted that the methodology used by Freedom House is derivative of the measures from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which Cameroon is signatory to and by that means compelled to it. This rating/score takes into account real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals and not that their constitutions promise. The government of Cameroon which has been in power for decades has a record of using state resources for political patronage while restraining the activities of alternative voices and opposition parties.

Preparations for the recent presidential elections and its aftermath revealed that there is no freedom of association in Cameroon especially in regards to political participation. Militants of several opposition parties such as the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (CRM) were cracked down and their activities stifled by the government as their rallies were banned and those who resisted the bans were arrested. The organization and operationalization of political groups is severely limited in Cameroon due to risks of arrest and detention by the forces commanded by the state. Opposition rallies are regularly forbidden throughout the country raising question as to the true nature of multipartyism in Cameroon as the country has remained dominated by a single party since independence despite the plethora of political parties in Cameroon. Similarly, the government in 2017 placed a ban on the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), an association made up of Anglophone politicians, whose purpose was for the advocation of greater self-determination for the two Anglophone regions.

3.5.2.3. Electoral Transparency And Credibility In Cameroon

Elections are an important determining element in any democracy, because through it, the voices of the people are expressed through the ballot. Huntington maintained as early as the

1970s that the 'holding of free and competitive elections is accepted as a sign of pluralist democracy' (Huntington and Moore 1970: 509). The history of elections in Cameroon shows constant disgruntlements from the opposition and the aftermath conclusion from international observers, the population and the local press paints the elections as fraudulent. The current constitution of Cameroon stipulates that the president who is also the head of state is elected through a single direct voting round to serve a limitless number of terms. The most recent presidential elections took place in 2018 which saw the long serving president Paul Biya emerging with a 71 percent lead largely described as being tainted by irregularities. The lack of trust in the electoral institutions and the lack of genuine democratic competition in Cameroon has gradually contributed to lessening voter turnout. A huge scandal came over the Cameroon government after when a television report on Cameroon's national TV, CRTV[22] showed some supposed electoral observers from Transparency International applauding the smooth running of the elections. These personalities where quickly challenged by a statement issued by Transparency International declaring that they had no electoral observers in Cameroon (Freedom House, 2019: 201).

The National Electoral Commission (ELECAM) is the main body that governs elections in Cameroon, but the organizational build up has always been a topic of criticism as the President of the republic reserves the right to appoint the Director General, Deputy Director General and other members of the organization.[23] Since its creation in 2006 it has been widely dominated by appointees from the ruling party, and as such casts doubts to the proper functioning and true nature of the organization. ELECAM's close attachment to the government and partisanship attachment has seriously destroyed its integrity and independence. The electoral process in Cameroon supervised by ELECAM exhibits several stages of irregularities starting from inappropriate voter registration stage, to voter cards, which are often arbitrarily issued, to intimidation of the citizens, to ballot stuffing, to visible

indelible ink, to handling of ballot boxes while they're being moved to special counting centers, to publication of election results. Basically, every stage of the election process in Cameroon has been reported to have instances of fraud at one stage of another, and this justifies why the regime has been able to uphold its position for almost four decades.




Figure 7. general overview of the level of democracy in Cameroon, 2020

Source IDEA

3.5.2.4. Presidential Term Limits

While transparent and credible elections remain a very credible aspect of democratic progress, along with it comes the alternation of political power. Cameroon's president Paul Biya has been in power since 1982, and is one of Africa and the world's longest serving presidents. Despite all these decades as president, the country continues to suffer from glaring problems such as social inequalities, rising unemployment, worsening insecurity, poverty and an apparent risk of secession. Several authors and political scientists such as believe that the limitation of presidential terms allows a certain political renewal and help prevent what Gelman and King call "incumbency advantage" (1990: 143). This is the advantage position that incumbents occupy against their oppositions, which in the case of Cameroon has extended over decades, gradually weakening any chances for the opposition succeeding in electoral processes, which mostly are controlled by the incumbents. Milan Svolik in support of term limits notes that term limits through regular power sharing among politicians help to promote regime stability (2012). Political term limits also help protect the people from their leaders. In a similar vein, Przeworski, Stokes & Manin noted that political term limits and change in power constitutes a major characteristic of their formal understanding of democracy because it gives the people the power of accountability in democratic settings in order to get rid of rogues (1999). The issue of presidential term limits and alternation of power is a crucial and very sensitive topic when discussing democracy in Cameroon. It is unimaginable that 88 years old President Paul Biya has ruled Cameroon for 39 years and the possibility of relinquishing power still looms far as a 2008 constitutional amendment of Article 6(2) let to the elimination of presidential term limits in the Central African country. Whether or not limiting term limits or removing them has been beneficial to Cameroon has with time proven to have serious political downturns as it increased social

division that already exited in the country before presidential term limits were scrabbed off the constitution. While the aftermath of some elections in some African countries such as Ivory coast, Chad, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, etc. and the suffering that followed these pollical transitions may provoke a line of argument against power alternation, presidential term limits remain an integral part of democracy. Other African countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Uganda, Mali, Tanzania, Cape Verde, and in Benin have recently demonstrated the potency of smooth power transitions and respect of term limits. Demers-Labrouse et al justify the controversial amendment in Cameroon to the relative peace the country has enjoyed since independence (2012: 117). More details on the effects of this controversial constitutional act and the legitimacy of the leaders are explained on the subsequent chapters below.

While we can argue that the trend of suppressing or taking off constitutional term limits is a common phenomenal in the African continent such as in Guinea (2001 and restored in 2010), Tunisia (2002 and restored in 2014), Togo (2002), Gabon (2003), Chad (2005), Uganda (2006), Algeria (2008), Cameroon (2008), Niger (2009 and restored in 2010), Rwanda (2015), Republic of the Congo (2015) (Zamfir, 2016), the twisted nature of the course of these amendments which in most cases are as a result of a majoritarian referenda to make them seem democratic should be challenged. In a similar vein, Dulani (2015) writes that a Afrobarometer survey highlights that majority of all respondents in 29 countries they surveyed overwhelmingly were in favor of the institution of term limits.




Figure 8. Support for presidential term limits | 29 countries with presidential or semi-presidential regimes | 2011/2013

Source: Dulani, 2025: page 3.

With the few democratic indicators analyzed above, we would say that several issues are at the heart of political reflection in Cameroon. Not without reason, many observers and political analysts have denounced the weaknesses of the democratic system in Cameroon which still has obvious challenges. Sometimes, we must also be able to detect this desire for change, the desire for renewal, the popular desire to evolve in a more democratic society.

3.6. THE NATURE OF POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Central African Republic has had one of the most dramatic histories that any African country has had to experience in the last two centuries and the country continues to make headlines around the world with its difficult political terrain. Annexed by France in 1880, the country was later partitioned among commercial concessions in the greater Ubangi-Chari area in 1894, and by 1910, the Ubangi-Chari area had become part of the Federation of French Equatorial Africa (US Department of State, 1969). The fight for autonomy from France began between the 1920s and 1930s following excessive abuses by the concessionaires, and in 1946, Ubangi-Chari had its own assembly and was represented in the French parliament by Barthelemy Boganda, who was the leader of the Social Evolution Movement of Black Africa (MESAN) a pro-independent movement in the area (Azikiwe, 2009: 47). Boganda pushed the Ubangi-Chari area to achieve self-government within French Equatorial Africa in 1958 and became the country's first Prime Minister, but died in 1959 in a plane accident, and his nephew, David Dacko took control of the MESAN and led the country to independence and became the first president in 1960 as the Central African Republic (CAR) (US Department of State, 1971).

It should be noted that the CAR's first ever constitution was adopted on February 9, 1959, by the Constituent Legislative Assembly and amended in December 1960 proclaiming the nation's "attachment to the Rights of Man, to the principles of democracy and of the self-determination of peoples" and further guaranteed the independence of the judiciary while outlying the powers of the president which largely centralized powers in the hands of the president (US Department of State, 1971). The effects of the concentration of powers in the hands of the president were immediately felt in 1962, when the government dissolved and placed a ban on all opposition parties, and the term of office for the president was extended from 5 years to 7 years in 1963 (USDS, 1971). This damaging and undemocratic move was

similar to the wave of one-party governments that proliferated the African continent at this time and Dacko cemented his position as president in the country's first presidential elections in 1964 in which he was the only candidate. David Dacko's reign was interrupted in a coup orchestrated by Jean-Bedel Bokassa, an army commander in 1965, with a mission to eradicate corruption and better-up the economy.

Bokassa's reign in CAR was the most dramatic the country ever witnessed, as he abolished the constitution, dissolved parliament, and turned over administrative duties to his appointed cabinet and allowed no opposition, though he had promised that his reign will be brief (O'Toole, 1982:140). Bokassa's reign is allegedly to have succeeded largely due to the good relationship he maintained with French president Valery Giscard (Ryan, 1981: O'Toole, 1982). He later in 1972 declared himself president for life, and later in 1977, proclaimed himself as "emperor", during what was briefly known as the "Central African Empire" but was ousted 2 years later in a coup by David Dacko whom he had ousted earlier in a coup. (Mercereau, 2004) assisted by France (O'Toole, 1982: 143).

Dacko's reign was also short-lived as he was ousted in another coup just 2 years later in 1981 by another army commander, Andre Kolingba, who ruled as president from 1981 to 1993. During Kolingba's regin, the ban on parties was lifted and several other reforms were made that saw some degree of economic a political progress, evidenced by the second holding of democratic presidential elections in 1993 that saw Ange-Félix Patassé emerge victorious, though the elections had been annulled the year later by the supreme court when incumbent president Kolingba was defeated. The Kolingba- Patassé peaceful transfer raised hopes for the country as it was the first time an incumbent ceded power following a democratic election. Ange-Félix Patassé's reign was marred by a series of civil unrests, an abortive coup (2001), which eventually led to a coup in 2003, by a rebel leader, General Francois Bozizé, who declared himself as president and once again, dissolved parliament.

A new constitution was approved for the country in a referendum in December 2004, and the following year, Francois Bozizé was announced winner of the presidential elections following the run-off vote. Bozizé's government was followed by years of unrests and the infiltration of several militia and rebel factions from neighboring countries such as People's Democratic Font led by Abdoulaye Miskine, the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Popular Army of the Restoration of Democracy (APRD), the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP). Several peacekeeping missions were also deployed by independent countries and International Organizations to intervene in the conflicts in Central African Republic, but finally, Bozizé was ousted in a coup by the leader of the Seleka rebels, Michel Djotodia in 2013, and is sworn in as president of CAR. Djotodia's incapacity to bring the country to order by putting a stop to the activities of the rebel groups which had become sectarian caused him to resign as interim president in January 2014, and was succeeded by Catherine Samba-Panza. The worsening humanitarian situation in Central Africa Republic triggered a UN Security Council resolution to take over peacekeeping, stationing more than 10.000 military personnel[24], called operation MINUSCA[25] and the European Union's mission under the banner of France was equally in place.

The incessant violence in Central Africa saw the intervention of several parties, multilaterally and unilaterally, with each playing significant role in either easing the situation or aggravating it. A UNSC follow up report on a previous resolution (2127) proved that the violence was escalated by the non-respect of the arms embargo placed on the country by Iran and China, who continually supplied the Seleka fighters with ammunition, and several arms smuggling operations were interrupted at border crossings which revealed that place of manufacture of this ammunition to be Europe.[26] The conflict in CAR quickly adopted a sectarian nature, tearing apart Christians and Muslims who have lived together for decades,

and the interventions from some of the bilateral partners especially that of France which has been subject to many criticisms can be examined within the lines of "rent seeking" behaviors, and the predictions of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who revealed the close relationship between the increasing odds of a civil war erupting in natural resource rich countries, since these resources can be utilized to finance these conflicts. Though not formally documented, the activities of the warrying parties in CAR and their supportive partners who seek to exert their influence on resource rich areas, further thwarting the situation.

3.6.1. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SINCE INDEPENDENCE

From this juncture, the level of political and democratic development in Central Africa Republic has been rather unprogressive and cats many doubts to the country's future. The country's 2016 presidential election ended with a newly elected president, Faustin-Archange Touadera after promising stability and peace in the country. However, the situation has not changed for the poor nation as it remains at the bottom of all international charts in all international organizations, which have labeled it a "failed state" (Helman and Ratner, 1992; Rotberg, 2003). While the holding of elections has been a regular thing in CAR, the insecurity in the country has not permitted for the smooth functioning of this process, thus leaving all the elections with post electoral violence. Also, regular elections alone are not a determining factor for democratization, but an array of other factors which must be carefully considered. In this vein, the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index (HDI), which has been an enduring tool for determining or at least suggesting some democratic progress remains handy in investigating democracy. Central Africa Republic has for a very long time occupied the worst positions in a classification of 189 countries and as its position for 2019 was 188 out of 189, with a value of 0.397, with an increase of only about 18.9 percent since 1990, when its value was 0.334 (UNDP, 2021). The methodology

utilized by the UNDP to conclude observes the overall progress of states made in human security, poverty, gender, inequality, socio-economic sustainability, health, education, income, demography, environmental stability, etc. to arrive at its conclusions. Boré describes the Central African Republic as a "ghost nation" and a "sham state" (2014). The figure below by International IDEA present a fair representation of the nature of democracy and politics in CAR, which similar to other observations made by other organizations, shows the country to be on a pervasive course towards collapse.




Figure 9. General overview of the level of democracy in Central African Republic, 2020

It will be a surprising that amidst the pervasive insecurity and absence of state authority that the Central African Republic will be a safe place for freedom of speech and expression. Freedom House' 2021 Freedom in the World Index places CAR on a score of 9 out of 100,

considering the country as “Not Free”, taking into consideration factors such as political rights and civil liberties.[27] This Freedom House report investigates that despite the enormous efforts by the High Commission of Communication to regulate media activities to be independent from the state and foreign intervention since 2017, the situation remains unaffected, as media activities remain largely very risky. Articles 136 and 137 of the 2016 Constitution however clearly stipulate the independence and freedom of the High Commission of Communication.

The constitution of Central African Republic officiates freedom of association on Article 14, with clearly makes it a secular state, thus allowing the citizens the freedom of the practice of every religion they choose (Article 10). However, ethnic and religious cleavages have gotten interwoven with the country’s political disunions, causing a rift between Muslims and Christians, that has placed the country in front of international attention for years.

Post-electoral violence has been the norm in Central Africa Republic and the credibility of the elections and the legitimacy of the leaders cannot be fully ascertained. Judging the respect of the rule of law and the constitution is very difficult in a lawless state such as CAR, but a heroic act from Central Africa Republic’s Constitutional Court in 2020 declined a draft by the government which intended to extend the presidential term limits (Rolland, 2020), shows how some institutions may yet uphold their values and try to preserve the essence of their institution. This act would have contradicted Article 35 of the 2016 Constitution which clearly states that

> “In no case, may the President of the Republic exercise more than two (02) consecutive mandates or extend it for whatever motive that may be.”[28]

Recent events recorded in 2021 marking the increasing in activities of rebel groups such as the CDC shows that the country continues to demonstrate all the features of a dysfunctional state, with no signs of improvement in the near future. The presence of horizontal and

vertical inequalities and the lack of peace and social cohesion, the inability of the government to control its borders, and heal the ethnic and sectarian divides has left the CAR a country repeated cycles of conflicts, split with profound mistrust.

3.7. GENERAL REMARKS

An in-depth analysis and field work may make it possible to detect important progress and interesting achievements in governance overall in the African continent, which may be insurmountable at first glance. With this, possible solutions seem to appear, bringing a nuance to the completely negative perception that the world have of Africa. However, the reality of things here are neither with nor black, but a mixture of both. This study believes that the important indicators of democracy highlighted above in some places at some times are respected. Without wishing to hide the weaknesses and deny that many improvements are still needed in these areas, our analysis and experiences in many African countries forces us to accept that there is a certain degree of democracy and political maturity in Africa's young political systems. The heterogeneity of Sub-Sahara Africa has made the reality about the existence of democracy in the region a subject of many debates in which opinions differ deeply. Some writers see democracy in the region as just a façade, with too many features negatively influencing its progress, amongst which corruption, stark poverty, illiteracy, multiethnicity and diversity, and the alternation of power are often invoked. Though there still exist quite a number of authoritarian and hybrid regimes in the continent, democracy in Africa is not just a utopia, but has come to stay and is work in progress. The presence of opposition and pressure groups in the continent's politics is a milestone towards democratization, demonstrating how tolerant times have evolved since the one-party times, raising hopes for more fundamental values in these democracies. The unique situation of each state, the many cultural diversities, the historical aspect differentiating one country from another, and the politics of these different countries, are factors that make it difficult to

analyze democracy for the whole continent. The peculiarity of these differences however creates common situations which makes it possible to draw common conclusions with and between these states.

CHAPTER FOUR

RIGID CONSTITUTIONALISM, LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE POLITICS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STATES

INTRODUCTION

This section examines the state of political legitimacy in Central Africa and its effects on democratic consolidation in the region. We should bear in mind that political legitimacy remains one of the most important foundations for democratic stability, and a prominent characteristic of politics in the region since independence; authoritarian rule is closely linked to it. The question of political legitimacy in the region still presents a great challenge especially as the region's nations are still building their paths towards democracy.

Subsequent to the world events of the 1980's which were marked by so many countries shifting in line with the tides of democratization which was 'blowing across the globe,' as written Broadbent, (1992: 102), most countries in the region began the holding of elections, legalization of multi-party systems and also the introduction of presidential term limits for the leaders. Following these events, prospects for democracy in Central Africa grew at a proportion never witnessed since the countries gained independence. This piece seeks to offer evidence of the intrinsic relationship between political legitimacy and democracy, exploring how the presence or lack of political legitimacy has positively or negatively influenced democracy in the region. This paper also suggests evidence that the democratic impulse in the region may have been weakened by the problems surrounding political legitimacy and that the forces intrinsic to weakening democracy are the political forces within rather than the external. More often than not, democracy in the region has been defined in terms of elections and transitions of power, but we also have to include other

accompanying variables like constitutionalism, the respect of human rights, freedom of association and assembly, which remain very much questionable in the region.

The following sections shall provide a brief overview of the literature on the relationship between political legitimacy and democracy and trace the history of political power in the selected countries, then explore what political legitimacy truly is; and another section will be devoted to discussing the development of political power, the prevalence of authoritarian rule or illiberal democracies and also the reasons for the prevalence of unresponsive multi-party states as the dominant idiom of today's politics in the Central African region by presenting the situation on ground as to the nature of democracy within the existing political apparatuses. This shall be done by looking at the long-run and short-run rapport between political legitimacy and democracy.

4.1. THEORIZING POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY

This section identifies the debates on political legitimacy and democracy by highlighting the determinants of both terms and will go further to establish the nature of the relationship between both concepts. Diamond summarizes diverse views of the determinants of democracy amongst which economic performances, with indicators such as improvement in living standards which he emphasizes has become a truism; and political performances such as freedom and order, human rights, and political legitimacy (Diamond, 1997: 19, 20), which resonates from positive policies instituted by the leaders. With democratic consolidation being the main idea, Larry Diamond in his lecture 'What is Democracy?', set out four standards upon which a democracy can be characterized to be, which this study greatly relies on as standards for legitimacy:

1. A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections.
2. The active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life.

3. Protection of the human rights of all citizens.
4. A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. (Diamond, 2004)

We can comfortably place the analysis of democratic stability in the Central African region within the larger literature on political legitimacy, which in general ordinary thinking connotes to approval. Levitov identifies at least two points of departure from which legitimacy may be set to prevail, pointing out a sociological path and a normative path (Levitov, 2016) with the latter emphasizing on the morality of right to rule. Showing the relationship between legitimacy and democracy in what he described as "loyalty to the democratic regime", Juan Linz emphasized that legitimacy must not be limited to the abstract form of democracy, but should be visible through commitment expressed in shared and normative behaviors in respect of the laws of the land (Linz and Stepan, 1975:29-37). Lipset in his analysis on the determinants of democracy highlights political legitimacy alongside social requisites such as emergent industrialization, urbanization, education, wealth and urbanization, (Lipset, 1959) Talking about political legitimacy, Merriam in *Systematic Politics* maintained that factors such as internal and external security, general state well-being, freedom and justice paved the way for states to enjoy political legitimacy (Merriam, 1945: 31). There can be several narratives from which analysis of political legitimacy can be departed; my general observation is that there is some degree of legitimacy in democracy through the ballot, or what we normally know as elections. This is because of the fact that at least all these countries hold regular elections in the name of democracy, but the problem we encounter in analyzing these elections is how free and fair they are. Again, election results are not sufficient enough variables to be used to characterize political legitimacy, but also, the manner in which these electoral results are achieved is important; are they free and fair? are the wielders of political authority legitimate or not? Buchanan sets out three[29] (3) ground

conditions for determining the legitimacy of political power (Buchanan, 2002: 703) It is not a new thing to hear of post-electoral contestations in sub-Sahara Africa, some of which even clash out to violent conflicts, only the existence of such instances alone prompts us to question whether or not the governments are legitimate.

Very important for the provision of a theory analyzing political legitimacy are the works of Buchanan, who argues in favor of political legitimacy rather than political authority, emphasizing on the need for real democratic institutions as the basis for determining political legitimacy (Buchanan, 2002: 718), thus the theory of democratically authorized political power (Buchanan, 2002: 693). Christopher Wellman on the other hand, a legal theorist sees a state as legitimate if it enjoys the moral freedom to utilize and threaten force against the ruled (Wellman, 1996: 211, 212). This direction of analysis of legitimacy focuses more on the coercive nature of the state, which alludes to the state's monopoly on the legitimate utilization of physical force to coerce and enforce actions within its territorial delineation. Buchanan's ideas are thus more useful to the analysis of this article because even in a democracy, each state has with it some degree of entitlement to the use of coercion to enforce laws on some serious issues warranting force. The abuse of such entitlements and the use of coercion and other political sneaky attitudes on issues of state against the general health of the country in democracies triggers in the issue of political legitimacy in these states, thus highlighting the centrality of legitimacy in the analysis of democratic studies.

Leadership plays and continues to play a great role in democracy and the discrepancies between the thoughts and actions and the diversity of the desires of these leaders determines the nature of democracy. Schatzberg quotes Decalo that 'there has been an unfortunate tendency to confuse longevity with legitimacy or the absence of coups with both stability and legitimacy' (Schatzberg, 1989: 445),[30] highlighting how misleading students of political sciences have been so far as the understanding of political legitimacy in African regimes is

concerned. Inherent to the analysis of Schatzberg is the importance he conveys to political culture, which has been the characterizing factor of leadership in sub-Sahara Africa.

Inglehart advances much on the debate of political culture as he analyses how societies have different patterns of political cultural approaches which are enduring and not unchallengeable (Inglehart, 1988) Inglehart's ideas trigger a line of reasoning towards thinking the type of political culture which characterizes the political sphere in Central Africa, to give meaning to the events which are almost peculiar to the area in understanding the cultural mechanisms of political legitimacy. This paper however upholds political legitimacy to be the attitude which the system of government deems best for the country, be it morally right, justifiable, proper and deserving of the people's fidelity. The idea is that a legitimate government is one which operates not for the interests of a particular group or the interests of the leaders, but for the majority of the country's population or the whole country, thus giving it a moral title to rule and command obedience from the people, be able to tax the people without objection, be capable of drafting, legislating and enforcing laws, thus being able to practice a mixture of coercion and consent for the general will of the people as democracy stipulates. Democracies however vary and are unique to every area, this paper thus sees democracy and political legitimacy as based on the consent of the governed, not saying coercion should not exist, but it seeks to put the voluntary consent of the citizens as the pre-condition for an effective democracy. Political legitimacy explores the relationship between the leaders in power/those who control the state on the one hand and the powerless citizens who are being governed. Also, because of the importance of this relationship, to democracy, the moral grounds of legitimate governance must be well established.

4.2. TRACING THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL POWER IN CENTRAL AFRICA

Pre-colonial African politics was characterized by a system of governance argued by many as being authoritarian, with hierarchy composing the basis of traditional rule, while others see it as being democratic made up of societies of general consultations prior to decision making (Kunz, 1991). Focusing on these skeletal and limited structures to discuss the present state of affairs will be misleading because these forms of practices were not practiced throughout the continent as there were variations in modes of governance in the various societies, neither where they universally regarded as modeled systems of governance as we have them correctly defined today. We cannot however deny that the tradition of constitutionality which we have today was absent, because these pre-colonial modes of government had modes of operation (though not written in texts as we do today), which they followed, with laws and legislations peculiar to every environment, to represent mutuality and accountability, thus proving the legitimacy of the governments that existed then, as Gluckman explained (Gluckman, 1965).

The present institutions of governance in Africa are the remnants of the colonial system, instituted during colonialism by the colonial powers to suit their interests, wherein the existing traditional political authorities were ousted and more colonial friendly ones replaced them, or they were friendly from the beginning and thus the colonial powers incorporated them on the basis of collaboration, thus conserving their 'traditional status' and powers and integrating themselves into the colonial governments. This system of leadership set the ground for the western loyalist governments we have in Central Africa today who operate on the basis of a client-patron relationship. The characteristic of the political elite is one with leaders of little regard for the local political culture who also have very fragile links with the larger masses.

As this paper seeks to establish, legitimacy has been variedly defined, but the propositions of this paper's view on legitimacy shall include government responsiveness as a basis for determining a legitimate government because the tendency is that a responsive government shall in most cases gain the support of the masses, and the loopholes for political opposition and crises shall be limited. The question of responsiveness however remains relative. Relativity here connotes to either economic responsiveness or political responsiveness. Conventional wisdom has it that economic performance by some governments in new democracies serves as a means of a government legitimizing itself. Examples of the miraculous economic achievements witnessed in some African countries such as Rwanda and East Asian economic giants operating under authoritarian systems of governance permitted these governments to legitimize themselves in power, though as recent waves of events prove, the waves have changed towards securing basic political rights. A prolific writer in this field is Adam Przeworski who stresses on the importance of economic delivery to consolidation of democracy by identifying the gap between the real economic experiences and the subjective expectations to conclude that popular support for democracy will increase if the citizens have witnessed and believe democracy to improve upon their individual economic condition (Przeworski, 1991). Experience from the History of Europe has proven that their move towards democracy came with improvements in their national economies. Another group of scholars William Mishler, Christian Haerpfer and Richard Rose, however warn against this reductionist theories against which they argue, 'treat all political attitudes as if they were merely reliant on economic situations.' And further concluded that it is not just economics factors, but also political factors that define the levels of popular support for democracy, but political factors account even more. (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998: 157, 174) Ascertaining the validity of this analysis is relative to region and country and also according to time. Popular support for governments has varied across time and

circumstances everywhere on earth. Analyzing the legitimacy and support for governments in countries like Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, and Gabon will place political factors in the forefront because the governments in these countries continue to thrive despite the numerous economic challenges and lapses they are facing, yet the popular support at least from electoral outcomes over the last two or three presidential elections have proven that the governments remain unshaken, and legitimate in the eyes of the voters. Contrary to the situation in countries such as Rwanda, economic policy performance and responsiveness has served at least for many as the basis for the legitimacy of the government in power.

This researcher contends that the legitimacy of governments in the Central African region is linked to and closely affiliated to the ruling party and its surrounding history and more often than not, the people do not even have a chance to determine if the government is legitimate or not, and it wouldn't matter if the government is democratic or authoritarian. The economic challenges faced by peoples have often tend to obscure their judgments of legitimacy and by this, draws them further away from political participation, which in turn limits the chances of ascertaining the legitimacy of a government, and some economic policy successes and breakout of civil disobediences and terrorist attacks have been seized as opportunities by governments to further their agenda of holding to power over an increasingly apolitical population. Voter registration and electoral results in several of these countries have proven this to be true, with increasingly decreasing figures. Data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) and International IDEA shall be used to illustrate the views of this paper. International IDEA report on the history of electoral processes shows a steady decline in voter turnout at least for the past two presidential elections in Cameroon to have declined from 68.28% in the 2011 presidential election to 53.85% in the 2018 presidential election.[31] This same outcome happens to be exhibited with the case of Central African Republic which in its subsequent presidential elections recorded a steady decrease from 72.65% in the 2005

presidential elections to 59.01% as of the 2016 presidential elections.[32] 'The justice-based theory of political legitimacy' proposed by Buchanan could be a rehab for further investigation of this situation (Buchanan, 2002: 23).

A few years after attaining independence, countries in this region immediately adopted multi-party politics as a basis of legitimizing their positions; this was done through the institutionalization of nationalists movements who fought for independence to become political parties to shoulder the responsibility of leading the states as the colonial masters packed their bags.[33] The promising age had begun, the age of enlightenment, true promises of the future everyone dreamt of; living in a land of freedom of expression, of speech, and of association. This age ushered in constitutional reforms in so many countries. As a case in point, Cameroon's constitution since 1961 during the creation of the federal structure authorized already a multi-party system, with many political parties already operating as of then though short-lived as the country under the reign of Ahmadou Ahidjo was geared towards another direction adopting a monolithic single mass party system, a system whose aim is centralization of power and also aimed at eliminating all forms of opposition. The pledging reasoning of this system include; the nonexistence of competitive political parties, multiple candidate elections, the absence of freely formed associations, and also the limitation of fundamental political and civil liberties, and the high monopolization of political decision-making.[34] Such measures were adopted then by the regime as a form of ensuring state conservation, to ensure that a country largely divided as Cameroon, remains united, which as of then had the formation of political parties based on regional and tribal lineages and other sources such as the United States Department of commerce saw it as a means for the state to tie together its resources and improve its economic development[35] because multi-party politics would have been wastage of resources. Evidence of the popularity of the existing political parties in Cameroon were prove enough that this assertion

was justifiable to a certain extent as the Union Camerounaise (UC), the party of President Ahidjo was popular mostly only in the region where he came from, while the party of John Ngu Foncha, who was vice president of the Federal Republic; Kamerun National Democratic Party KNDP was mostly popular only in the Anglophone region where the leader originated from. Ahidjo's position was advanced under the agenda of the "Grand National Party" known by its French appellation "Parti Unifié" (Ngoh, 1996: 235) The mono-party system adopted in Cameroon fell into the trap of desire for political power as it gradually led to the centralization of state power, which enabled Ahidjo to consolidate his position in power. This system was however abandoned with the coming of Paul Biya to power in what was described as the *'New Deal'* (Aseh, 2006: 110) government in 1982. The ideal behind the early one-party system was as well as in many other countries; unifying resources and the people towards common growth, which in essence legitimized the government. The introduction of multi-parties was a response to a call for liberty because One-party state had let to the centralization of power, thus multi-party politics piloted a new era witnessing the passing of legislations liberty laws as was the case in Cameroon (Jua, 2003: 85). With this age saw the emergence of political parties who competed in political elections and provided a sense of legitimacy to the governments. The euphoria surrounding multi-parties and legitimizing the leadership of these countries has however been short-lived as political prosecution and suppression of these liberty laws has become the norm and freedoms of expression seized from the people and opposition leaders detained as the case of Cameroon after the presidential elections,[36] Gabon in 2016.[37] IIAG statistics shows a downward trend of -2.8 on the rule of law in the Central African region, with the region having a public perception score of only 35.3% as illustrated on the image below. The respect for liberty laws thus are the determinants of political legitimacy alongside government responsiveness.




Figure 10. Public Perception of the Rule of Law in Central Africa, 2021

source: Adapted from data IIAG statistics on Public Perception of the Rule of Law for Central Africa(2021)

Another determinant of both political legitimacy and democracy which remains largely ignored is clientelism, a phenomenon that cannot be considered nonaligned, and whose very manifestation is accompanied by high corruption, favoritism and patronage, all these, the ills of governance and the fuel burning down democracy. The role of clientelism[38] in African politics remains a paradox which is difficult to explain especially as the relationships are more or less voluntary. Kitschelt best put it as 'relations not only involving some form or reciprocity and voluntarism but also exploitation and domination' (Kitschelt, 2000: 849) and one would wonder why these relationships persist, but evidence from central African region, proves that the clients are more accommodating because they could be better off if they severed the relationship. Several reasons could be proposed as to why these relationships

still exist as many have argued, the desires of these former colonial masters to maintain their status as world powers and also their spheres of influence in their former colonies. A good example to hang on will be the activities of France in sub-Sahara Africa, which have been very debatable[39] as their activities were described as being in 'support of leaders who are loyal to them' (French, 1996).

African leaders resulted to a form of 'rent seeking' engagement, Krueger, (1974), and Tullock, (1967), which involves the disbursing of the so much scarce resources to capture support (often military and economic, which generally serves just the interests of the leaders in power) from external partners and the equilibrium results are often that the support benefits some interest group at the detriment of others. This activity widely practiced by African leaders through which they create monopolies and assign political and economic rights and privileges to influential groups of peoples and even individuals in exchange for 'rent' with the aim of gaining the support of these groups and individuals not to challenge these leader's authorities, has been the source of several forms of inefficiencies in the democratic consolidation process of Africa and also its economic development. The approval of these powerful groups and individuals can be considered as a very important survival tactic for these rulers. Mbaku analyses these fears as competitive and transactions cost constraints.[40] The nature of political legitimacy in Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic and Gabon is very complex due to such relations because the support for these leaders is both internal and external, and monopoly on power positions keep shifting from one old to new rivalries with the coming of different leaders.

Institutionalized state corruption steered by the leaders of these countries has been the most visible hand of the rent seeking which has ensued severe levels of hardship in these countries, draining the national resources into private pockets. Institutionalized corruption is a variable that affects political legitimacy and democracy in this region. Many crises of legitimacy in

the continent have been linked to corruption, a continuous process of successive regimes operating with the same agenda under different groupings. The inability of governments to meet people's expectations, matched by growing corruption under normal circumstances gives a big blow to the legitimacy of the government and also democracy especially as widespread dissatisfaction leads to loss of confidence in the institutions of the state which are bent on shredding the remaining state resources for private ends. Government instituted anti-corruption mechanisms have more or less been very insignificant to putting an end to this activity. IIAG data on the Central African region shows that there is a downward trend of -5.2 since 2012 and the public perception on government efforts fighting corruption remains at only 41.2% as shown on the figure below (IIAG, 2022).




Figure 11. Public Perception of Anti-Corruption in Central Africa, 2021

Source: Adapted from data IIAG statistics on Public Perception of the Rule of Law for Central Africa(2021), https://iiag.online/data.html?meas=PubPercCorr&loc=g18&view=overview&subview=absoluteTrends

Another very intriguing issue about governance in this region that triggers questions on legitimacy is the usurping of the judiciary arm of government, or rather the political dependence of the judiciary on the executive arm, a relationship which has been clearly formalized and further triggering questions on the nature of the legitimacy of the regimes. Majority of the governments in the region are presidential republics by constitution, and all have weird twists in their political evolution and several irregularities surrounding their constitutions. The very nature of the constitutions and make-up of the judiciary in most sub-Saharan Africa is closely reserved to the special entitlements of the head of state, which in most cases is also the head of arm forces. The judicial authority in the Central African region contrary to classical constitutional setups in the context of the events clearly visible in the region have proven to be not in the aim of limiting the power of the executive arm by fulfilling the separation and balance of powers, but rather, as Kamdem explains, serves as an instrument of administrative hegemony over the state machinery (Kamdem, 2019: 52). Emphasizing on the troubling position of the respective arms of government in Cameroon, Ndifor writes that 'the judiciary system in Cameroon has been extremely intertwined in the political affairs of government such that it has lost its independence and currently is being run as an extension of the executive arm' (Ndifor, 2014: 29). The legislative arm of government has been accused of several exploitations in this region, which allows provisions that places the judiciary in the position to pass judgments and laws to the pleasure of the government in power who appoints them and whose judgments are final despite constitutional prescriptions that their judgments must be in the favor of the people,[41] as the case in Cameroon. A depicting feature of this is post-electoral round-up processes, which have been subject to several contestations but results twisted to ensure that the government

in power secures the vote, because it is the only means they have tended to as a form of legitimacy (Thurston, 2013: 3), and proof of being in a better place to manage the affairs of their respective countries. IIAG 2022 data proves this assertion yet again correct by showing that executive compliance with the rule of law in the region is on a +0.5 trend, using indicators such as executive compliance with the constitution, executive compliance with judicial decisions and constitutional changes of power as shown on the figure below.

Central Africa




Figure 12. Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law in Central Africa, 2021

source: Adapted from IIAG data: https://iiag.online/data.html?meas=ExecCompRoL&loc=g18&view=overview&subview=absoluteTrends&search=Impartiality+of+the+judicial+system

Issues of political legitimacy have been cracking down on democratic consolidation in this region because in many of the countries, the justice system is incapable of checking the power of the other arms of government especially the head of the executive arm or the head of state since the very constitution which prescribes their positions places the head of state above all other functions with statutory powers that cannot be challenged. For example, in

Cameroon, the constitution stipulates that the president is the chief executive officer, head of the armed forces[42] and also head of the Judicial Council. The pivot of political crisis in the Central African region which have led to crisis of legitimacy without further ambiguities must be linked to constitutional weaknesses, which has steered the over empowerment of the executive arm of government. The making up of recent constitutions in the region can be characterized as divisive and interest oriented, finally securing very less for the majority of the citizens, with very little progress made from the constitutions drawn during the pre- and post-independence periods. The outcome of such weak constitutions has been the existence of institutional arrangements that have failed to effectively coerce the state to provide mechanisms needed for adequate provision of the needs of the people. Pressures for state productivity regarding the ambiguities surrounding the performance of state institutions resonating from the limited nature of their constitutions have often pushed these countries into a series of constitutional amendments, setting further confusion as to which of the constitutions is finally in force in governing these states. In the case of Cameroon, its constitution has been amended more than three times since the first constitution drafted at independence for the country, with the most recent and most controversial being the 2008 constitution, which granted the president immunity from all forms of prosecution for acts as president and also removed presidential term limits, thereby permitting the president to run for an unlimited number of re-elections as he sees fit.[43] Similar cases have been recorded in Gabon (2003), where in the leaders manipulate either the parliament or senate to circumvent presidential term limits to allow them stay in power (Tull, 2017: 87). Vandeginste documents a similar situation in countries such as Senegal and Burundi, where the presidents abused the ambiguities and constitutional weaknesses to legalize more terms through the porous constitutional courts which they control, in 2012 and 2015 respectively (Vandeginste, 2015, 2016).

A good constitution sets the foundations for a sustainable democracy and paves the way for true leadership. Economic development, performance and provision of the needs of citizens can be considered as very important factors for democratic consolidation and legitimacy, but this alone should not suffice in legitimizing a government under democratic constitutions. Economic performance has severally been interpreted as democratic legitimacy, but this study emphasizes that constitutional loyalty, giving the right to independent actions of the other arms of government should constitute the primary variable in evaluating democratic consolidation.

4.3. THE NEED FOR THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

In a majority of the cases however, the strategy has changed to warrant that an election, which for many is the face of democracy must hold, through which the classical autocratic leadership ensures that his position in office is cemented through winning multiparty elections, thereby sustaining at all costs seemingly democratic parties, a legislature and judiciary (Versteeg et al, 2020: 13, citing Meng, 2018). Such elections are however just instructive and their fairness and independent status is regularly very questionable at the end due to the common protests from angry opposition parties. Empirical data from IIAG 2022 data scores democratic elections in the region on 25.0 out of 100.0 following variables such as integrity of elections and election monitoring bodies and agencies.




Figure 13. Democratic Elections score in Central Africa, 2021

source: Adapted from IIAG data: https://iiag.online/data.html?meas=DemElec&loc=g18&view=overview&subview=absoluteTrends

Following Diamond's four points highlighted above, it will be fair enough to classify such regimes as illegitimate based on the unconventional means by which these leaders utilize to secure their positions in power, which has gradually blurred the conventional lines between democracy and totalitarianism. The nature of authoritarianism today, what has been severally described as "new authoritarianism" is very legitimizing once position or at least making the position lasting through the maneuvering of the state organs, to secure decades of presidential power in countries where democracy or at least moves for democracy once was thriving. The reality about democracy in this region is that the true nature of the governments

is unknown and democracy continuous to be on a decline (Bermeo, 2016: 8). While in the past we would have been defining an illegitimate government as one which seizes power through authoritarian means such as in a military coup, as the case in Niger in 2010, Mali in 2012, Sudan in 2019, just to name a few, legitimacy crises have dissolved from military coup leaders to engulf elected leaders who continually maneuver in unethically defined ways their stay in power against the wishes of the people they rule.

Sustainable political legitimacy in Central African is a call for concern because the region is plagued with a multitude of problems and many of which have been aggravated by the very people charged with the tasks of governing these countries. There is growing need to put in line a true sense of political legitimacy, and moral authority which will represent the diverse communities making up these states and this is a problem whose answer is far-fetched and will take sadly decades of robust nation-building to achieve especially in an era of democratic decline, wherein donor agencies are still in close collaboration with the very state agencies. The region is increasingly faced with leaders who did not rise to power through tankers and bullets, but through the people's votes, through the ballot boxes in democratically elected parties. These leaders have however upheld not only the holding of regular and constituted elections, but also assumed supposedly democratic organs and institutions to look as if their governance is legitimate. These institutions; the constitution, which is meant to be liberal and in the interest of all the citizens; the legislatures; the judiciaries, have proven to be permeable and easily bent to the will of the leaders of these states, justifying their acts and helping them eschew a bad name in the face of the world as dictators, while allowing them the advantage to secure individual and group interests at the expense of the larger population. It is not surprising that these countries still operate under constitutions (Elkins et al., 2014: 141, 146) these however are mere decorations serving the strategic needs of the leaders in power. History of political events in the Central African

regions reveals multiple cases of opposition silencing and delegitimization, majority of whom are later sanctioned and imprisoned.

4.4. CONCLUSION

This paper concludes on a few important points; dreams for democratization in the Central African region are not yet relinquished. The history of democracy in the region is barely a few decades old, though growth seems to be slow and uneven; the future remains promising because at least talks of democracy remain the plea of majority of the people, giving hope for a better tomorrow.

Judging from the four propositions formulated by Diamond, the foundations of democracy in the region suffer the daunting challenges of constitutional weaknesses, which has plagued these countries since independence, and from which problems of political legitimacy drew their roots. From the empirical data presented above, it is clear that based on the criteria set by Diamond, the countries of the Central African region have fallen short of meeting the expectations of democracy, resulting to questionable governments. The successes of democratic consolidation in the Central African region must pay close attention to the sources of state legitimacy such as the respect for the constitution and provision of basic necessities; to reinstate trust in state institutions which has been narrowed away by the concentration of power, leaving state authority questionable.

CHAPTER FIVE

A DEEPER LOOK AT DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region that has struggled with political instability, conflict, and poverty for decades and continues to struggle as the continent is still far behind in terms of meeting international standards. The challenges facing the region are multifaceted, and there is a growing consensus that addressing these issues requires the effective interplay of democracy, peace, and development which form the basis of this thesis. As Ndulo (2004) notes, "the promotion of democracy, peace, and development are inextricably linked, and their effective interplay is essential for the progress of sub-Saharan Africa."

So far, democracy amongst all other forms of governace has been obsereved to be the best way to ensure fairness and prosperity. Democracy is thus a critical factor in achieving the desired stability and development in sub-Saharan Africa. As noted by Olowu and Wunsch (2004), "democracy is a means of ensuring good governance, accountability, and transparency, which are essential for fostering sustainable development." However, the establishment and sustainability of democratic institutions in the region have been challenging due to weak institutions, corruption, political interference and so many other forces which hve stifled the growth of democracy in the region despite the enthuasiasm with which it began during the creation of these states.

Peace is also crucial for the progress of sub-Saharan Africa. The African continent faces a rising combination of threats to peace ranging from rising authoritarianism, hate speech, incesant military coups, great power competition and violent extremism, and climate change, which has in its own, sparked new conflicts for increasingly scarced resources. As a result

of this, the region has been plagued by conflicts, civil wars, and social unrest, which have hindered economic growth and development. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, "peace is a prerequisite for development, and the absence of peace can derail economic progress and lead to the disintegration of democratic institutions." There is increasing need redesign and redefine peace processes, inorder to ensure that more sustainable solutions to the numerous violent conflicts scattered over the continent are secured.

Development, the third factor in the triad, is essential for the prosperity of sub-Saharan Africa. In the words of Pope Paul VI, development is the new name for peace. Talking about development, it is important to stress the need for inclusive development, which goes beyond economic development which is often defined by material and financial gains into non-material dimensions of human growth like social development and political development, ranging from empowerment and social rights. The idea here is to ensure that development is sustainable. As Moyo (2009) notes, "development is critical for addressing poverty, inequality, and social exclusion, which are major obstacles to achieving stability and democracy in the region." However, the region has struggled with economic underdevelopment, lack of infrastructure, and inadequate access to basic services, which have hindered progress.

Thus, the effective interplay of democracy, peace, and development is essential for the progress of sub-Saharan Africa. These three are the solution to the vicious cycles of war, diseases, and poverty that currently plague the sub-Sahara African region and much of the continent as whole. This chapter aims to explore the intricacies of their interplay and the ways in which they must work with each other to achieve a desired level of democracy in the region. By examining their unique characteristics and implications for sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter will provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between democracy, peace, and development and their importance for the progress of the region.

In summary, the promotion of democracy, peace, and development is crucial for achieving stability and progress in sub-Saharan Africa. As noted by Agbese and Adejumobi (2003), "the effective interplay of these factors is essential for addressing the challenges facing the region and fostering sustainable development." Thus, understanding the intricacies of their interplay is critical for achieving democracy in sub-Saharan Africa.

5.1. DEMOCRACY

Democracy is a form of government in which power is exercised by the people, either directly or through elected representatives. Democracy's focus on the individual, self interest and the common good remains the ideal system for any society, wherein, if put into practice guarantees at least the common good for all. There are several key characteristics of democracy, including political equality, popular sovereignty, rule of law, free and fair elections, and protection of individual rights and freedoms. According to Robert Dahl, a prominent political scientist, democracy requires "effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, inclusion of all adults, and respect for minority rights" (Dahl, 1971).

The idea of democracy has a long and complex history, dating back to ancient Athens and other early city-states. However, modern democracy emerged in the context of the Enlightenment and the rise of liberalism in Europe and North America. The French and American revolutions of the late 18th century marked significant milestones in the development of democratic principles and practices, including the ideas of popular sovereignty and individual rights. These ideas then spread across the Atlantic to Africa towards the end of colonialism.

There are various types of democracy, including direct democracy, representative democracy, and hybrid or semi-direct democracy. In Africa, democracy has taken on a unique form due to its historical, cultural, and political context. Some scholars have argued

that African democracy is characterized by "informality, inclusiveness, flexibility, and cultural hybridity" (Mozaffar, 2003). This however varies from country to country according, but have great areas of similarities. Others have pointed to the challenges of democratization in Africa, including weak institutions, corruption, and authoritarian legacies (Bratton, 1998).

Democracy is a crucial component of a healthy and functioning society, as it provides citizens with a voice in the political process and helps ensure accountability and transparency in government. According to the United Nations, "democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives" (UN, 2021). Additionally, research has shown that democratic societies tend to have higher levels of economic growth, social welfare, and human development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). This assertion too depends on the soceity. Evidence of exponential economic growth has been echoing from East Asia of what is to be the Authoritarian development model. While not diving into their ups and downs, this study believes that with the current state of affairs in Africa, the unity of democratic practices if well practiced, stands a better chance of catapulting the continent to desired development levels.

However, democracy remains a challenge in many parts of the world, including Africa. Data from international organizations show that Africa still faces significant obstacles to democratic governance, including weak institutions, corruption, and political instability. For example, the African Union reports that only 24 out of 54 African countries are considered free and democratic, with the rest classified as partially free or not free (AU, 2021).

In conclusion, democracy is a vital aspect of a healthy and functioning society, providing citizens with a voice in the political process and ensuring accountability and transparency in government. Understanding the characteristics and types of democracy, as well as the

challenges and opportunities of African democracy, can help policymakers and stakeholders develop effective strategies for promoting democratic governance in Africa and other regions.

5.2. PEACE

Peace is a complex and multifaceted concept that can be defined in different ways depending on the context and perspective. The United Nations (UN) defines peace as "a situation where there is an absence of violence, war, and conflict, and people live in safety and security" (United Nations, 2021). Peace can also be understood as a state of social, political, and economic stability that allows individuals and communities to live in harmony and pursue their goals without fear of harm or oppression.

The quest for peace is as old as human history, and various efforts have been made over the centuries to achieve it. Some of the most significant milestones in the history of peace include the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe, the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, and the creation of the UN in 1945, which was primarily aimed at preventing future wars and promoting international cooperation and diplomacy.

There are various types of peace, depending on the context and the actors involved. Some of the most common types of peace include negative peace, positive peace, and structural peace. Negative peace refers to the absence of violence and conflict, while positive peace refers to the presence of social justice, equality, and human rights. Structural peace, on the other hand, involves addressing the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and political oppression. It will not be selfish to say all these are the characteristics of peace needed in Africa as the continent, despite its abundance, suffers from issues deeper than these. Sub-Sahara Africa has fro decades been at the forefront of interational headlines of wars, hungar,

natural disasters, which for the greater part could have been prevented if the resources the region boasts of were properly managed, all of which have stifled peace in the region.

Peace is essential for the well-being and prosperity of individuals and communities, and it is closely linked to various indicators of social and economic development. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), "peaceful societies are more resilient, prosperous, and sustainable than those in conflict" (IEP, 2021). Moreover, peace is critical for promoting social cohesion, building trust among individuals and communities, and fostering economic growth and development.

In conclusion, peace is a fundamental concept that is essential for promoting stability, security, and prosperity in society. Understanding the various types of peace and their importance can help policymakers and stakeholders develop effective strategies for promoting peace and preventing conflict.

5.3. DEVELOPMENT

Development is a broad and multidimensional concept that encompasses economic, social, cultural, and political processes aimed at improving the well-being and quality of life of individuals and communities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines development as "the process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy" (UNDP, 2016). This includes access to education, healthcare, clean water, sanitation, and other basic needs, as well as opportunities for economic and social mobility.

The concept of development has evolved over time, and various theories and models have been proposed to explain its nature and dynamics. Some of the most influential theories include modernization theory, which posits that development is a linear process of economic growth and technological advancement, and dependency theory, which argues that underdeveloped countries are trapped in a cycle of exploitation and dependence on developed countries.

There are various types of development, depending on the context and the actors involved. Some of the most common types of development include economic development, social development, and human development. Economic development refers to the process of creating wealth and improving living standards through increased production, trade, and investment. Social development, on the other hand, focuses on improving social services and reducing poverty, inequality, and exclusion. Human development encompasses a broader range of factors, including education, health, gender equality, and environmental sustainability.

Development is crucial for promoting social and economic progress and improving the well-being and quality of life of individuals and communities. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), "development is essential for Africa's transformation and for unlocking the continent's potential" (AfDB, 2021). However, Africa still faces significant challenges in achieving sustainable development, including poverty, inequality, conflict, and climate change.

Data from international organizations show that Africa lags behind other regions in various development indicators. For example, the World Bank reports that sub-Saharan Africa has the highest poverty rates in the world, with more than 400 million people living in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2021). Similarly, the UNDP's Human Development Index ranks many African countries low in terms of access to education, healthcare, and other basic needs (UNDP, 2020).

In conclusion, development is a complex and multifaceted concept that is essential for promoting social and economic progress and improving the well-being and quality of life of individuals and communities. Understanding the different types of development and their importance can help policymakers and stakeholders develop effective strategies for promoting sustainable development in Africa and other regions. Different development

strategies have proven effective in different regions of the world and Africa is yet to situate the model that best suits its needs and environment.

5.4. INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA

5.4.1. HOW DEMOCRACY LEADS TO PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

Democracy is a form of government in which power is held by the people and exercised through a system of representation. It is a system that allows citizens to participate in the governance process, holding elected officials accountable and making informed decisions that impact their lives. Studies have shown that democracy leads to both peace and development.

Democratic countries tend to have higher levels of peace than autocratic countries. The absence of conflict and the rule of law in democracies provide a more stable environment for economic growth and development. Democracy also promotes social and economic development, as it allows for the distribution of resources and investment in human capital. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) notes that "democracy and development are mutually reinforcing." In countries with democratic systems, there are greater opportunities for citizens to participate in the political process, which leads to better governance, increased accountability, and greater transparency in decision-making. This, in turn, leads to economic growth and development.

5.4.2. HOW PEACE LEADS TO DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

Peace is a prerequisite for democracy and development. Countries that are plagued by conflict and instability are unlikely to achieve democracy and development. Peace provides a stable environment for economic growth and development, allowing governments to invest in social and economic infrastructure.

In addition, peace allows for the establishment of democratic institutions. Democratic systems are built on the principles of rule of law and accountability, which require a stable environment to thrive. In the absence of peace, these institutions cannot function effectively.

5.4.3. HOW DEVELOPMENT LEADS TO DEMOCRACY AND PEACE

Development is an important factor in promoting democracy and peace. Economic growth and development provide citizens with greater access to education, health care, and other basic services. This, in turn, leads to greater participation in the political process, as citizens become more informed and engaged in the governance of their countries.

The UNDP notes that "economic development and political development go hand in hand." Economic growth provides the resources needed to build democratic institutions and support democratic processes. In addition, economic development reduces the risk of conflict, as it provides opportunities for citizens to participate in the formal economy and access basic services.

5.5. CASE STUDIES OF SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES WHERE THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY

There are several examples of countries where the inter-relationship between democracy, peace, and development has worked effectively. Botswana, for example, is a country in sub-Saharan Africa that has achieved significant economic growth and development since its independence in 1966. The country has a stable democracy, with a multi-party system and regular elections.

Ghana is another example of a country where the interrelationship between democracy, peace, and development has worked effectively. Since the early 1990s, Ghana has experienced significant economic growth and development, while also establishing a stable

democracy with a multi-party system and regular elections. All this has been possible despite the several years of political instabilities the country faced, but as the situation in Ghana proved, good leadership set the foundation for a progressive democracy in Ghana.

Rwanda is another example of a country where the interrelationship between democracy, peace, and development has worked effectively. Despite the country's history of conflict and instability, Rwanda has made significant progress in economic development and poverty reduction. Barely three decades ago, Rwanda was toping headlines with one of the world's worst genocides of all time. Natioanl reconciliation efforts that followed the conflict brought peace and national unity and this has greatly benefited the country in terms of development. The country now prides itself in Africa as a leader in so many spheres. The country has also established a stable democracy, with regular elections and a multi-party system.

In conclusion, the interrelationship between democracy, peace, and development is crucial for the sustainable development of sub-Saharan Africa. Countries that prioritize these factors tend to experience greater economic growth and development, while also providing a stable environment for citizens to participate in the political process. These factors are mutually reinforcing, and their interrelationship must be understood in order to promote sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa.

5.6. THE CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT

Achieving democracy, peace and development in SSA involves addressing a variety of complex and interrelated challenges. SSA region countries comprise of unique circumstances and with these, several overarching issues can be indentified, which are both internal and external.

5.6.1. INTERNAL FACTORS THAT HINDER DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT

Achieving democracy, peace, and development in a society is a complex process that involves overcoming numerous internal factors that hinder progress. One of the main internal factors that hinder democracy, peace, and development is political instability. Political instability can arise from a lack of legitimacy, corruption, or poor governance, both of which fostering an environment of mistrust that hinders international investment. For example, weak institutions and poor governance have been identified as major obstacles to development in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2018).

Additionally, conflict and violence within societies can also hinder progress towards democracy, peace, and development. This includes ethnic and religious conflicts, as well as political violence. Many Sub-Saharan African countries are marked by ethnic and religious variety, which can often lead to tensions and war. These contradictions can stymie efforts to attain democratic governance while also impeding economic development and producing an insecure environment that discourages foreign investment. In many cases, these conflicts are fueled by social, economic, and political inequalities within a society.

In addition to these factors, poverty, inequality, and lack of education can also hinder progress towards democracy, peace, and development. Poverty and inequality can result in social unrest, while lack of education can lead to a lack of civic engagement and participation in democratic processes.

Many African countries lack essential infrastructure such as roads, power, and water supply systems. This makes attracting foreign investment difficult, as well as stifling economic progress and making it harder to provide basic services to the populace.

Climate change is equally a growing concern in Sub-Saharan Africa, with rising temperatures and erratic weather patterns causing crop failures, food poverty, and other social and economic issues. This has the potential to intensify current political and social

problems while also posing new difficulties for governments and civil society organizations in the continent.

5.6.2. EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT HINDER DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT

In addition to internal factors, external factors can also hinder progress towards democracy, peace, and development. One of the main external factors that hinder progress is economic dependence on foreign aid. While aid can be essential for development, it can also lead to a lack of accountability and perpetuate corruption.

Furthermore, trade imbalances and unequal power relations between countries can also hinder progress towards democracy, peace, and development. For example, multinational corporations and foreign investors may prioritize their own interests over those of the local population, leading to exploitation and further poverty and inequality.

5.7. WAYS TO OVERCOME THESE CHALLENGES

Addressing these difficulties will necessitate a collaborative effort on the part of governments in the first place civil society organizations, and the international community. This includes building strong institutions and promoting good governance, addressing poverty and inequality, investing in education, and promoting civic engagement and participation in democratic processes. Furthermore, combating corruption and fostering openness and accountability are critical for attaining sustainable development and ensuring Sub-Saharan Africa's peaceful and prosperous future.

Moreso, addressing external factors requires creating more equitable trade relations and addressing the root causes of economic dependence on foreign aid. This includes promoting domestic resource mobilization and increasing transparency and accountability in the use of aid and other forms of external financing.

Overall, solving these countries' difficulties necessitates a holistic approach that includes strengthening democratic government, reducing poverty and inequality, investing in infrastructure and economic development, and addressing the core causes of conflict and violence.

In conclusion, achieving democracy, peace, and development requires overcoming numerous internal and external factors that hinder progress. Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive approach that involves building strong institutions, addressing poverty and inequality, promoting education, and creating more equitable trade relations.

CHAPTER SIX

THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY AND ITS IMPACT ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON AND CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

INTRODUCTION

The interaction between democracy, political stability, and development has been a subject of interest to scholars and development practitioners. Most scholars are of the view that there is a positive correlation between a democracy, and political stability (Olofsgård, 2012; Africa Renewal & Djinnit, 2010; Weingast, 1997); as well as democracy and development (Khatun, 2022; Elbahnasawy, 2020; Dahl, 2000; Karış, 2000; Campos, 1994). This suggest that democratic governance can lay a foundation for political stability and economic development in a country since democratic institution provides principles such as good governance, rule of law, transparency, and accountability. This provides an enabling environment for the aforementioned (political stability and economic development) to thrive. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson eloquently demonstrate this paradigm in their masterpiece entitled Why Nations Fail in which they underscore the role of institutions to either undermine or enhance development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Conversely, this implies a decline in the democratic governance would frustrate both political stability and economic development. This chapter examines the decline of democracy in Cameroon and Central African Republic and the impact it has on political stability and economic development in these countries.

6.1. THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY IN CAMEROON

Since independence, the political landscape in Cameroon has witnessed two phases of democratization. At the dawn of independence, Cameroon witnessed what could be termed as the first wave of democratization characterized by multiparty politics (Ngolle, 1996) within the framework of the federal system of government the country adopted. Political parties that flourished during the colonial era, and played an active role during the quest for independence in both constituent communities of the Federal Republic of Cameroon (British Southern Cameroons, and French Cameroon) continued their political activities at state and Federal levels. However, this wave of democratization was short-lived as less than a decade after independence, Cameroon became a one-party state with the dissolution of all political parties and the creation of the Cameroon National Union (CNU) on 1 September 1966 (Takougang, 2003). The CNU was replaced by the Cameroon Peoples' Democratic Movement (CPDM) in 1985, which remained Cameroon's single political party till the return of multiparty politics in 1990 (Fonchingong, 1998).

The second wave of democratization began in 1990 when Cameroon's National Assembly passed a law to reallow the formation of other political parties. The reintroduction of multiparty politics in Cameroon began in earnest on 26 May 1990 with the launch of Cameroon's first opposition party called Social Democratic Front (SDF) in Bamenda (Nyinchiah, 2019). The climax of this second wave was the holding of Cameroon's first post-independent multiparty presidential elections on 11 October 1992 during which the incumbent president Paul Biya is said to have defeated SDF leader John Fru Ndi by 40% to 36% respectively (Gros, 1995). Since then, the country is said to have entered into a state of democratic decline which would be analysed below under the following domains: governance; the rule of law; civic space; free and fair elections; human rights; minority rights; and performance in composite indices measuring democracy.

6.1.1. GOVERNANCE

Cameroon's governance has faced challenges in maintaining democratic principles since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s. The dominance of the ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), has often led to a concentration of power. While efforts have been made towards the devolution of power, especially with the introduction of decentralization in the 1996 revised constitution and its implementation laws adopted by parliament (Law No. 2004/17, and Law No. 2004/18) (Tani et al, 2012), Cameroon has predominantly maintained a centralized system of governance with power concentrated in hands of the president and the ruling CPDM party. The 2022 BTI Transformation Index report on Cameroon describes the country as a "deeply centralized state" (BTI, 2022). It also adds that "Cameroon is a strongly personalized electoral autocracy, with little commitment to democratic institutions. The president’s centralization of power means that he can manipulate institutions to position supporters and punish detractors." (Ibid.).

The aforementioned assessment is corroborated by Quirk and Montemarano (2020) who identify the "persistent centralization of power" as one of Cameroon's democratic deficits. While acknowledging constitutional and legislative efforts to institute decentralization, they point out that political interference, and administrative bureaucracy undermines the ability of Cameroon's 360 municipal councils to fulfil their developmental responsibilities in sectors like education, social welfare, and the provision of healthcare (Ibid.).

The centralization of authority in the country also limits the effectiveness of checks and balances within the political system, contributing to governance issues. One of the most challenging governance issues that has accrued so far from the centralization is corruption. There has been unbridled corruption in Cameroon's governance system since the rebirth of multiparty politics with Cameroon earning twice the title of the most corrupt country in the

world (1998 and 1999) according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Bechem, 2018). Corruption in Cameroon mostly takes the forms of bribery, embezzlement of state funds, fraud, and influence peddling (Gbetnkom, 2012).

6.1.2. RULE OF LAW

The rule of law in Cameroon has been compromised by instances of political interference in the judiciary. The executive branch's influence on the legal system has raised concerns about the independence of the judiciary. Kamga (2019) posits that the influence political interest has on judicial office is a hallmark of the relationship between the executive branch and the judiciary in Cameroon. Ndifor (2004: p. 27) goes further to assert unequivocally that "the Cameroon judicial system has been deeply entangled in the political affairs of government such that it has lost its independence and is currently being run as an extension of the executive branch". Nyingchia and Leno (2021: p.182) further corroborate the issue of political interference on the judiciary from the executive by pointing out that in Cameroon, "courts operate like deconcentrated services of the Ministry of Justice without any financial autonomy, while the Higher Judicial Council which manages careers and promotion of judges is headed by the President of Republic."

Another major challenge in the respect of the rule of law in Cameroon is arbitrary arrests and detentions. Nguindip (2022) underscore that arbitrary arrests and detentions exist on a large scale in Cameroon. This is confirmed by the 2022 US Department of State country reports on human rights practices in the country which identified arbitrary arrests and detention among several human rights issues plaguing the country (US Department of State, 2023). A prominent case in point is the arbitrary arrest and detention of more than a hundred militants of the Mouvement pour la Renaissance du Cameroun (MRC) party by Cameroonian security forces following a protest march in September 2020 (Amnesty International, 2020).

6.1.3. CIVIC SPACE

The advent of multipartyism in Cameroon was accompanied by efforts to promote freedom of association. In this light, the government of President Paul Biya enacted a legislation reintroducing freedom of association (law No. 90/053) which caused the civic space in Cameroon to flourish (Kewir et al, 2021). The aforementioned legislation led to the establishment of more than 3000 associations in Cameroon including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), common initiative groups (CIGs), development associations, student associations, and professional associations (Ibid). However, this euphoria was short-lived as the government quickly took actions place constraints on the activities of civil society organizations (CSOs). The civic space became restricted as the government undertook military crackdowns on protests that emerged across the length and breadth of the country from March to August 1991 (Annan et al, 2021).

Over the years, the civic space in Cameroon has been constrained due to restrictions on freedom of assembly and expression. The government has been criticized for suppressing dissent, limiting the activities of civil society organizations, and cracking down on peaceful protests. These actions undermine the vibrancy of civic engagement and public discourse. This has been attested by the assessment of prominent civil society activists in the country. According to Maximillienne Ngo Mbe (Cameroonian activists and head of the Central African Human Rights Defenders Network), the "Civic space is closed" in Cameroon (Amaize, 2022). Her sentiments are shared by another Cameroonian civil society activist Barrister Felix Nkongho who believes that tensions concerning Cameroon's political future and political rivalries has caused the civic space in the country to shrink (Ibid).

The situation has been exacerbated by the Anglophone crisis which has had adverse effect on the activities of CSOs in the English-speaking regions of the country (South West and North West). According to findings from a field research conducted and published in 2023,

while CSOs have made significant contributions to resolve the conflict (from the organization of peace education to the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims) their efforts have been impeded by government restrictions, violence and intimidations from the belligerent parties that have led to the shrinking of the civic space in these regions (Annan et al, 2023).

6.1.4. FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

While multiparty politics were reintroduced to Cameroon in the early 1990s, concerns persist about the fairness of elections. The electoral process has been marred by allegations of irregularities, including voter suppression and manipulation of results. Most elections held after the return of multiparty politics have been tainted by allegations, and reports of fraud and irregularities. The first ever multiparty elections under the Biya regime held in 1992 was reported to have been marred by election malpractices. Gros (1995: p.112) pointed out that incumbent President Paul Biya owed his victory in the 1992 Presidential elections partly to "widespread election fraud". The US Department of State had the following damning assessment of Cameroon's electoral system after the return to multiparty politics in the country: "Since Biya won the highly flawed 1992 presidential election, elections have been tainted by an electoral process that is controlled by the Government's Ministry of Territorial Administration. International and local observers generally view the process as not free and fair." (US Department of State, 1998).

Both the 2011, and 2018 Cameroon presidential elections were also marked by allegations of massive fraud and irregularities brought forth by opposition parties (Reuters, 2018; Kiven et al, 2018; Reuters, 2011; BBC, 2011). More recently, similar allegations from opposition parties were noted concerning the conduct and outcome of the 2020 legislative and municipal elections (Kindzeka, 2020). The dominance of the ruling party has raised questions about the competitiveness and fairness of the electoral environment.

6.1.5. HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights concerns in Cameroon include reports of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and torture. Dicklitch (2002: p. 156) presents the following bleak assessment of the human rights situation in Cameroon:

> The human rights record of the Cameroonian government from a civil/political rights standpoint has been miserable at best. Complaints of military and police brutality are widespread. Torture and illegal detention are frequent, while extra-judicial executions are still evident, especially in the Far North Province. Since March 1998, some 700 people have been extra-judicially executed by the brigade anti-gang, a joint unit of the army and gendarmerie in the Far North Province. The security forces have continued to brutalize the public with the brandishing of automatic weapons, bribery and the resurgence of *kale kale*, especially in the Anglophone provinces.

Cameroon's human rights situation has been worsened by the ongoing Anglophone conflict which has been characterized by gross violation of human rights from both sides in the conflict (government forces and 'Ambazonia' separatists). According to a report submitted to the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament, by a team of independent researchers based at the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, both parties involved in the Anglophone conflict have committed human rights abuses ranging from inhumane detention condition to torture, and extra-judiciary killings (Willis et al, 2019). These reports have been corroborated by reports from other entities such the US Department of State, that talked about killings and abductions by the belligerents in the conflict (US Department of State, 2023); Amnesty International that cited the issue of denial of humanitarian access in to Doctors Without Borders (DWB) to carry out their duties in the North West and South West regions (Amnesty International, 2022b); and Human Rights Watch which talked about the violation of the right to education through the enforcement of a boycott on education by the separatists in the Anglophone regions since 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

6.1.6. MINORITY RIGHTS

The protection of minority rights in Cameroon has been a persistent issue, particularly in regions with diverse ethnic and linguistic communities. The Anglophone crisis, which escalated in the 2010s, has highlighted tensions around linguistic and cultural differences. The government's response to these issues has been criticized for not adequately addressing the concerns of minority populations.

Many scholars and human rights organizations are of the view that the Anglophone crisis draws its origins from the marginalization and violation of the rights of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon. Chiatoh (2019: p. 675) underscores that Anglophone minority in Cameroon has "since independence continuously has complained of marginalisation and neo-colonialism." He added that "These complaints have been to the effect that severe violations of the rights of some Anglophone Cameroonians have occurred." (Ibid.). Anye (2008) argues that it was the policies of the Cameroonian government from 1990 - 2000 that triggered the emergence of Anglophone nationalism. O'Grady (2019) establishes the nexus between Anglophone marginalization and the Anglophone conflict by stating the following concerning the root cause of the conflict:

Today’s conflict can be traced to late 2016, when English-speaking lawyers and teachers organized peaceful protests, a movement born of frustrations that the government had assigned French-speaking judges and teachers to English-speaking courts and schools. English speakers claimed that officials in Yaounde were essentially forcing the minority Anglophones to assimilate into Francophone legal and educational systems.

Reacting to the violent crackdown on a demonstration against marginalization in the Anglophone regions, UN Special Rapporteurs Maina Kiai and Rita Rita Izsak-Ndiaye acknowledged the issues the protesters were clamouring (bilingual public services and greater inclusion of the Anglophones in the public governance), and called on the

government to engage in inclusive dialogue with them (UN HRC, 2016). Mr. Kiai went further to point out that "In democratic societies, demonstrations and protests are key to raising awareness about human rights, and political and social concerns, including those regarding minority issues." (Ibid.).

Human rights entities such as International Crisis Group and the Centre for Human Rights (CHR) of the Faculty of Law in the University of Pretoria have also acknowledged the causal link between the marginalization of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon and the outbreak of the Anglophone conflict (Khumalo, 2023; International Crisis Group, 2017).

6.1.7. CAMEROON'S PERFORMANCES IN COMPOSITE INDICES MEASURING DEMOCRACY

The decline of democracy in Cameroon can also be seen in the country's performance in various international composite indices measuring democracy. Here, we shall look at Cameroon's performance in the following composite indices: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)'s Democracy Index; Freedom House's Freedom in the world index; World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI); Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG).

6.1.7.1. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)'S Democracy Index Ranking For Cameroon

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)'s Democracy Index provides a comprehensive review of the state of democracy across the globe which covers 165 independent states and territories. It focuses on five key indicators: political participation, electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, political participation, and functioning of government, each of which has its own ranking (EIU, 2022). There is an aggregate ranking on 10 upon which countries are classified under the following four categories of regime: full democracy (at the top), flawed democracy, hybrid regime, and authoritarian regime (at the bottom) (Ibid).

For the past decade (2013 - 2023), Cameroon has remained in the Authoritarian category with an average score of 3.16/10 (See Table 1).

Table 1. Cameroon's scores and category in EIU Democracy Index 2013-2022

2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013
2.56/10	2.56/10	2.77/10	2.85/10	3.28/10	3.61/10	3.46/10	3.66/10	3.41/10	3.41/10
Average score 2013-2023: 3.16/10									
Classification category: Authoritarian regime									
Classification index 1. Full democracies: scores greater than 8 2. Flawed democracies: scores greater than 6, and less than or equal to 8 3. Hybrid regimes: scores greater than 4, and less than or equal to 6 4. Authoritarian regimes: scores less than or equal to 4									

Source: compiled by author from EIU Democracy Index Reports from 2013 – 2022

6.1.7.2. Freedom House's Freedom In The World Report Ranking For Cameroon

The Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' Report is a global assessment of the state of political rights and civil liberties in the world. The political rights component has three sub-sections: Political Pluralism and Participation, Electoral Process, and Functioning of Government while the civil liberties component covers four sub-sections: Personal Autonomy and Individual rights, Associational and Organizational Rights, Freedom of Expression and Belief, and Rule of Law (Freedom House, 2021). It is a composite index that contains a statistical measurement with rankings that shows the level of freedom in the various states covered according to three categories: Free, Partly Free, and Not Free (Ibid.). For the past decade (2022-2013), Cameroon has remained in the 'Not Free' category (See Table 2).

Table 2. Cameroon's scores and category in Freedom House 'Freedom in the World Report 2013-2022

2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013
19/100*	18/100	16/100	15/100	22/100	24/100	24/100	12/14*	12/14	12/14
Classification category: Not Free									
Classification index 1. All 'Freedom in the World' scores from 2017 upward is summed over an aggregate score of 100 with 60 for civil liberties and 40 for political rights. Higher scores indicate high freedom meanwhile lower scores indicate low freedom. 2. All 'Freedom in the World' scores from 2015 and below is summed over an aggregate score of 14 with 7 for each component (political rights and civil liberties). Higher scores indicate low freedom and lower scores indicate high freedom.									

Source: compiled by author from Freedom House's 'Freedom in the World' annual report from 2013 – 2022

6.1.7.3. Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index Of African Governance (IIAG) Ranking For Cameroon

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is the only composite index that focuses on the measuring overall governance performance in all 54 African countries based on four key governance components: Security and Rule of Law; Participation, Rights, and Inclusion; Foundations for Economic Opportunity; and Human Development (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2023). The 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' component has indicators like democratic elections, civil society space, freedom of association and assembly, personal liberties, freedom of expression and belief, equal political representation, and equal rights and civil liberties (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2023b), for women which all combine to provides a clear insight to the state of democracy in African countries. Cameroon's performance in the aforementioned category has moved from bad to worse from 2012 - 2021 (See Figure 1).




Figure 14. Cameroon's performance in the 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' component of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) from 2012-2021

Source: https://iiag.online/data.html?meas=PARTICIP&loc=CM&view=graph&subview=score&range1from=2012&range1to=2021

6.2. IMPACT OF THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN CAMEROON

The decline of democracy in Cameroon over the past decades has had an adverse effect on the political stability of the country. Currently Cameroon is going through an internal conflict involving government forces and separatists in its English-speaking (Anglophone) regions (North West, and South West). As mentioned in the above analysis, some scholars (Chiatoh, 2019; Anye 2009) have linked the outbreak of the Anglophone conflict to the

marginalization of the minority Anglophones in the nation of Cameroon, which in itself is a reflection of the decline of democracy.

Another area where Cameroon's democratic decline has affected its political stability is that of social unrest which has witnessed an increase in the past decades. Generally, a decline in democracy can lead to social unrest as citizens may engage in protests, demonstrations, and civil disobedience, when they feel disenfranchised and frustrated with the political system. Cameroon has witnessed two major social upheavals that threatened its stability as a state: 'Operation Ghost Town' (better known by the French appellation 'Operation Villes Mortes'), which was a non-violent civil disobedience carried out through lockdowns in three major Cameroonian cities (Douala, Bamenda, and Bafoussam) throughout the second half of the year 1991 (Pommerolle & Heungoup, 2017; Konde, 2015; Krieger, 1994); and the February 2008 hunger riots against the rising cost of food in the country which had political undertones (Dongmo, 2022; Sneyd, 2017; Amin, 2013).

Statistically, Cameroon has witnessed a decline political stability in recent years which correlates with the democratic decline illustrated in the above analysis. The countries performance in the 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism category of the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) has been on a steady decline in the last decade (See Figure 15), and has remained below average over the past 27 years (see Figure 16).




Figure 15. Cameroon's performance in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 'Political Stability Absence of Violence/Terrorism' indicator 2013 – 2022

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators: https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators/interactive-data-access




Figure 16. Cameroon's performance in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 'Political Stability Absence of Violence/Terrorism' indicator 1996 – 2022

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators: https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators/interactive-data-access

6.3. IMPACT OF DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY ON DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON

Cameroon's democratic decline has also had a negative effect on its economic development. This can be seen in three areas. The first, is centralization of power. The centralization of power has been a fundamental impediment to local development in the country. Quirk and Montemarano (2020) argue that the failure of the state to effectively implement decentralization (adopted in the 1996 constitutional amendment, and enhanced by the 2004

law on the orientation of decentralization) in the country, due to political interference and excessive bureaucracy, has prevented Cameroon's municipal councils from fulfilling their developmental responsibilities in sectors such as education, healthcare, and social welfare.

Secondly, democratic decline can generally lead to an unfavourable environment for doing business which is a categorical imperative for economic development. Democratic decline in Cameroon has led to political instability and weaken institutions responsible for maintaining law and order, delivering public services, and safeguarding the rule of law. All of these have combined to create and unfavourable environment for business which could have attracted foreign investors and increase the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country. Cameroon was ranked 186 out of 190 in the World Bank's Doing Business report for 2020 (BTI, 2022).

Another area where democratic decline has adversely affected development in Cameroon is that of governance. Cameroon's democratic decline has come with the challenge of corruption, and a lack of transparency and accountability in in the governance system. The country was ranked twice consecutively (1998 and 1999) by Transparency International as the most corrupt country in the world (Bechem, 2018). Corruption diverts resources away from essential public services and infrastructure projects, thereby hindering overall development efforts. Finding from a study undertaken on the impact of corruption on economic and social development in Cameroon revealed "high level embezzlement of public funds and illicit financial flows have a statistically significant negative impact on the economic and social development of Cameroon." (Grimbald et al, 2020; p. 164). Similarly, a study on the impact on enterprise growth of the payment of bribes by small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) to public officials reveals that such payments have a detrimental effect on the growth in output of the firms (Gbetnkom, 2012).

6.4. THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Since gaining independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has faced numerous challenges in its democratization process. These challenges include: coups, rebellions, and governance issues. As the case with Cameroon, the decline of democracy in the Central African Republic will analyse from the following key indicators of the state of democracy: governance, rule of law, civic space, free and fair elections, human rights, minority rights, and CAR's performance in composite indices measuring democracy

6.4.1. GOVERNANCE

Since gaining independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic has faced persistent challenges in establishing stable and effective democratic governance. Political instability, coups, and changes in leadership have been recurring issues. Multiple coups and changes in government have disrupted the democratic process, undermining efforts to establish consistent governance. Since independence, the country has witnessed the reign of three military officers who entered power through a coup and have reign for a combine 36 years: Jean-Bédel Bokassa from 1965-1979; Andre Kolingba from 1981-1993; and François Bozizé from 2003 - 2013 (Stapleton, 2019). All of these regimes were dictatorial and engendered a decline of democracy in the country. The most notorious of them was that of Bokassa who siezed power from CAR's first president David Dako through a coup in 1965 and subsequently proclaimed himself as president for life, assuming the title of Emperor changing his country into an empire in 1976 (Britannica, 2023; Toure, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2007).

Though the country witnessed what has been seen as successful democratic transition in 1993, it was short-lived and shaky as eloquently described by Mehler (2005: p. 126):

> From that period to 2002, democracy survived (barely) in an environment punctuated by high levels of instability, engendered by outbreaks of political violence and extralegal efforts to take power. In October of that same year, the formal experiment with democracy appeared to have collapse as "politics" degenerated into open and bloody confrontations between forces loyal to the president and those of his former chief of staff. When the rebels took the capital Bangui in March 2003, they were greeted by joyous inhabitants but the prospects for civil peace—let alone democracy—remained bleak.

The results of the frequent military coups and succeeding dictatorships has been an enduring environment of political instability characterized by the disintegration of central authority and the virtual collapse of the rule of law (Niang, 2019). The aforementioned situation has made some scholars to ascribe to CAR the label of a "failed state" (Lizak, 2016; Kłosowicz, 2016; Kah, 2014; Deiros, 2014).

6.4.2. RULE OF LAW

The rule of law in CAR has been compromised by political instability and conflict. The lack of a stable and effective judicial system has contributed to impunity for human rights abuses and corruption. Weak institutions and a history of political interference in the judiciary have hampered the establishment of a robust rule of law. One of the unfortunate legacies of decades of political instability in CAR has been impunity which is a glaring sign of the failure of state institutions to uphold the rule of law in the country. In July 2014, the United Nations Committee on Sanctions against the Central African Republic released a report in which it underscored that "the total impunity that allows individuals to engage in or provide support for acts that undermine the peace, security and territorial integrity of the Central African Republic remains the main stumbling block on the road of the political transition." (ABA, 2023).

This assessment is corroborated by Caus (2021) who pointed out the failure of the rule of law in CAR has been worsened by the violence the country experienced from 2013 - 2014 which led to the destruction of court buildings (alongside criminal records), and prisons, as well as a restriction of forces of law and order (the police or gendarmerie) to the capital city Bangui. According to Caus, this has further increased the level of impunity by providing a context under which authors of human rights violations and international crimes went unpunished (Ibid).

6.4.3. CIVIC SPACE

Civic space in the Central African Republic has been restricted due to political instability, conflict, and violence. Civil society organizations often face challenges in freely expressing their opinions and advocating for democratic values. The threat of violence and intimidation has led to a constrained civic space, limiting the ability of citizens to engage in democratic processes. In April 2023, Human Rights Watch published a report in which it accused the government of CAR of undertaking a crackdown on the civil society, opposition political parties, and the media as the country prepare for local elections scheduled for July that year (Human Rights Watch, 2023). This accusation was also highlighted by the international civil society platform dubbed CIVICUS which revealed two specific cases of civic space restriction (CIVICUS Monitor, 2023). The first was the banning of Radio Ndéké Luka journalist, Igor Djeskin Sénapaye from access and coverage of the CAR National Assembly by the institution's vice-president, Evariste Ngamana; and the arrest and detaintion of three trade union leaders (Innocent Kéréguelé, Guillaume Sessé Brassy, and Kevin Wikon) after they took part in a 21-day strike action in public schools (Ibid.). CAR was categorized as 'REPRESSED' in terms of the state of civic space according the 2023 "PEOPLE POWER UNDER ATTACK" report published by CIVICUS (CIVICUS Monitor, 2023b).

6.4.4. FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

Elections in the CAR have been marred by irregularities, insecurity, and political manipulation. The conduct of elections has faced challenges, with instances of voter intimidation and fraud. These issues have raised concerns about the credibility and fairness of the electoral process, undermining the democratic foundation of the country. A good example is the December 2015 legislative elections in the country that was cancelled by its Constitutional Court because of irregularities (France 24, 2016). The president of CAR Constitutional Court in his declaration of annulment revealed that the court registered 414 complaints of election malpractices (Ibid.). Furthermore, the 2020 Presidential elections in the country took place in an atmosphere of distrust of CAR election management body by opposition parties which accused it of being at the beck and call of the government (International Crisis Group, 2020). Election observation, which is an important tool to enhance transparency and credibility, in the country is bedevilled by the risk arising from insecurity, violence, and political instability (Maphunye, 2023).

6.4.5. HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights abuses have been a longstanding concern in the Central African Republic. Conflict, violence, and political instability have contributed to violations of basic human rights, including extrajudicial killings, displacement, and gender-based violence. According to a report by Amnesty International on the human rights situation of CAR in 2022, "Women and girls were subjected to conflict-related sexual violence." (Amnesty International, 2023). This is further corroborated by the statistics given by the UN independent expert on CAR Yao Agbetse who revealed 483 violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law affecting 1300 civilians were verified and documented by the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (OHCHR, 2023).

On a general note, the protection and promotion of human rights have been compromised amid the broader challenges to democratic governance.

6.4.6. MINORITY RIGHTS

Protection of minority rights in the Central African Republic has been a complex issue, exacerbated by ethnic and religious tensions. Political instability and conflict have often led to violence targeting minority communities. Human Rights Watch reported that in 2014, a Christian militia group known as the 'anti-balaka' undertook a relentless and coordinated wave of violent attacks against the minority Muslim population whom they accused of being responsible for the emergence of the largely Muslim 'Seleka' rebel group which seized power in CAR in March 2013 (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Entire communities were forced to flee from the country because of these attacks (Ibid.). The lack of effective governance has hindered the establishment of policies and mechanisms to safeguard the rights of minority groups.

6.4.7. CAR'S PERFORMANCE IN COMPOSITE INDICES MEASURING DEMOCRACY

The decline of democracy in CAR can also be illustrated by its abysmal performance in some of the renown international composite indices measuring democracy. In this section, we shall look at the performance of CAR in the following composite indices measuring democracy and its components: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)'s Democracy; Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report Ranking for CAR; and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG).

6.4.7.1. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)'S Democracy Index Ranking For CAR

CAR has had a dismal performance in the EIU's Democracy Index for the past decade with an extremely low score that puts it in the category of 'Authoritarian regime' (See Table 3).

Table 3. CAR's scores and category in EIU Democracy Index 2013-2022

2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013
1.35/10	1.43/10	1.32/10	1.32/10	1.52/10	1.52/10	1.61/10	1.57/10	1.49/10	1.49/10
Average score 2013-2023: 1.46/10									
Classification category: Authoritarian regime									
Classification index 1. Full democracies: scores greater than 8 2. Flawed democracies: scores greater than 6, and less than or equal to 8 3. Hybrid regimes: scores greater than 4, and less than or equal to 6 4. Authoritarian regimes: scores less than or equal to 4									

Source: compiled by author from EIU Democracy Index Reports from 2013 – 2022

6.4.7.2. Freedom House's Freedom In The World Report Ranking For Car

CAR's performance in Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index for the past decade has been terrible. Apart from 2013, when it was placed in the 'Partly Free' category, CAR has mostly remained in the 'Not Free' category (See Table 4).

Table 4. CAR's scores and category in Freedom House 'Freedom in the World Report 2013-2022

2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013
7/100*	9/100	10/100	9/100	9/100	10/100	7/100	14/14*	14/14	10/14*
Classification category: Not Free except for 2013 when it was placed in the 'Partly Free' category									
Classification index 1. All 'Freedom in the World' scores from 2017 upward is summed over an aggregate score of 100 with 60 for civil liberties and 40 for political rights. Higher scores indicate high freedom meanwhile lower scores indicate low freedom. 2. All 'Freedom in the World' scores from 2015 and below is summed over an aggregate score of 14 with 7 for each component (political rights and civil liberties). Higher scores indicate low freedom and lower scores indicate high freedom.									

Source: compiled by author from Freedom House's 'Freedom in the World' annual report from 2013 - 2022

6.4.7.3. Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index Of African Governance (IIAG) Ranking For CAR

At the regional level, CAR has also performed poorly in the lone composite index measuring African governance—IIAG. The country performance in the 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' component of the IIAG from 2012-2021 has consistently been below average (See Figure 17).




Figure 17. CAR's performance in the 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' component of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) from 2012-2021

Source: https://iiag.online/data.html?meas=PRI&loc=CF&view=graph&subview=score&range1from=2012&range1to=2021

6.5. IMPACT OF THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN CAR

The decline of democracy in the CAR has had a significant impact on political stability in the country. The failure of democratic governance to take root in the country after independence has led to a protracted state of political instability marked by recurrent coups (as seen in the analysis above), and authoritarianism. After independence in 1960, CAR's first president David Dacko soon transformed his country into a one-party state (Ghura & Mercereau, 2004), thereby consolidating power in his hands. Though the one-party system seems to have been the order of the day among African countries in the early years of independence, it served to undermine the nascent democracy in these newly independent states. Building on the precedence set by Dacko, succeeding presidents of CAR have continued the authoritarian tradition that has provided a fertile ground for recurrent forceful seizure of power.

Despite attempts to break with the country's past, including the establishment of a democratic government in 2016, deep-rooted patterns of governance have continued to perpetuate violence (Glawion & Vries, 2018). This suggests that the impact of the decline of democracy on political stability in the Central African Republic is complex and multifaceted.

The adverse effect of the decline of democracy on political stability in CAR can also be seen in the country's very poor performance in the 'Political Stability Absence of Violence/Terrorism' indicator of the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI). CAR percentile rank has remained in single digits for the past two decades (See Figure 18).




Figure 18. CAR's performance in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 'Political Stability Absence of Violence/Terrorism' indicator 2013 – 2022

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators: https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators/interactive-data-access

6.6. IMPACT OF DECLINE OF DEMOCRACY ON DEVELOPMENT IN CAR

Zack-Williams (2001), underscores that the decline of democracy in CAR has had a significant impact on the level of development in the country. This can be seen in the correlation of three main factors: democratic decline, political instability, and development stagnation. This can be seen both in terms of human development and economic development as illustrated below.

The first challenge is undoubtedly that of human development. The decline in democracy, and the political instability that ensured over the years has plunged CAR into a severe humanitarian crisis: The civil wars and sporadic outbreaks of violence has led to with a significant number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. Recent (2023) statistics from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Office in CAR puts the total number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in the country at 3.4 million (out of a total population of 6.1 million); the total number of refugees at 750,500; and the total number of internally displaced people at 489,000 (UNOCHA, 2023). This humanitarian crisis has strained resources and hindered development efforts.

Economically, political instability and conflict occasioned by democratic decline often result in economic downturns. The CAR has faced challenges in maintaining economic stability, attracting investments, and fostering economic development due to the prevailing insecurity. Some scholars have argued that the decline of democracy in CAR has had an adverse effect on the country's economic development as political instability (which is a consequence of this decline) has acted as an obstacle to economic growth in the country (Traore et al, 2020; Ghura & Mercereau, 2004).

CHAPTER SEVEN

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE EFFECT OF THE LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SSA (CAMEROON AND CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC VS GHANA AND KENYA)

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter examined the decline of democracy its impact on political stability and development in our two case-study countries (Cameroon and the Central African Republic). Having analysed the situation in these two former French colonies in SSA, this chapter would provide a comparison with the situation in two other countries in SSA that have had a different path in the evolution of democracy in the region—Ghana and Kenya. The choice of Ghana and Kenya stems from the fact that as former British colonies, and 'emerging democracies' on the continent, they provide sufficient contrast on which a good comparison can be made on the differential impact the level of democracy bears on the two dependent variables in this thesis--political stability and development. Before delving into the comparison, this chapter will begin with an overview of the evolution of democracy in Ghana and Kenya as well as the impact it has had on their level of political stability and development. For a clearer and more concise comparative analysis, this chapter shall make use of tables and figures in its comparisons.

7.1. THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN GHANA SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Ghana gained independence from British colonial rule on March 6, 1957. The evolution of democracy in Ghana since independence has been marked by a transition from

authoritarianism to multi-party rule (Yayoh, 2006). The democratic process in the country so far has gone through four distinctive phases: First Republic; Military Rule; Transition to Multi-Party Democracy; and the Fourth Republic.

The first republic began at the dawn of independence in 1957 and lasted till the advent of military rule in 1966. Ghana's initiation into democratic governance began immediately after independence in 1957, when it adopted a parliamentary system of government (De Smith, 1957). The leader of Ghanaian struggle for independence and head of the Conventional People's Party (CPP) became Ghana's first Prime Minister. Ghana transitioned from into a presidential system in 1960 when an act of the country's parliament replaced the Westminster system to a presidential republic (Brierley, 2012). Ghana's experience with democracy was upended by a military coup in 1966.

Military rule in Ghana began in February 1966 when soldiers ousted the CPP from power and installed the National Liberation Council (NLC) (Austin & Luckham, 2014). Following the coup, Ghana experienced a series of military governments. The country went through periods of military rule characterized by coups and changes in leadership. During this time, Ghana had military leaders such as General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong and General Jerry John Rawlings. The former took power in 1981 and transitioned the country back to democratic rule in 1992.

The third phase in in Ghana's democratic evolution was the transition to democracy that took place from 1981 - 1992 under the leadership of General Rawlings. In 1981, Jerry John Rawlings staged a coup and took power. In 1992, he transitioned Ghana back to multi-party democracy and oversaw the drafting of a new constitution (Adedeji, 2001). This marked the beginning of the Fourth Republic.

The fourth phase of the evolution of democracy in Ghana is the advent of the Fourth Republic from the transition back to democracy in 1992 till date. Since 1992, Ghana has been

operating as a multi-party democracy. The Fourth Republic has seen a stable political environment with regular elections and peaceful transitions of power. This is not to say that everything has been smooth. This transition has been fraught with challenges, including a struggle to uphold the rule of law and democratic governance (Frimpong, 2018). Despite these challenges, the restoration of multi-party democracy has led to improved economic policy management and steady economic growth, which has in turn facilitated progress in poverty reduction and human development (Awal, 2012).

7.2. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA

The road has been long and challenging but Ghana stands out today as a good example of democratization in Africa with frequent seamless democratic transition from one elected administration to the other. So, what has been the impact of the level of democracy in Ghana on political stability and development in the country?

7.2.1. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN GHANA

The democratization process in Ghana has led to different types of impact on the stability of the country since independence. The democratic decline that which began with Nkrumah's authoritarianism (Biney, 2008; Mazrui, 1966); and successive military regimes ushered in a period of political instability marked by frequent military coups.

Meanwhile, the democratic resurgence from 1992 till date has brought in a sustained period of political stability marked by successive democratic elections and seamless transfer of power from one administration to another. Svanikier (2007) and Yayoh (2006) both highlight the positive influence of democracy on political stability, with Svanikier noting that the increase in unity among political elites has contributed to this stability.

It is important to acknowledge that Ghanaian democracy is not fully consolidated and is confronted with challenges like neopatrimonial governance, weak national institutions, excessive power of the executive/president, marginalization of women and the failure to fully entrench the rule of law, which all constitute potential threats to political stability (Frimpong & Agyeman-Budu, 2018; Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Maxwell, 2008). Despite these challenges, the transition to multi-party democracy in 1992 marked a significant departure from the country's history of military rule and dictatorship (Yayoh, 2006).

7.2.2. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA

As the case with political stability, the level of development in Ghana has also been impacted by the level of democratization. In this light, Boafo-Arthur (2008) underscore that protracted military dictatorships and the environment of political stability it creates has impeded development in Ghana and other counties in the West African subregion that went through military coups.

Conversely, the transition to democracy in Ghana has had a positive impact on the country's economic growth and development (Awal, 2012). This transition, marked by the Fourth Republic, has been a significant departure from the country's history of military rule and dictatorship (Yayoh, 2006). The consolidation of democracy in Ghana has been supported by the media, civil society, and state institutions, contributing to the country's democratic process and culture (Arthur, 2010). The introduction of participatory decision-making in a democratic environment has also played a role in Ghana's economic development, with improvements in competitiveness and poverty reduction (Harnack, 2000).

7.3. THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN KENYA SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Kenya gained independence from British colonial rule on December 12, 1963. The evolution of democracy in Kenya since independence has been influenced by a complex interplay of

domestic and international factors (Nyinguro, 2007). The transition from an authoritarian regime to a multi-party system in the 1990s marked a critical phase in this evolution (Steeves, 1999). However, the African character of Kenyan democracy, characterized by the influence of ethnicity and leadership, has posed challenges to its consolidation (Steeves, 2006). The historical context of colonial Kenya, particularly the struggle for electoral processes, has also played a significant role in shaping the country's democratic trajectory (Gathogo, 2020). The evolution of democracy in Kenya can be subdivided into five major phases: independence and the nascent years; shift to multipartyism; political turmoil and constitutional reforms; new constitution; elections and recent political developments.

The first phase was the period of independence and years immediately after (nascent years) of the Kenyan nation which ran from 1963-1978. Kenya gained independence in 1963, with Jomo Kenyatta becoming the country's first president. The early years were marked by a dominant one-party system under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) led by Kenyatta (Widner, 2023; Throup, 1987; Savage, 1970).

The second phase of Kenya's democratization process after independence was the shift to multipartyism. In 1991, pressure from civil society and international actors led to the repeal of the one-party system, and multi-party politics was reintroduced. The first multiparty elections were held in 1992, with KANU winning amid allegations of irregularities (Bienen, 2015).

The third phase of Kenya's march towards democracy was the political turmoil and constitutional reforms that took place in the 2000s. The early 2000s witnessed political unrest, culminating in the 2007-2008 post-election violence. International mediation efforts led to the formation of a coalition government between incumbent Moi Kibaki and and opposition leader Raila Odinga, after which began a push for constitutional reforms began (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

The fourth phase of Kenya's democracy evolution was the constitutional reform that took place in 2010. A new constitution was promulgated in 2010, addressing issues of governance, land reform, and devolution of power. The constitution introduced a more decentralized system of governance, devolving power to 47 counties (Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution, 2020).

The fourth phase of Kenya's democratization process had to do with elections and political developments through the period 2013-2022. Kenya held general elections in 2013 and 2017, with Uhuru Kenyatta winning both terms as the country's president. However, it is important to recall that the 2017 elections faced controversy, with the Supreme Court annulling the results, and ordering a rerun (Cheeseman, 2008).

Generally, the evolution of democracy in Kenya has been marked by a mix of progress and challenges. Ongoing efforts to address issues like corruption, strengthen institutions, and enhance electoral processes will shape the future trajectory of democracy in the country. Civil society organizations continue to play a crucial role in advocating for democratic reforms and accountability (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).

7.4. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA

The evolution of democracy has also had varying impact on political stability and development in Kenya. How does democracy affect the aforementioned dependent variables in this East African nation?

7.4.1. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN KENYA

The impact of democracy on political stability in Kenya after independence has been a complex and multifaceted issue. Southall and Wood (1996) highlight the potential for local government to contribute to political pluralism, while Tamarkin (1978) attributes Kenya's

political stability to the charismatic leadership of Jomo Kenyatta. Cheeseman et al (2014) argues that a combination of political realignment, a peace narrative, democratic reforms, and a new constitution helped to prevent ethnic violence during the 2013 elections.

Despite the move towards multiparty democracy, and the general atmosphere of stability it has engendered in the Kenyan political sphere, it is important to note that Kenya has experienced periodic election-related tensions, particularly in the 2007 presidential election. The disputed results led to post-election violence, raising concerns about the role of democracy in managing political transitions. There has definitely been enormous achievement in the area of political stability in Kenya but it would be better to describe the democracy-political stability connection in Kenya as a work in progress rather than a consolidated achievement.

7.4.2. IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA

Advancement in democracy in Kenya after independence has generally had a positive impact on development in the country. The introduction of devolved governance, as a form of democratic decentralization, has been a significant step in this direction (Khaunya & Wawire, 2015). However, the decentralization process has been met with challenges such as political interference and corruption (Cornell & D'Arcy, 2016). The role of education in promoting democracy and development was also pursued by the Kenyan government with a focus on curriculum support materials that encourage active participation of primary school students in the development of their local communities (Osler, 1993).

7.5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN SAMPLE FORMER FRENCH COLONIES (CAMEROON AND CAR), AND SAMPLE FORMER BRITISH COLONIES (GHANA AND KENYA)

To better illustrate the democratic decline in the two case study countries (Cameroon and CAR) and the impact it has on development and political stability, it would be good to

compare them with the two former British colonies with whom independence was achieved in a similar era (Ghana and Kenya). This comparison will be done both statistically (based

7.5.1. STATISTICAL COMPARISON ON THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN CAMEROON AND CAR VS GHANA AND KENYA

A comparison of the state of democracy between countries in SSA can be effectively done by making use of composite indices measuring various indicators or aspects of democracy. In this section, I will be using the same composite indices used in analysing the state of democracy in Cameroon and CAR in the previous chapter: EIU's Democracy Index; Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report; and IIAG's 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' component.

7.5.1.1. Cameroon And CAR Vs Ghana And Kenya In The EIU Democracy Index

Both Cameroon and CAR have perform poorly as compared to Ghana and Kenya on the EIU Democracy Index over the years 2013-2022. Cameroon has had an average performance of 3.15 on 10 over the aforementioned decade and was placed in the 'Authoritarian' category for each of the years in the time frame (see Table 5). CAR's performance is even worse as it scored an average of 1.46 on 10 over the same period also earning it a place in the 'Authoritarian' category in each year of the time frame like Cameroon (see Table 5).

Table 5. Comparative table on the performance of Cameroon, CAR, Ghana, and Kenya on EIU's Democracy Index

Cameroon	**2022**	**2021**	**2020**	**2019**	**2018**	**2017**	**2016**	**2015**	**2014**	**2013**
Score	2.56	2.56	2.77	2.85	3.28	3.61	3.46	3.66	3.41	3.41
Overall Category	Authoritarian									
CAR	**2022**	**2021**	**2020**	**2019**	**2018**	**2017**	**2016**	**2015**	**2014**	**2013**

Score	1.35	1.43	1.32	1.32	1.52	1.52	1.61	1.57	1.49	1.49
Overall Category	Authoritarian									
Ghana	**2022**	**2021**	**2020**	**2019**	**2018**	**2017**	**2016**	**2015**	**2014**	**2013**
Score	6.43	6.5	6.5	6.63	6.63	6.69	6.75	6.86	6.33	6.33
Overall Category	Flawed democracy									
Kenya	**2022**	**2021**	**2020**	**2019**	**2018**	**2017**	**2016**	**2015**	**2014**	**2013**
Score	5.05	5.05	5.05	5.18	5.11	5.11	5.33	5.33	5.13	5.13
Overall Category	Hybrid regime									

Classification index

1. Full democracies: scores greater than 8
2. Flawed democracies: scores greater than 6, and less than or equal to 8
3. Hybrid regimes: scores greater than 4, and less than or equal to 6
4. Authoritarian regimes: scores less than or equal to 4

Source: compiled by author from EIU Democracy Index Reports from 2013 – 2022

By contrast, both Ghana and Kenya have performed well in the EIU Democracy index over the decade 2013-2012. Ghana had an average score of 6.56, placing her in the 'Flawed Democracy' category (see Table 5). Kenya on it part had an average score of 5.14 and was ranked as a 'Hybrid regime' (see Table 5). Though both democracies (Ghana and Kenya) can still be viewed as a work in progress, they are far ahead of their Cameroonian and Central African Republic counterparts.

7.5.1.2. Cameroon and CAR vs Ghana and Kenya on Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report

Cameroon and CAR also trail Ghana and Kenya when it comes to their respective performances on the Freedom House Freedom in the World Report for the 2013-2022 decade. Both Cameroon and CAR have been classified in the 'Not Free' category for almost all of the respective years in the time frame (but for 2013 when CAR was classified as partly free) (see Table 6). Meanwhile, Ghana and Kenya have consistently remained in the 'Free' and 'Partly Free' categories respectively with performances which far surpasses that of their Cameroonian and Central African Republic counterparts (see Table 6).

Table 6. Comparative table on the performance of Cameroon, CAR, Ghana, and Kenya on Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index

Cameroon	**2022**	**2021**	**2020**	**2019**	**2018**	**2017**	**2016**	**2015**	**2014**	**2013**
Score	19*	18	16	15	22	24	24	12*	12	12
Overall Category	Not Free									
CAR	**2022**	**2021**	**2020**	**2019**	**2018**	**2017**	**2016**	**2015**	**2014**	**2013**
Score	7	9	10	9	9	10	7	14	14	10
Overall Category	Not Free except for 2013 when it was placed in the 'Partly Free' category									
Ghana	**2022**	**2021**	**2020**	**2019**	**2018**	**2017**	**2016**	**2015**	**2014**	**2013**
Score	80	82	82	83	83	83	83	3	3	3
Overall Category	Free									
Kenya	**2022**	**2021**	**2020**	**2019**	**2018**	**2017**	**2016**	**2015**	**2014**	**2013**
Score	48	48	48	48	48	51	51	8	8	8

Overall Category	Partly Free
Classification index 1. All 'Freedom in the World' scores from 2017 upward is summed over an aggregate score of 100 with 60 for civil liberties and 40 for political rights. Higher scores indicate high freedom meanwhile lower scores indicate low freedom. 2. All 'Freedom in the World' scores from 2015 and below is summed over an aggregate score of 14 with 7 for each component (political rights and civil liberties). Higher scores indicate low freedom and lower scores indicate high freedom.	

Source: compiled by author from Freedom House's 'Freedom in the World' annual report from 2013 - 2022

7.5.1.3. Cameroon And CAR Vs Ghana And Kenya On IIAG's 'Participation, Rights, And Inclusion' Component

The peculiarity of IIAG is that is its continental focus that analysis the governance performances of all African countries based on certain key indicators. One of the indicators that captures democratic values the most is 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion'. Here too, Cameroon and CAR are underperforming Ghana and Kenya. Cameroon's highest performance in from 2012-2021 is 40.3/100 (which is below average) and its lowest performance is 35.2/100 (see Figure 5). CAR's case is even worse with 41.8/100 as its highest performance and 32.3/100 as its lowest performance (see Figure 5).

By contrast, both Ghana and Kenya have scored above average with Ghana having the highest performance among all four countries. Ghana's highest score was 74.9/100 and its lowest was 72.2/100 (see Figure 19). Kenya's highest performance was 55.3/100 and its lowest performance was 51/100 (see Figure 19).




Figure 19. Comparison on Cameroon, and CAR vs Ghana and Kenya's performances in the 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' component of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) from 2012-2021

Source: https://iiag.online/data.html?loc=CM-CF-GH-KE&view=table&meas=PRI&subview=score&range1from=2012&range1to=2021&range2from=2017&range2to=2021&showLowest=true&showHighest=true&showEstimated=true&showTrimmed=true&showTrimmedEstimated=true&showHighlights=true&showFullContext=false&showAAT=false

7.5.2. EMPIRICAL COMPARISON ON THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT: CAMEROON AND CAR VS GHANA AND KENYA

Haven established in the aforementioned analysis that Ghana and Kenya have a better record in their democratic process than Cameroon and CAR, it would be good to look at the differential impact the variation in their level of democracy has on their level of political stability and development. I will use tables to better illustrate the difference in the impact of democracy on the aforementioned dependent variables.

7.5.2.1. Impact Of Democracy On Political Stability: Cameroon And CAR Vs Ghana And Kenya

Ghana and Kenya have had a better record on the practice of democracy after independence than Cameroon and CAR. This has had differential impact on the level of political stability

in the respective set of countries. From the below table, it is obvious that the strides made by Ghana and Kenya have had enhanced political stability meanwhile the democratic decline witnessed by Cameroon and CAR has engendered political instability.

Table 7. The impact of the state of democracy on political stability: Cameroon and CAR vs Ghana and CAR

	Cameroon and CAR	Ghana and Kenya
1.	Democratic decline has led to a centralized power structure, hindering local development (Cameroon).	Democratization since 1992 has brought sustained political stability and democratic elections (Ghana).
2.	Governance challenges, including corruption, lack of transparency, and accountability, hinder stability (Cameroon).	Challenges such as neopatrimonial governance and weak institutions persist but are not destabilizing (Ghana).
3.	Historical authoritarian traditions and recurrent coups contribute to political instability (CAR).	The evolution of democracy has contributed to political stability, but periodic tensions exist (Kenya).
4	Challenges in the implementation of democracy has led to poor performance in political stability indicators (Cameroon and CAR).	Strides made in the implementation of democracy had ushered in a sustained period of political stability (Ghana and Kenya).

Compiled by author from analysis in chapters six and seven.

7.5.2.2. Impact Of Democracy On Development: Cameroon And CAR Vs Ghana And Kenya

As the case is with the impact of the state of democracy on political stability, there has been a differential impact of democracy on development in the compared countries with Ghana and Kenya again performing better than Cameroon and CAR (see Table 8).

Table 8. The impact of the state of democracy on political development: Cameroon and CAR vs Ghana and CAR

	Cameroon and CAR	Ghana and Kenya
1.	Centralization of power obstructs local councils from fulfilling developmental responsibilities (Cameroon).	Transition to democracy positively impacts economic growth and development (Ghana).
2.	Corruption diverts resources, hindering essential public services and infrastructure projects (Cameroon).	Democratic consolidation supported by media, civil society, and participatory decision-making has created a stable and sustainable environment for development (Ghana).
3.	Democratic decline correlates with humanitarian crises, internally displaced persons, and refugees (CAR).	Advancements in democracy have a generally positive impact on development (Kenya).
4	Economic downturns result from political instability and conflict, hindering economic development (CAR).	Devolved governance, despite challenges, is a significant step forward in enhancing local development (Kenya).

Compiled by author from analysis in chapters six and seven.

On a general note, here are the major takeaways on the comparison between Cameroon and CAR on the one and Ghana and Kenya concerning the impact of democracy on political stability and human development.

A. Democracy and Stability

- Ghana stands out with sustained stability since democratization in 1992.

- Kenya has achieved stability but faces periodic challenges, especially during elections.
- Cameroon and CAR experience political instability due to democratic decline, with CAR facing historical authoritarianism.

B. Democracy and Development

- Ghana and Kenya show positive correlations between democracy and development.
- Cameroon experiences obstacles in local development and economic growth due to centralized power and corruption.
- CAR faces severe humanitarian crises and economic downturns due to political instability resulting from democratic decline.

CHAPTER EIGHT

GENERAL CONCLUSION

The state of democracy in the Central African sub-region has become a subject of a subject of huge attention with recent happenings across states in the region like the post-election coup in Gabon in December 2023, and the intractable insurgency in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. It is against this backdrop that this thesis embarked on an investigation of the implications of the level of democracy on political stability and development in the Central African sub-region. Using two former French colonies in the region (Cameroon and Central African Republic) as primary case-study and comparing their experience with those of two former British colonies (Ghana and Kenya), this thesis examined the correlation between the level of democracy being practiced and the level of political stability and development experienced. In my analysis therefore, democracy served as an independent variable, while political stability and development served as dependent variables.

After providing a general introduction and putting in place the methodological foundations of the thesis, Chapter 3 presented a comparative analysis on the nature of politics in SSA. It compared the case of Cameroon and CAR to that of Ghana and Kenya. In terms of findings, this chapter identified the major characteristics of politics in SSA states, which include frequent regime change; openness to Western values; high potential for ethnic conflicts; lack of accountability; patrimonialism; ineffective policy delivery; deficits in governance; and heavy dependence on foreign aid and loans. In terms of general performance in democracy, it was discovered that SSA harbours a high degree of fluctuations with simultaneous progress and regression in democratic standards.

An overview was also presented on the political evolution and democratic progress in Ghana, Kenya, Cameroon, CAR with more progress for Ghana and Kenya than Cameroon and CAR.

Chapter Four probed into the issue of political legitimacy and democracy in the politics of SSA states. It was discovered that the issue of political legitimacy still poses a great challenge given the fact that most countries in the region are still struggling to make progress in their march towards democracy. The central argument in this chapter is that the legitimacy of governments in Central Africa is more linked to the ruling party and its history than the approval and support of the masses.

Chapter Five examined the intricacies of democracy, peace, and development in SSA. Here the mutually enhancing relationship between the aforementioned variables was established. The role of democracy in creating a peaceful environment which is conducive for development in SSA was revisited. Unfortunately, it was noticed that the state of democratic governance in SSA is weak evidenced by weak institution, corruption, political interference, and other challenges, which have combined to foster an environment of political instability which inhibits development. The solution to SSA's development plight therefore lies in addressing the pitfalls in its democratic governance, which would in turn create an enabling environment for sustainable development.

Chapter Six explored the decline of democracy in Cameroon and CAR, as well as the impact that such decline has had on political stability and development in both countries. Here the major findings are that there has been a steady decline in the democratization process in both countries evidenced majorly by their poor performance in democratic indicators such as the rule of law, respect for human rights, health civic space, as well as their poor performances in composite indices measuring democracy like EIU's Democracy Index, Freedom Houses' annual Freedom in the World Report and the 'Participation, Rights, and Inclusion' category of Mo Ibrahim Foundation's IIAG.

Chapter seven made a comparison between two Francophone countries (Cameroon and CAR) and two Anglophone countries (Ghana and Kenya) on the level of democracy and its impact on political stability and development in SSA. Here, it was revealed that both Cameroon and CAR have a poor level of democratic governance which has an adverse effect on their level of political stability and development. By contrast, Ghana and Kenya are doing far better in democratic governance with consequent better performance in political stability and development.

The two hypotheses set forth at the beginning of this thesis are:

i. The democratic deficit in the Central African Region can be associated to the decline in political stability and the level of development in the region as evidence in the case-study countries (Cameroon and Central African Republic).

ii. Inversely, advances in democracy in Ghana and Kenya can be associated to the increase in their levels of political stability and development.

The analysis carried out in this thesis provides evidences and facts that leans more to the validation of the aforementioned presuppositional statements.

A correlation was established between the democratic decline witnessed in Cameroon and CAR and the level of political stability and development in both countries. Their weak democratic performance seen in both factual evidence like shrinking civic space, numerous human rights violations, political interference in the justice system, and corruption, has contributed to period of political instability ranging from long riots for Cameroon to frequent coups in CAR.

The aforementioned situation has frustrated developmental efforts in both countries in areas like infrastructural development, and economic growth. Conversely, there is also a correlation between the significant strides made in democratic governance in Ghana and

Kenya and progress in political stability and development. Ghana has never relapsed into military rule and authoritarianism since the advent of the fourth republic in the 1990s. This has created a sustained atmosphere of political stability which has been conducive for development. Kenya shares the same experience. Though, there has been some post-electoral violence, Kenya has made significant progress in the pursuit of democracy which in turn has serve a catalyst to the country's development.

NEW SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS

According to the most recent scholarly research and information available, several scientific findings and analyses have reiterated and stretched on the opinions upheld in this dissertation regarding the state of democracy, political stability, and development in the SSA sub-region, particularly in the perspective of evaluations between former French and British colonies. Recent research has persistently utilized metrics sucs as the Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Freedom in the World reports provided by Freedom House, and the Index of African Governance from the Mo IbrahimFoundation. Research from these indices consistently indicates that nations scoring higher in democratic principles, exemplified by countries like Ghana and Kenya, often exhibit enhanced economic growth and heightened political stability. In line with the arguements of this thesis, the Democracy Index also concluded that the case of democracies being more peaceful than non-democracies seems convincing. It also doesn't limit there story there, but goes further to insist on considering other factors such as history, goegraphy and socio-economic development (Democracy Index, 2023; 27). A closer look at the cases of Cameroon and Central African Republic where there's ongoing political instability for some news now further proves the assertions of this these recent findings, correlating with the hypothesis raised in this thesis.

The relationship between democracy and development is now viewed as not just a mere coincidence, but a driving force, as democratic governance contributes to better management of resources, thus economic and social growth. The recent rise in militry coups in SSA has partly been facilitated by growing public disatisfaction with the political systems in place and widespread poverty due to failed policies. Most political incumbents in the region fail to uphold democratic values and also do not deliver good governance and economic progress, which has discredited the electoral democracy for many Africans. Though the Democracy Index clissifies Ghana as per 2023 as a ''flawed democracy" and Kenya as a ''hybrid democracy", it classifies both Cameroon and Central African Republic as ''authoritarian". The better classification for Kenya and Ghana mimics their overall scores in categories such as electoral accountability and pluralism, political participation, functioning government, and civil liberties, wherein, they continue to outperform their regional counterparts such as Cameroon and Central African Republic through sustaining political environments that are more conducive for stable and progressive governance.

The 2024 Freedom in the World Report by Freedom House, which correlates freedom scores and levels of development and political stability highlights Ghana as a free country with a score of 80 out of 100 and Kenya as partly free with a score of 52 out of 100, while Cameroon with a score of 15 and Central African Republic with a score of 5 out of 100 are considered as not free (Freedom House, 2024). The differences in the scores registered for these countries underscores the hypothesis assertion that democratic discrepancies in Cameroon and Central African Republic adversely affect their political stability and also their developmental capabilities. Also, the BTI Transformation index decribes Ghana in one statement as "Ghana has strategically positioned itself as an economic hub and a political torchbearer in the region."[44]

The tentacles of Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) spread to contain asssesements of governance performance across Africa, evaluating political participation, civil rights and inclusion, safety and the rule of law, human development and foundations for economic opportunity. The latest index reports for 2023 show improved governance standards for both Ghana and Kenya. However, Cameroon and the Central African Republic remain on a lower scoring especially in terms of political participation, civil rights and inclusion, which reflects their levels of underdevelopment and also the continuos struggles with political instability.

These recent scientific findings and indices collectively corroborates the thesis hypothesis by illuminating that improvements in democratic governance as reflected in Ghana and Kenya are associated with their advanced levels of political stability, peace and development. Equally, the democratic deficits in Cameroon and Central African Republic are closely linked to their ongoing political instability and developmental challenges. This quantitative backing deepens the thesis narrative by providing an up-to-date portrait of the effects of governance on societal outcomes, thus, emphasizing the close intricacies between democracy, peace and development in the SSA. It also supports the case for consolidation democratic institutions as the pathway a sustainable, stable and developed future in the region.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES

ABA. (2023). Rule of law in the Central African Republic - American Bar Association. https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/where_we_work/africa/central-african-republic/

Abdulai, A. G., & Crawford, G. (2010). Consolidating democracy in Ghana: progress and prospects?. *Democratization*, *17*(1), 26-67.

Abdul-Gafaru, A. (2009). Political context study–Ghana. *Human Rights, Power and Civic Action Research Project, Universities of Oslo, Leeds, and Ghana*.

Acemoglu D., Simon J., and James A. R. (2003). "An African Success Story: Botswana." *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*, ed. Dani Rodrik. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 80– 122.

Adedeji, J. L. (2001). The legacy of JJ Rawlings in Ghanaian politics, 1979-2000. *African Studies Quarterly*, *5*(2), 1-27.

Adedeji, J. L. (2001). The legacy of JJ Rawlings in Ghanaian politics, 1979-2000. *African Studies Quarterly*, *5*(2), 1-27.

Africa Renewal, & Djinnit, S. (2010). 'Stability is based on democracy' Interview with Said Djinnit, UN representative on West Africa. other.

Agwanda, B., Nyadera, I. N., & Asal, U. Y. (2020). Cameroon and the Anglophone crisis. *The Palgrave encyclopaedia of peace and conflict studies*, 1-12.

Ahlman, J. S. (2011). Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, Southern Africa and the eclipse of a decolonizing Africa. *Kronos*, *37*(1), 23-40.

Ahmad, M. B., Pride, C., & Corsy, A. K. (2016). Free speech, press freedom, and democracy in Ghana: A conceptual and historical overview. In *Political influence of the media in developing countries* (pp. 59-73). IGI Global.

Aidi, H. (2019, November 1). *State failure and rebel governance in Africa*. Africa Portal. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.africaportal.org/publications/state-failure-and-rebel-governance-africa/

Amaize, O. (2022). Cameroon: Amid Deadly Conflicts, Activists NGO MBE and Nkongho Inspire Hope for closing civic space: RFK Human Rights. https://rfkhumanrights.org/voices-articles/cameroon-amid-deadly-conflicts-activists-ngo-mbe-and-nkongho-inspire-hope-for-closing-civic-space

Amin, J. A. (2013). Cameroonian youths and the protest of February 2008. *Cahiers d'études africaines*, (3), 677-697.

Amnesty International. (2022). Free people detained for expressing their opinions in Cameroon. https://www.amnesty.org/en/petition/free-people-detained-for-expressing-their-opinions-in-cameroon/#:~:text=More%20than%20a%20hundred%20people,human%20rights%20defenders%2C%20and%20protesters.

Amnesty International. (2022b). Human rights in Cameroon. https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/

Amnesty International. (2023). Human rights in Central African Republic. https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/central-african-republic/report-central-african-republic/#:~:text=Women%20and%20girls%20were%20subjected,faced%20intimidation%2C%20harassment%20and%20threats.

Annan, N., Beseng, M., Crawford, G., & Kewir, J. K. (2021). Civil society, peacebuilding from below and shrinking civic space: the case of Cameroon's 'Anglophone'conflict. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *21*(6), 697-725.

Annan, N., Beseng, M., Kiven, J. K., & Crawford, G. (2023). Civil society organizations work to end Cameroon's Anglophone conflict. https://peacenews.com/civil-society-organizations-work-to-end-cameroons-anglophone-conflict/

Anye, F. E. (2008). *Issues of minority rights in the context of political liberalization: the case of Anglophone Cameroon* (Doctoral dissertation).

Arthur, P. (2010). Democratic consolidation in Ghana: The role and contribution of the media, civil society and state institutions. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *48*(2), 203-226.

Asare, S. K., & Kwasi Prempeh, H. (2010). Amending the Constitution of Ghana: Is the imperial president trespassing? *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, *18*(2), 192-216.

Aseh, N. (2006). *Political philosophies and nation-building in Cameroon: Grounds for the second national liberation struggle*. Global Vision for Development Alternatives.

Atanga, M. (2011). *The anglophone Cameroon predicament*. African Books Collective.

Atangana, M. (2010). *The end of French rule in Cameroon*. University Press of America.

Austin, D., & Luckham, R. (2014). *Politicians and soldiers in Ghana 1966-1972*. Routledge.

Awal, M. (2012). Ghana: Democracy, economic reform, and development, 1993-2008. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, *14*(1), 97-118.

Azikiwe, I. (2009). *Africa: Conflict Resolution and International Diplomacy*. Author House.

Barkan, J. D. (2013). *Electoral violence in Kenya*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Barnhurst, K. G. (2005). Qualitative analysis, political science. *Encyclopedia of Social Measurement*, 225–230. https://doi.org/10.1016/b0-12-369398-5/00204-8

Bates, R. H. (2015). *When things fell apart*. Cambridge University Press.

Bates, R. H., Greif, A., Levi, M., Rosenthal, J. L., & Weingast, B. R. (1998). *Analytic narratives* (Vol. 1). Princeton University Press.

BBC. (2011). Cameroon election: SDF accuse Paul Biya's CPDM of fraud. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15238067

Bechem, E. E. (2018). Corruption in Cameroon: Public perception on the role and effectiveness of the different anti-corruption agencies. *Review Pub Administration Manag*, *6*(235), 2.

Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, *27*(1), 5-19.

Bernard, H. R. (2011). Sampling III: Nonprobability samples and choosing informants. *Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and quantitative approaches. 5th ed. United Kingdom: AltaMiraPress*.

Bienen, H. (2015). *Kenya: The politics of participation and control*. Princeton University Press.

Biney, A. (2008). The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect. *Journal of Pan African Studies*, *2*(3).

Bingham, A. (2021, October 31). *Qualitative analysis: Deductive and inductive approaches*. Andrea J. Bingham, Ph.D. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://www.andreajbingham.com/resources-tips-and-tricks/deductive-and-inductive-approaches-to-qualitative-analysis

Boafo-Arthur, K. (2008). *Democracy and stability in West Africa: the Ghanaian experience*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

Bonye, S. Z., Thaddeus, A. A., & Owusu-Sekyere, E. (2013). Community development in Ghana: Theory and practice. *European scientific journal*, *9*(17), 79-101.

Boré, H. (2014). Did You Say,"Central African Republic"?. *ASPJ: Africa and Francophonie*, *5*(4), 57-67.

Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. (2009). Democratization, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. *African Affairs*, *108*(430), 1–26. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27667092

Brierley, S. (2012). Party unity and presidential dominance: parliamentary development in the fourth republic of Ghana. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *30*(3), 419-439.

Britannica. (2023). *Jean-Bédel Bokassa*. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Bedel-Bokassa

Broadbent, E. (1992). Foreign Policy, Development, and Democracy. *Development and Democratization in the Third World: Myths. Hopes, and Realities. Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis*, 99-107.

BTI. (2022). BTI 2022 Cameroon Country Report. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/CMR

Buchanan, A. (2002). Political legitimacy and democracy. *Ethics*, *112*(4), 689-719.

Burchard, S. M., & Djak, I. (2013). Patterns of Violence in 2007. In *Elections and Electoral Violence in Kenya: Insights from the 2007 Elections — Implications for the 2013 Elections* (pp. 7–13). Institute for Defense Analyses. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep36554.6

Burke, L. (2012). Coup era over, Ghana showcases African democracy.

Campos, N. (1994). Why Does Democracy Foster Economic Development? An Assessment of the Empirical Literature. *unpublished, USC, Los Angeles*.

Carol, S. (2012). *From Jerusalem to the Lion of Judah and beyond: Israel's foreign policy in East Africa*. iUniverse.

Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. *Journal of democracy*, *13*(1), 5-21.

Caus, J. (2021). Support to Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace in the Central African Republic. https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/5175/RuleofLaw_CAR.pdf

Cheeseman, N. (2008). The Kenyan elections of 2007: an introduction. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *2*(2), 166-184.

Cheeseman, N., & Murray, C. (2017). Power-sharing in Kenya: Between the devil and the deep blue sea. In *Power-Sharing* (pp. 36-62). Routledge.

Cheeseman, N., Lynch, G., & Willis, J. (2014). Democracy and its discontents: understanding Kenya's 2013 elections. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *8*(1), 2-24.

Chiabi, E. (1997). *The Making of Modern Cameroon: A history of substate nationalism and disparate union, 1914-1961* (Vol. 1). University Press of Amer.

Chiatoh, V. M. (2019). Recognition of minority groups as a prerequisite for the protection of human rights: The case of Anglophone Cameroon. *African Human Rights Law Journal*, *19*(2), 675-697.

CIVICUS Monitor. (2023). Civic space closing ahead of local elections, controversial plans to change constitution, says Human Rights Group. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/civic-space-closing-ahead-of-local-elections-controversial-plans-to-change-constitution-says-human-rights-group/

CIVICUS Monitor. (2023b). PEOPLE POWER UNDER ATTACK 2023. https://monitor.civicus.org/globalfindings_2023/

Cleenewerck, L., Molaye, A., & van Puyenbroeck, R. (2017). *From failed governance to building a new future: The case of the central african republic*. United Nations. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/failed-governance-building-new-future-case-central-african-republic

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford economic papers*, *56*(4), 563-595.

Comiskey, C., & Curtis, E. (1970, January 1). *Correlational research: Importance and use in nursing and Health Research*. TARA. Retrieved November 4, 2022, from http://www.tara.tcd.ie/handle/2262/74298

Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC). (2010). "The Constitution of Kenya: A Reference Book."

Cornell, A., & D'Arcy, M. (2016). Devolution, democracy and development in Kenya. *ICLD Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy, Research Report*, *5*.

Creswell, J. W. (2002). *Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative* (Vol. 7). Prentice Hall Upper Saddle River, NJ.

Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches*. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from

http://155.0.32.9:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1091/1/Qualitative,%20Quantitative,%20and%20Mixed%20Methods%20Approaches%20(%20PDFDrive%20)-1.pdf

Crowe, S., Cresswell, K., Robertson, A., Huby, G., Avery, A., & Sheikh, A. (2011). The case study approach. *BMC medical research methodology*, *11*(1), 1-9.

CSIS. (2022, March 25). *Central Africa*. Central Africa | Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.csis.org/programs/africa-program/regions/central-africa

Dahl, R. A. (2000). A democratic paradox?. *Political Science Quarterly*, *115*(1), 35-40.

De Smith, S. A. (1957). The independence of Ghana. *Mod. L. Rev.*, *20*, 347.

Deiros, T. (2014). Central African Republic: The Invention of a Religious Conflict. *Opinion Papers (Instituto Español de Estudos Estratégicos)*, *67*, 1-14.

Demers-Labrousse, N., Vandal, G., & Aoun, S. (2012). *La démocratie en Afrique subsaharienne: le cas du Cameroun*. Université de Sherbrooke.

Diamond, L. (1997). Consolidating democracy in the Americas. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *550*(1), 12-41.

Diamond, L. (2004). What is Democracy? https://diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/speaking/lectures/what-democracy

Diamond, L. J. (1996). Is the third wave over?. *Journal of democracy*, *7*(3), 20-37.

Dicklitch, S. (2002). Failed democratic transition in Cameroon: A human rights explanation. *Hum. Rts. Q.*, *24*, 152.

Dion, D. (1998). Evidence and inference in the comparative case study. *COMPARATIVE POLITICS-NEW YORK-*, *30*, 127-146.

Dongmo, C. (2022). Re-imagining Violence Against Africa's Youth Within the Framework of the 2008 Hunger Riots. In *Youth Exclusion and Empowerment in the Contemporary Global Order: Existentialities in Migrations, Identity and the Digital Space* (pp. 49-64). Emerald Publishing Limited.

Dulani, Boniface. "African publics strongly support term limits, resist leaders' efforts to extend their tenure." *Afrobarometer Dispatch* 30, no. 25 (2015): 1-12.

Dulock, H. L. (1993). Research design: Descriptive research. *Journal of Pediatric Oncology Nursing*, *10*(4), 154-157.

EIU. (2022). (publication). *Democracy Index 2021: The China Challenge* (pp. 1–82). London, London: Economist Group.

EIU. (2022, February 15). *Democracy index 2021: The China Challenge*. Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2021/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=democracy-index-2021&gclid=Cj0KCQiA-JacBhC0ARIsAIxybyOKVUMPGKKPJbi-lCYnZlCRzZGidUfKnAMQbavNyUMTAr-3YqLH5zIaAhBXEALw_wcB

Ekeh, P. P. (1975). Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement. *Comparative studies in society and history*, *17*(1), 91-112.

Elbahnasawy, N. G. (2020). Democracy, political instability, and government tax effort in hydrocarbon-dependent countries. *Resources Policy*, *65*, 101530.

Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., & Melton, J. (2014). The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions. *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*, 141.

Engelmann, F. (1971). Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems. New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., 1970, pp. x, 533. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, *4*(4), 578-579. doi:10.1017/S0008423900030134

Engmann, R. A. A. (2020). Name, Shame, and Jail: An Interview with Anas Aremeyaw Anas. *African Studies Review*, *63*(4), E1-E24. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/780079

Enonchong, L. S. E. (2021). *The Constitution and Governance in Cameroon* (p. 272). Taylor & Francis.

Fireman Kramer, R. (1985). A overview of descriptive research. *Journal of the Association of Pediatric oncology nurses*, *2*(2), 41-45.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2011). Case study. *The Sage handbook of qualitative research*, *4*, 301-316.

Fonchingong, T. N. (1998). Multipartyism and democratization in Cameroon. *Journal of Third World Studies*, *15*(2), 119-136.

France 24. (2016). Car confirms presidential run-off, annuls legislative vote over "irregularities." https://www.france24.com/en/20160125-central-african-republic-confirms-presidential-run-off-cancels-legislative-election

Freedom House. (2021). Freedom in the World 2020 Methodology. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2020_Methodology.pdf

Freedom House. (2022). *Countries and territories*. Freedom House. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores

French, H. W. (1996). France's Army Keeps Grip in African Ex-Colonies. *New York Times*, *22*.

Frimpong, K., & Agyeman-Budu, K. (2018). The rule of law and democracy in Ghana since independence: Uneasy bedfellows?. *African Human Rights Law Journal*, *18*(1), 244-265.

Gathogo, J. (2020). Consolidating Democracy in Kenya (1920-1963): Challenges and Prospects. *Jumuga Journal of Education, Oral Studies, and Human Sciences (JJEOSHS)*, *3*(1), 1-18.

Gbetnkom, D. (2012). Corruption and small and medium-sized enterprise growth in Cameroon. *Inclusive Growth in Africa: Policies, Practice, and Lessons Learnt*, 37-58.

Gelman, A., & King, G. (1990). Estimating incumbency advantage without bias. *American journal of political science*, 1142-1164.

Gerring, J. (2006). *Case study research: Principles and practices*. Cambridge university press.

Ghura, D., & Mercereau, B. (2004). Political Instability and Growth in the Central African Republic, a Neighbor of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *POSTCONFLICT ECONOMICS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*, 205.

Glawion, T., & De Vries, L. (2018). Ruptures revoked: why the Central African Republic's unprecedented crisis has not altered deep-seated patterns of governance. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *56*(3), 421-442.

Gluckman, M. (1965). Stateless society and maintenance of order'. *Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society. Oxford: Blackwell*.

Goodrick, D. (2014). *Comparative Case Studies*. Methodological Briefs Impact Evaluation No. 9 Comparative Case Studies. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/brief_9_comparativecasestudies_eng.pdf

Grimbald, N., Nchang, N. D., & Mbuh, P. E. A Critical Assessment Of The Impact Of Corruption On The Economic And Social Development Of Cameroon: A Positivism Perspective.

Gros, J. G. (1995). The hard lessons of Cameroon. *J. Democracy*, *6*, 112.

Gulati, P. M. (2009). *Research management: Fundamental & applied research*. Busca Inc.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004). Civil society and democratic development. *Democratic reform in Africa: The quality of progress*, 5-27.

Hancock, D. R., Algozzine, R., & Lim, J. H. (2021). *Doing case study research: A practical guide for beginning researchers* (4th ed.). Teachers College Press.

Handley, A., & Mills, G. (2001). *From military coups to multiparty elections: The Ghanaian military-civil transition*. Clingendael Institute..

Harbeson, J. W. (2014). Kenya's 2013 Elections. *African Studies Review*, *57*(1), 199-207.

Haynes, J. (1993). Sustainable democracy in Ghana? Problems and prospects. *Third World Quarterly*, *14*(3), 451-467.

Haynes, J. (2003). Democratic consolidation in Africa: the problematic case of Ghana. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *41*(1), 48-76.

Hearth, K. (2021, February 24). *Central african republic approaches 'failed state' status*. Mission Network News. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.mnnonline.org/news/central-african-republic-approaches-failed-state-status/

Helman, G. B., & Ratner, S. R. (1992). Saving failed states. *Foreign policy*, (89), 3-20.

Herbst, J. (2014). *States and power in Africa*. Princeton University Press.

Horowitz, J. (2008). *Power-sharing in Kenya*. PRIO.

House, F. (2019). *Freedom in the world 2019: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties*. Rowman & Littlefield.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/gabon-presidential-guard-attack-opposition-headquarters-1472721343 accessed, [09/29/2020]

Human Rights Watch, (2019) Https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/30/cameroon-opposition-leaders-arrested, accessed, [09/29/2020]

Human Rights Watch, (2019). Cameroon: Opposition Leaders arrested, Https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/30/cameroon-opposition-leaders-arrested

Human Rights Watch. (2007). Background: The Varied Causes of Conflict in CAR. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/car0907/4.htm

Human Rights Watch. (2008). Ballots to bullets: Organized political violence and Kenya's crisis of governance. *Human Rights Watch*, *20*(1A).

Human Rights Watch. (2014). Central African Republic: Muslims Forced to Flee. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee

Human Rights Watch. (2022). World Report 2022: Rights trends in Cameroon. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/cameroon

Human Rights Watch. (2023). Central African Republic: Closing Civic Space. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/04/04/central-african-republic-closing-civic-space

Hyde, K. F. (2000). Recognising deductive processes in qualitative research. *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, *3*(2), 82–90. https://doi.org/10.1108/13522750010322089

Inglehart, R. (1988). The renaissance of political culture. *The American Political Science Review*, 1203-1230.

International Crisis Group. (2007, August 23). *Central african republic: Anatomy of a phantom state*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-anatomy-phantom-state

International Crisis Group. (2017). Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-cameroons-anglophone-crisis-crossroads

International Crisis Group. (2020). Managing election tensions in the Central African Republic, Report 296 / Africa 10 December 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/managing-election-tensions-central-african-republic-report-296

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/80/40 Cameroon, accessed, [09/22/2020]

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/75/40 Central African Republic, accessed, [09/22/2020]

Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come. *Educational Researcher*, *33*(7), 14–26. https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189x033007014

Jua, N. (2003). Problematizing a Transition: The power Elite, the State, and Transition Politics in Cameroon. *Political Liberalization and Democratization in Africa, ed. Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere and John Mukum Mbaku. Westport, Conn.: Praeger*, 85-112.

Kah, H. K. (2014). History, external influence and political volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR). *Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies*, *3*(1), 17–31. https://doi.org/10.13014/k2ff3qjk

Kamdem Kamga, G. E. (2019). The political (in) dependence of the judiciary in Cameroon: fact or fiction?. *Africa Review*, *11*(1), 46-62.

Kamga, G. E. K. (2019). The political (in) dependence of the judiciary in Cameroon: fact or fiction?. *Africa Review*, *11*(1), 46-62.

Kariş, Ç. (2020). The Relationship Between Economic Growth and Democracy: A Conceptual Approach. *Sosyal Mucit Academic Review*, *1*(1), 1-14.

Keatley, P. (2011). From the archive, 14 January 1972: Colonel takes charge after coup in Ghana. *The Guardian*.

Kewir, J. K., Crawford, G., Beseng, M., & Annan, N. (2021). Shrinking Civic Space and the Role of Civil Society in Resolution of Conflict in Anglophone Cameroon. https://pure.coventry.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/42002302/civic_space_web.pdf

Khatun, F. (2022). Should development and democracy be at odds with each other? https://www.thedailystar.net/recovering-covid-reinventing-our-future/developing-inclusive-and-democratic-bangladesh/news/should-development-and-democracy-be-odds-each-other

Khaunya, M. F., & Wawire, B. P. (2015). Devolved governance in Kenya; is it a false start in democratic decentralization for development?.

Khumalo, S. (2023). About the #stopcameroonviolations campaign. https://www.chr.up.ac.za/cameroonviolations

Kindzeka, M. E. (2020). Claiming massive fraud, Cameroon opposition challenges ruling party landslide victory. https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_claiming-massive-fraud-cameroon-opposition-challenges-ruling-party-landslide-victory/6184185.html

Kitschelt, H. (2000). Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities. *Comparative political studies*, *33*(6-7), 845-879.

Kiven, B., Stone, S., & Maclean, R. (2018). Biya wins again in Cameroon as crackdown disrupts Anglophone vote. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/paul-biya-cameroon-85-year-old-president-wins-re-election-landslide

Kłosowicz, R. (2016). Central African Republic: Portrait of a collapsed state after the last rebellion. *Politeja-Pismo Wydziału Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego*, *13*(42), 33-51.

Konde, E. (2015). *Cameroon: Traumas of the Body Politic*. Xlibris Corporation.

Konings, P. J. J. (1999). The Anglophone struggle for federalism in Cameroon. *Federalism and decentralization in Africa: The multicultural challenge*.

Krieger, M. (1994). Cameroon's democratic crossroads, 1990–4. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *32*(4), 605-628.

Krueger, A. O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. *The American economic review*, *64*(3), 291-303.

Kunz, F. A. (1991). Liberalization in Africa--Some Preliminary Reflections. *African Affairs*, *90*(359), 223-235.

Le Vine, V. T. (1964). *The Cameroons from mandate to independence* (p. 32). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Leite, S. P., Pellechio, A., Zanforlin, L., Begashaw, G., Fabrizio, S., & Harnack, J. (2000). *Ghana: Economic development in a democratic environment*. International Monetary Fund.

Levitov, A. (2016). Normative legitimacy and the state.

Linz, J, and Alfred S. (1975). "The breakdown of democratic regimes." *RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA* 5, no. 1: 7-43. Page 29-37

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *The American political science review*, *53*(1), 69-105.

Lizak, W. (2016). The Central African Republic as a Fragile (Failed) State. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, *52*(2), 179-194.

Lizak, W. (2020). *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations*, *52*(2), 179–193. https://doi.org/10.7366/020909612201609

Maphunye, K. J. (2023). Elections can lead to conflict if they are not free and fair - what role observers play to make sure they are. https://theconversation.com/elections-can-lead-to-conflict-if-they-are-not-free-and-fair-what-role-observers-play-to-make-sure-they-are-207868

Maxwell, A.T. (2008). Political Stability in Ghana.

Maxwell, J. and Loomis, D (2003). Mixed method design: An alternative approach. In A. Tashakkori and C. Teddle (Eds.), *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research* (pp. 241-272). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mazrui, A. (1966). Nkrumah: The Leninist Czar. *Transition*, (26), 9-17.

Mbaku, J. M., & Takougang, J. (Eds.). (2004). *The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya*. Africa World Press.

Mbembe, A. (2001). *On the postcolony*. University of california Press.

Mehler, A. (2005). The shaky foundations, adverse circumstances and limited achievements of democratic transition in the Central African Republic. *Villalón/VonDoepp*, 126-152.

Meng, A. (2018). Tying the big man's hands: From personalized rule to institutionalized regimes. *Unpublished manuscript. University of Virginia, Charlottesville*.

Mercereau, B. (2004). Political Instability and Growth: The Central African Republic.

Merriam, C. E. (1945). Systematic politics.

Mo Ibrahim Foundation. (2022). *Ibrahim index of African governance (IIAG)*. Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag

Mo Ibrahim Foundation. (2023). Methodology. https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/methodology

Mo Ibrahim Foundation. (2023b). Ibrahim index of African governance (IIAG) Data Portal. https://iiag.online/about.html

Molina-Azorin, J. F. (2016). Mixed methods research: An opportunity to improve our studies and our research skills. *European Journal of Management and Business Economics*, *25*(2), 37–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.redeen.2016.05.001

Mueller, S. D. (1984). Government and opposition in Kenya, 1966–9. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *22*(3), 399-427.

Mwanasali, M. (1999). Politics and Security in Central Africa. *African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique*, *4*(2), 89-105.

Ndifor, B. F. (2014). The politicization of the Cameroon judicial system. *J. Glob. Just. & Pub. Pol'y*, *1*, 27.

Ngangum, P. T. (2021). Investigative Journalism and Counter-terrorism Law in Cameroon. *Counter-terrorism Laws and Freedom of Expression: Global Perspectives*, 233.

Ngoh, V. J. (1996). *History of Cameroon since 1800*. Presbook.

Ngoh, V. J. (2001). *Southern Cameroons, 1922-1961: A constitutional history*. Ashgate Pub Limited.

Ngoh, V. J. (2004). Biya and the Transition to Democracy. *The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya*, 428-451.

Ngolle Ngolle, E. (1996). Democratization and multipartism in Cameroon: challenges and prospects. *Beiträge/Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen*, *3*.

Nguindip, N. C. (2022). The Right to Liberty and Security of Persons Under Human Rights Law: Relevance of its Recognition in Respecting International Human Right Prescription in Cameroon. *Justice and Law Bulletin*, *1*(3), 45-53.

Niang, A. (2019). Beyond State Collapse: A CAR Notebook. https://stanleycenter.org/publications/beyond-state-collapse-a-car-notebook/

Ninsin, K. A. (1993). Some Problems in Ghana's Transition to Democratic Governance. *Africa Development / Afrique et Développement*, *18*(2), 5–22. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43657921

Nkansah, L. A., & Gawu, D. A. (2020). A Review of the Electoral Process under Ghana's Fourth Republic. *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, *28*(3), 355-377.

Nyadera I.N., Agwanda B., Maulani N. (2020) Evolution of Kenya's Political System and Challenges to Democracy. In: Farazmand A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3997-1

Nyinchiah , G. G. (2019). Multiparty Politics, Violence and Coping Strategies Among Victims in Bamenda, Cameroon, 1990-1992. *Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences*, *X*(III), 1–17.

Nyingchia, K. H., & Leno, N. D. (2021). Appraisal the independence of the judiciary in Cameroon in the fight against corruption. *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence*, *12*(1), 182-196.

Nyinguro, P. O., & Otenyo, E. E. (2007). Social movements and democratic transitions in Kenya. *Journal of Asian and African studies*, *42*(1), 5-24.

O'Grady, S. (2019). Cameroon's crackdown on its English-speaking minority is fueling support for a secessionist movement. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/world/cameroon-anglophone-crisis/

Ochilo, P. J. O. (1993). Press freedom and the role of the media in Kenya.

OHCHR. (2023). Central African Republic: Human rights violations against civilians by the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) are unacceptable, says UN expert. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/central-african-republic-human-rights-violations-against-civilians-central

Olofsgård, A. (2012). Political Instability in Fragile Democracies: Political Cycles Kyrgyz Style. https://freepolicybriefs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/free_policy_brief_olofsgard_sep241.pdf

Osafo-Danso, R. (2015). *Beyond elections: Ghana's democracy from the perspective of the citizenry* (Doctoral dissertation, Walden University).

Osler, A. (1993). Education for development and democracy in Kenya: A case study. *Educational review*, *45*(2), 165-173.

O'Toole, T. (1982, January). " Made in France": The Second Central African Republic. In *Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* (Vol. 6, pp. 136-146). Michigan State University Press.

Owusu, R. Y. (2006). *Kwame Nkrumah's liberation thought: a paradigm for religious advocacy in contemporary Ghana*. Africa World Press.

Pommerolle, M. E., & Heungoup, H. D. M. (2017). The "Anglophone crisis": a tale of the Cameroonian postcolony. *African Affairs*, *116*(464), 526-538.

Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. C. S., Stokes, S. C., & Manin, B. (Eds.). (1999). *Democracy, accountability, and representation* (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press.

Quirk, P. W., & Montemarano, D. (2020). Stabilizing cameroon requires a sustained solution for democracy, rights, and governance. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/stabilizing-cameroon-requires-a-sustained-solution-for-democracy-rights-and-governance/

Reuters. (2011). Vote fraud complaints mount up at Cameroon Court. https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-cameroon-election-20111014-idAFJOE79D02N20111014/

Reuters. (2018). Cameroon Court hears calls for “irregular” election to be annulled. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cameroon-election/cameroon-court-hears-calls-for-irregular-election-to-be-annulled-idUSKCN1MQ2CH/

Robinson, J. A., & Acemoglu, D. (2012). *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty* (pp. 45-47). London: Profile.

Rolland, A. 2020, June 5. Central African Republic court rejects bid to extend president's mandate. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralafrica-vote-constitution-idUSKBN23C1RP

Rose, R., Mishler, W., & Haerpfer, C. (1998). *Democracy and its alternatives: Understanding post-communist societies*. JHU Press.

Rotberg, R. I. (2003). Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: Causes and indicators. *State failure and state weakness in a time of terror*, *1*, 1-25.

Rutinwa, B. (2001). *Freedom of association and assembly: Unions, NGOs and political freedom in sub-Saharan Africa*. Article 19.

Sanger, C., & Nottingham, J. (1964). The Kenya general election of 1963. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *2*(1), 1-40.

Sarfo, S. A. (2014, February). The best coup d’état in Ghana. *GhanaWeb*. Retrieved from

Schatzberg, M. G. (1993). Power, legitimacy and'democratisation'in Africa. *Africa*, 445-461.

Seeram, E. (2019). An overview of correlational research. *Radiologic technology*, *91*(2), 176-179.

Sheppard, V. (2020). Research Methods for the Social Sciences: An Introduction. *Vancouver: BCCampus*.

Shorten, A., & Smith, J. (2017). Mixed methods research: Expanding the evidence base. *Evidence Based Nursing*, *20*(3), 74–75. https://doi.org/10.1136/eb-2017-102699

Sindjoun, L. (1994). Cameroun: le système politique face aux enjeux de la transition démocratique (1990-1993). *L'Afrique politique*, 143-165.

Sneyd, L., & Scott-Villiers, P. (2017). “We eat what we have, not what we want”: The policy effects of food riots and eating after the 2008 crisis in Cameroon. In N. Hossain (Ed.), *Food Riots, Food Rights and the Politics of Provision* (pp. 98–115). essay, Routledge.

Snieder, R., & Larner, K. (2009). *The art of being a scientist: A guide for graduate students and their mentors*. Cambridge University Press.

Southall, R. (1998). Moi’s Flawed Mandate: The Crisis Continues in Kenya. *Review of African Political Economy*, *25*(75), 101–111. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006362

Southall, R., & Wood, G. (1996). Local government and the return to multi-partyism in Kenya. *African Affairs*, *95*(381), 501-527.

Stapleton, T. (2019). Central African Republic: Coups, mutinies, and civil war. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Steeves, J. (2006). Beyond democratic consolidation in Kenya: ethnicity, leadership and 'unbounded politics'. *African identities*, *4*(2), 195-211.

Steeves, J. S. (1999). The political evolution of Kenya: The 1997 elections and succession politics. *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *37*(1), 71-94.

Stiglitz, J. E., Lin, J. Y., & Patel, E. (Eds.). (2013). *The industrial policy revolution II: Africa in the 21st century*. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Svanikier, J. O. (2007). Political elite circulation: Implications for leadership diversity and democratic regime stability in Ghana. *Comparative Sociology*, *6*(1-2), 114-135.

Svolik, M. W. (2012). *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge University Press.

Swanborn, P. (2010). *Case study research: what, why and how?*. Sage.

Takougang, J. (2003). Nationalism, democratisation and political opportunism in Cameroon. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *21*(3), 427-445.

Tamarkin, M. (1978). The roots of political stability in Kenya. *African affairs*, *77*(308), 297-320.

Tamarkin, M. (1979). From Kenyatta to Moi: the anatomy of a peaceful transition of power. *Africa Today*, *26*(3), 21-37.

Tani, B. V., Abangma, J. A., & Bruno, A. M. (2012). The dilemmas of implementing decentralization policies in a centralized state construct: evidences from some municipalities in the northwest region of Cameroon. *African Journal of Social Sciences*, *3*(2).

Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (2021). *Sage handbook of mixed methods in social & behavioral research*. SAGE publications.

The World Street Journal, (2016) Gabon Presidential Guard Attack Opposition Headquaters,

Throup, D. (1987). "Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau, 1945-1953." *African Affairs*, *86*(344), 55-80.

Thurston, A. (2013). Mali: The Disintegration of a" Model African Democracy". *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, *2*(1).

Toure, M.-K. (2010). Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1921-1996). https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/bokassa-jean-bedel-1921-1996/

Transparency International. (2021). *The abcs of the CPI: How the corruption perceptions index is calculated*. Transparency.org. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://www.transparency.org/en/news/how-cpi-scores-are-calculated

Traore, A.O., Traoré, B., & Diallo, F. (2020). EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY ON SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

Tull, D. M., & Simons, C. (2017). The institutionalisation of power revisited: Presidential term limits in Africa. *Africa Spectrum*, *52*(2), 79-102.

Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. *Economic Inquiry*, *5*(3), 224-232.

UN HRC. (2016). Cameroon: Un experts urge government to halt violence against English-speaking minority protests - Cameroon. https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroon-un-experts-urge-government-halt-violence-against-english-speaking-minority

UN SC. (2022, June 8). *Security challenges threaten to derail democratic strides in Central African region, briefers tell Security Council - Cameroon*. ReliefWeb. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/security-challenges-threaten-derail-democratic-strides-central-african-region-briefers-tell-security-council

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. (2021). *HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2020: The Next Frontier-human Development and the Anthropocene*. UN.

United States. Department of State. Office of Media Services, & United States. Department of State. (1971). *Background notes*. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services.

UNOCHA. (2021). *West and Central Africa: General overview: analysis of the context, crisis, and needs*. General overview: analysis of the context, crisis, and needs | Digital Situation Reports. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/west-central-africa/card/2l3mvguFKg/

UNOCHA. (2023). Central African Republic. https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/car/

US Department of State. (1998). Cameroon Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997. https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/cameroon.html

US Department of State. (2023). 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cameroon. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cameroon/

Vandeginste, S. (2015). Burundi's electoral crisis–back to power-sharing politics as usual?. *African Affairs*, *114*(457), 624-636.

Vandeginste, S. (2016). Legal loopholes and the politics of executive term limits: insights from Burundi. *Africa Spectrum*, *51*(2), 39-63.

Versteeg, M., Horley, T., Meng, A., Guim, M., & Guirguis, M. (2020). The law and politics of presidential term limit evasion. *Columbia Law Review*, *120*(1), 173-248.

Weingast, B. R. (1997). The political foundations of democracy and the rule of the law. *American political science review*, *91*(2), 245-263.

Wellman, C. H. (1996). Liberalism, samaritanism, and political legitimacy. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, *25*(3), 211-237.

Willis, R., McAulay, J., Ndeunyema, N., & Angove, J. (2019). Human Rights Abuses in the Cameroon Anglophone Crisis: A Submission of Evidence to UK Parliament. https://www.cl2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Cameroon-Anglophone-Crisis-Report-online.pdf

Wilson, J. (2010). *Essentials of Business Research: A Guide to Doing Your Research Project*. SAGE Publications.

World Bank. (2022). *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. Data. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from

https://databank.worldbank.org/databases.aspx?qterm=governance#:~:text=Worldwide%20Governance%20Indicators&text=Aggregate%20and%20individual%20governance%20indicators,of%20Law%3B%20Control%20of%20Corruption.

World Bank/KNOMAD. (2022, November). *Remittances Brave Global Headwinds: Special Focus: Climate Migration.* Migration and Development Brief 37, World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Bank/KNOMAD. (2023, December*). Remittances Remain Resilient but Are Slowing.* Migration and Development Brief 38, World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Population Review. (2022). *Freedom Index by Country 2022*. Freedom index by country 2022. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/freedom-index-by-country

Yayoh, W. K. (2006). Resurgence of multi-party rule in Ghana, 1990-2004: a historical review. *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, (10), 125-147.

Zack-Williams, A. B. (2001). No democracy, no development: Reflections on democracy & development in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy, 28*(88), 213-223.

Zainal, Z. (1970, January 1). *Case study as a research method*. undefined. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Case-Study-As-a-Research-Method-Zainal/8a545bb8172b9d0de6ab8068ab63aefdfc76555d

Zamfir, I. (2016). *Democracy in Africa: Power alternation and presidential term limits*. EPRS, European Parliamentary Research Service, Members' Research Service.

Zamfir, L. (2021). State of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa Democratic progress at risk. European Parliament Research Service, ERPS.

NOTES

[1] Bertelsmann Trans Index

[2] Available online at https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/The-best-coup-d-etat-in-Ghana-Part-one-301121?audio=1. Page consulted on Novermber 04, 2021

[3] Available at https://judicial.gov.gh/index.php/freedom-and-independence-of-the-media Page consulted on November 04 2021.

[4] Available at https://rsf.org/en/news/ghanaian-investigative-reporter-shot-dead-while-driving-accra Page consulted on November 04 2021

[5] Available at https://rsf.org/en/ghana Page consulted on November 04 2021.

[6] Available at http://www.africanplatform.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Ghana-RTI-Act-__1_.pdf Page consulted on November 04 2021.

[7] 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Available at https://judicial.gov.gh/index.php/fundamental-human-rights-and-freedom Page consulted on November 05, 2021.

[8] Available at https://freedomhouse.org/country/ghana/freedom-world/2021 Page consulted on November 05, 2021.

[9] Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996. Available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996.pdf

[10] Available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/16/ballots-bullets/organized-political-violence-and-kenyas-crisis-governance Page consulted on Movember 10, 2021.

[11] Available at http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2008/Constitution_of_Kenya_(Amendnt)_Bill_2008.pdf Page consulted on November 10, 2021.

[12] Available at https://rsf.org/en/kenya Page consulted on November 11, 2021.

[13] Available at https://www.cuk.ac.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Access-to-Information-ActNo31.pdf Page consulted on November 11, 2021.

[14] Available at https://www.dw.com/en/kenyan-doctors-strike-leaders-jailed/a-37535462 Page consulted on November 12, 2021.

[15] Available at https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2021 Page consulted on Novemer 12, 2021.

[16] Available at https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/press-release/Kenya/ken-r8-pr-kenyans-support-presidential-term-limits-age-restrictions.pdf Page consulted on November 12, 2021.

[17] United Nations, 16 October 1959 Paragraph 5.

[18] Available at https://rsf.org/en/cameroon (Page consulted on 03 November 2021).

[19] Available at https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20200605-cameroon-military-admits-journalist-wazizi-died-10-months-ago (Page consulted on 03 November 2021).

[20] 1996 Constitution of Cameroon.

[21] Available at https://freedomhouse.org/country/cameroon/freedom-world/2021 (Page consulted on 03 November 2021).

[22] Available online at https://www.africanews.com/2018/10/09/we-have-no-observers-in-cameroon-transparency-international/ (Page consulted on November 03 2021).

[23] Refer to Law No. 2012/001 of April relating to the Electoral Code, Section 24 (1).

[24] Available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/04/465792 Page consulted on November 20, 2021.

[25] UNSC Resolution 2149, April 10, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11349.doc.htm Page consulted on November 20, 2021.

[26] UNSC, 2014, Available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_452.pdf Page consulted on November 20, 2021.

[27] Available at https://freedomhouse.org/country/central-african-republic/freedom-world/2021 Page consulted on November 21, 2021.

[28] Central African Republic, 2016. Available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Central_African_Republic_2016.pdf?lang=en Page consulted on November 21, 2021.

[29] See "The central idea is this: a wielder of political power(the monopolistic making, application, and enforcement of laws in a territory) is legitimate (i.e., is morally justified in wielding political power) if and only if it (*a*) does a credible job of protecting at least the most basic human rights of all those over whom it wields power, (*b*) provides this protection through processes, policies, and actions that themselves respect the most basic human rights, and (*c*) is not a usurper (i.e., does not come to wield political power by wrongly

deposing a legitimate wielder of political power).” In Buchanan, Allen. "Political legitimacy and democracy." *Ethics* 112, no. 4 (2002): 689-719.

[30] See Schatzberg, Michael G. "Power, legitimacy and'democratisation'in Africa." *Africa* (1993): 445-461. Page 445, quoting Decalo, Samuel. "Modalities of civil-military stability in Africa." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 27, no. 4 (1989): 547-578.

[31] International IDEA, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/80/40 Cameroon

[32] Ibid, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/75/40 Central African Republic [09/22/2020]

[33] See Healey, John Michael, and Mark Robinson. *Democracy, governance and economic policy: sub-Saharan Africa in comparative perspective*. Overseas Development Institute, 1994. Citing Post, 1968, and Collier 1982

[34] See Ngolle Ngolle, Elvis. "Democratization and multipartism in Cameroon: challenges and prospects." *Beiträge/Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen* 3 (1996).

[35] U.S. Department of Commerce, *Country Reports*, US Department of Commerce, Washington D.C.

[36] Human Rights Watch, 2019 Https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/30/cameroon-opposition-leaders-arrested

[37] The World Street Journal, 2019 https://www.wsj.com/articles/gabon-presidential-guard-attack-opposition-headquarters-1472721343

[38]The Oxford Dictionary of English defines it as a social order which depends on relations of patronage. This concept, variedly used tends to be suffering from a lack of consensus as to what it truly means. It could be used to describe the relationship between the native African ruler and the colonial masters during the time of colonization, or to allude to the current relationship between the African governments and the external partners including former colonial masters, or even to the most visible form, the relationship between the political leaders and the voters whom they represent

[39] For some of the details of French involvement in post-colonial Africa, see University of Westminster. Maghreb Research Group. *Bulletin of Francophone Africa*. No. 9-10. Maghreb Research Group, University of Westminster, 1996, Touati, Sylvain. *French foreign policy in Africa: between Pré Carré and multilateralism*. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007.

[40] See MBAKU, JOHN MUKUM. "The Economic Origins of Political Dictatorship in Africa." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 4 (1992): 446-477. Pages 469-471Analyzing the events in Uganda, Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea, Mbaku carefully exposes the motives and the survival tactics of Amin, Bokassa and Nguema (Macias) respectively. These three held their countries with the iron fist and are known today as the true faces of Dictatorship in Africa, leaders of competitive interest groups who seized advantage of the state apparatus to control the state economy and make personal wealth.

[41] See the CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 1972, art. 37(1) which states that "Justice shall be administered in the territory of the Republic [of Cameroon] in the name of the people of Cameroon"

[42] See the CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 2008 art. 8(2)) http://africaagenda.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Const.ofCameroon2008.pdf

[43] See Ibid, art. 6(2) http://africaagenda.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Const.ofCameroon2008.pdf

[44] BTI Transformation Index, accessed on April 15, 2024. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-dashboard/GHA